[2025] WASC 508
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of WA
2025-12-01
Palmer J
Original judgment source is linked above.
(a) first, whether Mr Hardy was mentally impaired at the time that he unlawfully murdered Mr Peasley; and
(b) secondly, if so, was it more likely than not that his mental impairment deprived him of one of the capacities contained in s 27(1) of the Criminal Code.
28 August 2023 - Mr Hardy assaults a support worker
24 October 2023 - Mr Peasley dies and Mr Hardy is arrested for murder
(a) a very overweight middle-aged man with chop-like injuries and lacerations on the scalp;
(b) underlying comminuted and depressed skull fractures and disruption of the brain;
(c) neuropathology macroscopic examination of the brain showed a recent traumatic brain injury composed of extensive disruption to the dura with extensive subdural haemorrhage and disruption and fragmentation of the brain tissue, contusions on the right surface of the brain and subarachnoid haemorrhage;
(d) signs of previous cranial surgery with a metal plate on the right side of the skull (titanium cranioplasty);
(e) lacerations and bruising on the right hand;
(f) lungs were fluid-laden and congested, both non-specific findings;
(g) liver showed fatty change (steatosis);
(h) microscopic examination of the major body tissues confirmed the presence of fluid-laden lungs (oedema) and steatotic liver with fibrosis;
(i) mild coronary artery atherosclerosis and focal replacement-type fibrosis in the heart muscle;
(j) fresh haemorrhage in bruises on the undersurface of the scalp at the right side, the back of the right hand, the right neck and the left thumb;
(k) toxicology analysis showed the presence of medications in keeping with emergency medical care; and
(l) alcohol, cannabinoids and other common drugs were not detected.
(a) a chop-like injury to the right side of the head that perforated the subcutaneous soft tissue and penetrated the brain (injury 2);
(b) ten irregular chop-like injuries to the right side of the head (injuries 1 and 3 - 11) that either perforated or penetrated the subcutaneous soft tissue;
(c) a laceration to the right side of the back of the neck that penetrated the subcutaneous soft tissue (injury 12);
(d) an abrasion to the right side of the back of the neck (injury 13);
(e) a chop-like injury to the left side of the head that perforated the subcutaneous soft tissue with an underlying corresponding skull fracture (injury 14);
(f) an 'I' shaped laceration to the left side of the head (joining injury 9) that perforated the subcutaneous soft tissue with an underlying corresponding 'V' shaped skull fracture (injury 15);
(g) an 'L' shaped laceration to the left side of the head that penetrated the subcutaneous soft tissue (injury 16);
(h) complex comminuted and depressed fractures to the skull and multiple loose pieces of bone (injury 19);
(i) a dent to the titanium plate with a few associated scratches (injury 20);
(j) bruising to the undersurface of the scalp on the left side of the head (injury 21);
(k) a dark red bruise in the subcutaneous tissue of the back of the neck (injury 22);
(l) a brown scab to the top lip (injury 17);
(m) two red bruises to the inside of the top lip (injury 18);
(n) lacerations or bruising to the right middle finger (injury 23), right ring finger (injuries 24 - 26), back of the right hand (injury 27) that caused subcutaneous bruising;
(o) lacerations or bruising to the palmar surface of the right hand (injury 28), palmar surface of the right middle finger (injury 29), back of the right wrist (injury 30), front of the right upper arm (injury 31) and right upper arm (injury 32);
(p) an abrasion on the base of the left thumb that caused subcutaneous bruising (injury 33);
(q) a subcutaneous bruise to the metacarpophalangeal joint of the left thumb (injury 34);
(r) a red bruise on the right shin (injury 35);
(s) two faint purple bruises on the right thigh (injury 36);
(t) a red abrasion on the left side of the chest at the upper aspect (injury 37).
21 October 2023 - Mr Hardy's first police interview
HARDY: Yeah, he was - was awake.
DET CON MURRAY: Yeah. And so how did you lash out at him?
HARDY: Well, with a hammer.
DET CON MURRAY: with a hammer.
HARDY: Yeah.
