The State of South Australia (In Right of the Department of Education and Children's Services) v The Estate of Mason [2002] SAWCT 114

(i) the worker's place of residence and place of employment; or

(ii) the worker's place of residence or place of employment and -

• an educational institution the worker attends under the terms of an apprenticeship or other legal obligation, or at the employer's request or with the employer's approval; or
• a place the worker attends to receive a medical certificate, to obtain a medical report or certificate (or to be examined for that purpose), to participate in a rehabilitation program, or to apply for, or receive, compensation for a compensable disability,

and there is a real and substantial connection between the employment and the accident out of which the disability arises.

(6) However, the fact that a worker has an accident in the course of a journey to or from work does not itself establish a sufficient connection between the accident and the employment for the purposes of subsection (5)(b)."

1. During the hearing at first instance a statement of agreed facts was presented to the learned Deputy President in the following terms:-

"1. In 1983, the Applicant first drove the Verran bus route, with the terminus at Rudall, travelling Verran, to Cleve, to Rudall. That bus was housed at Rudall.

1. 2. In 1987 the Applicant was hired to perform the Darke Peak run, being picked up by the Cleve bus from her home at Rudall, and taken to the Kielpa terminus to collect the bus.
2. 3. In 1992, the route was changed, making way for a small Darke Peak bus to connect with the Applicant's bus at the Kononda terminus. At the time the Applicant's bus was housed at Rudall.
3. 4. Over the course of the Applicant's bus driving duties with the Respondent, the route was on occasion changed in order to most effectively organise the School bus run in order to suit the changing needs of the families within the School catchment area. The Cleve Area School did not have the power to make that change at the time, and that the directive originated from a Mr Brian Hudson, who was in charge of bus routes in the Education Department at the time.
4. 5. In 1993, the bus route was changed again, with the terminus being at the Schumanns' property.
5. In 1997 the terminus was changed to the Evans' property, and the bus was housed at that property. That was the terminus that the Applicant was driving from at the time of the subject injury."
6. The learned Deputy President recorded the arrangement, as described by the worker that was in place at the time of the accident, at par 4 as follows:-

"2. I drive one regular route on the same bus. The bus is left overnight at a remote location and I need to use two private vehicles to be able to complete the run. In the mornings, I drive my vehicle to the terminus, where I leave my vehicle and then commence my bus-driving duties. The route ends at the School in the morning. I leave another vehicle at the School so that when I reach the School I can then drive home. When the end of the School day approaches, I then drive back to the School, collect the School bus, leave my vehicle by the School and drive to the terminus, dropping students off along the way. At the end of the run I leave the School bus at the terminus and pick up my first vehicle and then return home. This is because I am not allowed to drive the bus home."

1. He further noted from the evidence of the worker, certain terms of engagement of the worker by the appellant:-

"7. I was paid fortnightly upon production of a log return (Form EDO37). The method of payment is calculated upon the route distance travelled on a daily basis, in accordance with prescribed rates.

1. 8. In addition to this, I am paid an allowance for about one-half of the necessary use of my private vehicle. The allowance however is quite minimal and does not properly recognise the fact that I have to use two private vehicles to be able to complete the run."
2. The learned Deputy President noted that the evidence was "that the road surfaces on the day in question were in a shocking condition and that this was nothing unusual".
3. The learned Deputy President referred to the evidence of Mr Brian Hudson, Senior Project Officer of the Transport Services Unit (Review Group) of the appellant, pursuant to the "Department of Education, Training and Employment Administrative Instructions and Guidelines (Schooling Sector) Section 1: General School Procedures" in relation to buses, that:-

"Departmental buses are to be garaged at schools over night and during the day, unless it is more appropriate for the department to have the bus garaged at the terminus for economic reasons. ..."

"Drivers are not permitted to drive buses between the school and home, the terminus and home, or to and from the school or terminus to any other place for personal use."

