The Hills Shire Council v Kinnarney Civil & Earthworks Pty Ltd & Kinnarney

The Hills Shire Council v Kinnarney Civil & Earthworks Pty Ltd & Kinnarney - [2012] NSWLEC 45 - NSWLEC 2012 case summary — Zoe

CONTENTS Paragraphs THE CHARGES 1-3 OVERVIEW 4-20 PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT OPERATIONS ACT 21-23 ELEMENTS OF THE s 143(1) OFFENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF 24-29 CATEGORIES OF EVIDENCE 30-30 CONDUCT OF MR KINNARNEY WAS CONDUCT OF HIS COMPANY 31 THE LAND AND ADJACENT BLOCK 32-38 CORPORATE DEFENDANT'S TRUCK AND TRAILER 39 MOTIVE 40 THE LAND PROPRIETORS - MR AND MRS CLARK 41-42 HISTORY OF FILLING ON THE LAND 43-53 2009 ARRANGEMENT WITH MR KINNARNEY FOR FILLING OF LAND 54-58 FILLING OF LAND PURSUANT TO 2009 ARRANGEMENT 59-65 COUNCIL INSPECTION ON 1 JULY 2010 66-71 MR CLARK'S CREDIT 72-80 MR KINNARNEY'S SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH MR CLARK 81-84 COUNCIL LETTER TO MR AND MRS CLARK 2 JULY 2010 85 COUNCIL INDEMNIFIES MR CLARK AGAINST PROSECUTION 21 JULY 2010 86 COUNCIL'S CORRESPONDENCE WITH CORPORATE DEFENDANT FEBRUARY 2011 87-90 SURVEY, INSPECTIONS AND ANALYSIS OF SAMPLES 91-98 ANALYSIS OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY AND SATELLITE IMAGES 99-101 EXTENT TO WHICH DEFENDANTS RESPONSIBLE FOR FILL BODIES 102-119 Defendants entirely responsible for Fill Body 2 102-110 Defendants partially responsible for Fill Body 1 111-116 Conclusions re both Fill Bodies 117-119 INVOICES AND PAYMENTS PURSUANT TO 2009 ARRANGEMENT 120-131 PROPORTION OF FILL BODIES FOR WHICH DEFENDANTS RESPONSIBLE 132-137 FILL PUSHED OVER EDGE OF ESCARPMENT AT FILL BODY 1 138-144 THE MATERIAL TRANSPORTED WAS WASTE 145-152 UNLAWFULNESS OF USE OF THE LAND AS A WASTE FACILITY 153-170 Unlawful use of the Land under the EPA Act 155-161 Unlawful use of the Land under the POEO Act 162-169 Conclusion 170 DEFENCE OF HONEST AND REASONABLE MISTAKE OF FACT 171-191 Mistake of law not fact 175-183 Environment protection licence under POEO Act also required 184 Defendants' evidentiary burden not satisfied 185-191 RURAL FIRES ACT 192 ORDERS 193

[5]

OVERVIEW 4The waste in issue was deposited on two areas of land at 190 Cattai Ridge Road, Maraylya being Lot 1 DP 566767 (the Land). The two areas were described in evidence as "Fill Body 2" with an area of 900 square metres, and "Fill Body 1" with an area of 1,850 square metres. There were 950 cubic metres of fill in Fill Body 2, which weighed an estimated 1,425 tonnes. There were 2,050 cubic metres in Fill Body 1, which weighed an estimated 3,075 tonnes. The totals were therefore 3,000 cubic metres weighing an estimated 4,500 tonnes. Fill Body 2 included brick, piping, hessian and fragments of asbestos-containing fire cement sheeting. Fill Body 1 included brick, metal, concrete, bitumen, artificial grass and fragments of asbestos-containing fibre cement sheeting. The material in the two fill bodies did not comprise excavated natural material and analysis of samples revealed elevated levels of Benzo(a)Pyrene. 5The Land is a large rural lot owned by Ralph and Suzanne Clark. They have lived and conducted businesses from there since the 1980's. 6The defendant Mr Kinnarney resided next door where he conducted a business through the corporate defendant. As its name suggests, the business of the corporate defendant involves earthworks. Mr Kinnarney is the sole director and shareholder of the corporate defendant, and he is its controlling mind and will, and drove its truck during the relevant period . 7Mr Kinnarney did not give evidence. 8It is common ground that: (a)An oral arrangement was entered into between Mr Clark and Mr Kinnarney for Mr Kinnarney to transport and deposit fill on the Land for which Mr Clark would charge a fee. The object was to contribute to the creation of a firebreak. I find that the arrangement was entered into in late 2009. (b)Thereafter Mr Kinnarney deposited fill on the Land using the corporate defendant's truck and trailer. I find that he did so between about and including late 2009 and June 2010. (c)Between January and July 2010 Mr Kinnarney paid for depositing the fill by six cheques he drew on the corporate defendant's bank account against six invoices which he received from Mr Clark's company. Five of the six invoices are in evidence and are dated from January 2010 to July 2010. They were paid on or within days after the dates they bore. The sixth invoice cannot be located but, judging by its payment date of 4 May 2010 and the pattern of payment of the other invoices, it most likely was invoiced on or shortly before 4 May 2010. 9The fill transported by Mr Kinnarney constituted "waste" as defined in the POEO Act even if it was clean. In fact, I find that it contained the various materials referred to above at [4]. He transported it to a place that could not lawfully be used as a "waste facility" as defined in the POEO Act. This is not disputed. 10On the basis of the undisputed matters outlined above, the defendants are guilty of the offences charged subject to consideration of their only defence, identified on the first day of the trial, namely, the common law defence of honest and reasonable mistake of fact. 11The only other issues the defendants identified on the first day of the trial go not to guilt but to the seriousness of the offences, namely, the amount of fill and whether it was clean. However, the latter issue was not pressed in submissions, presumably because of the unchallenged evidence that it included a large amount of demolition material and the like. 12Calculation of the amount of fill turns on the rate paid per load and what constituted a load, neither of which were recorded on the invoices nor elsewhere in writing. I accept Mr Clark's evidence that he and Mr Kinnarney orally agreed that Mr Kinnarney would pay $100 plus GST per load; that periodically Mr Kinnarney informed Mr Clark how many loads he had delivered so they could be invoiced; and that a load was treated as a combined truck and trailer load (each with a capacity of a little over 10 tonnes, total 20 tonnes). The defendants submit that the rate was $200 per load (plus GST), but there is no evidence of that rate. 13On the basis of a rate of $100 per load of about 20 tonnes and the defendants' admitted payments of the invoices in the total amount of $16,550 (excluding GST), I conclude that Mr Kinnarney deposited approximately 3,310 tonnes of waste on Fill Bodies 1 and 2 in the six or seven months before 1 July 2010. Of this amount, I am satisfied that he deposited all the waste of 1,425 tonnes on Fill Body 2, and that the balance of his waste, approximately 1,885 tonnes, was deposited on Fill Body 1. 14A further issue, identified by the defendants in closing submissions, is whether Mr Kinnarney pushed fill over the escarpment on Fill Body 1. Having regard to the totality of the evidence and my assessment of Mr Clark's credit recounted later, I do have a reasonable doubt about whether Mr Kinnarney did so, and therefore I do not find that he did. 15Turning to the common law defence of honest and reasonable mistake of fact, the defendants say that Mr Kinnarney's mistake of fact was that, in reliance on what Mr Clark told him, he believed that Mr Clark had development consent which permitted the deposit of the fill on the Land under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EPA Act). Although Mr Kinnarney did not give evidence, 15 propositions were put to Mr Clark in cross-examination, which the defendants say encapsulate this defence. Many of them Mr Clark denied or said he did not recall and there is no other evidence of them. Nevertheless, the defendants argue that the 15 propositions should be accepted as establishing the defence or as giving rise to a reasonable doubt as to whether they are guilty. 16The defendants submit, and I accept, that in assessing whether there is reasonable doubt in any respect, there should be taken into account damage to the credit of the main prosecution witness, Mr Clark, because: (a)he admitted in cross-examination to lying to the Council investigating officers when they interviewed him on 1 July 2010 and to similarly lying in his two affidavits; and (b)he was granted an indemnity against prosecution by the Council on 21 July 2010, even though he was criminally involved in and profited from the defendants' activities, on the basis of no more than his interview by Council officers and before the Council had conducted any further significant investigation. 17Consequently, I treat Mr Clark's evidence with particular caution. Nevertheless, having assessed his oral evidence, I do accept some but not all aspects of his evidence including evidence favourable to the defendants. 18In my opinion, the defence raised of honest and reasonable mistake of fact fails for at least three reasons. First, the alleged mistake was not one of fact but one of law, or alternatively was one of mixed fact and law, which is to be treated as a mistake of law. Secondly, the alleged belief, if true, would not take the defendants outside the operation of the POEO Act because lawful authority was required not only by development consent under the EPA Act but also by an environment protection licence under the POEO Act Chapter 3. Thirdly, in any event the defendants have not satisfied their evidential burden of proving that Mr Kinnarney was honestly and reasonably mistaken as alleged. 19Consequently, I propose to find the defendants guilty as charged. 20Having stated my conclusions shortly and summarised the main evidence and reasoning, I now proceed to a more detailed analysis.