DET CON MURRAY: Yeah. And what did you do with the hammer?
HARDY: I just, um, hit him over the head and that. Oh, yeah.
DET CON MURRAY: Hit him over the head. How many times do you think you hit him?
HARDY: About 10 times.
DET CON MURRAY: Okay. 10 times all to the head?
HARDY: Yeah.
24 October 2023 - Mr Hardy's second police interview
DET MCADOO: Why so many times? What were you trying to do?
HARDY: I was trying to end him, eh.
DET S/CON SAMPEY: So, Chad, which - the first time you struck him, which edge - which side of the hammer did you use?
HARDY: Uh, the, um, pointy bit. The sharp thing.
DET S/CON SAMPEY: The sharp bit.
HARDY: Yeah.
DET S/CON SAMPEY: And why did you use that part?
HARDY: 'Cause, um, I thought I'd just, you know, like, try to end him quickly. You know? I didn't wanna, like, fucking sit there for fucking 2 hours. You know?
DET S/CON SAMPEY: Yeah.
HARDY: Just try to end him quick. Um - - -
DET S/CON SAMPEY: quicker. And you thought the sharper bit could do it
HARDY: Yeah.
DET MCADOO: Why haven't you asked for help? Why haven't you asked for help and said, "This is what I'm thinking. Help me"?
HARDY: Because it - it - it - it's gotta come from somewhere. It doesn't come from nothing. Do you know what I mean? Like, it's impossible for something to come from nothing. It wouldn't exist. Do you know what I mean? Like, this wood here comes from something.
DET MCADOO: Yeah.
HARDY: you know? And if - if it doesn't - how could it exist if it's -
DET MCADOO: No. I - I - no, I - - -
HARDY: Everything -
DET MCADOO: understand that. So - - -
HARDY: Yeah.
DET MCADOO: But you understand that people are there to - to try - to try and help you manage that - - -
HARDY: Yeah.
DET MCADOO: - - - but you haven't done that. And is there a reason for that?
HARDY: Because it went on for 20 years, I felt like there was nothing that anyone could do.
DET MCADOO: Okay.
Insanity
(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission on account of mental impairment if at the time of doing the act or making the omission he is in such a state of mental impairment as to deprive him of the capacity to understand what he is doing, or of capacity to control his actions, or of capacity to know that he ought not to do the act or make the omission.
(2) A person whose mind, at the time of his doing or omitting to do an act, is affected by delusions on some specific matter or matters, but who is not otherwise entitled to the benefit of subsection (1), is criminally responsible for the act or omission to the same extent as if the real state of things had been such as he was induced by the delusions to believe to exist.
An underlying pathological infirmity of the mind, whether of short or long duration, and whether permanent or temporary, but does not include a condition that results from the reaction of a healthy mind to extraordinary stimuli.
The definition of 'mental illness' reflects some of the comments made by King CJ in Radford about the meaning of the expression 'disease of the mind' which is used in the common law of insanity. Summarising the statement of King CJ:
A case of this description must turn very largely upon the jury's appreciation of what amounts to knowledge of the nature and quality of the act and of its wrongness. For it is evident that a jury although satisfied that no capacity existed in a particular accused to reason at all may think that at the back of it all was an awareness of the nature of the act and of the fact that other people might regard it as wrong more especially if that means regarded by the law as wrong. That would not lead to a conviction if the jury understands that, given a disease disorder or defect of reason, then it is enough if it so governed the faculties at the time of the commission of the act that the accused was incapable of reasoning with some moderate degree of calmness as to the wrongness of the act or of comprehending the nature or significance of the act of killing. See R v Davis (1881) 14 Cox CC 563, Stephen J, R v Kay (1904) 68 JP Jo 376, Stephen J. In R v Porter [1933] HCA 1; (1933) 55 CLR 182 at pp 189, 190, this was expressed by Dixon J as follows:
'The question is whether he was able to appreciate the wrongness of the particular act he was doing at the particular time. Could this man be said to know in this sense whether his act was wrong if through a disease or defect or disorder of the mind he could not think rationally of the reasons which to ordinary people make that act right or wrong? If through the disordered condition of the mind he could not reason about the matter with a moderate degree of sense and composure it may be said that he could not know that what he was doing was wrong.
