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[2018] WASC 329
Supreme Court of WA
2018-10-31
Jenkins J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Background and psychiatric condition prior to 23 November 1989
Committed to control of Dept of Community Welfare until 18 years old
He experiences auditory hallucinations and had done so for at least 9 months, saying that he heard god, Christ, Michael, David all speaking to him telling him to read the paper and other such things, and more recently had started to command him to do more disturbing things such as hanging himself, cutting his foot off, or harming others. He believed that he was plagued by the voices as a punishment for the bad things that he has done, and that he is caught up in a spiritual battle. He had also experienced times when the people on TV would say his thoughts as he though them. He also had ideas of reference from the TV, and on one occasion experienced visual hallucinations when he saw the archangel Michael on the clouds in a chariot with bulldogs.[39]
Events and psychiatric condition after 23 November 1989
(1) if the accused was fit to stand trial, a defence of insanity 'would be appropriate';
(2) the accused's mental condition was one of a persistent psychosis, namely paranoid schizophrenia;
(3) it was highly likely that at the time of the Queensland offences the accused was suffering from a disease of the mind, and that there is no other possible explanation for the Queensland offences;
(4) his paranoid schizophrenia would be sufficient to deprive him of the capacity to control his actions or to know that what he was doing was wrong;
(5) an excessive intake of Valium could aggravate but not cause the accused's protracted violent behaviour;
(6) the likely outcome of the accused's mental illness was chronic disability and continued high risk to the community; and
(7) further treatment might ameliorate the accused's symptoms but there was no realistic prospect of release from a security hospital.[50]
(1) at the time of his arrest he believed he was well and that there was nothing wrong with him;
(2) he did not have any symptoms of illness, any problems with his thinking or any auditory hallucinations;
(3) for the first few days after his arrest he was not feeling 'too well' and he thought this may have been because the police put some kind of drug into his coffee; and
(4) he had not had any psychotic symptomatology since being arrested.
[W]e fell asleep. When I woke up it was drizzling. I heard voices saying to 'Ice him'. I stabbed him in the chest with a pocket knife, and ran off. I stabbed the other bloke 3 times. I broke the branch off a tree, and ran into a flat. I could hear the voices on and off. I hit a man over the head, and he ran into the kitchen. I ran into another house. There was one woman in the bedroom. I hit her over the head 3 4 times and stabbed her girlfriend in the breast. I was blacking out of it; I was just looking for somewhere to sleep. I tried to be merciful. I didn't want to do it deep down. It was like a magnet drawing me, I had no control.[61]
Was the accused in a state of mental disease at the time he killed Mr Nguyen?
Did the accused's mental disease deprive him of the capacity to understand what he was doing when he killed Mr Nguyen?
Did the accused's mental disease deprive him of the capacity to control his actions which killed Mr Nguyen?
(1) there is no rational reason or motivation for the fatal attack on Mr Nguyen;
(2) three months later the accused committed the Queensland offences which were also lacking any kind of rational basis;
(3) the accused told the police in the 2016 EROI that he 'lost control' and stabbed Mr Nguyen in a 'frenzy'; and
(4) the accused was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia which, by itself, would make it more likely that he, as opposed to someone without the illness, would be deprived of the capacity to control his actions.
(2) unlike in the Queensland offences, he did not continue to seek out and attack others;
(3) he was able to resist the voice he heard the following day which told him to kill his brother;
(4) immediately after the fatal attack on Mr Nguyen he consciously washed his hands and disposed of the knife; and
(5) he at all times maintained the ability to direct his actions such as by choosing where he would stab Mr Nguyen.
Did the accused's mental disease deprive him of the capacity to know that he ought not do the acts which killed Mr Nguyen?
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
RESEARCH ASSOCIATE TO THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE JENKINS
[7] Ramsay v Watson [1961] HCA 65; (1961) 108 CLR 642, 647.
[8] Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 32.
[10] Evidence Act s 32. The admissions are contained in exhibit 1, statement of material facts.
