(ii) adopt, as in its discretion it considers proper, any findings, decision, judgment or reasons for judgment of any such court that may be relevant to the proceedings."

The Court did not refer any matter to the Tribunal or to the Master for investigation and report, and accordingly s89(5)(a) does not provide a basis for receiving and acting upon the findings of the Tribunal or of the Master.

However, in my opinion it is implicit in s89 that the Court may accept and act on the findings of the Tribunal. After all, the Court has heard an appeal against those findings, and has dismissed the appeal. The findings stand. Section 89(1) of the Act authorises the Society to institute disciplinary proceedings when the Tribunal:

"... after conducting an inquiry into the conduct of a legal practitioner recommends that disciplinary proceedings be commenced against the legal practitioner in the Supreme Court ..."

It would be peculiar if, in such a case, the Court had no choice but to rehear the evidence, or to go through the process of referring to the Tribunal, for investigation and report, the matters with which it had already dealt. It is for those reasons that I consider that s89(1) by implication authorises the Court to receive and to act upon findings of the Tribunal.

In any event, I consider that the Court has power to do that exercising its inherent jurisdiction, which is preserved in terms by s89(3) of the Act. In Re Maidment (unreported, 26 August 1992, Judgment No. S3583), this Court adopted and applied findings of the Tribunal. Although the Court does not state the precise basis upon which it did so, I consider that it must have followed the same process of reasoning that I have identified. In In Re Practitioners (1980) 26 SASR 275 Mitchell J, with whom Mohr J agreed firmly asserted the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to regulate the conduct of practitioners. In so doing (at 279) she referred to cases in which an order had been made, striking a name off the roll of practitioners, on the basis of findings made by a judge of the Court in a civil action. It appears that her Honour must have taken the view that, exercising the Court's inherent jurisdiction, it was at liberty to act upon findings made by a judge of the Court.

I therefore conclude that the Court is at liberty to act upon the findings of the Tribunal. Mr Jordan did not submit that the Court did not have power to do so.

The same process of reasoning supports the conclusion that the Court has power to adopt and act upon findings of the Master. In the case of the findings of the Master, there is the added consideration that the Master is a constituent member of the Court: see s7(1) of the Supreme Court Act. It would be curious if, acting under s89(5)(b), the Court could adopt findings made by a Court of another State or Territory, but could not adopt findings made by a member of this Court. I conclude that the Court has power to adopt and to act upon the findings of the Master.

In my opinion, the Court should adopt and act on the findings of the Tribunal and of the Master.

As to the Tribunal, it should do so because those findings were made upon a hearing of the charges in question, and the findings have survived the challenges made to them on the appeal against them. Considerations of convenience strongly favour the Court adopting the findings. There can be no unfairness to Mr Jordan in the Court doing so.

As to the findings of the Master, the position is a little different. The Master was not hearing disciplinary charges. He was determining the amount of costs properly claimable by Mr Jordan. However, the taxation of Mr Jordan's costs was conducted before the Master on the basis that the conduct of Mr Jordan was in issue. The Master was asked to find that Mr Jordan had acted incompetently, that he had misled the beneficiaries and that his evidence to the Master should be rejected. The Board and Mr Jordan joined issue on these matters before the Master. The taxation was conducted on the footing that these matters were in issue. The issues were thoroughly investigated before the Master. It is not a case of a taxation in which, incidentally or along the way, the Master has made some adverse findings or comments about the practitioner whose bill is the subject of taxation. The taxation was conducted on the basis that it was alleged that Mr Jordan had grossly overcharged the beneficiaries, had performed work unnecessarily due to his own incompetence, and had otherwise conducted himself inappropriately. In my opinion there is no unfairness to Mr Jordan in acting on the findings made in those circumstances. There can be no question of him having been taken by surprise. There can be no suggestion that he was not able to present his case in answer to those criticisms, subject to the complaints which he advanced on appeal, complaints that I have rejected.

I now return to the findings of the Tribunal. The Court will give considerable weight to the opinion of the Tribunal on the question of whether conduct is unprofessional. As it happens, I agree with the views of the Tribunal, and so in this case no question arises as to the extent to which, if at all, the Court is bound by the views expressed by the Tribunal.

The Tribunal has found Mr Jordan guilty of unprofessional conduct in a number of respects. Earlier in these reasons I summarised the Tribunal's findings. The question now is, whether, in the light of those findings, Mr Jordan's name should be struck off the roll of practitioners.

The Tribunal did not regard as particularly serious the unprofessional conduct constituted by the representation made to Ms R. Nor do I.