Drivers are not paid for use of private vehicles for travel between home and school or home and terminus, except in the following circumstances:

• where a private vehicle is driven from the school along a lineal route to the bus terminus to avoid the bus being double run over the route. In this instance the driver would be eligible to be paid car mileage for the distance travelled from school to the terminus in the morning and from the terminus to the school in the afternoon. Where the distance between the driver's home and terminus is shorter than the distance from the school to the terminus, payment is to be based on the shorter distance.".

1. The learned Deputy President identified the fact that two issues were raised before him; namely whether this was a "journey" from employment "and if so, whether the worker has established any of the provisos in subsection (5)". The learned Deputy President referred to extracts from a number of authorities, namely, TransAdelaide v Karanicos (unreported Full Supreme Court) (1996) SASC 5536; State of South Australia v Brophy (1997) 68 SASR 97; Nogare v Mosaic Flooring Co Ltd (1965) SASR 120; Dunning v Binding (1932) 25 BWCC 361; Chadburn v The Queen Elizabeth Hospital (North Western Adelaide Health Service) Print No JD47/1999_; The State of South Australia (Department of Education and Children's Services) v Attwell-Gill_, Print A105/1996; The Corporation (The City Swim School) v Rowberry, Print No A1/1996_; Nebl v CGU Worker Compensation (SA) Pty Ltd (DV & DM Stribing)_ (2000) SAWCT 27; Curran v Wills Industries (2000) SAWCT 36; Owen v Department of Education Training and Employment (2001) SAWCT 104.
2. In Karanicos (supra) he referred to what the Chief Justice had to say, ie.

"23. ... But to my mind the ordinary meaning of the language suggests that it requires an affirmative answer to the question of whether one would say that in undertaking the journey the worker was performing the worker's job, complying with an instruction from the employer given by the employer in the exercise of its control as employer, or doing something reasonably incidental to one of those things. It is also necessary to view the journey in context. By that I mean one should not look at the journey in isolation but should consider what preceded it and what was going to follow it. Sometimes the link between the journey and the employment would only emerge when the journey was seen in context.".

1. In his reference to State of South Australia (Department of Education and Children's Services v Attwell-Gill (supra) he included the following extract from the decision of Parsons J:-

"... The extreme remoteness of the locality of the school at which the worker was employed to teach has resulted in special conditions applying to his contract of employment. Had he been a teacher in the metropolitan area he would have been required to commence his first duty day for term 3 by presenting to teach at his school on Monday 26 July. Instead the start of the school term was delayed for two days until Wednesday 25 (sic) July and the worker was authorised to use his first two duty days for that term to undertake the journey from his place of residence to his place of employment. He was paid for those two days as duty days. This is a recognition that travelling to such a remote location is necessarily incidental to carrying out the duties of a teacher at Amata. The necessary link between the journey and the employment described by Doyle CJ in Karanicos (supra) has been established. ..."

1. We interpose, and note that in like manner, the distances and "remoteness" in this case are equally relevant and are established by both the vehicular accident report (151 AB) where the worker said that the accident occurred 15 minutes after she had left the terminus on her journey home and also the map of the area (146 AB).
2. The learned Deputy President then made certain findings and a conclusion which were the subject of the grounds of appeal and written and oral submissions of Mr Lines, counsel for the appellant, in support thereof. Those findings and conclusion of the learned Deputy President were as follows:-

"38 I have considered whether the trip to the terminus at the start of the day could be covered for injuries but the trip from the terminus to home not covered. There is an inherent anomaly in such a conclusion. The better conclusion is that if either satisfies the requirements then both do.

1. 39 For the purpose of this case I will assume without deciding this was a "journey". On this basis, this case is close to the border between those covered and those not covered. In the end the weight of the following factors favour the category of those the legislation intends to cover:-

(a) The fact that when initially engaged the bus was housed at Rudall and the worker commenced the run from that point (viz Agreed Facts par 1 and par 2).

(b) The fact that due to the extraordinary remoteness and distances on the Eyre Peninsula and the economics and efficiencies which were varied from time to time, the employer reserved the right to direct where the bus was to be left (AB 22, 23, 32, 33, 43). Thus to proceed to the place the bus was left at became the first duty of the contract.

