1. Jon Allred be convicted of between 8 February 2009 and 9 December 2010 by deception, dishonestly obtaining financial advantage from a Commonwealth entity, namely Comcare.

2. Jon Allred be sentenced to two years imprisonment from today, 13 October 2015.

3. Jon Allred be released on 12 January 2016 after serving three months, upon giving security in the sum of $2,500 to be of good behaviour for a period of three years, and that he be subject to the supervision of the DirectorGeneral or her delegate and obey all reasonable directions of the person supervising him.

4. Under s 21B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), Jon Allred make reparation to Comcare by paying the sum of $64,418.62.

5. Under s 3ZL of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), a constable of police be permitted to attend on Jon Allred at the Alexander Maconochie Centre on or before 12 November 2015 to allow impression of his fingerprints to be taken in accordance with that Act.

CRIMINAL LAW - Jurisdiction, practice and procedure - judgment and punishment - sentencing - obtaining financial advantage by deception - Comcare - workers compensation benefits - self-reporting - false declaration - failure to declare income - overpayment - general deterrence - reparation order

Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), ss 16A, 21B, s 3ZL

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)

Cameron v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339

Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Alateras [2004] VSCA 214

Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Carter [1998] 1 VR 601

Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v El Karhani (1990) 21 NSWLR 370

Director of Public Prosecutions v Ip [2005] ACTCA 24

Gunes v Pearson (1996) 89 A Crim R 297

Hameed [2001] NSWCCA 287; (2001) 123 A Crim R 213

Hayes v The Queen [2014] VSCA 309

Pont [2000] NSWCCA 419; (2000) 121 A Crim R 302

R v Anderson [2012] QCA 215

R v Brewer [2004] ACTCA 10

R v Calma (Unreported, Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, Mildren J, SCC 21008445, 30 July 2010)

R v Fisher (Unreported, Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, Murrell CJ, SCC 194 of 2013, 17 December 2013)

R v Hinton [2002] NSWCCA 405; (2002) 134 A Crim R 286

R v Host [2015] WASCA 23

R v Peterson [2008] QCA 70

R v Richards [2015] ACTSC 206

R v Scerri (Unreported, Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, Nield AJ, SCC 348 of 2010, 18 February 2011)

R v Steen [2015] ACTSC 259

R v West [2015] ACTSC 134

Stitt (1998) 102 A Crim R 428

Togias [2001] NSWCCA 522; (2001) 127 A Crim R 23

Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)

1. Comcare is a statutory authority established by the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) with various functions and powers under that Act. In particular, under s 14, it is liable to pay compensation in respect of an injury suffered by a Commonwealth or other eligible employee, within the meaning of the Act, if that person has suffered an injury which results in incapacity for work or impairment.

2. The accused, Jon Allred, was an employee of the ACT Ambulance Service when he suffered an injury to his lower back and as a result was payed compensation by Comcare from 27 August 1991.

3. As required, Mr Allred provided Comcare with medical certificates, generally on a yearly basis, confirming that he continued to suffer the injury for which he was being compensated.

4. On 9 February 2009, he completed a review form which Comcare sent to him seeking confirmation of his present circumstances. Such a form is used by Comcare to determine his eligibility to continue receiving benefits and the rate at which those benefits are to be paid.

5. He completed the form, answering "no" to questions: "Are you currently working" and "Have you been employed at any time since you started receiving compensation?"

6. An investigation ascertained Mr Allred was employed as a taxi driver between 18 April 2007 and 9 December 2010.

7. As a result, he was charged with obtaining a financial advantage by deception from Comcare, namely workers compensation benefits to which he was not entitled.

8. Obtaining a financial advantage by deception from another person with the intention to permanently deprive that person of the property and the property belongs to the Commonwealth is an offence contrary to s 134.1 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) and renders Mr Allred to a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 10 years.

9. The facts have been summarised above but it is appropriate to add to that explanation. As noted, Comcare is the agency that administers compensation for government employees within the Australian Government, the Australian Capital Territory Government and certain other employers.

10. To continue to receive workers compensation benefits, an employee eligible for such benefits must provide medical evidence of the medical condition for which compensation is claimed and notify Comcare of any income received, so that a determination can be made of the correct level of entitlement to benefits.

11. While Mr Allred did suffer compensable impairment by the injury he had suffered to his lower back and, as required, continued to provide medical certificates attesting to that, he was also required to complete review forms confirming his circumstances and, in particular, disclosing any income from other sources that Comcare.