The Tribunal did regard the failure to respond adequately to requests by the Board for information as a serious departure from the required standards of conduct. So do I. The Tribunal said:

"The extent of the departure from acceptable standards was and is substantial and serious. We are referring here to the practitioner's failure to comply with the Tribunal's orders, his failure to respond to the Board's requests, his failure to obtain a practising certificate and his failure to lodge an audit report."

I agree with those remarks. A practitioner whose conduct is the subject of an inquiry by the Board has a duty to assist the Board in its inquiries: Johns v Law Society of NSW [1982] 2 NSWLR 1 at 6, Re Veron; Ex Parte Law Society of NSW (1966) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 136 at 141-142. That does not mean that the solicitor must disregard his own interests. But it does mean that there is an obligation upon the solicitor to respond to reasonable requests for information, particularly when one takes into account the fact that often the solicitor will have a better knowledge and understanding of the matter, the subject of the complaint, than will the client who complains. In the present case, Mr Jordan fell a long way short of meeting his obligation. By his conduct Mr Jordan has delayed, and to some extent frustrated the Board in its attempts to deal satisfactorily with the complaints made to it. I consider that his conduct manifests a plain disregard, over a sustained period, of his professional obligations when dealing with the Board and in relation to the other matters referred to in the passage just set out. Mr Jordan's attitude before the Tribunal appears to have been one of self justification and blame of others. The Tribunal rejected his explanations as in any sense adequate to justify his conduct.

I regard the charges of failing to prepare and deliver the two bills of costs that the Tribunal directed him to deliver, as serious matters. The directions were given in the context of complaints of overcharging. They represented a sensible approach to this disposition of the complaints. Mr Jordan's failure to comply with the directions is another instance of his failure to provide appropriate information and assistance to the Board and to the Tribunal in relation to those complaints. Mr Jordan's conduct has effectively prevented the Board and the Tribunal from dealing satisfactorily with the complaints. His failure to comply with the directions means also that the clients in question have not been able to ascertain the amount for which they are properly liable. There is a separate breach of the duty that Mr Jordan owes to his clients to provide adequate information to them of the charges that he has made to them.

The extract that I set out above from the Tribunal's reasons indicate that it took a serious view of the failure to obtain a practising certificate and the failure to lodge an audit report. Once again, I agree. These statutory requirements are not mere matters of form. They are an important part of the statutory scheme that regulates the practice of the law in the public interest: Mee Ling v Law Society of NSW [1974] 1 NSWLR 490. The practitioner was guilty of a conscious and sustained breach of these statutory provisions. Quite apart from their relevance to the regulation of the profession, these provisions are in any event statutory obligations imposed on a practitioner, and Mr Jordan's disregard of his legal obligations was a serious one.

I also regard Mr Jordan's conduct, in swearing an affidavit which contained the statement that he ought to have known was false, to be a serious breach of his professional obligations. It is incumbent upon legal practitioners to uphold the sanctity of the oath, and to take particular care when they make statements on oath. While Mr Jordan has not been found to have made a statement that he knew to be false, his conduct indicates an unacceptable degree of carelessness in the swearing of his affidavit.

Considering the findings of the Tribunal as a whole, it appears to me that Mr Jordan fails to understand or to accept his professional obligations in a number of respects. That is the only conclusion open when one considers the number of professional defaults, their seriousness, and the sustained nature of them. In my opinion this conclusion is confirmed by the inadequate explanations that Mr Jordan offered to the Tribunal, most of which were persisted in for this Court on appeal. Mr Jordan's behaviour exhibits an alarming preparedness to blame others for matters which are his responsibility, and a preparedness not to accept his personal responsibility in professional matters.

Overall, the findings of the Tribunal mean that there are a number of serious departures from the standard of conduct required of a legal practitioner. Some of them are serious in their nature, and made more serious by the prolonged period over which the failure to observe the required standard occurred. Others are less serious. In all matters Mr Jordan's conduct has clearly fallen short of accepted professional standards.

The mitigating circumstances put forward by Mr Jordan not only fail as a defence, but are entitled to little weight when considering the action that the Court should take. The matters put forward by Mr Jordan do not justify his conduct. Nor do they diminish its seriousness to any significant degree. In my opinion, the best that can be said in Mr Jordan's favour is that in the years in question he was clearly under considerable pressure, professionally and financially. But even when I make allowance for his circumstances, I consider that his conduct falls far short of what would be expected of a practitioner in those circumstances.