(c) The fact that the employer paid an amount towards the cost of the out of pocket expenses of the travel (AB 12, 32). It is not the case that journeys to and from work are reimbursed by employers in the normal scheme of things.

(d) The terms of the contract implicitly dictated the route the worker had to take between home and the terminus (AB 33). This led to the worker having to use the segment where she had her accident irregardless of her own preference in the matter.

(e) The purpose of this trip was to locate the bus at a point dictated by the contract (ie Evans' farm). It was therefore travel in discharge of the terms of the contract. This employs the contextual approach to the characterisation and distinguishes the circumstances from the mere journey described in s 30(6). It would place the journey in the group described by Doyle CJ in Karanicos in par 23 and Napier CJ in Nogare at 122-123. It appears to conform as best as can be with the tests indicated by the decisions of this Tribunal and detailed above".

1. Mr Lines asserted the learned Deputy President's ultimate ruling or conclusion amounted to an error of law, that is based on an error of legal principle and findings of fact which either do not fall within the relevant provision or cannot sustain the conclusion that he reached. In this context he referred to and relied upon the decisions of South Australia Police Department v Tate [1999] SAWCT 111 and South Australia Police Department v Barber [2001] SAWCT 100.
2. Mr Lines was critical of the findings made by the learned Deputy President in par 38 of his decision (referred to above) primarily on the basis that the subject claim related to an injury which the worker sustained when she was travelling from the bus terminus to her residence at the end of the bus run, and that he thus erred in taking the approach that either the trip to the terminus at the start of the day or the trip from the terminus to her home at the end of the day respectively were undertaken by the worker in the discharge of her duties of employment.
3. In relation to the learned Deputy President's citing of and reliance upon Karanicos (supra), Mr Lines submitted that the approach taken by the learned Deputy President resulted in a failure by him to properly consider the purpose of the specific journey in the course of which the worker suffered her injury; ie Mr Lines submitted the learned Deputy President failed to take into account that the actual trip in the course of which the injury occurred was when the worker was travelling home, and at a time where she had no further duties to perform.
4. Mr Lines, in support of his submission that the learned Deputy President misunderstood the evidence, referred to the various sub-paragraphs contained in par 39 of the learned Deputy President's reasons for decision as follows:-
   • As to par 39(a) he submitted the fact that the terminus of the bus was changed some four times over a 19 year period was not supportive of the learned Deputy President's ruling that the worker's trip from the terminus to home was undertaken in the course of carrying out duties of employment.
   • As to par 39(b) he submitted that the fact that the respondent reserved the right to direct where the bus was to be left did not support the finding of the learned Deputy President that "to proceed to the place the bus was left at became the first duty of the contract". In this context he relied upon the case of Curran v Wills Industries (supra) maintaining there was no duty or obligation imposed by the appellant on the worker to proceed home the way she was going, and that she was, in so doing, not going about the business of the appellant.
   • As to par 39(c) he maintained that if the payment of wages at the time of the journey accident is not "decisive" of the journey being undertaken in the course of the employment (Chadburn, supra), then the payment of "a mere car allowance based on a nominal mileage" made it even less conclusive.
   • As to par 39(d) he submitted that there was no evidence to support the finding of the learned Deputy President that "the terms of the contract implicitly dictated the route the worker had to take between her home and the terminus" or that the worker was compelled by her employment to use the segment of the road where the accident occurred "irregardless of her own preference in the matter".
   • As to par 39(e) Mr Lines submitted that what was contained therein represented "a complete misunderstanding of the evidence" by the learned Deputy President. He maintained that the purpose of the trip was not to locate the bus at the terminus, but rather the evidence indicated that the sole purpose of the trip was for the worker to return home from the terminus. Furthermore he submitted that the trip home was part of her normal routine and that it therefore followed that the learned Deputy President's conclusion that the worker's travel was in discharge of the terms of her contract was based on an erroneous premise.
5. Having made those submissions Mr Lines submitted that a correct understanding of the facts did not reasonably permit any conclusion other than that the trip from the terminus to home was a journey between the worker's place of employment and place of residence without there being any real or substantial connection being between the accident and her employment: (s 30 (6)).
6. He therefore submitted that the appeal should be allowed, on the basis that the application of correct legal principle to the evidence in this case should have resulted in a ruling that the disability arose from a journey which was not covered by the provisos of s 30 (5), and is not therefore compensable.
7. Mr Saies, counsel for the respondent, submitted the appellant had not identified any error or question of law (as required by s 86(1) of the Act), and that the alleged error of legal principle was no more than a challenge to the learned Deputy President's findings of fact and/or the way that he weighed up the evidence and thus were only questions of fact and degree. Having read the evidence and having considered the learned Deputy President's findings and conclusion, I agree.
8. The majority in Barber's case (supra) had this to say:-