12. Comcare regularly wrote to Mr Allred, as it did to all employees receiving compensation from it, explaining how the rate of payment of benefits was calculated, including examples.

13. As a result of the determination of incapacity by Comcare, Mr Allred received workers compensation benefits each fortnight, those payments being deposited into his bank account.

14. However, on 18 April 2007, Mr Allred commenced working with Aerial Group Ltd and registered himself as a sole trader under the name of "Jon Allred trading as Jon Allred Personalised Taxis Canberra."

15. On 9 February 2009, Mr Allred completed the review form issued by Comcare. In the form he denied that he was currently working and denied that he had been employed at any time since he started receiving compensation. He also denied that he was self-employed in any capacity and denied that he received income from any other source not disclosed in the form, either from non-employment income, such as benefits, or from employment income, such as wages.

16. Between 6 May 2010 and 24 May 2010, Mr Allred was investigated and subject to surveillance video, which showed that he drove a Canberra Elite taxi every week, dropping off and picking up passengers, commencing generally between 6.30am and 8.00am and concluding between 3.30pm and 4.00pm.

17. On 9 December 2010, officers from Comcare and the Australian Federal Police executed a search warrant at his home and discovered documents relevant to this matter. Those documents included correspondence from Comcare advising him of the amount he was to be paid and explaining how the rate of that payment changes when he receives employment; bank records showing the benefits paid to him being deposited into his bank account; and documents relating to his activities as a taxi driver, including wages records, registration as a sole trader, records of completed shifts, including EFTPOS transactions, dockets and cash taken, expenses incurred, times of shifts, copies of Cabcharge documents and other material.

18. On 24 August 2011, Mr Allred was formally interviewed. He was invited to contact a legal practitioner but he declined. He was cautioned and, during the interview, he made a number of admissions, including that he had engaged in employment and had earned income from that employment as a taxi driver, as well as that he knowingly made false statements to Comcare on the review form dated 9 February as to his involvement in employment and earning income from that employment, but said, "I mean I never read them anyway." He believed he was still entitled to compensation benefits.

19. He did say that he had spoken to Comcare about working, although he could not remember the person to whom he had spoken. He said he had a record of that person's name and would be able to provide it at a later date. He did not do so. Furthermore, he did not respond to a letter from Comcare dated 16 September 2011 seeking that information.

20. From 9 February 2009 to 9 December 2010, he received a total of $120,445.89 in income from his employment. During that period, he was also paid $71,713.90 in compensation payments. Due to his income, Comcare calculated that he was only entitled to $7,295.28 as benefits. As a consequence of his false declaration, he was overpaid a total of $64,418.62. That amount is not disputed by Mr Allred.

21. A Pre-Sentence Report was tendered and Mr Allred's son gave evidence. From this evidence and the submissions of counsel, I make the following findings.

22. Mr Allred is now 53 years old and was 46 to 48 at the time of the offending. It clearly took some time for the offence to be discovered and the prosecution to be commenced. Thus the delay is not something that can be a source of mitigation.

23. For most of his early life he worked productively, primarily with the ACT Ambulance Service, both in the emergency control centre or on the road, until he had to leave his position because of his workplace injury.

24. He later worked with Keirs Bus Company and was recently with Keirs City Transport as a bus driver.

25. Mr Allred was married for 22 years but is now separated from his wife, although they remain on amicable terms. He has two sons and one daughter. One of his sons gave evidence, as I have indicated.

26. The evidence was that Mr Allred had been actively employed until his accident and he found that period of unemployment very difficult. There were times when things became quite difficult because of the pain management and the effect of the drugs on him. At one time, it led to real problems with his medication but this resolved in about 2005.

27. He is, however, a much loved grandfather and interacts well and valuably with his grandchildren, whom he takes fishing, camping and driving.

28. Mr Allred's father died in February 2015 and his mother is now aged 77 and requires some assistance. For two or three nights every week, he lives with her to provide that assistance.

29. While Mr Allred has debts and no assets, he does not claim that he is under financial hardship. Indeed, his explanation for the offending was that he wanted to be in work, rejoining the community and being an active participant in people focused employment rather than he needed the money. This makes the offending rather odd, for he could simply have answered truthfully and would not have received the benefits to which he is not entitled and which he says he did not really need. That answer to the questions on the form would not have affected his ability to rejoin the community, be in work and be an active participant in people focused employment.

