[2025] NTSC 25
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of the NT
2025-04-23
Blokland J, Legislation J
Original judgment source is linked above.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - Joinder and severance - whether one count of
gross indecency properly joined with two counts of assault with
circumstance of aggravation - newly enacted presumption under s 341B of
the Criminal Code applied to domestic violence offences - whether
directions could overcome prejudice inherent in sexual offences - held,
counts properly joined - severance application dismissed.
Justice Legislation (Domestic and Family Violence Act) 2023
De Jesus v The Queen [1986] HCA 65; (1986) 61 ALJR 1; HML v The Queen (2008) 235
CLR 334; KRM v R [2001] 206 CLR 22; Packett v The King (1937) 58 CLR
R v FDP (2009) 74 NSWLR 649; R v Hofschuster 1992) NTSC 23; R v
Johnston [2016] NTSC 57; R v LM [2017] NTSC 81; R v O'Brien [2017]
NTSC 34; R v PJMS [2011] NTSC 48; R v TJB [1998] 4 VR 621; Sutton v
The Queen [1984] HCA 5; (1984) 152 CLR 528; The King v Swan [2024] NTSC 82; The
Queen v LM [2017] NTSC 81; Wilson v The Queen [1970] HCA 17; (1970) 123 CLR 334;
Respondent: Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions
The King v XN [2025] NTSC 25
[1] These are reasons for a ruling made on 5 December 2024.
[2] The accused faced three counts on an ex officio indictment across two files.
[3] He initially faced a single count of gross indecency upon EB, a child, contrary to s 127(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. That offence was alleged to have been committed between 1 December 2022 and 29 January 2023.
[4] He then faced an additional two counts of assault with circumstances of aggravation, contrary to s 188(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code. Both of those offences were alleged to have taken place on 18 March 2023.
[5] The accused was served with a notice to appear on 24 October 2023. Count one was listed for trial on 13-17 January 2025. A date to pre-record the evidence of child witnesses was listed for 11 and 12 December 2024. The January 13-17 trial date was fixed at a call-over on 11 July 2024.
[6] With respect to counts 2 and 3, the offending was alleged to have taken place on 18 March 2023. The accused was given a notice to appear on 16 April 2023. Counts 2 and 3 were originally set down for hearing in the Local Court on 2 July 2024. The hearing was due to take place on 11 November 2024 in the Darwin Local Court.
[7] On 24 October 2024, the Crown wrote to the Local Court advising of the intention to deal with counts 2 and 3 by way of filing an ex officio indictment. The proposed indictment was attached to the letter of 24 October 2024. All three counts were included on the one indictment. It is not clear why defence counsel was not informed of this development at that time. Defence counsel should have been informed of the email to the Court seeking to list the matter for mention so that the hearing could be vacated.[1] The Local Court vacated the hearing in Chambers on 25 October 2024.
[8] Following a pre-trial mention in this Court on 1 November 2024, the matter was listed for a voir dire on 19 November 2024 on the issues of joinder and severance of count 1 from counts 2 and 3.
[9] The Crown sought to have all counts on the indictment dealt with together at the one trial scheduled to commence on 13 January 2025.
[10] Counsel for the Crown provided an updated Crown Case Outline on 8 November 2024 which included the facts it would seek to prove on all three counts. It was not sought to prove any tendency or cross admissibility of counts.
[11] The accused contended counts 2 and 3 were improperly or erroneously joined in the same indictment as count 1. Even if properly joined, it was submitted the indictment should be severed on the basis of prejudice which would flow to the accused which could not be cured by direction.
[12] It is necessary to consider these rulings in the context of the Crown case and the issues as far as they were known prior to the commencement of the trial. The accused denied the conduct alleged in all counts. The Court was provided with the following helpful Crown Case Outline:
[13] While it was unfortunate that defence counsel were not notified of the Crown's intention to join all charges in the one indictment when the assault charges were filed in the Local Court, that omission cannot operate to exclude proper consideration of the joinder of the charges.
[14] Counsel for the accused argued the charges were never properly joined under s 309(1) of the Criminal Code. Section 309(1) relevantly provides charges for more than one offence may be joined in the same indictment if those charges 'are founded on the same facts or are, or form part of, a series of offences of the same or similar character or a series of offences committed in the prosecution of a single purpose.'