[20]

ELEMENTS OF THE s 143(1) OFFENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF 24In my opinion, the elements of the offence created by s 143(1) are : (a)the defendant transported a substance to a place; (b)that substance was "waste" within the meaning of that word in the POEO Act; and (c)the place to which the waste was transported could not lawfully be used as a "waste facility", within the meaning of that expression in the Act, for that waste. That is, that lawful authority was required . 25The first two elements may be described as physical elements, and the third as a status element. 26In relation to the burden of proof and taking s 143(2) into consideration, a charge of the offence requires an inquiry into whether: (a)the prosecutor has proved that a substance which was waste was transported to a place; (b)the prosecutor has proved that lawful authority (for example, a licence) was required to use that place as a waste facility under the Act; and (c)the defendant then has proved that, at the time the waste was transported, it was lawful to use the place to which the waste was transported as a waste facility for that waste (for example because a necessary licence had been obtained): Environment Protection Authority v Hardt [2006] NSWLEC 438, 148 LGERA 61 at [92] - [93]. In relation to a not relevantly different element of the offence of permitting land to be used as a waste facility, contrary to s 144(2) as it was framed before 1 May 2006 - namely the element that specified land could not lawfully be used as a waste facility. 27In Environment Protection Authority v Shannongrove Pty Ltd [2010] NSWLEC 162 176 LGERA 31 at [75] Craig J said: The elements of the offence against s 143(1) of the Act are: (i) the defendant transported a substance; (ii) that substance is "waste" within the meaning of the Act; (iii) the place to which that waste was transported was being used as a "waste facility" within the meaning of the Act; (iv) that place could not lawfully be used as a waste facility for that waste. 28The prosecutor submits that element (iii) in this passage is not an element of the s 143(1) offence and, on that point, Shannongrove should not be followed. His Honour may not have had the benefit of argument as to the elements. I do not think that his Honour meant that it was an element that the place to which the waste was transported by the defendant was previously being used as a waste facility. That would not be a purposive construction because it would give a charter to dump waste in bushland or any other place that had not previously been used as a waste facility. His Honour may have had in mind something narrower. However, since s 143(1) does not, in its terms, require that the place is "being used" as a waste facility, in my respectful view it should be construed without that requirement and thus without his Honour's element (iii). His Honour's remaining elements are in substance the same as I have proposed at [24] above. 29As a "tier 2" offence under s 114 of the POEO Act, the s 143(1) offence of unlawfully transporting waste is an offence of strict liability subject to the statutory defences in ss 143 and 169, which require the defendant to bear the onus of proof: Shannongrove at [138]. As a strict, rather than absolute, liability offence it is also subject to the common law defence of an honest and reasonable but mistaken belief in a state of facts, which, if they had existed, would have rendered the act innocent. The defendant bears the evidential burden of establishing such a belief of proof. That is the only defence raised by the defendants, who do not seek to rely on the statutory defences, and it is considered below at [171].

[23]

THE LAND AND ADJACENT BLOCK 32The Land the subject of the charges belonged to Mr Kinnarney's neighbours, Ralph and Suzanne Clark. 33The Land was a residential semi-rural block running south-west, downhill from Cattai Ridge Road. It is bounded on the south-eastern side by Cattai Creek. The Land is a large rural acreage with mixed uses. There is a dwelling house and curtilage and a business in separate areas (each of which areas is substantially cleared of the natural bushland), with roads and tracks and other areas where the natural bushland has been disturbed. 34The Land is accessed from Cattai Ridge Road on the northern boundary, down a driveway. There is a collection of buildings on the northern, upper part of the site. These largely service a business called "Baligarden", a Balinese garden products, artefacts and furniture business. They also include a mechanical workshop. 35Below and south of the Baligarden buildings and workshop is a roughly circular part of the driveway and tracks on the Land, which was referred to by some witnesses as "the roundabout", but is part of the gravel track and road network on the Land. South of the roundabout, the driveway does a loop and descends to a fork. The eastern travelling road services a dwelling in the middle of the Land on the eastern side. 36The western travelling road descends to an area on the western side which is the first area the subject of the charges. Adopting the terminology employed by Mr Wierzchowski , the surveyor who prepared a survey of the fill sites, the north-western area is called " Fill Body 2 ". It appears in recent aerial photography as a semi-cleared and grassed area with a few items of plant or sheds around it. 37The pathway continues to descend, moving in a south-easterly direction until it reaches the top of an escarpment. On recent aerial photography, that too appears as a cleared or recently grassed area. South of the escarpment is a steep drop of some 3 to 4 metres to a tributary of Cattai Creek. The area at the top of the escarpment and part of the escarpment comprises the second area the subject of these charges. Employing the terminology used in the survey of the site, it is called " Fill Body 1 ". The plan prepared by Mr Wierzchowski comprising an extract from an aerial photograph taken on 26 February 2011 on which he overlaid a reduced size version of his survey is the basic reference plan which has been used in these proceedings. 38The adjacent block to the east was Lot 2 in DP 566767, known as 188 Cattai Ridge Road, Maraylya. It was owned and occupied by Mr Kinnarney. The block was also the registered office and principal place of business of the corporate defendant.

[27]

HISTORY OF FILLING ON THE LAND 43I accept Mr Clark's evidence as to the history of filling on the Land recounted below, which I understand to be undisputed. 44At the time of purchasing the Land, Mr Clark noticed there were areas on it which had been disturbed, some of which contained demolition rubble. In particular there was some demolition rubble on Fill Body 1. 45Before the offence period, Mr Clark moved rubble from one area on the Land, on its western boundary, into Fill Body 1. 46In the mid 1990s, over a period of a few months, Mr Clark allowed various operators to put fill on the Land. A particular operator was Mr Mark Vaughan. The fill was placed right at the very top of the Land, where the Baligarden buildings and structures were later erected. His object at the time was to create a platform on which to build stockyards. The filling got out of control and to stop it Mr Clark put a gate with a lock on it at the entrance. He fell into dispute with the Council about the filling. In 1994, he lodged a development application in respect of that fill . It was refused in 1995. In 1996 he lodged another one. 47The fill which was the subject of Mr Clark's dispute with the Council in 1994-1996 was in a different area to the fill which is the subject of the present charges. 48Starting in about 2000-2001, Mr Clark did occasional work for Mr Kinnarney - driving Mr Kinnarney's truck and performing repairs on it. When Mr Clark drove Mr Kinnarney's truck in the early 2000s, the truck was a tipper truck and he carted a range of excavated earth and demolition waste. Mr Clark also conducted mechanical servicing and repairs on Mr Kinnarney's truck, both on Mr Kinnarney's land and in Mr Clark's own workshop. The last time Mr Clark drove for Mr Kinnarney was in about 2002. In 2003, Mr Clark purchased his own truck and ran it for three years before selling it in 2006. Since that time, Mr Clark's main business has been interstate truck driving on contract and logistics consulting - advising on truck routes and rosters for truck drivers for other companies. 49In 2000-2002, when Mr Clark was driving for Mr Kinnarney, Mr Clark brought crushed sandstone onto the Land as well as loads of shale and blue metal or road-base. He put all this material on the driveway, all the way down to the bottom of the Land, south of the escarpment. Mr Kinnarney also brought some of this material in and placed it on the driveway for him. Each of these areas was different from the areas on the Land the subject of the charges (Fill Bodies 1 and 2). 50Some time in the period 2002-2007, Mr Clark arranged for Mr Jerry Delaney to bring what Mr Clark described as "a few, very few" loads of crushed sandstone and soil onto the Land. It went into a north-west to south-east running depression or gully in Fill Body 1 . 51In the period 2000-2006, Fill Body 1 was used for filling by Mr Clark himself and also Mr Kinnarney. In the period 2003-2006, at Mr Clark's request, Mr Kinnarney brought building demolition waste, bricks and rubble onto Fill Body 1. 52Mr Clark wanted the area to be a firebreak. That had always been his motivation for filling Fill Bodies 1 and 2. The reason the material which put in Fill Body 1 in these preceding periods was put there was demolition material and the like was that Mr Clark wanted to ensure that the tongue-shaped depression or gully there was filled with coarse material to ensure decent drainage. Mr Clark brought the same sort of material onto the Land and placed it in the area of Fill Body 1. He used the tipper truck and dog he had at the time and brought between 20-30 loads. He said the truck and dog had the capacity to carry very roughly 11 tonnes each. 53Mr Clark also brought in less coarse material - the impression is that it was soil - and placed it over the area of the tongue-like depression containing the rubble and also over a much broader area including the northern part of Fill Body 1 and in the area immediately to the north of Fill Body 1.

[28]

2009 ARRANGEMENT WITH MR KINNARNEY FOR FILLING OF LAND 54Mr Clark said in his affidavit evidence that: (a) in or about late July or early August 2009 he came to an oral arrangement with Mr Kinnarney that he, Mr Kinnarney, would deliver clean soil to the Land in exchange for payments by Mr Kinnarney; (b) he asked Mr Kinnarney to put the soil in Fill Body 2; (c) he told Mr Kinnarney that he wanted to create a firebreak in that area; (d) there was discussion between the two men about the fact that Mr Kinnarney would need to construct a ramp there so that his truck would not tip over; and (e) he also showed Mr Kinnarney Fill Body 1 and asked him to put some soil on the top of the escarpment but not to put any over the edge of it. 55Mr Clark explained, and I accept, that the reason for wanting the fill he arranged for Mr Kinnarney to be brought onto the Land was that he wanted to construct a firebreak on the western side to guard the buildings on the Land against bushfires spurred by westerly winds. Prevailing westerly winds in the area caused a real risk of fire funnelling up the valley and across the swamp at the bottom of the escarpment, up and over the escarpment onto the northern part of the Land. Depositing fill onto the stretch of land ranging from the top of Fill Body 2 to the end of Fill Body 1 enabled the area to be grassed and managed much better than if vegetation was merely cleared. And a level grassed area would be much easier to maintain as a firebreak than an area simply cleared of vegetation. 56Mr Clark also said in an affidavit that on one occasion he spoke to Mr Kinnarney while he was delivering fill onto the Land and said he would like clean soil with some clay in it so the soil retains water to get some grass and lawn growing, to which Mr Kinnarney agreed. 57When confronted with new information received by the prosecution in conferences with the Council's lawyers on 15 and 21 February 2012 (notes of which are in evidence), Mr Clark revealed more: namely, that his arrangement with Mr Kinnarney included that Mr Kinnarney would pay a rate proposed by Mr Kinnarney of $100 GST per load, that Mr Kinnarney paid by the defendant corporation's cheques, and that he remembered giving Mr Kinnarney some invoices. 58I find that in late 2009 Mr Clark and Mr Kinnarney entered into an oral arrangement for Mr Kinnarney to dump fill on Fill Bodies 1 and 2 in exchange for Mr Kinnarney paying a fee per load. The quantum of the fee is in dispute and is discussed below.