"64 In our view the history of the relevant legislation, the dispute resolution process that parliament has seen fit to create, and the terms of the Act itself, indicate that parliament envisaged that the trial presidential member alone is charged with the duty of finding the facts and applying the law to the facts as found. We think parliament intended for the Full Bench's role to be limited to determining whether there has been a misunderstanding of legal principle, or an error as to the proper construction of the Act or of some other legislative enactment. If none of these matters are involved, we think that parliament's intention is for the Full Bench to let the decision made below stand. In other words, if there was some evidence to support the findings made or some basis to conclude that the findings did or did not fall within the relevant statutory provision, that has not been shown to have been misunderstood by the trial presidential member, the Full Bench has no right to interfere with the result.

1. By giving pre-eminence to the findings and conclusions reached at first instance, parliament is making it clear to the parties that if they take a matter to trial, absent an error of law, the decision of the presidential member will be final and that this is a factor that will have to be taken into account in deciding whether or not to make or accept or reject an offer of compromise.".
2. In this case, having considered all of Mr Lines' submissions it has not been demonstrated to me that the learned Deputy President misunderstood legal principle, or made an error as to the proper construction of s 30(5)(a) or s 30(6) of the Act.
3. Indeed by virtue of his reference to the various authorities and his reference to what the Chief Justice had to say in Karanicos and his application thereof, it is clear to me that the learned Deputy President was aware of and applied the correct legal principles, and that there was sufficient evidence to support his respective findings and conclusion.
4. I would dismiss the appeal.

1. The State of South Australia (Department of Education, Training and Employment) ("the appellant") has appealed against the decision of the learned Deputy President dated 8 March 2002, whereby he concluded that a disability sustained by the respondent Barbara Mason ("the worker"), on 21 July 1999 in the course of a journey, arose from her employment pursuant to s 30(5) of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 ("the Act").
2. Since the case was heard by the learned Deputy President the worker has died, and her estate has now been substituted as the respondent to the appeal.
3. When a worker suffers injury whilst in the course of a journey, s 30(5) and (6) are the relevant qualifying subsections of the Act to be applied in determining entitlement to compensation. (TransAdelaide v Karanicos (unreported Full Supreme Court) (1996) SASC 5536; State of South Australia v Brophy (1997) 68 SASR 97; Chadburn v The Queen Elizabeth Hospital (North Western Adelaide Health Service) Print JD47/1999.) S 30(5) and s 30(6) provide as follows:-

"30(5) A disability that arises out of, or in the course of, a journey arises from employment only if -

(a) the journey is undertaken in the course of carrying out duties of employment; or

(i) the worker's place of residence and place of employment; or

(ii) the worker's place of residence or place of employment and -

• an educational institution the worker attends under the terms of an apprenticeship or other legal obligation, or at the employer's request or with the employer's approval; or
• a place the worker attends to receive a medical certificate, to obtain a medical report or certificate (or to be examined for that purpose), to participate in a rehabilitation program, or to apply for, or receive, compensation for a compensable disability,

and there is a real and substantial connection between the employment and the accident out of which the disability arises.

