The Hills Shire Council v Stankovic

Legal representation

1. In almost all of the proceedings the Council relied on, Mr Stankovic has appeared unrepresented. One exception was in Stankovic v The Hills Shire Council [2012] NSWSC 738, which Adamson J dismissed. Then he was represented by Dr Walsh, who appeared for him again on this application. Another was on an application in Stankovic v The Hills Shire Council [2015] NSWCA 279 at [13], when leave to appeal from the judgment given by Pain J in the Land and Environment Court on 14 March 2005 was refused. Mr Stankovic was also represented in some applications made in respect of his bankruptcy.
2. This is relevant because firstly, there was in this case no objection to the tender of the judgments on which the Council relied to make out its case. Secondly, because in this case there was no issue lying between the parties as to the proper construction of the Vexatious Proceedings Act. Thirdly, because a conclusion that particular proceedings are vexatious is more difficult to reach where a party was legally represented, as was conceded by the Attorney General in The Attorney General for the State of New South Wales v Mohareb [2016] NSWSC 1823 at [65].

The parties' cases

1. The Council's case rested on some 41 judgments published since 2005 by the Land and Environment Court, the Federal Magistrates Court, the Federal Court, the District Court, the Court of Appeal and this Court, in proceedings to which Mr Stankovic was a party. Of those, 23 were particularly relied on.
2. Prior to the hearing and outside of the time directed, Mr Stankovic had prepared an extensive affidavit, while he was still unrepresented. There he deposed to his views as to what had transpired in various of the proceedings on which the Council relied; the errors he believes that were made in the proceedings in the Land and Environment Court, Federal Magistrates Court and Court of Appeal; and why the orders sought by the Council should not be made. Much of this affidavit was objected to and finally not read, Mr Stankovic being legally represented at the hearing.
3. It was not finally contended for Mr Stankovic that the evidence was not capable of establishing that he had instituted and conducted "vexatious proceedings" as defined in s 6 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act, or that he had done so frequently. It was thus acknowledged that he faced difficulties resisting the orders sought, given the decisions relied on, but it was urged that the Court should accept that his case was not hopeless.
4. The case pressed for Mr Stankovic as to the Court's exercise of its discretion included that: 1. The Court should not to take into account judgments given in the Family Court proceedings commenced by his wife; 2. The Court should "minimise" its consideration of proceedings he had commenced against his lawyers, which had arisen out of disputes over legal costs; 3. The Court should take into account Mr Stankovic's lack of legal representation in most of the proceedings to which he was a party; 4. Mr Stankovic did not want to be a permanent litigant, but wanted to resolve "this one issue", although it was not entirely clear what that issue was; 5. Referring to Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481, it was contended that Mr Stankovic had not sought to harass, annoy or embarrass anyone and that he had not made applications for purposes other than having a court adjudicate upon the issues to which they gave rise and that he had only ever sought to "get a just result in relation to his financial position"; 6. If the Court was minded to make an order under the Act, it should not "close the door completely" on the pursuit of the issues he has pursued to this point; 7. Accordingly, any order made should still leave it open for Mr Stankovic to institute proceedings against the Council, or any other party, on any ground that had not already been ruled upon by the Court of Appeal. He should also be permitted to bring further proceedings in relation to matters he had already litigated, if he obtained new evidence, such as evidence proving fraud.

Issues

1. It was thus common ground that whether the orders pressed would be made depended on: 1. The Court being satisfied that: 1. Mr Stankovic had instituted or conducted "vexatious proceedings" as defined in s 6 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act; and 2. Mr Stankovic had instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings "frequently". 1. The Court being satisfied that it should exercise its discretion to make vexatious proceedings orders against Mr Stankovic.
2. For reasons which follow I am satisfied that these issues must be resolved in the Council's favour, it having established as it has that Mr Stankovic's ongoing pursuit of his views as to the judgment given by Pain J in 2005, his later bankruptcy and the sale of his Kellyville property, in both proceedings he has brought and interlocutory applications he has made in other proceedings, has involved the institution and conduct of "vexatious proceedings" as defined; that he has done so frequently; and that the circumstances are such that the Court's discretion must be exercised, albeit not in the form of the orders pressed.