[29]

FILLING OF LAND PURSUANT TO 2009 ARRANGEMENT 59Shortly after making the arrangement with Mr Kinnarney, Mr Clark saw Mr Kinnarney's white Sterling truck with trailer being driven by Mr Kinnarney on the Land. He saw and heard it arrive laden and depart empty. Over the next period of months, Mr Clark saw Mr Kinnarney driving his truck onto the Land, usually with the trailer attached, although there would also be periods when apparently there were no deliveries at all. When Mr Clark saw them, the truck and trailer were laden when they arrived and empty when they departed. Mr Clark estimated he saw Mr Kinnarney driving his truck onto the Land between about 20 and 25 times. On occasions after the truck or truck and trailer arrived, he heard the sound of a metal tailgate slamming shut. 60Mr Clark, as he admitted, was not in a position to observe whether Mr Kinnarney drove his truck and trailer onto the Land every day of every week because he, Mr Clark, regularly worked interstate driving trucks 4 to 5 days a week. However, he occasionally said he inspected the areas known as Fill Bodies 2 and 1 and saw a number of piles of fill comprising what he thought was clean soil, some of which had been levelled. During the course of these inspections of Fill Bodies 2 and 1, he noticed that they were getting bigger. I accept that he made these inspections but given the independent evidence of the foreign material in those Fill Bodies, I do not accept that he always thought it was clean soil. 61Mrs Clark, from her position in the office of Baligarden, saw and heard a white truck go up and down the driveway but she never saw the driver and could not tell whether the truck was laden or not. Her evidence was consistent with that of Mr Clark. 62In his first affidavit, Mr Clark said that the first delivery by Mr Kinnarney was made about a week after they made their arrangement, "probably in early August 2009". However, during the trial Mr Clark's invoices (discussed in detail at [120] ff below) were tendered and all were dated between January and July 2010, commencing with the first one dated 28 January 2010. 63After being exposed to the invoices and payments, Mr Clark said in oral evidence that he now doubted whether any fill was delivered by Mr Kinnarney before January 2010. He also came to doubt his earlier date of July 2009 for their arrangement but believed that the arrangement was made some time in the latter half of 2009 and the first delivery was a couple of weeks later. He could not recall Mr Kinnarney delivering any fill in 2009 but could recall him delivering fill in 2010. 64There is no doubt, as the prosecutor concedes, that Mr Clark's memory as to dates and time is not very reliable. However, based on a rate of $100 per load plus GST (which I accept, as discussed below) the net amount (ex GST) of that first invoice, $2,700, gives rise to an inference that Mr Kinnarney transported 27 loads (truck and dog) to the Land - a number which seems unusually high to have taken place in the space of one month, particularly given the holiday period during which construction and excavation sites are generally shut down. Accordingly, the first invoice suggests at least a likelihood that the deliveries commenced in December 2009. 65I conclude that before 1 July 2010 Mr Kinnarney transported fill onto Fill Bodies 1 and 2 between about December 2009 and June 2010.

[30]

COUNCIL INSPECTION ON 1 JULY 2010 66Two Council compliance officers, Parmjit Singh and Ryan Carr, gave evidence that on 1 July 2010 they were driving on Boundary Road, Box Hill, when they saw Mr Kinnarney's white Sterling truck and trailer. It appeared that the trailer was laden with soil-like material. They followed it. By an indirect route, the truck and trailer led them to the Land. They saw it enter the Land and followed it down the driveway. The truck went down past the Baligarden business before coming to a halt. It did not go down to Fill Body 2 or beyond. They could see that the truck and trailer appeared to be laden. Eventually they saw Mr Kinnarney emerge from the Baligarden office, get into the cabin of the truck and drive the truck and trailer back out without unloading. 67After the Council officers spoke with Mrs Clark, they went down to Fill Body 2 and saw a large landfill platform jutting into the bush. Fill Body 2 appeared to comprise soil containing waste including bricks, agricultural pipes, tiles, cement, asphalt, gyprock, wood, clods of clay and fibrous asbestos sheeting. The fill area appeared to be about 25 metres by 25 metres and up to about 5 metres deep in parts. A stationary backhoe was sitting to one side of the fill platform, which had been previously observed by Council officers on Mr Kinnarney's property and was also subsequently seen there. This is the same machine that Mr Clark described as a front-end loader. Mr Clark gave evidence that that he had never operated that machine. 68During the Council officers' inspection of Fill Body 2, Mr Clark arrived and was spoken to. They had a conversation there which Officer Carr noted in a notebook and which Mr Clark signed. In amplified form, which I accept, in a file note made by Officer Carr the next day, the conversation was to the following effect: R Carr: Who is bringing in the material? R Clark: Patrick Kinnarney, my neighbour. I think I am allowed to fill to 1m depth. P Singh: You mentioned 1 metre, why up to 1 metre? R Clark: I checked with council many years ago and recall something about 1 metre. P Singh: The requirement is also less than 100m2 and the material has to be excavated natural material. This fill material contains waste including asbestos. R Clark: Asbestos! That can not be true and I wasn't aware of that 100m2 requirement P Singh: Do you know the source of the landfill? R Clark: It's supposed to be clean fill. P Singh: How did you come about engaging Mr Kinnarney? R Clark: I approached Mr Kinnarney and asked if he could bring in some clean fill so as I could create a firebreak. P Singh: When did you approach Mr Kinnarney? R Clark: I know him. I have driven his truck many years ago. I approached him about fill some 6-12 months ago however he has only brought in fill more recently, over the last few months. R Carr: Did you pay any money or receive any money for the fill? R Clark: No not at all . R Carr: May I have your details please? R Clark: Ralph Clark [mobile phone number].

[31]

(emphasis added) 69Mr Clark explained to the Council officers that the site was already cleared of vegetation and it was his intention to bring in some fill to create a firebreak to be used for fire fighting purposes. The conversation continued: P Singh: You are allowed to import and deposit clean fill in less than 100 m2 area without consent and it can not be deposited within 40 m of the natural watercourse. This soil is also not natural excavated material and polluted water may run into the natural water course. R Clark: It is quite far away from the creek. What about clay, is clay a problem? P Singh: The polluted water would easily travel to the natural water course from here. This clay material is a problem as it is not natural to the area. It will spread several types of weeds into the natural bushland areas. You should immediately cease bringing in fill, not spread this material any further and install sediment and erosion control fencing. R Clark: So what's my best option now? P Singh: Stop import and deposition of landfill waste and install sediment and erosion controls to prevent the material from polluting waters. You may also be required to remove the material and rehabilitate the area returning it to its natural state. R Clark: Please note that I was unaware of the 100 m2 requirement. What would you suggest I now do? P Singh: To cease, not spread any further and install the controls as discussed until the matter has been fully investigated. Action may include a fine (PIN) or even a Court Attendance Notice. A Clean-Up Notice requiring the removal of the landfill beyond the permissible limit may also be required. R Clark: Okay P Singh: Did I speak to you before? R Clark: Yes, I spoke to you before about Patrick Kinnarney bringing some extraordinary amount of landfill onto his land. I still maintain to this day that he was the only one to bring in fill. P Singh: What about here? R Clark: Yes, he is the only one to bring in fill. R Carr: Mr Clark, you may be required to make a statement or attend an interview regarding this matter and your instructions to Mr Kinnarney. R Clark: OK.