(6) However, the fact that a worker has an accident in the course of a journey to or from work does not itself establish a sufficient connection between the accident and the employment for the purposes of subsection (5)(b)."

1. The issue before the learned Deputy President was whether, when travelling in her private vehicle from a destination known as Evans' farm to her home at Rudall, Eyre Peninsula, on 21 July 1999, the worker was undertaking a journey "in the course of carrying out duties of employment" (s 30(5)(a)).
2. The relevant facts ascertained from the decision of the learned Deputy President were that the worker was employed by the appellant as a school bus driver with the Cleve Area School at Cleve, Eyre Peninsula. She had been in that employment since 1983. She lived in the nearby town of Rudall.
3. A statement of agreed facts was tendered setting out details of the various bus routes driven by the worker since 1983, an explanation as to changes in the bus route from time to time, and the process by which those changes were made, as follows:-

1. In 1983, the Applicant first drove the Verran bus route, with the terminus at Rudall, travelling Verran, to Cleve, to Rudall. That bus was housed at Rudall.
2. 2. In 1987 the Applicant was hired to perform the Darke Peak run, being picked up by the Cleve bus from her home at Rudall, and taken to the Kielpa terminus to collect the bus.
3. 3. In 1992, the route was changed, making way for a small Darke Peak bus to connect with the Applicant's bus at the Kononda terminus. At that time the Applicant's bus was housed at Rudall.
4. 4. Over the course of the Applicant's bus driving duties with the Respondent, the route was on occasion changed in order to most efficiently organise the School bus run in order to suit the changing needs of the families within the School catchment area. The Cleve Area School did not have the power to make that change at the time, and that the directive originated from a Mr Brian Hudson, who was in charge of bus routes in the Education Department at the time.
5. 5. In 1993, the bus route was changed again, with the terminus being at the Schumanns' property.
6. 6. In 1997 the terminus was changed to the Evans' property, and the bus was housed at that property. That was the terminus that the Applicant was driving from at the time of the subject injury."

1. As indicated in par 6 of the Statement of Agreed Facts, from 1997 the terminus for the worker's bus route was Evans' farm where the bus was housed overnight.
2. As was her usual practice, on the morning of 21 July 1999 the worker drove her own private motor vehicle to Evans' farm from her home in Rudall. She left her vehicle there, drove the school bus from the terminus to the school, collecting passengers along the way. At the completion of the morning run she left the school bus at the school, ready to collect passengers in the afternoon to be dropped off on route to the terminus at Evans' farm. At the school she had another private motor vehicle which she used to drive home to Rudall after the morning run, and to return to the school in the afternoon to collect the bus for the afternoon run.
3. On the afternoon of 21 July 1999, after leaving the bus at Evans' farm and while travelling from there on route to Rudall in her own vehicle along the unsealed Mangalo Road, she lost control of the vehicle and sustained injuries.
4. The learned Deputy President accepted the evidence of the worker that Mangalo Road was in a poor condition on that day (judgment par 7).
5. His Honour noted that the worker's remuneration was calculated on the basis of the route distance travelled on a daily basis relying upon prescribed rates, and that she also received an allowance for the use of her private vehicle (par 5 and par 10).
6. Relying on the statement of Mr Hudson, who was at that time in charge of bus routes in the Education Department, and the Agreed document, the Department of Education, Training and Employment Administrative Instructions and Guidelines (Schooling Sector) Section 1: General School Procedures, His Honour noted that although bus routes usually operate from a designated school along a specific route and return to the designated school, the Department may choose to operate the route differently. If the bus operates for a significant part of the journey without collecting passengers the Department may "choose to house the bus overnight at the first pickup" (par 8).
7. This choice may be made for economic reasons to avoid the bus being double run over the route. In those limited circumstances the bus driver is reimbursed for the use of a private vehicle to get to and from the terminus (par 8 and par 10). His Honour noted in general terms the basis upon which that allowance was calculated as being the distance that the bus would have travelled between the school and the terminus along the shortest route.
8. In this way payment for travel to and from the terminus (first pick up point) is regarded as an exception to the general rule that bus drivers are not paid for the use of private vehicles for travel between home and school or home and terminus (par 10).
9. Having made those findings the learned Deputy President identified the appropriate legal approach relying, in particular, upon the decision of Doyle CJ in Karanicos (supra). He also drew attention to a like approach in Blee v London and North Eastern Railway Co (1938) AC 126, especially at 133 - 134, which was referred to in Nogare v Mosaic Flooring Co Ltd (1965) SASR 120, a decision under the repealed Workmen's Compensation Act 1932 - 1961. He then referred to a number of examples of the application of the Karanicos approach in other cases before the Tribunal involving a variety of fact situations; The State of South Australia (Department of Education and Children's Services) v Attwell-Gill A105/1996, The Corporation (The City Swim School) v Rowberry A1/1996, Nebl v CGU Workers Compensation (SA) Pty Ltd (DV and DM Stribing) 2000 SAWCT 27, Curran v Wills Industries 2000 SAWCT 36, Owen v Department of Education Training and Employment 2001 SAWCT 104.
10. The learned Deputy President then distilled from the facts those matters which he considered significant in determining whether the journey from Evans' farm to Rudall was undertaken "in the course of carrying out duties of employment". In so doing he said at par 38 of his reasons:-