[15] Reliance was placed on The Queen v LM[2] where Chief Justice Grant stated:
The meaning of the word 'series' in this context has been said to be somewhat vague, but connotes some connection between the crimes; relates more to the legal character or components of the offences than to the facts alleged by the prosecution in each particular instance; and requires some nexus or similarity between the offences which in all the circumstances of the case enables them to be described as a series see: R v PJMS [2011] NTSC 48 at [10].[3]
[16] Counsel for the accused submitted count 1, a sexual offence, had no similarity to counts 2 and 3, neither the legal components nor the character of the offences had relevant similarities. Count 1 was alleged to have taken place between 1 December 2022 and 29 January 2023, counts 2 and 3, on 18 March 2023. Counts 2 and 3 were not sexual offences. As the allegations in counts 2 and 3 took place immediately after one another, it was acknowledged those two counts could properly be considered a series or a course of conduct. As such, it was submitted counts 2 and 3 were not based on the same facts as count 1, were not similar in nature, did not form a series of offences and were not properly joined.
[17] Reliance was also placed on The Queen v PJMS ('PJMS').[4] In PJMS, counts 1 and 2 involved charges of indecent dealing with a child. The third count was an assault with circumstances of aggravation against the same child. Justice Mildren found the third count to be improperly joined with the indecent dealing charge. The core allegation contained in the first two counts was that the accused squeezed the child complainant's vagina. Count 3 was alleged to have taken place around one year later, the allegation being that the accused punched the child on the arm. Mildren J referred to the need for joined counts to be of a similar character, have some nexus and that there be elements of similarity which in all the circumstances enables them to be described as a series:[5]
So far as count 3 is concerned, apart from the fact that the offence was committed allegedly on the same victim it is hard to see how they are part of a series of offences of the same or a similar character as the other offences. Count 1 and 2 are both sexual offences. Count 3 is not a sexual offence at all. It is separated in time by over a year from count 2 and two years from count 1. It occurred in a different place and under entirely different circumstances.
[18] His Honour rejected arguments put on behalf of the Crown contending there was commonality between the offences as the assault involved touching and there was a history of threats and emotional control.[6]
[19] Each case must be considered on its own facts. Although it is acknowledged here that count 1 involves sexual offending and counts 2 and 3 do not, the inquiry on whether all counts are properly joined must go further than mere categorisation. The elements of gross indecency require physical touching to be proven. As above in the outline, it will be alleged there was "touching sort of close" and stroking before the sexual acts constituting the charge took place. Effectively, count 1 does represent applications of force without consent with an additional sexual element. Consequently, count 1 possesses similar elements as counts 2 and 3. At the most there was three and half months between the alleged conduct in count 1 and counts 2 and 3, although the time between the offences could have been as close as six weeks. The offending was alleged to have occurred in the same house, although different rooms, with the same complainant and the same alleged lack of action on the part of EB's mother in the face of complaints from her daughter.
[20] In short, PJMS can be distinguished given it was not a case where all of the offending took place in one family home. Here, all of the offending took place in the family home. The assault alleged in PJMS took place in a car at a petrol station. The delay between the counts was much more significant.
[21] An additional factor which the Crown submitted was relevant to regarding the offences being of the same character was that although all offences were of a sexual or violent nature, they could all be characterised as 'domestic violence' offences as sexual abuse in the circumstances here is a form of domestic violence.
[22] Section 5(1)(b) of the Domestic and Family Violence Act includes conduct specified in s 5(2) in circumstances where 'the person had previously committed a sexual act against (or had sexual contact with) the other person without consent'. The conduct specified in s 5(2) includes 'physical or sexual abuse' (s 5(2)(a)). Section 5(3) adds that 'Exposing a child with whom a person is in a domestic relationship to conduct mentioned in subsection (2), including to the effects of the conduct on another person, is also domestic violence.' As the accused was in a relationship with EB's mother and was regarded as her stepfather, residing with her mother at the same residence, the accused and EB's relationship readily comes within the definition of 'domestic relationship' within s 9 of the Domestic and Family Violence Act.
[23] Relevantly, s 9 provides a person is in a 'domestic relationship' with another person if the person:
(a) is or has been in a family relationship with the other person; or
(b) has or had the custody or guardianship of, or right of access to, the other person; or
(c) is or has been subject to the custody or guardianship of the other person or the other person has or has had a right of access to the person; or
(d) ordinarily or regularly lives, or has lived with:
(ii) someone else who is or was in a family relationship with the other person; or
(e) is or has been in a family relationship with a child of the other person; or
(g) is or has been in a carer's relationship with the other person.