Mr Stankovic has instituted or conducted "vexatious proceedings"

1. The Council particularly relied on judgments in: 1. Proceedings brought in relation to sequestration and other orders made against Mr Stankovic by Raphael FM on 12 May 2009. Those orders were dealt with by: 1. Emmett J in Stankovic v The Hills Shire Council (No 3) [2012] FCA 523, who dismissed Mr Stankovic's application to file and serve a notice of appeal against Raphael FM's orders, because the grounds advanced lacked any prospect of success; 2. Emmett J in Stankovic v Van Der Velde (No 2) [2012] FCA 1437, who refused Mr Stankovic's application to adjourn the hearing of a cross-claim filed by the trustees of his bankrupt estate, given the time that had elapsed since the sequestration order was made; 3. Emmett J in Stankovic v Van Der Velde (No 3) [2013] FCA 183, who dismissed Mr Stankovic's application to have the orders made on 14 December 2012 stayed, because he failed to establish any grounds to justify a stay; 4. Raphael FM in Stankovic v Baulkham Hills Shire Council [2013] FMCA 178, who refused Mr Stankovic's application to re-open the sequestration proceedings, because Mr Stankovic had not established any grounds justifying a re-opening; 5. The Full Federal Court in Stankovic v Van Der Velde [2013] FCAFC 57, which dismissed Mr Stankovic's appeal against Emmett J's 14 December 2012 judgment, Mr Stankovic having failed to establish any error; 6. Foster J in Stankovic v The Hills Shire Council [2013] FCA 652, who dismissed Mr Stankovic's application for the annulment of his bankruptcy and restoration of the Kellyville property to him, or alternatively, $35,000,000 damages from the Council and five other parties, because it had no prospects of success; 7. Yates J in Stankovic v The Hills Shire Council [2013] FCA 765, who refused leave to appeal Foster J's judgment, because Mr Stankovic failed to establish any arguable error; 8. Emmett J in Kent and Orlizki, in the matter of the Bankrupt Estate of Milovan Stankovic [2012] FCA 333, who dismissed Mr Stankovic's application to review a decision made by the trustees of his bankrupt estate, because the trustees had acted validly. 1. Proceedings brought in the Land and Environment Court, this Court and the Court of Appeal in relation to the Kellyville property; its sale to Eric Newham Namul Pty Ltd by Mr Stankovic's trustees in bankruptcy; and damages arising from his loss of the property, which were dealt with by: 1. Adamson J in Stankovic v The Hills Shire Council [2012] NSWSC 738, who dismissed Mr Stankovic's statement of claim because it failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action and was an abuse of process; 2. The Court of Appeal in Stankovic v Namul Pty Ltd [2013] NSWCA 41, which dismissed Mr Stankovic's appeal to stay orders made by Rein J on 14 February 2013 in favour of Namul Pty Ltd, because Mr Stankovic had failed to establish that the appeal had sufficient prospects of success; 3. The Court of Appeal in Stankovic v Namul Pty Ltd [2013] NSWCA 276, which dismissed Mr Stankovic's appeal to set aside orders made by Rein J on 14 February 2013, because no error was established; 4. Davies J in Stankovic v State of NSW [2016] NSWSC 18, who dismissed proceedings brought by Mr Stankovic against the State of NSW and the NSW Land and Environment Court, as well as two Notices of Motion filed by Mr Stankovic, because they were an attempt to re-litigate issues already resolved and were an abuse of process; 5. Davies J in Stankovic v State of NSW (No 2) [2016] NSWSC 335, who ordered Mr Stankovic to pay costs, in a gross sum, to the State of NSW; 6. The Court of Appeal in Stankovic v State of New South Wales [2016] NSWCA 168, which dismissed Mr Stankovic's appeal against Davies J's judgment, because he failed to establish any error; 7. The Court of Appeal in Stankovic v The Hills Shire Council [2015] NSWCA 279, which dismissed Mr Stankovic's application for leave to appeal Pain J's 2005 judgment because no error was established. It also dismissed Mr Stankovic's application to inspect the Land and Environment Court file, because it was hopeless and unarguable; 8. Moore J in Namul Pty Ltd v The Hills Shire Council [2016] NSWLEC 152, who dismissed Mr Stankovic's application to be joined in Land and Environment Court proceedings between the Council and Namul Pty Ltd; 9. The Court of Appeal in Stankovic v The Hills Shire Council [2017] NSWCA 49, which dismissed Mr Stankovic's appeal against Moore J's judgment, because it lacked any prospect of success. 1. Proceedings brought in the District Court and this Court relating to damages sought by Mr Stankovic against his former solicitors, which were dealt with by: 1. Harrison J in Stankovic v Magee t/as Armstrong Legal [2014] NSWSC 448, who dismissed an application made by Mr Stankovic seeking the Court to order that "dismiss" meant "the case is dismissed"; 2. Davies J in Stankovic v Peter Michael Magee t/as Armstrong Legal [2014] NSWSC 873, who dismissed Mr Stankovic's claim for $35,000,000 in damages against his former solicitor Mr Magee, his application for a trial by jury; and application for orders previously rejected by Harrison J, because they were entirely hopeless and doomed to fail; 3. Kearns DCJ in Peter Magee t/as Armstrong Legal v Stankovic (District Court (NSW), Kearns DCJ, 10 December 2015, unrep), who dismissed a cross-claim brought by Mr Stankovic against Mr Magee for $35,000,000 in damages; 4. Beech-Jones J in Stankovic v Hockey [2014] NSWSC 1019, who struck out, with leave to re-plead, a statement of claim filed by Mr Stankovic seeking $35,000,000 in damages against another of his former solicitors, Mr Hockey; 5. Button J in Stankovic v Hockey [2014] NSWSC 1455, who struck out, with four weeks leave to re-plead, Mr Stankovic's Amended Statement of Claim against Mr Hockey; 6. Harrison J in Stankovic v Hockey [2016] NSWSC 31, who dismissed Mr Stankovic's damages claim against Mr Hockey with costs, because it lacked any foundation and was wholly misconceived.