"I have considered whether the trip to the terminus at the start of the day could be covered for injuries but the trip from the terminus to home not covered. There is an inherent anomaly in such a conclusion. The better conclusion is that if either satisfies the requirements then both do."

1. He considered it significant that when the worker was initially engaged in 1983 she drove a bus route which began and ended each day in the town where she lived, Rudall, but that because of remoteness, distance, economics and efficiencies, the employer reserved the right to direct that a bus should be housed at a place distant from its school destination. He noted that the employer had exercised that right in this instance and that travelling to such a terminus became the driver's first duty of the contract; that in such circumstances the employer paid an allowance towards the cost of travel to and from the terminus in contrast with the usual policy in relation to the private usage of motor vehicles; that by payment of an allowance based on the shortest route between the terminus and the school or the driver's home, whichever was the shortest, the terms of the contract implicitly dictated the route of travel between home and terminus; and finally that the purpose of "this trip was to locate the bus at a point dictated by the contract (ie Evans' farm)", and was therefore travel in discharge of the terms of the contract.
2. Mr Lines, counsel for the appellant, submitted that in determining whether this was a journey in the sense intended by the Act namely "in the course of carrying out duties of employment" the learned Deputy President took an approach which was inconsistent with that enunciated in Karanicos (supra), and that notwithstanding the learned Deputy President's reference to that authority in the course of his reasons, he had not applied it in the sense in which it was intended. It was said that this was demonstrated by the passage quoted above from par 38.
3. In addition to this complaint about the learned Deputy President's general approach, Mr Lines also questioned the factual foundation of His Honour's conclusion. Mr Lines submitted that there was no evidence to support the learned Deputy President's reliance upon the employer's right to change the bus route as in this case it had remained the same for a period of two years. He also submitted that the payment of an allowance was simply concessional and did not alter the private nature of the journey from Evans' farm to Rudall, and that there was no evidence to support the conclusion that the terms of the contract implicitly dictated the route that the worker had to take between the terminus and her home. Furthermore, it was submitted that there was no evidence to support the learned Deputy President's conclusion at par 39(e) that the purpose of the trip in question was to locate the bus at a point dictated by the contract, rather, the evidence established that the sole purpose of the trip was for the worker to return home from the terminus.
4. Mr Saies, counsel for the respondent, submitted that the complaints made by the appellant do not give rise to a question of law. Whether facts, as found, accord with the words of a statutory enactment, will not always give rise to a question of law. When it is necessary to engage in the process of construction of the meaning of a word or a phrase in a statute, a question of law will be involved. However, if a statutory provision uses words according to their common understanding and the question is whether the facts as found fall within those words, that will not amount to a question of law (Vetter v Lake Macquarie City Council [2002] HCA 12 par 25 - 27 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Callinan JJ). In this instance the issue is one of law because it involves determining whether the worker's activities, as found on the facts, fall within or outside the statutory expression "carrying out duties of employment". As the case of Karanicos (supra) demonstrates, they are words of special meaning in a particular statutory context rather than words used in ordinary parlance. Moreover, the determination of an employee's obligations pursuant to a contract of employment is a question of law. It involves a correct appreciation of the principles applying to the content of the contract and a correct understanding of the facts to which those principles must be applied.