30. Mr Allred continues to require medication for his back injury and the chronic pain associated with it.

31. For some time, he received pethidine and morphine, even being permitted to perform his own injections. He developed an addiction to those drugs but attempted recovery through the pain clinic at St Vincent's Hospital in Sydney. While he found this unhelpful, he returned to the ACT, seeking assistance from his current general practitioner.

32. A letter from his general practitioner confirmed that, noting that:

Ever since the car accident in 1991 he required increasing amounts of analgesics which turned into abuse in the mid-1990s affecting his family and social life with him eventually having to move out.

With his life starting to fall apart, he became increasingly depressed with low moods, little motivation and frequent suicidal ideation which left untreated feeling a failure. He started to withdraw and not care about everyday life and commitments.

He admits to frequently signing documents from Comcare without ever reading them and ignoring the likely repercussions.

Over the past five years he has started to get things together again, has been in contact with his children on a regular basis and started taking on casual work appropriate to his condition, namely chronic back pain and diabetes.

He is genuinely remorseful of his past actions and committed to make amends.

He is taking his medication in accordance with my directions especially in relation to his pain medications, whether or not to change dosage under my care. In that respect he has never exhibited signs of abuse or addictive behaviour.

34. He has eleven offences recorded on his criminal record. None of them are in the serious category, although the most recent five are common assaults. The last, however, was committed on 5 May 1985, 30 years ago. In addition none of the offences are dishonesty offences. In my view, his prior record is of no consequence to the sentencing task that I must now perform.

35. Many factors need to be assessed in order to identify the objective seriousness of an offence. One, of course, is the maximum penalty for a statutory offence, which is identified in cases such as Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357 at 732; [30]-[31]. The maximum penalty for such an offence is an indication of the relative seriousness of the offence. The courts are required to pay careful attention to the maximum penalties. By this yardstick the offence is a serious offence.

36. Obtaining a financial advantage by deception from the Commonwealth covers a wide range of circumstances and, indeed, various other legislation creates similar offences, as I pointed out in R v West [2015] ACTSC 134 at [49]:

There is no doubt that offences of this kind, where benefits available to the public are improperly accessed, are required to be treated very seriously. In R v Purdon (Unreported, New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, Hunt CJ at CL, McInerney J and Donovan AJ, 60659 of 1996, 27 March 1997) the court held that a custodial sentence is to be imposed unless there exist very special circumstances justifying some lesser penalty. The rationale is that the offences are easy to commit but difficult to detect, that they are widespread and that the introduction of more checks on the system would cause delays in the payment of benefits and possibly hardship to those accessing it. Likely hardship to others may be more significant in relation to social security offences but the expense of and need for medical assistance has some of the same elements.

37. Such crimes are, of course, not victimless crimes, in that they have consequences for the public for whom the Commonwealth is governing. Some of those consequences are referred to above but there is also the impact on the public revenue which has an impact on all Australians. The offence also involved an abuse of the system of self-report which relies on the honesty required of benefits recipients to comply with their reasonable obligations.

38. It is also relevant that the deception continued for a little less than two years and the result of the other payment was a substantial sum. It is regrettably not the largest sum seen in such cases but nevertheless a significant amount.

39. Section 16A of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), sets out the factors which the court must take into account in sentencing a federal offender, thus the court must impose a sentence that is appropriate in all the circumstances and ensure that the offender is adequately punished for his offending. Other matters, such as general deterrence, may be considered by the sentencing court. See Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v El Karhani (1990) 21 NSWLR 370 at 377-8.

40. It is accepted that, ordinarily, general deterrence is of particular importance to this type of offence as has been said on many occasions; see for example, Stitt (1998) 102 A Crim R 428 at 430-1.

41. This is consistent with what might be regarded as a general approach to white collar crime such as this offence. In Pont [2000] NSWCCA 419; (2000) 121 A Crim R 302 at 308-9; [36]- [43], Greg James J, with whom Beazley JA and Wood CJ at CL agreed, analysed a range of authorities concluding:

... it was conceded on the authorities in this court that where there are breaches of trust by employees, particularly involving large or substantial sums, involving systematic dishonesty attended by planning and some sophistication, general deterrence requires at least usually or in the absence of special features, that there be substantial sentences of imprisonment.

42. On behalf of Mr Allred it was contended that there were special or unusual features or circumstances which rendered a sentence of immediate imprisonment appropriate.