2. In addition to these judgments, the Council also submitted that when exercising its discretion to make the orders sought, the Court should take into account three Family Court judgments to which Mr Stankovic was a party, because he had pursued his case in those proceedings on the same grounds as the proceedings that they argued were vexatious.
3. There was no issue between the parties that Mr Sankovic was a party to the Family Court proceedings, but whether the judgments were relevant to the exercise of the Court's discretion was not agreed.
4. I consider that the Family Court judgments are relevant, evidencing as they do that in those proceedings Mr Stankovic has also pursued a course by which he calls into question decisions, including that of the Court of Appeal and Full Federal Court, by which he is bound. That this was so, was, in truth, not disputed by Mr Stankovic.
5. The evidence well established that Mr Stankovic commenced "vexatious proceedings" as defined in s 6 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act to mean: "(a) proceedings that are an abuse of the process of a court or tribunal, and (b) proceedings instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose, and (c) proceedings instituted or pursued without reasonable ground, and (d) proceedings conducted in a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose."
6. The word "proceedings" is defined in s 4 to mean: "(a) any cause, matter, action, suit, proceedings, trial, complaint or inquiry of any kind within the jurisdiction of any court or tribunal, and (b) any proceedings (including any interlocutory proceedings) taken in connection with or incidental to proceedings pending before a court or tribunal, and (c) any calling into question of a decision, whether or not a final decision, of a court or tribunal, and whether by appeal, challenge, review or in another way."
7. It was Pain J in Stankovic v The Hills Shire Council (No 2) [2007] NSWLEC 870 at [16] - [20] who first discussed the principle of finality in litigation in proceedings brought by Mr Stankovic. In the appeal from her Honour's judgment, the Court of Appeal set out a summary of the proceedings and its procedural history and affirmed the validity of the Land and Environment Court's reinstatement of the 2005 proceedings: see Stankovic v The Hills Shire Council [2015] NSWCA 279 at [4] - [16].
8. Mr Stankovic did not appeal that judgment, but has plainly never accepted the conclusions reached, as recent judgments of the Court of Appeal confirm. Nor has he accepted conclusions reached in other judgments in relation to the claims which he has variously advanced, as to the invalidity of his bankruptcy and its consequences. The views which Mr Stankovic has long held are views which he continues to advance, even in the affidavit which he swore in these proceedings. They, too, plainly call into question judgments which bind him, including those given by the Court of Appeal and the Full Federal Court.
9. In the result, it also cannot be doubted that Mr Stankovic has "instituted" a considerable number of vexatious proceedings, that term being defined in s 5(1) to include: "(a) for civil proceedings - the taking of a step or the making of an application that may be necessary before proceedings can be started against or in relation to a party, and … (d) for civil or criminal proceedings or proceedings before a tribunal - the taking of a step or the making of an application that may be necessary to start an appeal in relation to the proceedings or to a decision made in the course of the proceedings."
10. Section 5(2) provides that a reference to instituting proceedings includes instituting: "(a) proceedings generally, and (b) proceedings in relation to a particular matter, and (c) proceedings against or in relation to a particular person, and (d) proceedings in a particular court or tribunal."
11. The evidence also establishes that Mr Stankovic has commenced vexatious proceedings "frequently", as that word is used in s 8(1)(a). That is a relative concept, the meaning of which turns on its context. Whether such proceedings have been commenced "frequently" thus depends upon "the quality of the vexatiousness of a proceeding and the nature of the proceeding itself, inform the assessment of frequency": Potier v Attorney General in and for the State of New South Wales (2015) 89 NSWLR 284; [2015] NSWCA 129 at [114] - [118]. The considerations there discussed favour "'frequently' being a relatively low threshold".
12. As I will explain, the judgments the Council relied on establish that this threshold has been met in Mr Stankovic's case. On the evidence there can be no question that despite his legal representation at the hearing of some of the proceedings in question, he has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia.
13. It follows that the Court's discretion to make orders under s 8 of the Act against him arises to be exercised.
14. The reasons for those conclusions are as follows.