5. In Karanicos (supra) the learned Chief Justice suggested a liberal and practical approach to the expression "carrying out the duties of employment" and one not restricted to those things which the worker is literally or specifically required or obliged to do, but acknowledging that contemporary conditions and understandings of the concept of duties of employment should be taken into account. In that context the Chief Justice referred to the judgment of Dixon J in Whittingham v Commissioner of Railways (WA) [1931] HCA 49; (1931) 46 CLR 22 at 29, who remarked that the sufficiency of the connection between the employment and the thing done by the employee is a matter of degree "in which time, place and circumstance, as well as practice, must be considered together with the conditions of the employment" (Karanicos (supra) par 22).
6. Doyle CJ further explained the expression "duties of employment" as referring to "the carrying out of tasks under a contract of employment or the performance of an activity which is related to that which the worker was employed to do" (par 23). It was said that the question posed is "whether one would say that in undertaking the journey the worker was performing the worker's job complying with an instruction from the employer given by the employer in the exercise of its control as employer, or doing something reasonably incidental to one of those things" (par 23).
7. Importantly, it was said that the journey must be viewed in context, by which Doyle CJ expressed himself to mean "one should not look at the journey in isolation but should consider what preceded it and what was going to follow it. Sometimes the link between the journey and the employment would only emerge when the journey was seen in context" (par 23).
8. The focus of the learned Deputy President's inquiry was necessarily the extent of the duties of the worker's employment. It was therefore necessary that he place the particular journey in the context of the worker's daily obligations concerning the driving of the bus as determined by her contract of employment. That is the explanation for the learned Deputy President's references in par 38 and par 39(e) to the worker's activities when travelling to Evans' farm each school day. He did not err in giving attention to that aspect of her duties. He was quite properly articulating the general setting in which she was required to work. In doing so he was following the approach required by Karanicos (supra).
9. The facts as found by the learned Deputy President establish that it was a condition of the contract of employment that the worker commence and end the bus route each day at a place remote from the school and local towns, and at a place not served by public transport. In recognition of this imposition it was a term of her contract of employment that she be paid an allowance for the use of her private vehicle based on the distance between the school and the terminus. Such payment, combined with the geographical circumstances in which the worker was obliged to start and finish the bus route, establish that both driving to Evans' farm to locate the bus in the mornings and returning from Evans' farm after depositing the bus there in the afternoons, were part of the duties of her employment in the sense of being reasonably incidental to compliance with an instruction from the employer as to the location of terminus. The return journey from Evans' farm was reasonably incidental to placing the bus at that location regardless of whether the worker was travelling back to the school or to her nearby home at Rudall.
10. We also reject Mr Lines' submission that the learned Deputy President erred in law when he said that the place of employment was ubiquitous. Although Mr Lines relied for his criticism of that finding that this particular bus route had not changed for two years, its location was entirely at the discretion of the employer and could be changed at any time subject to the condition of local roads, the changing needs of families within the school catchment area, and other relevant factors. In the past it had changed several times and could do so at the behest of the employer at any time in the future. To that extent there was evidence upon which the learned Deputy President was able to use that description of the place of employment and to conclude that the worker was required to follow instructions as to the location of the bus route and its terminus. In doing so he did not make an error which would vitiate his decision.
11. The appeal is dismissed.