[24] In the circumstances of this particular case, it is entirely appropriate to characterise all of the offending as domestic violence offending.
[25] The Crown also submitted all offences were committed with a single purpose, namely to occasion domestic violence towards EB in the exercise of emotional control over EB which took place within the family home. On the Crown case, as a matter of inference this was open and taking the Crown case at its highest does provide support to conclude there was a relevant single purpose.
[26] A further consideration favouring joinder is reliance on the same body of evidence to establish the terms of the various relationships: between the accused and EB, her mother and at times sisters for each of the charges. The same body of evidence would provide context for each of the allegations made and the events leading up to the incidents forming the basis of the charges and beyond, including complaint. While the Crown was not relying on any tendency, some cross admissibility would be allowed in as much as it showed why various witnesses acted as they did, to prove the nature of the relevant relationship and to rebut possible defences such as accident.[7] In other words, there was clearly a case for mutual admissibility for a non-tendency purpose in the sense and for the purposes considered in HML v The Queen:[8]
[27] In my view there was a compelling case for joinder under s 309 of the Criminal Code. In any event, the relatively recent addition of s 341B to the Criminal Code creates a presumption that domestic violence offences will be tried together. That presumption became law on 25 March 2024 through the Justice Legislation (Domestic and Family Violence Act) 2023. As to whether the presumption applied to this case, while the usual rule is that procedural provisions apply prospectively, it may have been possible to argue that in some circumstances substantive rights are affected by s 341B. The alleged offending took place before the commencement of s 341B and the relevant indictment was not filed until 24 October 2024, after its commencement. Although the Explanatory Statement appears to be to the contrary:[9]
The intent of the Bill to only apply to offences which are committed after the Amendment Act has commenced; section 478 of the Criminal Code makes plain the provision applies to indictments presented after the commencement of s 341B, even if the offence charged precedes it:
Section 341B, as inserted by the amending Act, applies in relation to an indictment presented or filed in court after the commencement, even if an offence charged in the indictment is alleged to have been committed before the commencement.
[28] The presumption of joint trials applied to this matter as the indictment was filed on 24 October 2024 and the conduct alleged fell within the definition of 'domestic violence' as defined by the Domestic and Family Violence Act.
[29] In terms of the application to sever, counsel for the accused argued counts 2 and 3 should be severed from Count 1, notwithstanding the Court may take the view that charges were properly joined. Section 341(1) of the Criminal Code permits separate trials if the Court is of the opinion an accused may be prejudiced in their defence; the accused may be embarrassed in their defence or for any other reason it is desirable to direct a separate trial.
[30] The discretion will be guided by a number of considerations which include:[10]
[31] As was said in R v O'Brien[11] concerning the presumption with respect to sexual offences in s 341A, 'prejudice' in this context 'means the danger of improper use of the evidence. It does not mean its legitimate tendency to inculpate.' Similarly, the loss by an accused of the strategic advantage of conducting his or her defence in each trial in isolation does not of itself constitute prejudice in the material sense. Something more is required, such as the misuse of the evidence on one charge to support a conviction for an unrelated charge for which it would be inadmissible.
[32] Counsel for the accused drew attention to McHugh J's statement in KRM v R[12] determining the factors relevant to severance: 'Ordinarily, however, the court should order separate trials where ... the joinder of charges creates a risk of prejudice.' Further, it was pointed out that in R v TJB,[13] Callaway JA provided guidance by the following:
[33] Further, in R v Hofschuster[14] Mildren J stated:
That the power of the Court under s 341 of the Criminal Code to order separate trials is not limited to a situation where an accused may be prejudiced or embarrassed in his defence, but rather: 'the court may so order, notwithstanding that no prejudice or embarrassment is demonstrate by the accused, if it is desirable 'for any other reason'.
[34] It is accepted here, which was a central part of the accused's submissions, that some sexual offences are particularly likely to arouse prejudice against which direction to a jury is unlikely to guard.[15]
[35] This was recognised in De Jesus v R, when Gibbs J said:[16]
Sexual cases, however, are peculiarly likely to arouse prejudice against which direction to the jury is unlikely to guard.
[36] Similar, sentiments were expressed in R v TJB where Callaway J stated:[17]
At least some sexual offences, particularly those of an unnatural nature or repellent character like offences against young children, are peculiarly likely to arouse prejudice. The law cannot shut its eyes to the facts of life.