The dismissal of the Land and Environment Court proceedings in relation to the Kellyville property

1. In the proceedings relied on, Mr Stankovic has repeatedly contended that Lloyd J's dismissal of the Land and Environment Court proceedings on 16 February 2005 was final and that any proceedings pursued after that dismissal, were invalid, void or of no effect.
2. That argument was plainly wrong, given the powers exercised by the Court. It was rejected by the Court of Appeal in Stankovic v The Hills Shire Council and Namul Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 279, which found on the material before it, that there was no hint of any irregularity in the proceedings in the Land and Environment Court being reinstated and that Mr Stankovic's challenge to the validity of the proceedings before Pain J was misconceived.
3. Neither that judgment, or any other given by the Court of Appeal or the Full Federal Court have been sought to be challenged in the High Court, although I note that an application for an extension of time by Mr Stankovic to seek special leave to appeal Stankovic v Van Der Velde [2013] FCAFC 57 was refused in Stankovic v Terry Grant Van Der Velde & Ors [2014] HCASL 109.
4. It follows that Mr Stankovic's ongoing pursuit of the arguments which failed before Pain J and the Court of Appeal, in other proceedings, was "vexatious" as defined in s 6 (a) and (c) at least.
5. In the bankruptcy proceedings, Emmett J discussed the problems with Mr Stankovic's case, so advanced: Stankovic v Van Der Velde (No 3) at [16]. That judgment was not appealed, but the argument that the Land and Environment Court proceedings had been dismissed was also raised unsuccessfully again before Adamson J in this Court: Stankovic v The Hills Shire Council [2012] NSWSC 738. There was also no appeal from her Honour's judgment.
6. That argument was also advanced, however, before Yates J in Stankovic v The Hills Shire Council [2013] FCA 765, when leave to appeal Foster J's dismissal of his application to annul his bankruptcy was also dismissed. Then other allegations already determined against him were also advanced, for example that his former legal representatives were not entitled to fees, earlier dealt with in Kent and Orlizki in the matter of the Bankrupt Estate of Stankovic [2012] FCA 333 at [20].
7. Mr Stankovic, again, raised the belief he continues to hold about the dismissal of the proceedings in 2005, in the proceedings he currently has on foot in the Land and Environment Court, despite their rejection again in other judgments given in 2016 by the Court of Appeal. That is consistent with views he has expressed in the parts of the affidavit relied on in these proceedings, where his views and complaints about the reinstatement of the Council's 2005 application in the Land and Environment Court, which have been repeatedly rejected, as I have explained, were raised again.
8. Mr Stankovic's pursuit of these claims resulted in proceedings which were vexatious, as defined.