I consider that, on the findings of the Tribunal, Mr Jordan's name should be struck off the roll of practitioners. His conduct cannot be regarded as a temporary aberration, or as due to particular circumstances, and so unlikely to be repeated. His conduct is indicative of a failure to understand and to accept the required standards of conduct. In my opinion Mr Jordan has demonstrated that he is unfit to practise.

There is a finding by the Master of serious delay in the obtaining of a grant of probate. I do not consider that, in itself, that constitutes unprofessional conduct. It may be that the failure to obtain probate until June of 1990 did represent such a neglect of his duties as solicitor, that a finding of unprofessional conduct should be made, but I do not consider that the findings of the Master are clear enough for this finding to be made.

There is a finding by the Master that Mr Jordan lied to his clients at the meeting in September 1989. That is a serious matter, and clearly amounts to unprofessional conduct. The Master has also found that, in a number of respects, Mr Jordan's evidence was "utterly unreliable and ... deceitful", and that Mr Jordan did this to "cover up his own demonstrated deficiencies". I consider that that amounts to a finding of unprofessional conduct. The Master has found that, in an attempt to justify his own charges and his delay, Mr Jordan has put a false construction on his dealings with this clients.

In relation to Mr Jordan's costs, the Master found that what had taken place was "a certain lack of competence and overcharging on his part" rather than "any deliberate and fraudulent intent to 'milk' the estate ...". I do not consider that there is a basis for a finding of unprofessional conduct in that respect.

In submissions, counsel for the Law Society initially suggested that the Court should be prepared to act on the basis of certain matters not dealt with by the Master, but ultimately desisted from that suggestion.

The Master's findings to which I have referred as amounting to findings of unprofessional conduct indicate that, when his own interests are at stake, Mr Jordan is prepared to attempt to shift blame from himself, in an unprofessional manner, and that he puts little weight upon his duties as a practitioner to be frank and honest in his dealings with the Court. It is clear that, in this respect, Mr Jordan's conduct has fallen short of the standard required of a legal practitioner. In that respect the Master's finding provide further support for the conclusion that Mr Jordan's name should be removed from the roll of practitioners. However, as I have indicated, I consider that the Tribunal's findings are a sufficient basis for that order.

For those reasons, in my opinion, the orders sought by the Law Society should be made.

In my opinion the appeal against the findings of the Tribunal should be dismissed.

I would not interfere with the findings of fact made by the Master in taxing Mr Jordan's bill of costs. I would allow Mr Jordan the opportunity to attempt to persuade the Court that the review of the taxation should be referred to a single judge to consider particular items dealt with in the course of the taxation, but indicate that my tentative view is that in view of the time that has elapsed, and all the circumstances, it would be inappropriate to do so unless there is a significant matter of principle at issue.

I would order that Mr Jordan's name be struck off the roll of practitioners.

I can see no reason why the Court should not order that Mr Jordan pay the costs of the Board and of the Law Society in connection with the proceedings, but would hear Mr Jordan on that matter before making an order.

For the reasons canvassed by the Chief Justice, I agree that the appellant should be struck of the roll.

I add, that I cannot imagine any justification for several of his actions. There is no excuse for lying to clients, little reason to justify taking 16 months to obtain probate of a simple estate, while almost ten years later the administration of the estate is not complete. Mr Jordan's representation to Ms P in using confidential information of a past client is quite unprofessional. His overall contempt for clients shewn by delay and overcharging is utterly reprehensible.

Jordan has done very little to help himself by putting obstacles in the way of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal and the Legal Practitioners Conduct Board. This obstruction alone is enough to have him struck off. His contempt shewn by not replying to letters, by not taking out a practising certificate or having his trust account audited, indicates his attitude to the legal profession. Lastly, not only has he made the job of the Tribunal and Board exceedingly difficult, he has angered at least 14 clients who remain understandably dissatisfied with the legal profession. At the least Jordan should have cooperated in these investigations for the sake of his clients.

Throughout the whole sorry history of these matters Mr Jordan has delayed and obstructed everyone at every turn. Whether he has acted deliberately or through a lack of appreciation of what he was doing, neither the public nor the legal profession should have to put up with such a man in practice.

I have had the advantage of reading the draft reasons for judgment of the Chief Justice. I agree with the reasons he has expressed.

I agree that the appeal against the findings of the Tribunal should be dismissed.

I agree that there should not be any interference with the findings of fact made by the Master in taxing Mr Jordan's bill of costs but Mr Jordan should be given the opportunity to attempt to persuade the court that the review of taxation should be referred to a single judge.

I agree that Mr Jordan's name should be struck off the role of practitioners.