Thus the real issue for the jury in this case was whether the appellant had established on the balance of probabilities that at the time of the killing his mental impairment resulted in a complete incapacity to reason as to what is right or wrong according to ordinary standards. The term 'know' means 'understand', 'appreciate' or 'comprehend'. An incapacity to reason rationally as to what is right or wrong according to ordinary standards prevents a person from understanding that he (or she) ought not do the act. Knowledge (short of understanding) that to kill is punishable by law does not prevent such a finding. Nor is a finding of incapacity dependent upon proof of a positive belief in the rightness of the conduct. Whether an act is right or wrong is determined by reference to an objective standard. The question is whether the appellant had a complete incapacity to reason as to what was, by that objective standard, right or wrong.
It is not easy to summarise the detailed discussion of authority in Stapleton in a way which is capable of being fashioned into an appropriate direction in every case of insanity. However, the principles extracted from that discussion appear to focus upon two issues. First, the ability to know that one 'ought not' to do an act or make an omission is a capacity to know that one 'ought not' to do it according to ordinary standards of right and wrong, rather than knowledge that the act is unlawful. As the High Court observed, from a practical point of view it often may not matter much, because in relation to serious offences the two ideas 'are not easily separable' (at 375). However, in cases where, as here, the distinction may arise, it should be made. The second principle is that the capacity which must be found to be lacking is not merely a capacity to appreciate, in some abstract sense, that others would view the act as wrong. Rather, it is a capacity of the particular accused either to discern the difference between moral good and evil, or to 'think rationally' of the reasons which would lead ordinary people to consider the act to be right or wrong.
(1) that Mr Hardy killed Mr Peasley;
(2) the killing was unlawful; and
(3) at the time Mr Hardy killed Mr Peasley, he intended to cause Mr Peasley's death or intended to cause him a bodily injury of such a nature as to endanger, or be likely to endanger, his life.
Whether Mr Hardy was mentally impaired at the time he unlawfully killed Mr Peasley
Whether Mr Hardy was deprived of one of the capacities in s 27 of the Criminal Code
Verdict: Mr Hardy is not guilty on account of mental impairment
What is the appropriate order to make under the Criminal Law (Mental Impairment) Act 2023? Should a custody order be made?
(2) If a court makes a custody order, the court must set a limiting term for the order, being the best estimate of the term of imprisonment or term of detention that the court would, in all the circumstances, have imposed if -
(a) the court were sentencing the person for the offence; and
(b) any mental impairment of the person were not taken into account.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), the court must assume that -
(a) the person had pleaded guilty to the charge at the earliest opportunity; and
(b) there is no other option but to impose a term of imprisonment or term of detention.
(4) The limiting term commences on the day on which the order is made unless the court, after taking into account any time that the person has already spent in custody in relation to the offence, orders that the term be taken to have commenced on an earlier day.
(4) A person, other than a child, who is guilty of murder must be sentenced to life imprisonment unless -
(a) that sentence would be clearly unjust given the circumstances of the offence and the person; and
(b) the person is unlikely to be a threat to the safety of the community when released from imprisonment,
in which case, subject to subsection (5A), the person is liable to imprisonment for 20 years.