The validity of the sequestration order

1. The Council pursued bankruptcy proceedings against Mr Stankovic in the Federal Magistrates Court in 2009. Sequestration orders were made by Raphael FM in The Hills Shire Council v Stankovic [2009] FMCA 478. Mr Stankovic's trustees in bankruptcy sold the Kellyville property in September 2010. His challenge to that bankruptcy advanced on various grounds, including on the basis that he had paid the judgment debt to the Council, was not insolvent and the victim of fraud, failed: Stankovic v Van Der Velde [2013] FCAFC 57 at [12]-[13].
2. Still Mr Stankovic has repeatedly and unsuccessfully called into question the validity of the bankruptcy, including in proceedings Namul Pty Ltd brought in this Court against him for injunctive relief, to prevent him trespassing on the Kellyville property and impugning its title: Namul Pty Ltd v Stankovic [2013] NSWSC 115. Mr Stankovic's ongoing pursuit of those arguments in that and other proceedings, has in the result, also been "vexatious" as defined in s 6.
3. Mr Stankovic also advanced such arguments in the applications for stay of Rein J's orders: Stankovic v Namul Pty Ltd [2013] NSWCA 41. A second application for stay was dismissed in Stankovic v Namul Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] NSWCA 260. Similar arguments were advanced on the appeal, when it was concluded that Rein J and the Court of Appeal were required to recognise and accept the orders of the Federal Magistrates Court, the Family Court and the Land and Environment Court: Stankovic v Namul Pty Ltd 2013 NSWCA 276 at [11].
4. Such arguments were also advanced unsuccessfully in the applications pursued in 2013 to reopen the bankruptcy: Stankovic v Baulkham Hills Shire Council [2013] FMCA 178.
5. Mr Stankovic's pursuit of these claims also resulted in proceedings which were vexatious as defined.

The claim to continued ownership of the Kellyville property

1. Despite his bankruptcy and the sale of the property, Mr Stankovic continued to assert that he owned it, entering the property, removing chains on gates and holding barbecues there: Namul Pty Ltd v Milovan Stankovic [2013] NSWSC 115 at [6]. Earlier he had filed a caveat which his trustees in bankruptcy had taken steps to remove: Namul Pty Ltd v Milovan Stankovic [2013] NSWSC 115 at [10]. Before Rein J, Mr Stankovic's challenge to Namul's right to ownership of the Kellyville property failed and Namul was granted the injunctive relief it sought, to prevent his continuing slander of is title. The appeal was dismissed in Stankovic v Namul Pty Limited [2013] NSWCA 276.
2. Despite this, in Namul Pty Ltd v Stankovic [2016] NSWLEC 15 Moore J refused Mr Stankovic's application to be joined as a party to proceedings between the Council and Namul in the Land and Environment Court, given the orders made by Rein J. Leave to appeal was refused in Stankovic v The Hills Shire Council and Namul Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 49, where again, Mr Stankovic's claim to be the lawful and rightful owner of the property failed, the Court concluding that Moore J's order was the only one open, given what had been decided by Rein J and the arguments advanced having been ones previously considered and rejected.
3. The pursuit of these claims thus also resulted in proceedings which were vexatious as defined.