43. In this context it is worth remembering what President Winneke said in Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Carter [1998] 1 VR 601 at 605-6:

It should not be supposed that revenue fraudsters, who are shown by evidence to have deliberately defrauded the revenue for the purposes of enriching themselves, will not be treated with justified severity by the courts. However the degree of culpability of an accused person relevant to the punishment to be imposed must be dependent upon the facts, as found, in each case. Ritual incantations, such as "serious frauds on the revenue will result in custodial sentences" (R v Whitnall [1993] FCA 271; (1993) 42 FCR 512 at 519) are of little practical value...

44. That approach was more recently affirmed by Nettle J in Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Alateras [2004] VSCA 214 at [21].

45. It seems to me, too, that, as suggested by Nettle J in Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Alateras at [26] it is not the case that, '[t]he "rule" or "practice" rises any higher than the application of general sentencing principles to the particular considerations which apply in cases of tax and welfare fraud.' In my view, this encompasses the kind of fraud here committed.

46. Accordingly, it is necessary for me to deal with each of the matters referred in s 16A(2) of the Crimes Act as required.

47. This has been described above (at [9]-[20]). It involved the period of about one year and 10 months and improper receipt of $64,418.62. It also involved the deliberate falsification of the review form. The period of receipt is reasonably substantial and the amount received is quite substantial, making this a serious version of the offence, though there are certainly a number of cases where longer periods and much larger sums have been involved.

48. While the offence was blatant, it was neither premeditated nor calculated and did not involve any planning. It was, subject to what I note below about the course of conduct, not persistent or repetitive. It did not, however, cease voluntarily but only when discovered. For that, Comcare had to engage in surveillance.

49. It is also relevant that the system relies on the honesty of the people receiving benefits through the self-report. That makes a breach perhaps somewhat more serious or at least more deserving of a deterrent sentence to ensure the honesty of answers and the integrity of the system.

51. The offending occurred when Mr Allred dishonestly answered a review form. That was a single occasion. Nevertheless he continued to work and to receive benefits for 22 months. The execution of the search warrant resulted in the seizure of documents which clearly showed that Mr Allred had received an open document which would have alerted him to his compensation and his income. He continued to receive the benefits and that can be construed as a course of conduct; see for example, Gunes v Pearson (1996) 89 A Crim R 297 at 307. On the other hand, this is, to a large extent, dealt with in addressing the nature and circumstances of the offence rather than, in its own right, being a course of conduct such as would be constituted by regularly answering such forms dishonestly or supplying an illegal drug over time.

52. This is, as I have pointed out (at [37]), not a victimless crime. The Commonwealth is the victim and through it all citizens are affected by the improper payment away of its funds. As McLure P said in R v Host [2015] WASCA 23 at [24]:

However, it may be significant that the Commonwealth incurs very considerable, unrecoverable costs in compliance, audit and investigation systems designed to protect its revenue from, and to detect, fraudulent and other dishonest conduct. Of course, the real victims of such conduct are the members of the Australian community as a whole because it reduces the funds available for essential and other services and increases the taxation burden on honest taxpayers.

53. The obvious loss is the amount of $64,418.62 which Mr Allred improperly received. As is clear from what McLure P said in R v Host cited above (at [52]), there are, of course, other costs to be added to that.

55. I accept that Mr Allred is remorseful but I consider he has some way to go in the insight he needs to show in order to express what I might call complete remorse. This factor of contrition, however, addresses a slightly different issue which was explained by Buss JA in R v Host at [104], as follows:

The focus of para (i) of s 16A(2)(f) of the Crimes Act is upon contrition which the offender has shown by taking action to make reparation for any injury, loss or damage resulting from the offence, as distinct from taking action by disgorging or paying any benefits which the offender has derived from the commission of the offence. The provision requires the offender to have shown remorse by taking action to make reparation. Also, the provision is concerned with the making of compensation for injury, loss or damage as distinct from the restitution of benefits.

56. Mr Allred has shown willingness to repay what he has taken. His circumstances, however, are such that he can only afford $25 per week, so far paying $425. That has been appropriated to an earlier debt. He is unable to make an impact on that debt for some time to come.

58. This is a matter that is taken into account, not just as evidence of remorse, but also for its utilitarian value in facilitating the course of justice: Cameron v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339 at 343; [14]. In this case, Mr Allred pleaded at an early stage in the Magistrates Court and an early plea entitles him to a significant discount if I am satisfied this was his intention. I am so satisfied.