[33]

MR CLARK'S CREDIT 72In cross-examination, Mr Clark admitted to lying in two respects at his initial interview by Council officers on 1 July 2010 and in his affidavits of 14 April 2011 and 26 July 2011. 73One of his lies, told to the Council officers on 1 July 2010, was that Mr Kinnarney did not pay him anything for the fill delivered. In fact, Mr Kinnarney paid a fee per load. When cross-examined as to why he told this lie, Mr Clark said he just did not think it advisable to let the Council officers know, and he agreed he thought it best to manufacture a lie to protect himself in relation to the Council. Mr Clark did not disclose to the Council that he had been paid by Mr Kinnarney until a conference with the Council's lawyers on 15 February 2012 when he was confronted with certain information. At a subsequent conference with the Council's lawyers on 21 February 2012, after the trial started, he disclosed that he gave Mr Kinnarney some invoices for the loads he delivered in 2009 - 2010. During these conferences Mr Clark revealed that he agreed to Mr Kinnarney's proposed rate of $100 per load; that Mr Kinnarney paid by cheque; and that he estimated that he received about $8,000 - $10,000 in total over maybe a ten month period. In fact, that estimate was well short of the true amount he received of over $18,000:see [127] below. 74The other lie, according to Mr Clark's admission, concerns (a) his statement to Council officers on 1 July 2010 whilst standing at Fill Body 2 that only Mr Kinnarney had delivered the fill; and(b) the statements in his first affidavit of 14 April 2011 that between July 2009 and July 2010, other than trucks making deliveries to Baligarden, he did not see any trucks other than that of Mr Kinnarney enter the Land, that Mr Kinnarney was the only person he had authorised to deliver fill to the Land, and that as far as he was aware the only person who delivered fill to the Land was Mr Kinnarney. 75Other evidence establishes that, by arrangement with Mr Clark, Gubler & Associates Pty Ltd delivered seven loads of fill to the Land in May and June 2010 but I am satisfied that none of those loads was place don Fill Bodies 1 and 2: see [104] - [117] below. 76The prosecutor submits that the statement to the Council officers on 1 July 2010 was not in fact a lie because they were then standing on Fill Body 2 and, according to Mr Clark's oral evidence, he believed, at the time, that Gubler & Associates had delivered some loads of soil to Fill Body 1 (not Fill Body 2) prior to 1 July 2010. Even if I were to accept that statement of belief, Mr Clark may not have been distinguishing in his mind at that time between Fill Bodies 1 and 2. However, as discussed below at [105], I accept the evidence of Mr Vili Osborne, the Gubler & Associates truck driver, that the only fill he deposited on these Fill Bodies was on Fill Body 2 (not Fill Body 1) but not until 2011. Therefore, if Mr Clark held his claimed belief, it was erroneous. Be that as it may, the statements by Mr Clark in his first affidavit referred to above at [74] related to the Land itself and were untrue because he knew (as established by invoices given to Gubler & Associates) that the Gubler & Associates' truck had entered the Land laden with fill in the month or so prior to July 2010; and, at the time, he mistakenly believed that this truck had deposited soil on Fill Body 1 some time between mid 2009 and 1 July 2010. 77At one point in cross-examination Mr Clark claimed that he told Council Officer Carr on 1 July 2010 that another truck had been there, at a time when he thought Officer Singh may not have been present. He said that this was a reference to Gubler & Associate's truck. Officers Carr and Singh denied that Mr Clark said anything about another truck. It is not recorded in Officer Carr's contemporaneous notes of the conversation nor in his amplified file note made the next day, which they said were correct. It is inconsistent with his later affidavit evidence. It is self-serving. I do not accept his evidence on this point. 78The defendants submit that by reason of the Council's indemnity against prosecution, Mr Clark's evidence should be regarded as tainted. The defendants are critical that the Council favoured Mr Clark with an indemnity against prosecution on 21 July 2010 without further investigation, particularly as he had profited from his own criminal involvement, lied to Council officers on 1 July 2010 and, as later transpired, lied in later affidavits and acted contrary to the Council's cease and desist letter of 2 July 2010 by allowing Gubler & Associates to bring fill onto Fill Body 2. 79Mr Clark appears to have obtained the indemnity against prosecution on the basis of his initial interview on 1 July 2010 where he lied (as he admitted) about the financial arrangement with Mr Kinnarney and where, to his understanding, he had lied because he thought Gubler & Associates had delivered fill to Fill Body 1 (although, as discussed elsewhere, I think he was mistaken in that understanding). Having obtained the indemnity on that basis, It can be understood why he would wish to keep lying about those matters, as he did in his subsequent affidavits. It was not until less than a week before the trial, when the prosecutor confronted him with new information, that he started to reveal the truth. At the trial he admitted to lying, but that did not do him much credit because by then the game was up. 80I accept that the indemnity against prosecution, coupled with his subsequent lies and non-disclosure require that I should be very cautious in accepting his evidence where it does not assist the defendants. I have attempted to exercise such caution. I am even more cautious when I scrutinise his evidence which is capable of being regarded as self-serving or exculpatory of himself, such as the alleged admission by Mr Kinnarney of pushing soil over the ridge at Fill Body 1 (see [141] below) and the matter referred to at [74] above. I have kept in mind, however, that he also gave evidence exculpatory of the defendants which has the ring of truth. That evidence includes the long history of filling Fill Body 1 before 2009 (see [50] - [53] above, his ultimate acceptance that the arrangement with Mr Kinnarney was made late in 2009 and that he could not recall any deliveries being made in 2009, and his proposition that there were only perhaps a couple more invoices than the five tendered.

[40]

95Mr Passlow prepared a report in which he indicated that in parts of Fill Body 2 he observed brick, piping and Hessian. In parts of Fill Body 1 he observed brick, metal, concrete, bitumen and artificial grass. Mr Passlow reported observing fragments of asbestos-containing fibre cement sheeting on the surface of both Fill Bodies 2 and 1. In his report and covering affidavit, Mr Passlow gave the opinion that the material comprising the Fill Bodies is not considered excavated natural material. He reported on the results of the analysis of the samples taken from the Fill Bodies. Among other things, the analysis of the samples taken from three test pits revealed elevated levels of Benzo(a)Pyrene. 96The evidence does not allow for a precise calculation of the amount of fill transported to the Land by the defendants. This is because the evidence of Mr Passlow and Mr Wierzchowski produces a calculation of the total volume and estimated tonnage of deposited material in Fill Bodies 2 and 1. However, in respect of Fill Body 1, Mr Clark gave evidence (see [44] - [45], [51] - [53] above) which I accept, that:

some demolition rubble was present in that area when he purchased the Land;
he moved some building rubble from the Land's western boundary to Fill Body 1 before 2009;
he and Mr Kinnarney placed a quantity of demolition waste on part of Fill Body 1 in 2000-2006 (the tongue-shaped depression);
Mr Clark placed a quantity of soil on part of Fill Body 1 in presumably the late part of 2000-2006 (the depression and part of the northern part of Fill Body 1); and
a Mr Delaney placed a "very few" loads of material onto Fill Body 1 in 2002-2007. 97It follows that not the whole of the volume of 2,050 cubic metres in Fill Body 1 can be attributed solely to the corporate defendant's activities. 98However, the evidence is sufficient for me to be satisfied that a substantial proportion of the material identified by Mr Passlow and surveyed by Mr Wierzchowski to produce that volume was transported and placed there by Mr Kinnarney in his company's truck and trailer in the period of about seven months prior to 1 July 2010. In the end, I have a reasonable doubt whether Mr Kinnarney pushed some of the fill at Fill Body 1 over the escarpment. Consequently, I make no finding that he did.

[43]

Defendants entirely responsible for Fill Body 2 102There is an issue as to whether any (and, if so, what proportion) of the fill on Fill Bodies 1 and 2 on 1 July 2010 was placed there by Gubler & Associates Pty Ltd (Gubler) in the period of the charges (1 July 2009 to 1 July 2010). 103Gubler did deliver material to the Land during the charge period shortly before 1 July 2010, and thereafter, by arrangement with Mr Clark. The quantity of Gubler material delivered can be determined from a combination of Mr Ernest Gubler's secretary's list and 25 Clark invoices to Gubler relating to those deliveries. Only the earliest four invoices relate to delivery of material prior to July 2010. They are dated in May and June 2010 and charge for a total of seven loads at $200 per load. 104The Gubler driver was Mr Vili Osborne, whose evidence I generally accept. He recalled delivering some 12 to 14 loads in 2010-2011 in a truck with a capacity of 10 tonnes. He said that each load was between 8.5 and 9 tonnes. However, it is clear from the invoices to Gubler that in the years 2010-2011 he delivered more than the number he recalled. Mr Osborne said it was he who normally made the Gubler deliveries to the Land. The only other person who made deliveries for Gubler was Mr Shannon Gubler. However, it does not appear that he made more than perhaps one delivery to the Land and this may have been when he was with Mr Osborne on the latter's first trip . 105Mr Osborne estimated that 90 per cent of the material he delivered was crushed sandstone and the rest was topsoil. He indicated that most of the loads were placed in a location outside Fill Bodies 1 and 2, which Mrs Clark confirmed was a sandstone stockpile area. The rest Mr Osborne said he placed on Fill Body 2. Mr Osborne said that he only placed two loads on Fill Body 2 and that was in 2011. 106Significantly: (a)the Gubler secretary's list, the Clark invoices to Gubler and Mr Osborne's evidence all indicate that the Gubler deliveries started no earlier than May 2010, very much at the end of the offence period charged; (b)the vast bulk of the Gubler deliveries were after 1 July 2010; (c)Mr Osborne's evidence was that, at the direction of Mr Clark, some 90 per cent of the Gubler deliveries were to the bottom of the Baligarden business (immediately south of the "roundabout"), well outside Fill Bodies 1 and 2. This was confirmed by Mrs Clark; (d)Mr Clark's evidence is to like effect and that he used the crushed sandstone for the driveway on the premises; (e)according to the aerial photograph he marked , Mr Osborne delivered two loads to Fill Body 2 - and those deliveries comprised sandstone mixed with some soft material, possibly soil, possibly another form of soft sandstone; (f)however, those two deliveries to Fill Body 2 were in 2011 - outside the period of the offences charged; and (g)bearing in mind that the material delivered by Gubler seems predominantly to have been crushed sandstone, despite the fact that the two Fill Bodies have been inspected and observed, and samples have been analysed, there is no suggestion that either Fill Body contains quantities of crushed sandstone. 107Although there is evidence that Gubler delivered crushed sandstone to a stockpile outside Fill Bodies 1 and 2, and hesitant evidence from Mrs Clark that she might have told the Council officers that there was a load of sandstone just down the driveway, I accept that such a stockpile was not seen by the Council officers on 1 July 2010. It follows that that stockpile is likely to have come into existence after the period of the offence charged. 108Evidence given by Mr Clark in re-examination was that, as a result of a conversation or conversations he had with Mr Osborne, he believed that some loads of topsoil, no more than half a dozen, were tipped at Fill Body 1 by Mr Osborne in the period before the Council officers arrived on 1 July 2010. Mrs Clark was not sure where the Gubler soil went, but thought it was somewhere down below and later she included the Fill Body 1 area. I prefer Mr Osborne's evidence that he placed no material on Fill Body 1 and that the only material he placed on Fill Body 2 was in 2011 after the period of the offences charged. I conclude that if Mr Clark held the belief, he was mistaken. 109There is no evidence that anyone else delivered material to Fill Body 2. 110I conclude that the only person to deliver material to Fill Body 2 was Mr Kinnarney on behalf of the corporate defendant during the period of about six or seven months prior to 1 July 2010.