The damages claims in relation to the loss of the Kellyville property

1. Mr Stankovic has also failed in proceedings he pursued against nine separate parties, including the Council, his trustees and his former solicitors, by which he sought orders for damages of some $35 million, based on his loss of the Kellyville property.
2. In 2012, Adamson J found that his statement of claim which claimed huge financial loss, involved an abuse of process depending as it did, amongst other things, on complaints about the sequestration order and his re-agitation of matters on which he had not succeeded in other proceedings: Stankovic v The Hills Shire Council [2012] NSWSC 738 at [8].
3. The damages claim was also advanced before Emmett J in Stankovic v Van Der Velde (No 3) [2013] FCA 183, when Mr Stankovic sought to reopen his 2009 bankruptcy and have the Kellyville property restored to him.
4. The argument in relation to having suffered $35 million damages was also pursued before Foster J, when orders annulling the bankruptcy were refused: Stankovic v The Hills Shire Council [2013] FCA 652.
5. Claims for $35 million damages were also pursued against Mr Magee, who acted for him in Family Court proceedings. They were dismissed as entirely hopeless and doomed to fail in Stankovic v Peter Michael Magee t/as Armstrong Legal [2014] NSWSC 873 at [23]. The appeal from that decision was given in Stankovic v Magee trading as Armstrong Legal [2016] NSWCA 168 and the appeal against the proceedings brought against Mr Magee in the District Court was dealt with in Stankovic v Magee t/as Armstrong Legal [2016] NSWCA 125. There it was observed at [16] that: "The appellant has for many years considered that the dismissal of the proceedings in the Land and Environment Court was final and that the subsequent costs order was therefore made without jurisdiction. That dispute has, however, been resolved against him. The proceedings were reopened and the costs order duly made on the application of the Council. An attempt to appeal from that judgment was rejected by this Court on 9 September 2015. "
6. Similar damages claims against Mr Hockey, who acted for Mr Stankovic in the bankruptcy proceedings, were dismissed in Stankovic v Hockey [2016] NSWSC 31. Similar claims against the State were dismissed by Davies J in Stankovic v State of NSW [2016] NSWSC 18 at [36] as unarguable, doomed to fail and an abuse of process.
7. In the result, the pursuit of Mr Stankovic's claims to having suffered $35 million damages, has also resulted in vexatious proceedings as defined.
8. It is not necessary to discuss what Mr Stankovic advanced in the Family Court in detail. It is sufficient to note that there he also argued, for example, that he had never been made bankrupt and that he had a claim to $35 million damages.

Why a vexatious proceedings order must be made

1. It is in the face of this relentless pursuit, since 2005, of claims about the 2005 Land and Environment Court proceedings, his bankruptcy, the Kellyville property and his extravagant damages claim, which have been repeatedly rejected, that despite the case advanced for Mr Stankovic, I am satisfied that the Court's discretion to make orders under s 8 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act against him, must be exercised.
2. That section relevantly provides: "(1) When orders may be made An authorised court may make an order under this section (a "vexatious proceedings order") in relation to a person if the court is satisfied that: (a) the person has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia, or … (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an authorised court may have regard to: (a) proceedings instituted or conducted in any Australian court or tribunal (including proceedings instituted or conducted before the commencement of this section), and (b) orders made by any Australian court or tribunal (including orders made before the commencement of this section). (3) An authorised court must not make a vexatious proceedings order in relation to a person without hearing the person or giving the person an opportunity of being heard. … (7) Orders that may be made by Supreme Court The Supreme Court may make any one or more of the following vexatious proceedings orders in relation to a person: (a) an order staying all or part of any proceedings in New South Wales already instituted by the person, (b) an order prohibiting the person from instituting proceedings in New South Wales, (c) any other order that the Court considers appropriate in relation to the person."
3. The purpose of the Act must also be considered when making such orders.
4. In the second reading speech that purpose was explained to be that Parliament intended for the Act to "expand the powers of the courts to control vexatious litigants" and thus to protect the "effectiveness and efficiency of the justice system", by reducing the financial and emotional cost of litigation and preventing the "harm caused to, and costs incurred by, opposing parties and other participants in the justice system as a result of persistent litigation by vexatious litigants": New South Wales Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 26 June 2008 at 9459.
5. Further, that the Act sought to "protect the fundamental right of citizens to approach the courts to seek justice in accordance with the law while preserving the efficiency of the justice system and shielding other participants in the justice system from unmeritorious actions": New South Wales Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 26 June 2008 at 9459.
6. These purposes were re-iterated by the Explanatory Notes to the Vexatious Proceedings Bill 2008 (NSW), which refer to the Act seeking to prevent vexatious litigation and thus the "waste of public resources, the harassment of defendants in litigation and the incurring of unnecessary costs".
7. Given what I have explained as to Mr Stankovic's relentless pursuit of what he undoubtedly believes to be his rights, notwithstanding that he has never been able to establish the correctness of his views, that orders must be made to end his vexatious pursuit of arguments which have repeatedly failed, cannot be doubted. His conduct has been such that both those who he has wrongly pursued and the justice system itself, must be protected from what both his affidavit and the submissions advanced on his behalf, make apparent would result, if orders of the kind pressed were not made.
8. On the evidence I have discussed, there is no apparent basis on which Mr Stankovic has any further claim to advance against the Council, or anyone else, in relation to the proceedings the Council brought against him in the Land and Environment Court, his bankruptcy, the sale of the Kellyville property or any resulting claim for damages.
9. In the result, I am satisfied that orders of the kind pressed must be made, despite the submissions advanced on his behalf, which included that he did not wish to be a permanent litigant, but just wants to resolve "the issue".
10. The difficulty with Mr Stankovic's case, so advanced, is that all issues Mr Stankovic has pursued in the litigation I have discussed, have been resolved by the judgments which bind him, even though he simply will not accept that to be so.
11. The evidence establishes that Mr Stankovic has no insight into what has become a significant abuse of the Australian legal system and substantial and unnecessary costs being incurred by those who have become the victim of his relentless pursuit of claims which have repeatedly failed. That there is any possibility that such costs can be recovered is entirely unlikely, given that he is still a bankrupt.
12. Given that even now Mr Stankovic has further proceedings on foot in the Land and Environment Court in relation to Pain J's orders in favour of the Council, it seems assured that without the orders I propose to make, Mr Stankovic's pursuit of his beliefs will continue. That will not only result in further unnecessary costs being incurred by the Council and potentially others, but also the further waste of considerable judicial resources, which will be required to be directed to dealing with what are on the evidence, now futile claims.