59. It was submitted by the prosecution that this was a strong crown case. While that may generally be accepted, some of that is because Mr Allred made admissions when interviewed by investigators. As explained by Simpson J in Hameed [2001] NSWCCA 287; (2001) 123 A Crim R 213 at 215; [4]- [6], the making of those admissions does not deny Mr Allred the benefit of the plea. Indeed, the making of the admissions is, in itself, some evidence of Mr Allred's willingness to facilitate the course of justice.

60. Mr Allred's admissions to the investigators do constitute such co-operation. He did, however, claim to have informed Comcare about his employment and offered to provide the name of the Comcare officer to whom he had spoken, but never supplied it, despite a reminder.

61. The author of the Pre-Sentence Report assessed Mr Allred as at a medium to low risk of reoffending. The relevant factors were not clear. The report's author also expressed some concern about his attitude to the offence, which included an attempt to justify his actions by relying on his drug use. This means that specific deterrence is a significant factor in sentencing.

62. The circumstances of the offence point to a need for stern punishment in this case. The matters I mentioned in R v West, referred to above (at [36]), attest to this. The Crown submitted that this was an offence of greed and not need. It referred to the comment of Keane JA in R v Peterson [2008] QCA 70 at [22], that, "[p]unishment must be such as to make it clear that defrauding the community, even for large amounts of money, is not worthwhile."

63. Counsel for Mr Allred, however, submitted that his "offending had one pressing driver, his desire to be in work, rejoining the community as an active participant in peoplefocused employment." This is a laudable aim. It could, however, have been perfectly adequately achieved without the fraud that Mr Allred perpetrated. Nevertheless, I accept this was the motivation for Mr Allred and that he was not primarily motivated by greed; but he accepted the benefits and clearly spent them, where he has no means to repay them. This is clearly an indication of some greed.

64. I have set out these above and do not need to repeat them. While his prior offending is not relevant for this sentencing, good character is often of limited value in some crimes which are facilitated by such character. I am not satisfied that this a crime particularly facilitated by good character.

65. No information was provided as to the way in which the offence would be more easily committed because of Mr Allred's character. On the other hand, as pointed out in R v Brewer [2004] ACTCA 10 at [19], many persons charged with such an offence as fraud on the Commonwealth are first offenders with otherwise good character.

66. The prognosis for rehabilitation made by the author of the Pre-Sentence Report is cautious. On the other hand, Mr Allred's admissions to investigators are to his credit and show some recognition of the criminality of the conduct, which is a step towards rehabilitation.

67. There were some comments, however, that suggested he was minimising his culpability, which points in the other direction.

68. There is no doubt that he has family support, as the evidence of his son clearly showed. In my view, Mr Allred would benefit also from supervision to ensure that he is properly rehabilitated with the health problems that he suffers.

69. A prison sentence will obviously leave Mr Allred's mother somewhat vulnerable, though she has three children who have some responsibility to support her.

70. There will also be an effect on Mr Allred's grandchildren. Such an effect, however, is not of such seriousness that it can moderate an otherwise proper sentence.

71. Indeed, this provision is said not to do more than reflect the common law position. Thus, in Togias [2001] NSWCCA 522; (2001) 127 A Crim R 23, it was accepted that the provision in s 16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act 1914 means that to be mitigating, such an effect must be exceptional; see also R v Hinton [2002] NSWCCA 405; (2002) 134 A Crim R 286 at 293; [31]. That may not be the position in this Territory: Director of Public Prosecutions v Ip [2005] ACTCA 24.

72. I am not satisfied that there were any exceptional or other circumstances that would warrant mitigation here.

73. Finally, I note that Mr Allred has been assessed as not suitable for a community service work condition to a Good Behaviour Order or to serve a sentence of imprisonment by periodic detention because of his back condition.

74. It is always problematic to have regard to comparative decisions. A number were referred to by the Crown and by the accused, and differences were noted by counsel for Mr Allred, between those submitted by the Crown and by counsel for the Crown to those submitted by Mr Allred.

75. As the court observed in R v Brewer at [23], "It is important that sentencing for federal offences be consistent between states and territories".

76. Mr T Shepherd, counsel for the Crown, provided a number of decisions from various jurisdictions. They were recent cases of similar offences, that is offences of defrauding the Commonwealth in various ways.

77. There were significant differences in fact and the subjective circumstances of the offenders but they provide some guidance as to the approach to take in such cases, including comments in the cases, their purposes and approaches that a court should take, to many of which I have already referred.

