The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW v Odisho

Catchwords: CONTEMPT – sentence for contempt – where contemnor pleaded guilty to charges of refusing to give evidence in a criminal trial – where re-trial of the criminal proceedings will raise the prospect that the contemnor will be required to give evidence again – where the contemnor’s attitude to giving evidence at the re-trial not known – whether it is in the interests of justice to adjourn the sentence proceedings until after that issue is clarified

Category: Procedural rulings

Parties: Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Sargon Odisho (Defendant)

Representation: Counsel:
D Kell SC and J Caldwell (Plaintiff)
T Weller-Wong (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor’s Office (Plaintiff)
SANS Law (Defendant)

File Number(s): 2024/236651

Publication restriction: Nil

JUDGMENT

1. HIS HONOUR: By summons filed on 27 June 2024**,** Sargon Odisho was charged with seven counts of contempt of this Court. The first six charges are effectively representative charges arising from Mr Odisho’s refusal to answer questions when giving evidence in the trial of Cengiz Coskun on 14 March 2022. The summons also alleges that Mr Odisho is guilty of contempt of this Court in that on 26 April 2022, when called as a witness in the trial of Cem Batak, he again refused to give evidence. The Prothonotary seeks declarations that Mr Odisho’s refusal to give evidence had a tendency to interfere with the administration of justice and seeks declarations to that effect.

2. In the events that have now occurred, Mr Odisho has pleaded guilty to these charges. The proceedings came before me today for the purpose of hearing submissions on sentence.

3. During the course of this morning, I was informed that, following the outcome of his appeal, a re-trial of Mr Batak’s case has now been scheduled to commence before Sweeney J on 17 November 2025 with a current estimate of 20 days. Although the question has not yet finally been determined, there is a prospect that Mr Odisho will once again be called to give evidence in that trial. Whether Mr Odisho agrees, or refuses, to do so at that time remains to be seen. However, it is not in my view appropriate either that he be asked now to state his position or that he does so.

4. There are potential implications for present purposes arising from what may transpire at the upcoming trial. It is unnecessary and unhelpful to speculate about what decision Mr Odisho may ultimately make. My present difficulty is that I am being asked to sentence Mr Odisho in the shadow of a trial in which any decision he may make about giving evidence, if asked to do so, remains unclear. It is of course not unusual that sentences are imposed upon the basis of predictions concerning future events. It is in my view preferrable where possible to arrive at a proper sentence with the benefit of what is known as opposed to what can only be predicted.

5. I am also troubled by the fact that proceeding to sentence Mr Odisho now, without the benefit of knowing what approach he takes at Mr Batak’s trial, may cause avoidable disadvantage to him. For example, an eventual decision to give evidence at the trial would more significantly inform issues such as remorse, specific and general deterrence and the risk of reoffending than bare predictions about what might then occur.

6. Mr Odisho is currently in gaol as the result of the revocation of parole on unrelated charges. He is also in custody as a remand prisoner for further serious charges for which he is currently bail refused. While it is obviously in the interests of justice that serious matters such as contempt are dealt with expeditiously where at all possible, there does not appear to me on balance to be any compelling reason why I should proceed to sentence Mr Odisho now. On the contrary, as I have attempted briefly to explain, the Court will be better placed to arrive at a just outcome if there is a relatively brief adjournment of the proceedings. Mr Odisho will also have an opportunity to consider his position in light of what happens later in the year.

7. I raised with counsel what was then my preliminary view that in the circumstances it would be preferable to adjourn today’s hearing. The Prothonotary opposed that course; Mr Odisho supported it.

8. I consider that the proceedings should be adjourned for directions at a time when some of the present uncertainties may have been resolved. I will make the following orders:

9. Adjourn the proceedings before me to 9.30am on Monday 15 December 2025 for mention.

10. Grant liberty to the parties to apply on 48 hours’ notice.

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