[44]

Defendants partially responsible for Fill Body 1 111On Mr Clark's account, which I accept, in the period 2000-2007, he and Mr Kinnarney, and to a much lesser extent a Mr Delaney, deposited amounts of material into the depression or gully running from the north-west to the south-east in a tongue-like fashion in the area at the top of the escarpment at Fill Body 1 . Some of that material Mr Clark moved there from another site, from right on the western boundary of the Land (further west than Fill Body 2), which had contained demolition rubble since the time in 1983 when he and his wife purchased the Land. However, as noted above, at [50] - [53] he and Mr Kinnarney also brought a significant amount of material onto the Land to deposit in that place; and during 2002-2007 a few loads were put into the same depression or gully by Mr Delaney . Mr Clark then covered that material with soil that he brought onto the Land . 112Mr Clark subsequently, in 2009, asked Mr Kinnarney to deliver soil - later, soil with some clay in it - to the area of Fill Body 1, as well as the area of Fill Body 2. He wanted to reduce the slope of the escarpment at Fill Body 1 and to grass the areas . 113Mr Clark saw Mr Kinnarney driving his truck and usually also his trailer, laden, into the Land and depart unladen - and that from time to time he looked at the areas comprising the two Fill Bodies and they were increasing in height and size. 114In the first half of 2010 Mr Kinnarney was, through the corporate defendant, paying Mr Clark's company significant amounts of money in order to be able to tip fill onto the Land. pursuant to invoices issued by Mr Clark's company. The defendants admit that these invoices were for fill delivered to the Land by Mr Kinnarney, and that each of them was paid. 115A significant proportion of Fill Body 1 pre-existed Mr Clark's arrangement with Mr Kinnarney in late 2009 and was put there by Mr Clark. This evidence is adverse to Mr Clark and reduces the defendants' culpability in respect of that Fill Body. It is therefore unlikely to be a lie. 116When inspected by Officers Carr and Singh on 1 July 2010 and later, in August 2010, by Messrs Passlow and Wierzchowski, the only two parts of the Land to account for such a large amount of fill were Fill Bodies 2 and 1. Officer Singh gave evidence that on 1 July 2010 there were recent tyre marks at Fill Body 2 but not at Fill Body 1, the fill at Fill Body 1 was relatively fresh but did not appear to be as fresh as the fill at Fill Body 2, and he formed the impression that the fill at Fill Body 1 was maybe two or three months old. It is clear that the deliveries by the corporate defendant, for which it paid, were made during the six or seven months preceding 1 July 2010. Accordingly, I accept Mr Clark's evidence as to Mr Kinnarney's responsibility in that period for a portion of the fill in Fill Body 1.

[46]

INVOICES AND PAYMENTS PURSUANT TO 2009 ARRANGEMENT 120Mr Clark said, and I am prepared to accept, that under his arrangement with Mr Kinnarney: (a)the rate charged to the corporate defendant was $100 plus GST per load; (b)a "load" was the load carried on any one delivery by both Mr Kinnarney's truck and dog (trailer); (c)if Mr Kinnarney reported he delivered only a truckload without a trailer-load at the same time, then the charge was $50; and (d)invoices were prepared by Mr Clark's company based on the number of loads reported from time to time by Mr Kinnarney, and were paid. 121The rate per load is relevant to working out the tonnages delivered. It was put to Mr Clark in cross-examination that the agreed rate was $200 per load (plus GST). He denied it. There is no evidence of that rate. Nevertheless, the defendants submit that I should hold that the rate agreed with Mr Kinnarney was $200 plus GST per load and say that was the rate Mr Clark agreed with Gubler, as discussed at [122] below. That is not accurate: the Gubler rate was $200 inclusive of GST. The defendants make the criticism that it was not until his oral evidence that Mr Clark indicated that he treated a Kinnarney load as a truck and trailer (each of about 10 tonnes) and that if it was a truck without a trailer the charge was only $50 plus GST . There is no evidence that the rate charged was other than the $100 plus GST per load (truck and trailer) to which Mr Clark testified. Mr Clark's unchallenged evidence was that the Clark invoices sent to the corporate defendant were based on the number of loads advised from time to time by Mr Kinnarney. 122The amount of $50 at the end of a payment excluding GST of $1,950 for the missing invoice referred to at [125] below is prima facie consistent with Mr Clark's evidence and prima facie inconsistent with the defendants' proposed $200 plus GST per load. However, the defendants submit that this $50 plus GST is explicable on the basis that there might have been a contra involved. In relation to the contra they assert that perhaps Mr Clark (a) deducted $50 off the invoice for fuel used in his Bobcat when he spread material because the fuel was provided by Mr Kinnarney; or (b) perhaps it was $50 off for the fuel to be used in Mr Kinnarney's grader when he allegedly pushed material over the edge of the escarpment at Fill Body 1. Upon my asking what evidence supported the contra submission and those assertions, I was told that the evidence was: (a) proposition 13 in the statement put to Mr Clark in cross-examination and denied by him, that he told Mr Kinnarney that he wanted $200 plus GST per load and that Mr Kinnarney would thereby save money (see below at [181] re proposition 13), and (b) the absence from the evidence of any written record of the load information provided by Mr Kinnarney to Mr Clark on the basis of which the invoices were compiled. I do not accept the defendants' contra submission and assertions. There is no evidence to support proposition 13. The rate of $200 inclusive of GST per load charged to Gubler does not lead to a conclusion of a rate of $200 plus GST per load agreed with Mr Kinnarney and charged to the corporate defendant. If any of the number-of-loads information supplied by Mr Kinnarney was written, it is unsurprising that a copy was not retained. The explanation of a contra and the assertions of two possible contra situations were not put to Mr Clark in cross-examination and have no evidentiary foundation. I have difficulty seeing why Mr Clark would lie about the rate. If anything, and notwithstanding his indemnity against prosecution, he might have an interest in agreeing that the rate was $200 plus GST per load since it would halve the amount of fill deposited by Mr Kinnarney in the charge period and correspondingly reduce the degree of Mr Clark's own involvement. I am satisfied on the evidence that the rate agreed and charged to the corporate defendant was $100 plus GST per load, which Mr Clark treated as a truck and trailer load with a truckload alone treated as a half load for which half that rate was charged. 123There are in evidence five invoices from Mr Clark's company, CFS Logistics Pty Ltd, addressed to Kinnarney Civil Pty Ltd (sic), generated in 2010 . The first three in time bear dates from January through to April 2010 . Mr Clark did not generate them but they were generated at his request. The fourth and fifth in time bear dates in May and July 2010. While they all have electronic funds transfer details on them, it appears these were included only because the documents were created from pre-existing templates, used for other debtors. While the services described in the first template all spoke of "Fees for earth fill January 2010", the use of "January" can be ascribed to a mistake on the part of the person creating the invoices in February and April 2010. While the invoices in May and July spoke of "Maintenance and driving services as requested", Mr Clark himself created those from a template used by him when he was doing subcontracting work for Mr Kinnarney many years before. The use by him of an identical template (with the same electronic funds transfer details for Jo-Anna Taylor) in 2008 for his daughter's photographic services shows that this is likely to be right. 124Mr Clark found records in the statements of his bank accounts for the payment of four of those five invoices, and it is accepted by the defendants that Mr Kinnarney drew cheques on the corporate defendant's account in payment of all five invoices, as shown by what appear to be Mr Kinnarney's handwritten annotations on each invoice. 125In addition, there is compelling evidence of a sixth invoice and its payment. The stub kept by Mr Kinnarney for cheque number 301255 on the account of Kinnarney Civil & Earthworks Pty Ltd was dated 4 May 2010 and records that the cheque was drawn in the sum of $2,145 in favour of CFS Logistics. As GST on that sum would have been $195, the net amount would have been $1,950. That figure can be divided by $100 to arrive at 19.5 loads. That would be consistent, on Mr Clark's evidence , with 19 loads comprising a truck and trailer at $100 per load and one half load comprising just a truck at $50. The date of 4 May 2010 is roughly halfway between the two invoices dated 7 April and 30 May 2010. This cheque stub is consistent with there having been a sixth invoice. Mr Clark agreed that there were possibly "a couple more" than the five in evidence, and said that fire damage to his computer prevented him from locating copies. Having regard to the closeness of the dates of the corporate defendant's other cheques to the dates of the other five invoices, the missing sixth invoice was most likely dated 4 May 2010 or shortly before that date. The precise date is not important. Mr Clark said that he believed the cheque stub concerned was referable to such an invoice. He identified a deposit made the same day into the CBA account of CFS Logistics Pty Ltd which corresponds with the date of the cheque stub. Mr Clark said (and was not challenged on this) that he was doing no work for Mr Kinnarney at this time. There was nothing else for which such a payment would have been made. I infer that such an invoice was rendered by Mr Clark to Mr Kinnarney on about 4 May 2010. 126The defendants, I understand, accept that there were the six invoices discussed above for fill Mr Kinnarney delivered and that he caused them to be paid on the corporate defendant's cheque account. 127A table of the invoices and payments is set out below: Invoice date Exhibit Cheque Ex AF Payee Total amount GST Net amount 28.1.10 2 28.1.10 Ralph Clarke $2,970 $270 $2,700 301235 25.2.10 2 25.2.10 Ralph Clarke $5,390 $490 $4,900 301244 7.4.10 2 8.4.10 CFS $4,510 $410 $4,100 301251 assumed 4.5.10 AF 4.5.10 CFS Logistics $2,145 $195 $1,950 301255 30.5.10 AC 7.6.10 [illegible] $1,430 $130 $1,300 301269 21.7.10 AC 23.7.10 CFS Logistics $1,760 $160 $1,600 301273 Total $18,205 $16,550