[37] While I acknowledge those authorities and acknowledge the problem of prejudice in particularly demeaning behaviour described in some sexual offences, that sentiment cannot be applied in a way which would effectively create a counter presumption, contrary to the presumption in 341B concerning domestic violence offences.
[38] On behalf of the accused it was submitted that should the indictment not be severed, there is a real risk that the accused will be substantially prejudiced and embarrassed by a jury being made aware of the following:[18]
[39] As to (i), as above, the Court cannot ignore and must apply the presumption in cases which are defined as domestic violence cases. It cannot be the case that whenever there is a sexual offence, a counter presumption will apply, although it is accepted the nature of the offending is a consideration. As to (ii), the circumstances there described remain a possibility in some cases. However, here the allegations, although serious, are not of such a grotesque order that emotions and irrational thinking are likely to subsume directions given at various stages in the trial. As to (iii), this is not a case where the enormity of potential prejudice will prevail against what will be fairly standard directions. As to (iv), while I agree the accused should have been informed earlier of the joinder of all charges, the evidential material which forms the backdrop of the allegations is the same throughout. Arrangements will need to be made to ensure the accused and counsel can prepare. It is accepted it is currently difficult for counsel to obtain instructions from people in custody. Such difficulties may require bail to be considered afresh when it has been previously refused.
[40] Counsel for the accused also submitted[19] disclosure of all allegations against the accused were likely to provoke an emotional reaction, which would inevitably tend to show bad character or moral shortcomings on his part. It may also incite revulsion in members of the jury. It was said there is a real risk that the joinder of charges will distract the jury and the risk of misuse of each charge is very high as it has the potential to allow the jury to improperly engage in propensity reasoning and draw an illegitimate conclusion that the defendant is therefore guilty across all counts. This was said to be so particularly given tendency reasoning would not be deployed.
[41] As above, the misuse of evidence refers to the danger of improper use and not a tendency to inculpate. There is common background evidence and evidence relevant to the relationships between various witnesses and the accused. That evidence was important even though it is not to be used as tendency evidence. The nature of the alleged offending, although serious, is not at a level where a level of disgust would be aroused such that the jury could not concentrate on their task, appropriately directed.
[42] The ruling was against severance. All charges proceeded in the one trial which commenced on January 13, 2025.
[43] The accused was found not guilty of all charges at the conclusion of the trial. My own observation was that certain witnesses were readily discredited on the basis of unreliability. The primary focus of the witnesses was count 1. The issues of reliability and credibility carried over and were relevant to counts 2 and 3. A Markuleski direction was given. As a cautionary tale, the accused in this case may well have been in a more favourable position having had all charges dealt with together. A tactical advantage is likely to have been lost if there had indeed been two trials.
[1] Outline of defence submissions on joinder and severance, 18 November 2024 at 4.
[2] [2017] NTSC 81 at [36].
[3] Packett v The King [1937] HCA 53; (1937) 58 CLR 190 at 207; Sutton v The Queen [1984] HCA 5; (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 540-541; De Jesus v The Queen [1986] HCA 65; (1986) 61 ALJR 1 at 9.
[5] [2011] NTSC 48 at [12].
[6] [2011] NTSC 48 at [13].
[7] In the sense of evidence admitted in R v FDP (2009) 74 NSWLR 649; Wilson v The Queen [1970] HCA 17; (1970) 123 CLR 334.
[8] [2008] HCA 16; (2008) 235 CLR 334; see also, The King v Swan [2024] NTSC 82 at [19].
[9] Outline of defence submissions on joinder and severance, 18 November 2024 at [24].
[10] R v LM [2017] NTSC 81, (Grant CJ).
[11] [2017] NTSC 34 at [11], (Grant CJ).
[12] [2001] 206 CLR 22 at 235.
[13] [1998] 4 VR 621 at 622.
[15] R v Johnston [2016] NTSC 57 at [11].
[18] Outline of defence submissions on joinder and severance at [35].
[19] Outline of defence submissions on joinder and severance at [36].
The King
XN [2025] NTSC 25
(1986) 61 ALJR 1
(2008) 235
CLR 334
(2009) 74 NSWLR 649
(1984) 152 CLR 528
(1970) 123 CLR 334
(1937) 58 CLR 190
(2008) 235 CLR 334