78. Although not quite in this category, R v Brewer involved two counts of defrauding the Commonwealth and one count of dishonestly causing a loss. Dr Brewer obtained $80,849.84 between 1994 and 2002, to none of which he was entitled. The fraud involved a falsified birth certificate, production of a marriage certificate, though she was divorced, and a failure to disclose that she was employed. She claimed benefits under two names. The claims did not end voluntarily.

79. Dr Brewer was, on appeal, resentenced to imprisonment for two years, to be released after serving six months imprisonment with a two year Good Behaviour Order.

80. In R v Calma (Unreported, Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, Mildren J, SCC 21008445, 30 July 2010), Ms Calma claimed family benefits of various kinds on three occasions, gaining a total of $51,619.19. She provided what were false claims and included a false letter purporting to have come from the father of her children. She had a gambling problem and suffered depression. She used the money to pay rent, food and bills, but also for the children's lunches and basic needs, and also on gambling. She had references attesting to her capacity as a good mother. She was sentenced to two years imprisonment, which his Honour described as "The standard fare for this kind of offending", but he released her after three months with a two year Good Behaviour Order.

81. The Queensland case of R v Anderson [2012] QCA 215 was a quite different matter in many ways, but involved ten offences of what was described a tax fraud arising out of false claims for refunds of GST. The amount obtained was $53,000, of which $32,000 had been recovered, and an attempt was made to claim a further $65,000. At the time of the offending, Mr Anderson was subject to a Good Behaviour Bond for social security fraud of $12,700. An appeal against ten concurrent sentences of three years to be released after 15 months imprisonment was dismissed.

82. The Victorian case of Hayes v The Queen [2014] VSCA 309 was also mentioned. In that case, Ms Hayes pleaded guilty to two charges of dishonestly obtaining financial advantage by deception from a Commonwealth entity and one count of attempting to do so. Ms Hayes received a total of $102,997.60 over a period of eight months and, later on, one further claim in which she attempted to obtain a further $30,000. She had symptoms of depression and anxiety and later developed a gambling problem. She also had been convicted of similar offences which were entered after her commission of the instant offences, but they were of a similar kind, relevant to the issue of rehabilitation. Ms Hayes was sentenced to imprisonment for two years and six months, to be released after serving 15 months with a Good Behaviour Order for three years. Her appeal against sentence was dismissed.

83. The final two decisions are also decisions of this Court. In R v West, I sentenced a woman who had used her position as practice manager of a medical practice to create false invoices and receipts for medical services that had not been provided and then made claims on Medicare, obtaining a total of $68,868.90 by this fraud. She too was a chronic gambler, but had no criminal record. She was severely depressed. A consultant psychiatrist opined that it was not uncommon for gambling to be used by people who experienced depression as a form of escape, and that this applied to Ms West. I sentenced her to two years imprisonment, to be released after serving four months with a three year Good Behaviour Order.

84. Finally, in R v Richards [2015] ACTSC 206, Murrell CJ sentenced Mr Richards for two counts of dishonestly obtaining a financial advantage by deception and two counts of using a false document to induce a public official to accept it as genuine. This was an extensive tax fraud through the GST system, from which Mr Richards received a total of $320,945 from a claim of $390,865. Mr Richards had a prior but limited record. Mr Richards suffered severe anxiety and claimed he needed to commit the offences to provide for his family. He had supportive character references.

85. The learned sentencing judge noted that the offences were premeditated and committed with persistence in a variety of dishonest conduct. Mr Richards was sentenced to an effective sentence of 4 years and 2 months imprisonment, to be released after two years and one month with a two year one month Good Behaviour Order.

The Commonwealth Sentencing Database indicates that, for multiple offences committed against s 134.2(1) of the Criminal Code, sentences of two to three years' imprisonment are common, and a sentence of up to five years' imprisonment is not unusual. Of course, sentencing statistics are only a yardstick against which the sentencing court compares sentences that it may have in mind: Barbaro v The Queen; Zirilli v The Queen [2014] HCA 2; (2014) 253 CLR 58 at [40].