[11] Exhibit 1, statement of material facts.
[13] Exhibit 1, statement of material facts, pages 30 33.
[14] Exhibit 1, statement of material facts, page 33.
[15] Ward v The Queen [2000] WASCA 413; (2000) 118 A Crim R 78.
[16] R v Porter [1933] HCA 1; (1933) 55 CLR 182, 184 (Dixon J). The parties agree that the law of insanity which applies to this case is the law as at the date the accused killed Mr Nguyen that being s 27 as it was at 23 November 1989.
[17] Hone v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 283 and the cases cited therein.
[20] R v Falconer [1990] HCA 49; (1990) 171 CLR 30, 60.
[21] Radford (1985) 20 A Crim R 388, 396.
[22] In R v Falconer the High Court generally approved of King CJ's comments even in the context of the Code provisions.
[23] Evans v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 34. Evans was decided after amendments to the Code s 27 substituted the phrase 'mental impairment' for 'mental disease or natural mental infirmity'. It remains otherwise relevant to the construction of the Code s 27.
[24] Evans v The State of Western Australia [30] [31].
[25] Evans v The State of Western Australia [59] [61].
[26] Stapleton v The Queen [1952] HCA 56; (1952) 86 CLR 358, 367.
[31] Colvin E, McKechnie J and O'Leary J, Criminal Law in Queensland and Western Australia - Cases and Commentary (8th ed, 2018) 443 [17.33].
[32] There is nothing exceptional noted about his family upbringing.
[33] For the sake of completeness, the table includes his convictions for offences committed after he killed Mr Nguyen.
The authority most directly on point in this context is Stapleton v The Queen [1952] HCA 56; (1952) 86 CLR 358. In that case, having regard to the state of the evidence, it seems unlikely that there would have been any practical difference in result whether the jury had been directed in terms of a capacity to understand that an act was wrong according to ordinary standards, or to understand that it was contrary to law. It appears that that was the reason why the court would have 'hesitated' to order a new trial simply because the jury had been directed that the test of insanity was whether the accused knew that firing a shot at another person was against the law (at 375). However, the court made it clear that such a direction was erroneous (at 367 368).
It is not easy to summarise the detailed discussion of authority in Stapleton in a way which is capable of being fashioned into an appropriate direction in every case of insanity. However, the principles extracted from that discussion appear to focus upon two issues. First, the ability to know that one 'ought not' to do an act or make an omission is a capacity to know that one 'ought not' to do it according to ordinary standards of right and wrong, rather than knowledge that the act is unlawful. As the High Court observed, from a practical point of view it often may not matter much, because in relation to serious offences the two ideas 'are not easily separable' (at 375). However, in cases where, as here, the distinction may arise, it should be made. The second principle is that the capacity which must be found to be lacking is not merely a capacity to appreciate, in some abstract sense, that others would view the act as wrong. Rather, it is a capacity of the particular accused either to discern the difference between moral good and evil, or to 'think rationally' of the reasons which would lead ordinary people to consider the act to be right or wrong.
In my view, the question in this case made it imperative that her Honour explain to the jury the two principles which I have described above. For completeness, I would add that it was not, in my view, necessary for her Honour to adopt the formula contended for by ground 2(b) of the grounds of appeal. Although a direction as to whether the accused was capable of reasoning 'with some moderate degree of calmness' or, as it was put in Porter, with 'a moderate degree of sense and composure' is sanctioned by authority, it may in some cases, in my view, run a risk of confusing the jury. That is because these offences generally take place in circumstances in which the accused is, plainly, not composed and not calm. The relevant issue is not whether the accused is, in fact, at the particular time, reasoning calmly and rationally. The question is whether the accused's mental condition is such that the accused is incapable of thinking in a rational way.[25]
(1952) 86 CLR 358
(1933) 55 CLR 1828
(1961) 108 CLR 642
(1933) 55 CLR 182
(1990) 171 CLR 30