(a) that I am required to determine the 'best estimate' of the term of imprisonment that a court 'would, in all the circumstances' have imposed based on certain assumptions. This task is necessarily a hypothetical exercise;[158]
(b) the use of the word 'would' signifies that I am required to 'stand in the shoes' of a hypothetical sentencing court and apply the relevant principles contained in the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), including in s 6 of that Act, in light of ordinary sentencing principles;[159]
(c) one of the assumptions imposed by s 50 of the CLMI Act is that in setting the limiting term, I am not to take into account Mr Hardy's mental impairment. That assumption may be relevant to the circumstances of the offence, mitigatory factors and potential facts that might have resulted in a longer term of imprisonment;[160]
(d) the other assumptions imposed by s 50 of the CLMI Act are that I must assume that Mr Hardy has pleaded guilty to the charge of murder at the earliest opportunity.[161] I must also assume that there is no other option but to impose a term of imprisonment;
(e) subject to the exceptional circumstances identified in s 279(4)(a) and s 279(4)(b) of the Criminal Code, the sentence of life imprisonment for murder is a mandatory sentence. Therefore, on its proper construction, s 50 of the CLMI Act requires that if, on the assumptions required by that section, the mandatory term of life imprisonment would have been imposed, then the limiting term must be set as the duration of that mandatory term;[162]
(f) given the exceptional nature of a sentence other than life imprisonment for murder generally, the circumstances in which a limiting term on a charge of murder will be set as a term other than the duration of the person's life will be equally exceptional. This is particularly the case given the statutory requirement to exclude from consideration the accused's mental impairment. This is because an accused's mental impairment at the time of committing an offence might otherwise have been the principal reason for concluding that it would have been 'clearly unjust given the circumstances of the offence and the person' to have imposed a sentence of life imprisonment;[163] and
(g) where the court's 'best estimate' of the sentence that the sentencing court would have imposed is life imprisonment, s 50 of the CLMI Act does not permit, or require, the court to determine the minimum non-parole period that would have been set if the person had been sentenced to life imprisonment.[164]
Statements made by Mr Hardy on 21 October 2023[165]
Statements made by Mr Hardy on 24 October 2023[166]
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
[1] The State of Western Australia v Hardy [2025] WASC 249.
[69] Exhibit 1, par 93. See also Exhibits 3 and 13.
[80] Hone v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 283; (2007) 179 A Crim R 138 [124]
[82] R v Porter [1933] HCA 1; (1933) 55 CLR 182.
[83] R v Falconer [1990] HCA 49; (1990) 171 CLR 30, 60.
[84] The State of Western Australia v Jones [2018] WASC 395 [43].
[85] Stapleton v The Queen [1952] HCA 56; (1952) 86 CLR 358, 367.
[88] Evans v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 34 (Evans).
[99] Exhibit 6, pages 2 - 4, pars 3 - 16.
[107] Exhibit 6, page 4, pars 14 - 15.
[108] Exhibit 6, pages 2 - 5, pars 17 - 27.
[109] Exhibit 6, pages 5 - 7, pars 28 - 37.
[110] Exhibit 6, pages 7 - 8, pars 38 - 48.
[113] Exhibit 6, pages 8-14, pars 49 - 90.
[115] Exhibit 6, page 15, pars 92 - 102.
[116] Exhibit 6, page 16, pars 103 - 104.
[117] Exhibit 6, page 16, pars 105 - 106.
[118] Exhibit 6, pages 16 - 17, pars 107 - 112.
[119] Exhibit 6, page 17, pars 110 and 112.
[120] Exhibit 6, page 17, pars 113 - 115.
[121] Exhibit 6, page 18, pars 116 - 117.
[131] Exhibit 7, pages 5 - 8, pars 25 - 47.
[134] Exhibit 7, pages 2 - 5, pars 5 - 24.
[137] Exhibit 7, page 3, pars 12 - 13.
[141] Exhibit 7, pages 8 - 11, pars 48 - 67.
[143] Exhibit 7, pages 12 - 13, pars 69 - 83.
[144] Exhibit 7, page 13, pars 84 - 85.
[145] Exhibit 7, page 14, pars 86 - 89.
[146] Exhibit 7, page 14, pars 90 - 95.
[147] Exhibit 7, pages 14 - 15, pars 96 - 102.
[155] The State of Western Australia v McCullock [No 2] [2024] WASC 400 [134]-[136].
[156] Criminal Procedure Act s 149(1); CLMI Act s 44(1).
[157] The State of Western Australia v Chokolich [2024] WASC 346 (Chokolich), [60] - [99].
(1933) 55 CLR 182
(1990) 171 CLR 30
(1952) 86 CLR 358