87. Mr A Fraser, who appeared helpfully for Mr Allred, referred me to two decisions of this Court. In R v Fisher (Unreported, Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, Murrell CJ, SCC 194 of 2013, 17 December 2013), the Court was sentencing Mr Fisher for 13 offences of the Territory equivalent offence of obtaining a financial advantage by deception. Mr Fisher had stolen 13 cheques from his employer and cashed them at the bank for amounts ranging from $810 to $1350 to the total value of $12,440. Mr Fisher, however, was a quadriplegic and required assistance with many daily activities. He was in receipt of a disability pension.

88. He had some criminal history, including an offence of kidnapping and a dishonesty offence but committed a decade earlier. The offences, which occurred over about a month, were unsophisticated but only ended because the offending was detected. Mr Fisher was sentenced to a total of four months imprisonment wholly suspended with a 22month Good Behaviour Order, including a probation condition and a condition to make all reasonable attempts at reparation.

89. In R v Scerri (Unreported, Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, Nield AJ, SCC 348 of 2010, 18 February 2011), Ms Scerri also committed territory offences of dishonestly obtaining a financial advantage by deception. She committed 76 offences involving her creating documents in the name of her illiterate husband to obtain credit cards which she used and loans secured by a mortgage over her home. All in all she obtained $164,015.60 in the 76 transactions. She was confronted by her husband in January 2009 and, as a result, they separated. Police interviewed her on 19 November 2009 but did not lay charges until 22 October 2010. The proceedings did not come on for sentence, despite her pleas of guilty on her first appearance in the Magistrates Court, until February 2011.

90. The division of the matrimonial property would permit full restitution to be made for the funds taken. Ms Scerri spent most of the funds on the needs of her family. She was remorseful and assessed as unlikely to reoffend and was assessed as having been completely rehabilitated. She had some traffic offences on her record. She was sentenced to a Good Behaviour Order for 18 months.

91. These are very lenient sentences but for which there were special circumstances not present here.

92. I consider all the matters to which I have referred.

93. In my view, the seriousness of the offences require a term of imprisonment but not all of it to be served in fulltime custody because of the circumstances of Mr Allred and what I regard as his reasonable prospects of rehabilitation.

94. I have also been asked to make a reparation order, available under s 21B of the Crimes Act. I have set out the relevant principles in R v Steen [2015] ACTSC 259 at [51]- [52]. Given that Mr Allred has accepted that obligation and has prospects of employment, I am prepared to make the order.

95. I have also been asked to make an order that Mr Allred allow his fingerprints to be taken under s 3ZL of the Crimes Act. The purpose expressed to me was that identification is often an issue in fraud cases and the retention of his fingerprints can assist in the detection of such offences. No objection was taken to such an order being made and, although with some hesitation, I am prepared to make the order.

1. I convict you of between 8 February 2009 and 9 December 2010 by deception, dishonestly obtaining financial advantage from a Commonwealth entity, namely Comcare.

2. I sentence you to two years imprisonment from today.

3. I direct that you be released on 12 January 2016 after serving three months, upon giving security in the sum of $2,500 to be of good behaviour for a period of three years, and that you be subject to the supervision of the DirectorGeneral or her delegate and obey all reasonable directions of the person supervising you.

4. Under s 21B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), I order that you make reparation to Comcare by paying the sum of $64,418.62.

5. Under s 3ZL of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), I order that a constable of police be permitted to attend on Jon Allred at the Alexander Maconochie Centre on or before 12 November 2015 to allow impression of your fingerprints to be taken in accordance with that Act.

97. Mr Allred, that is the formal sentence I have made. I have assessed that the dishonesty that you were involved in justified a sentence of imprisonment of two years, but I only require you to serve three months in fulltime custody. I also have directed that you make reparation of the full amount. That is a matter that will now be dealt with civilly between you and Comcare. I have also ordered that your fingerprints be taken at the Alexander Maconochie Centre. If you do not do that, you commit an offence or if you do not allow that to be done, you commit an offence.

98. I am satisfied that after you have repaid the debt to society you are likely to not offend again in the community. Therefore, I have allowed a long period after the service of the three months imprisonment for you to be in the community under supervision. That supervision is intended to do two things. One is a degree of control, to see that you do not commit any further offences. If you commit any further offences, you can be brought back before the Court and you can be resentenced, including being sentenced to a further term of imprisonment.

99. Persons such as parole officers, however, are there also to assist you if things get tough. In life they do get tough and obviously, in your circumstances, they can get very tough. They are people who can provide some assistance to you. They know of agencies and persons who can provide support and assistance that can be made available to you.

I certify that the preceding ninety-nine [99] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Acting Chief Justice Refshauge.