[50]

FILL PUSHED OVER EDGE OF ESCARPMENT AT FILL BODY 1 138The fill pushed over the edge of the escarpment at Fill Body 1 falls into a different category from the fill on the top of the escarpment. It is relevant to the seriousness of the offence. The prosecutor submits that Mr Kinnarney was responsible for all of that part of Fill Body 1 which was found over the edge of the escarpment. The defendants submit that there is at least a reasonable doubt, and that there is a reasonable possibility, that Mr Clark pushed it over the edge of the escarpment using his Bobcat. 139Officer Singh considered that it was too dangerous to reverse a truck to the edge of the escarpment at Fill Body 1 and dump the waste directly from the truck into the gully. He considered that it had to have been pushed over using some other implement. He said that on 1 July 2010 there were recent tyre marks at Fill Body 2 but not at Fill Body 1, the fill at Fill Body 1 did not appear to be as fresh as the fill at Fill Body 2, and he formed the impression that fill at Fill Body 1 was maybe two or three months old. 140The material on the escarpment can be seen in the photographs taken by the Council officers, and is noted in Mr Wright's analysis of the satellite images taken on 13 April and 11 May 2010 . The prosecutor submits that these support the conclusion that at least the portion of Fill Body 1 which ended up over the edge of the escarpment was relatively fresh. In addition, the prosecutor submits, Mr Kinnarney had access to his front-end loader on the Land which was alternatively described by the Council officers as a backhoe loader when they found it, on the Land on 1 July 2010. The prosecutor submits that the Court should infer that Mr Kinnarney used his loader to spread recently tipped soil on both Fill Bodies and that, in order to make room for the truck and trailer to deliver more loads onto Fill Body 1, he used the loader to push recently tipped soil over the edge of the escarpment. 141Mr Clark had a Bobcat and thus had access to the means to push fill over the edge of the escarpment. The prosecutor submits that the Court should reject any suggestion that Mr Clark did so for several reasons. First, such a suggestion was not put to Mr Clark. Secondly, the evidence of Mrs Clark took the matter no further. Although at first she said she had heard the sound of the Bobcat in what she called "the bottom paddock", which seems to have been a reference to Fill Body 1, upon re-examination she said she could not say whether she heard that before or after the day when the Council officers came to the Land and could not say that the sound was not of the Bobcat working to repair holes in the driveway. Thirdly, the unchallenged evidence of Mr Clark is that he regarded the escarpment itself as intrinsically important and did not want any material put over its edge . This is said to be supported by the evidence from Officers Carr and Singh of apparent shock on Mr Clark's part when he saw material had been pushed over the escarpment edge. Fourthly, there is Mr Clark's evidence that, when he spoke with Mr Kinnarney after the officers had been to the Land on 1 July 2010 and asked him to cease deliveries, Mr Clark also expressed his unhappiness at fill having pushed over into the escarpment when he had not told Mr Kinnarney to tip there (or he might have said I told you not to tip there) to which Mr Kinnarney responded with the admission, "Don't worry. I can pull it out" (see [83] above). 142While there is force in the prosecutor's submissions on this point, I take into account the damage to Mr Clark's credit by the lies he told the Council officers on 1 July 2010 and in his subsequent affidavits and his failure to disclose the truth until shortly before the trial (and then only when confronted with indications that his evidence had not been truthful). If he pushed material over the escarpment, he had a motive to lie about who was responsible for it. He had the ability to push it over using his Bobcat and Mrs Clark's evidence indicates that he was using it in that area possibly before 1 July 2010. Apart from Mrs Clark's evidence concerning her husband using his Bobcat in that vicinity, there is no evidence of machinery being used in that vicinity. Mr Clark's evidence, for instance, did not refer to hearing machinery being used in that area by Mr Kinnarney on the occasions he saw and heard Mr Kinnarney on the Land in his truck. 143If, as Mr Clark alleged, he specifically told Mr Kinnarney, when making the 2009 arrangement, not to put fill over the escarpment at Fill Body 1, it would be surprising, to say the least, if Mr Kinnarney were to do so because he would have foreseen that Mr Clark would discover that he had disobeyed his directive. If Mr Clark said to Mr Kinnarney on 1 July 2010 that he had not told Mr Kinnarney to tip there, that would have been not consistent with the alleged 2009 directive not to tip there: it is different form saying to Mr Kinnarney on 1 July 2010 "I told you not to tip there". This uncertainty in Mr Clark's evidence as to what he said to Mr Kinnarney on this significant point in the alleged 1 July 2010 conversation detracts from the reliability of his evidence as to this conversation. Mr Clark said he had been on Fill Body 1 approximately a month before the Council officers' visit in 1 July 2010 . If so, he should have seen the fill pushed over the escarpment because, according to Officer Singh's estimate, at that date the fill at Fill Body 1 was two or three months old. Yet he professed to experiencing shock when he saw it with the Council officers on 1 July 2010. 144In the result, I have a reasonable doubt whether Mr Kinnarney made the admission claimed by Mr Clark (see [141] above), and or pushed material over the ridge at Fill Body 1, and, consequently, I make no finding that he did.

[51]

THE MATERIAL TRANSPORTED WAS WASTE 145It is convenient to repeat the relevant part of the definition of "waste" in the Dictionary to the POEO Act: (a) any substance (whether solid, liquid or gaseous) that is discharged, emitted or deposited in the environment in such volume, constituency or manner as to cause an alteration in the environment, or (b) any discarded, rejected, unwanted, surplus or abandoned substance, or (c) any otherwise discarded, rejected, unwanted, surplus or abandoned substance intended for sale or for recycling, processing, recovery or purification by a separate operation from that which produced the substance, or ... The definition concludes - A substance is not precluded from being waste for the purposes of this Act merely because it is or may be processed, recycled, re-used or recovered. 146The prosecutor submits without contest, and I accept, that on the evidence the material transported to the site in the corporate defendant's truck and trailer comprised "waste" under the Act for the following reasons. 147First, the material transported was deposited in "such a volume and...a manner as to cause an alteration in the environment" within par (a) of the definition of "waste" (cf the bioremediation pile held to fall within that part of the definition in Australian Solvent Recyclers Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority of New South Wales [2000] NSWLEC 10, 105 LGERA 324 at [104]) per (Sheahan J). 148Secondly, if only so far as it comprised soil-like material excavated from building sites and other places where it was no longer wanted, at the time it was loaded at source ( Environment Protection Authority v Shannongrove at [89] - [92]), the material transported was either - (a)an "unwanted [or] surplus" substance within par (b) of the definition of "waste", or (b)an "otherwise discarded, rejected, unwanted, surplus ... substance intended ... for recycling [or] processing... by a separate operation from that which produced the substance" within par (c) of the definition ( Environment Protection Authority v HTT Huntley Heritage Pty Ltd [2003] NSWLEC 76, 125 LGERA 332 at [19] - [20] per Pearlman CJ. 149Having regard to the rider at the conclusion of the definition of "waste", the fact that Mr Clark had a purpose of using the material for a firebreak or for covering existing fill did not prevent it being "waste". 150Perhaps four to six truckloads, on the evidence of the Council officers, of the material transported to the Land was left in mounds on Fill Body 2 and not levelled by the time the it was sighted by Officers Singh and Carr. However, it was still "waste" for the purposes of these proceedings. 151I do not regard that as stockpile material, but if it was, two questions would arise on which the decision in Owen v Willtara Construction Pty Ltd [1998] NSWLEC 216, 103 LGERA 137 turned. In that case, Willtara Constructions was the builder on a construction site from which a quantity of soil was excavated and stockpiled on an adjacent road reserve. The purpose of it being placed there was for storage pending the soil being redeployed as backfill on the construction site. Willtara Construction was prosecuted for an offence of disposing of waste on land without lawful authority, contrary to s 63(1) of the Waste Minimisation and Management Act 1995. The charge was dismissed for a number of reasons. Two reasons are relevant here. First, because the soil was only being stockpiled and was not being gotten rid of, Bignold J said he was not satisfied the soil was being disposed of: at [77] - [79]. Secondly, relevantly to the question of proof that the material in this case was waste, Bignold J found that because the soil was being stockpiled before being redeployed to the site from which it came, it was not "discarded, rejected, unwanted, surplus or abandoned": at [82] - [84]. In addition, it was simply mounds of soil. There was insufficient evidence to find that, approached in a commonsense way, the mere existence of the mounds "caused an alteration in the environment": at [90] - [93]. This decision is distinguishable because here the material delivered to the Land was, at the time it was loaded onto Mr Kinnarney's truck and trailer, plainly unwanted or surplus material. 152I conclude that the material transported to the Land comprised "waste" within the meaning of that term in the POEO Act.