Orders

1. The orders I propose to make will stay the further proceedings Mr Stankovic has brought in the Land and Environment Court, but they do not precisely reflect those otherwise finally pressed.
2. That is because I am not satisfied that the Court should preclude Mr Stankovic pursuing claims of any kind against the Council in the future. As discussed in Viavattene at [76], like all litigants Mr Stankovic is bound by established principles such as res judicata and issue estoppel. Thus the orders must preclude his pursuit of claims inconsistent with the decisions by which he is bound. The Council is not entitled, however, to protection under the Vexatious Proceedings Act against any other legitimate claims which might arise to be pursued against it in the future.
3. Contrary to the case advanced for Mr Stankovic, I do not, however, consider that the orders should carve out any particular claims in relation to the matters with which they are concerned, given the breadth of all of the claims he has to date already unsuccessfully advanced, including as to fraud: see for example Stankovic v Baulkham Hills Shire Council [2013] FMCA 178 at [10].
4. Such an approach would simply invite further litigation from Mr Stankovic, who clearly has a fervent belief in his right to pursue his claims in relation to these matters, notwithstanding all that legitimately stands in the way of him being granted the relief which he has so repeatedly been refused.
5. Accordingly, for these reasons, I order under s 8(7) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) that: 1. Milovan (Michael) Stankovic is prohibited from instituting any proceedings in New South Wales: 1. which are inconsistent with the findings that: 1. the orders made by the Land and Environment Court in proceedings 41243 of 2004 and 2016/00166961 were validly made; or 2. the sequestration order made in respect of the estate of Milovan (Michael) Stankovic on 12 May 2009 was valid or enforceable; or 3. the property known or previously known as Lots 1, 2, 4-12 inclusive in deposited plan 1169214, situated at and known as 85-95 Presidents Rd, Kellyville 2155 in the State of New South Wales (Kellyville Property), was validly transferred to Namul Pty Ltd. 1. making any claim in relation to, or alleging loss caused by or misconduct by any person in relation to: 1. orders made against him by the Land and Environment Court in proceedings 41243 of 2004; or 2. the conduct by The Hills Shire Council or any other person in the course of proceedings between Milovan (Michael) Stankovic and the Hills Shire Council; or 3. the sequestration order made on 12 May 2009; or 4. the sale of the Kellyville Property. 1. Proceedings 2016/00166961 in the New South Wales Land and Environment Court are stayed. 2. The usual order as to costs is that they follow the event. That would be an order that Mr Stankovic is to bear the Council's costs as agreed or assessed. Unless the parties approach to be heard on the question of costs within 14 days, that will be the Court's order.

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