[54]

Unlawful use of the Land under the POEO Act 162"Waste facility" is relevantly defined in the Dictionary to the POEO Act as - any premises used for the storage, treatment, processing, sorting or disposal of waste... 163In the context of this legislation, "disposal" means "getting rid of": Environment Protection Authority v N (1992) 26 NSWLR 352 per Hunt CJ at CL (Enderby & Allen JJ agreeing) at 355E-F. The word "for" in the definition of "waste facility" ("premises used for...the disposal of waste") does not mean that the prosecutor must prove that the purpose of using the premises was for the disposal of waste. Rather, it means only that in the circumstances there was such a use: Environment Protection Authority v Hardt at [106] - [109] per Preston CJ. 164The Land was a "waste facility" as defined in the POEO Act because it was used for the disposal of waste. 165Waste disposal by application to land is a premises-based "scheduled activity" within the meaning of that term in the POEO Act (ie an activity listed in Schedule 1): Dictionary, cl 39(1) Part 1 Schedule 1, s 5(1) POEO Act. 166An environment protection licence is required under the POEO Act to carry out the scheduled activity: s 48 POEO Act. 167In fact there was no environment protection licence under the POEO Act to use the Land as a waste facility. 168The defendants did not submit that the Court should not make any of the above findings. 169In addition, I note that under s 50 of the POEO Act, where development cannot be carried out without development consent under the EPA Act, an environment protection licence under the POEO Act cannot be granted unless development consent has been granted for the development. Logically, if a development is prohibited under the EPA Act, such a licence under the POEO Act should also not be able to be granted. Section 50 does not expressly refer to prohibited development under the POEO Act, and the question might arise as to whether it should be construed so as, in effect, to preclude the issue of a licence under the POEO Act in the case of prohibited development. That would be this case. However, as the point was not argued, I say no more about it.

[56]

DEFENCE OF HONEST AND REASONABLE MISTAKE OF FACT 171The only defence raised by the defendants is the common law defence of honest and reasonable mistake of fact. The defendants claim Mr Kinnarney operated under the mistaken belief, induced by Mr Clark, that there was a development consent, , for the construction of a firebreak on the Land, namely, the firebreak which Mr Clark had told him would be constructed by placing fill in the areas of Fill Bodies 2 and 1. In fact there was no such development consent. 172The evidentiary burden of establishing a defence of honest and reasonable mistake of fact is in the first place upon the defendants. There must be evidence that makes it appear that the defendant had reasonable grounds for believing in the existence of a state of facts which, if true, would take his act outside the operation of the enactment and that on those grounds he did so believe. The necessary foundation in evidence will in most cases have to be provided in the defendant's case. But it is conceivable that during the prosecution case sufficient evidence may be elicited by way of cross-examination or otherwise to provide the necessary evidentiary foundation. The evidentiary burden in this context is to be understood in light of the concept of honest and reasonable belief. The concept has a subjective element of a kind that ordinarily is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, and an objective element that must be capable of being measured by the court against the evidence. If that evidentiary burden is satisfied, then ultimately it is for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did not honestly believe, on reasonable grounds, in the existence of that state of facts: He Kaw Teh v The Queen [1985] HCA 43, 157 CLR 523 at 534-535, 592-593; Jiminez v The Queen [1992] HCA 14, 173 CLR 572 at 582; CTM v The Queen [2008] HCA 25, 236 CLR 440 at [7] - [8] and [35] - [39]; Ostrowski v Palmer [2004] HCA 30, 218 CLR 493 at [10], [42] and [85]; Mei Ying Su v Australian Fisheries Management Authority (No 2) [2008] FCA 1485, (2009) 251 ALR 135 at [73] - [87] (Reeves J); Environment Protection Authority of NSW v Goulburn Wool Scour Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCCA 439, 137 LGERA 289 at [55] - [58]; Environment Protection Authority v Unomedical Pty Ltd (No 3) [2010] NSWLEC 198 at [255] - [262] (Pepper J). 173In the case of a corporation, the mistaken belief of fact must be held by a person whose belief can relevantly be the belief of the corporation, often the directing mind and will of the corporation: Director-General Department of Environment and Climate Change v Jack & Bill Issa Pty Ltd (No 5) [2009] NSWLEC 232, 172 LGERA 225 at [78] - [95] where I reviewed the authorities relating to attribution of personal conduct to a corporation (see also in the mistaken belief context G J Coles & Co Ltd v Goldsworthy (1985) 57 LGRA 122 (WA CCA) at 127-128, 130, 133 and Coles Myer Ltd v Catt (1992) 58 SASR 298 (FC) at 305-306). In the case of the corporate defendant, there is no issue but that Mr Kinnarney, as the sole owner and director, fitted that description (cf the owner and sole director of a corporation, Mr Suciu, in The Hills Shire Council v Suciu [2009] NSWLEC 145, 168 LGERA 302 at [103] (Pepper J)). 174In my opinion, the defence fails for at least three reasons: (a)the alleged mistake was not a of mistake of fact but of law, or alternatively of mixed fact and law, and neither is a defence; (b)the alleged belief, if true, would not take the defendants outside the operation of the POEO Act because lawful authority was required not only under the EPA Act by way of a development consent but also under the POEO Act Chapter 3 by way of an environment protection licence; and (c)in any event, the defendants have not discharged their evidentiary burden of establishing that Mr Kinnarney in fact held the alleged belief honestly and reasonably or at all.

[57]

Mistake of law not fact 175The long-standing maxim of the criminal law is that ignorance of the law is no excuse: Iannella v French [1968] HCA 14, 119 CLR 84 at 112-116 per Windeyer J. It is thus irrelevant that an accused person did not know that his conduct constituted an offence: Ostrowski at [1] per Gleeson CJ and Kirby J. A mistake of law is therefore not a ground of exculpation. In Ostrowski Callinan and Heydon JJ said at [85]: A mockery would be made of the criminal law if accused persons could rely on, for example, erroneous legal advice, or their own often self-serving understanding of the law as an excuse for breaking it, however relevant such matters might be to penalty when a discretion, unlike here, in relation to it may be exercised. 176Glanville Williams said in Criminal Law: The General Part , 2nd ed (1961) Stevens & Sons, at [100] (p 287) - Generally speaking a fact is something perceptible by the senses, while law is an idea in the minds of men. The distinction may be illustrated by reference to marriage and ownership. A mistake as whether a marriage has been celebrated may be either a mistake of fact or a mistake of law. It is a mistake of fact if no ceremony has been performed; a ceremony is a fact, of which a cinematograph picture could be taken. But the mistake is one of law if, though the ceremony has been performed, there is a misunderstanding of the rules of law governing the validity of the ceremony. In the same way, a mistake as to ownership may be either a mistake as to whether a deed of conveyance has been executed, which is a question of fact, or a mistake as to the law of property in its impact on a particular deed of conveyance. ... 177A belief that something is lawful is a belief in an idea. It is a belief that the requirements of the law have been satisfied. It is thus a belief of law: Ostrowski at [46] - [49] per McHugh J applying Von Lieven v Stewart (1990) 21 NSWLR 52 per Handley JA at 66-67. 178This is illustrated by the South Australian case of Power v Huffa (1976) 14 SASR 337, discussed by McHugh J in Ostrowski at [58]. In that case, a defendant charged with loitering claimed that she had, during a telephone conversation with a federal Minister, been authorised by the Minister to remain in place in defiance of police orders to move on. The majority (Bray CJ at 345 and Jacobs J at 356- 357) held that while the belief the defendant held that she had received an authority from the Minister was one of fact, her belief that that authority was lawful was a belief as to a matter of law. 179Thus, a belief in the legality of one's act is a belief about a matter of law and, as such, cannot exculpate: Ostrowski at [55] citing Olsen v Grain Sorghum Marketing Board; Ex parte Olsen [1962] Qd R 580; and at [57] citing Cambridgeshire & Isle of Ely County Council v Rust [1972] 2 QB 426 at 434 per Lord Widgery CJ, as illustrating the set of cases "where the defence of mistake of fact failed even though the defendant believed that he or she had been given lawful authority to act as charged". Where one's act is unlawful, a belief that the act was lawful is a claim to a defence of ignorance of the law, a defence long held to be impermissible. 180Environment Protection Authority of NSW v Goulburn Wool Scour Pty Ltd (referred to above) is an instructive decision. The defendant was charged with polluting waters under the POEO Act. The defendant had held an environment protection licence under the POEO Act which did not authorise the pollution it caused. The trial judge (Talbot J) had found the defendant held mistaken beliefs as to two matters. First, a mistaken belief as to how the environment protection licence operated - a misunderstanding of particular environment protection licence conditions. Secondly, a mistaken belief that pollution by stormwater discharge from the site was conditionally authorised. Applying Ostrowski v Palmer , the Court of Criminal Appeal at [65] held that such beliefs were mistakes of law. 181A mistaken belief, without more, that an activity is authorised will be a mistaken belief as to a matter of law rather than to a matter of fact: Ostrowski at [59]. A mistaken belief expressed as a belief that there was some document which authorised an activity may involve a more detailed analysis. 182A clear distinction needs to be made between the construction (operation) of a statute or document, for example a development consent, on the one hand and the fact of its existence on the other: Ostrowski at 524 citing (inter alia) Iannella at 96-97. The former is a question of law, the latter is a question of fact. In the present case, it may be possible to characterise the mistake on which the defendants rely as being a single mistake of mixed fact and law constituted by: (a) a mistaken belief as to the existence of a development consent which applied to the Land (a mistake as to a fact); and (b) a mistaken belief that this supposed development consent (which in fact did not exist) as a matter of construction permitted the depositing of the waste on the Land (a mistake of law). Mistakes on mixed questions of fact and law will not ordinarily constitute mistakes of fact: Strathfield Municipal Council v Elvy (1992) 25 NSWLR 745 at 751 per Gleeson CJ (Clarke JA and Lee A-J concurring). Such mistakes will be treated as mistakes of law "if one of the components vital to the total belief is a belief on a question of law": Power v Huffa (above) at 345 per Bray CJ (Jacobs J concurring at 357). Strathfield was cited in Ostrowski at [13] fn [51] per Gleeson CJ and Kirby J and at [35] fn [63] per McHugh J. Dixon J in a bigamy case, Thomas v The King [1937] HCA 83, 59 CLR 279 at 306, in which the majority of the High Court did not join, said obiter that "a mistake as to the existence of a compound event consisting of law and fact is in general one of fact and not a mistake of law". Dixon J immediately illustrated what he meant by reference to a situation discussed in an English bigamy cases, which is irrelevant for present purposes. Thomas was distinguished by Jacobs J in Power v Huffa at 356. The decision in Strathfield is binding on this Court. 183In my opinion, whether Mr Kinnarney's alleged mistake is characterised as a pure mistake of law or one of mixed fact and law, the outcome is the same. The alleged defence fails.

[59]

Defendants' evidentiary burden not satisfied 185In any event, in my opinion the defendants' evidentiary burden has not been discharged. Mr Kinnarney did not give evidence. Therefore there is no direct evidence as to his state of mind in a context where his state of mind is critical. However, that is not fatal if sufficient evidence is elicited by way of cross-examination or otherwise to provide the necessary evidentiary foundation : He Kaw Teh at 592 per Dawson J. 186The defence is sought to be established by reference to a pending development application for Baligarden buildings to the north of Fill Bodies 1 and 2, lodged by Mr Clark on 12 October 2009 and granted by the Council on 29 June 2010 and to Mr Clark's answers to 15 written propositions put to him in cross-examination as to the content of his discussions with Mr Kinnarney in late 2009 when they arranged for the corporate defendant to deposit fill on the Land for a fee . That oral arrangement would have been shortly after that development application had been lodged. I would say immediately that I have difficulty in seeing how in late 2009 Mr Kinnarney could possibly have thought that there was a development consent when it was not granted until about six months later, after he had transported the fill to the Land. 187The 15 written propositions put to Mr Clark and his oral answers were as follows: (1)"You spoke to Kinnarney about Sept/Oct 2009 and said Sonya had said that DA was almost ready to go through Council." Mr Clark's answer was no. He agreed it was possible he had spoken to Mr Kinnarney about the development application and that one such conversation could have been in September/October 2009. "Sonya" was Sonya Phillips, a former Mayor of the Council. . (2)"You told Kinnarney it was a lot of hard work and cost but almost finished". Mr Clark agreed. He accepted that this placed the discussion closer to October than July 2009. (3)"You told Kinnarney that DA would mean the whole property was legitimised". Mr Clark denied saying this. I note that the development application is not in evidence but the terms of the June 2010 development consent indicate that it was concerned with development of structures associated with the Baligarden business, not with land fill development with which this case is concerned. Any "legitimisation" should be understood accordingly. Further, a development "application" could not authorise, nor could it reasonably be understood as authorising, anything until it was consented to. (4)"You told Kinnarney a firebreak was necessary as part of the DA and told him there would be a survey by fire experts or Council to confirm firebreak location". Although Mr Clark at first said he quite possibly said this , shortly afterwards he said that there was confusion here and he had not discussed anything about Council involvement of any sort with the firebreak that the fill went into. That is consistent with the scope of the later 2010 development consent. The defendants submit that Mr Clark's answer to proposition 4 is consistent with him showing Mr Kinnarney a copy of a letter of 24 November 2009 from the Rural Fire Service to the Council thereby inducing Mr Kinnarney to think that a firebreak was required in the context of the development application. They refer to condition 6 of the 2010 development consent which required compliance with the requirements in this letter, a copy of which was attached to the consent. The requirements did not relevantly extend to the two Fill Bodies the subject of these proceedings . I do not accept the submission. There is no evidence that Mr Clark had a copy of that letter at that time let alone showed it to Mr Kinnarney. Even if he did, there is no evidence as to Mr Kinnarney's consequential state of mind. Indeed, I was informed by the defendants from the bar table that Mr Kinnarney did not recall being shown a copy of the letter. (5)"You told [Kinnarney] that other things in the DA would benefit [Kinnarney's] property, such as no more sewage discharge". Mr Clark had no recollection of saying this at all. (6)"You told [Kinnarney] you wanted him to bring in clean fill as soon as it was okay, for firebreak". Mr Clark agreed he said this. (7)"Sometime later you went back to [Kinnarney] with some documents and asked if he would be objecting to DA and [Kinnarney] said he would not object to the DA". Mr Clark recalled saying this. (8)"You showed [Kinnarney] documents from the DA and said Sonia Phillips said it is all going through OK". Mr Clark's answer was that he probably did. He was not asked what the documents may have been. The defendants submit that the documents included the letter of 24 November 2009 from the Rural Fire Service to the Council which was referred to in the later development consent of June 2010. I do not accept the submission. That was not put to Mr Clark. There is no evidence that he had a copy of that letter before receiving notice of determination of the development consent. The letter in its terms was not part of the development application but was addressed to the Council in response to the Council's request subsequent to receipt of the development application. (9)"[Kinnarney] said because of past problems between you (Clark) and Council, and the fact the DA had been demanded by Council that [Kinnarney] was concerned". Mr Clark denied this. (10)"[Kinnarney] said that Clark (you) had told him you got fined twice by Council because he had not put in this DA for a long time". Mr Clark agreed that he told Mr Kinnarney at some time about two fines he had received in the past for lodging a late development application, but Mr Clark had no idea whether that was of concern to Mr Kinnarney or not. He said he had not discussed with Mr Kinnarney anything about Council involvement of any sort with the firebreak that the fill was being put into . (11)"[Kinnarney] said that he wanted confirmation that there were no problems bringing fill in for firebreak". Mr Clark did not recall that ever being said. Nevertheless, the defendants submit that it should be held that Mr Kinnarney said it and that it was consistent with his approach that Mr Clark had had problems in the past and that Mr Kinnarney was not going to get involved unless he had the confirmation. I am unable to accept the submission. There is no evidence that Mr Kinnarney said what is attributed to him. (12)"Sometime after that you showed documents to [Kinnarney] and said this meant it was okay, and there were discussions about price". Mr Clark denied this (13)"You told [Kinnarney] you wanted $200 a load plus GST and he would save money on disposal facility fee and fuel by tipping next door". Mr Clark denied this. The rate is relevant to working out the tonnages delivered by Mr Kinnarney: see [121] - [131] above. Mr Clark said $100 per load plus GST was agreed and that this rate was offered by Mr Kinnarney. (14)"[Kinnarney] said he would only do it if he got invoices for fill and he would only pay by cheque". Mr Clark did not recall this. (15)"The arrangement and all loads were complete by 1 July 2010". Mr Clark said that they certainly came to an end as a result of Council officers coming onto the Land. He said that he discovered that all the material he needed was there by that time. 188The defendants submit that the 15 propositions put to Mr Clark are an alternative hypothesis, which I should accept; that they are as equally able to be true as anything Mr Clark said or denied; and that Mr Clark's response to them in a certain way does not mean that his responses are true. In the absence of any evidence from Mr Kinnarney, I do not accept that the propositions put to Mr Clark are correct except to the extent that Mr Clark agreed with them. This is subject to a qualification relating to his answer to proposition 15. I accept the evidence of Mr Vili Osborne that Mr Clark received some fill from Gubler in Fill Body 2 in 2011. 189In CTM v The Queen [2008] HCA 25, 236 CLR 440 there was more than there is in the present case, namely, out-of-court assertions by the accused, but even that, the High Court held, was not sufficient to raise the defence. The High Court held that in the absence of sworn evidence from an accused charged with underage sex, evidence in a Crown case of out-of-court assertions by the accused that the complainant lied to him about her age, was insufficient to raise an issue of honest and reasonable mistake of fact as to the victim being above the age of consent: per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Crennan & Kiefel JJ at [36] - [39], Hayne J at [136], [179], [194]. 190Honesty and reasonableness are essential features of the mistaken belief relied upon. The belief of Mr Kinnarney was a matter peculiarly within his own knowledge. In the absence of evidence from Mr Kinnarney, Mr Clark's answers to the propositions put to him in cross-examination do not establish that Mr Kinnarney held the alleged mistaken belief, honestly and reasonably or at all. 191It is unnecessary to address the prosecutor's further submission that even if Mr Kinnarney honestly held the alleged mistaken belief, it was not reasonably held. The submission is that a professional truck driver such as Mr Kinnarney should never accept that it is lawful to dump just on the say so of a private landowner and should sight and satisfy himself that there was both a development consent under the EPA Act and an environment protection license under the POEO Act.

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