The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Li [2025] NSWCATOD 114;

1. The applicant Council's employed trust account investigator Mr Thong deposes in Exhibit A to the Law Society of New South Wales receiving, on or around 14 June 2022, a letter from Tahota Law comprising a notification pursuant to s151 (1) of the Uniform Law. That letter commences at page 37 of the Exhibit to the affidavit. The letter is authored by an Andrew Hu who describes himself as a director and principal of the firm. In the letter Mr Hu makes disclosures in relation to the firm's trust account. He says that the respondent was hired as an internal bookkeeper by Tahota Law in October 2018 and resigned on 14 April 2022. He says that after the resignation the firm engaged NJ and Associates, accountants, as external bookkeepers and that the firm, together with NJ and Associates, found that the respondent had:

(a) caused variances and breaches in the trust account without authority and without notifying any of the directors/principal solicitors.

(b) fraudulently altered printed trust account records, and

(c) stole money from the firm by ". . . . . high jacking invoiced trust money transfers that were meant for [the firm's] office account, and transferred funds into her personal account instead".

1. The letter then set out (at page 38 of the Exhibit) a variance of $6,895.01 referrable to a total of nine matters where invoices had issued on various dates between January and February 2019, and the abovementioned amount then being transferred from the trust account to the office account in or about February 2019.
2. Page 39 of the Exhibit sets out a number of actions recorded in the firm's Practice Evolve System Trust Audit Track.
3. Page 40 of the Exhibit sets out the firm's contention of a further variance of $11,848.70 and, at page 42, assertions of fraudulent alteration of printed trust records and misappropriation by the respondent.
4. Mr Thong deposes to being assigned, on or around 14 June 2022, to conduct an investigation of the Practice pursuant to s163; that from 14 June 2022 to 11 May 2023 he investigated the Practice and, on 11 May 2023 - pursuant to s165 - completed his report in relation to the investigation. He annexes a copy of the report to his affidavit. He says that the facts, matters and circumstances set out in the report are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief; further, that the opinions expressed in the report are held by him based on his experiences as an investigator and based on the factual matters set out in the report. The text of the report is reproduced at pages 6 to 33 of the Exhibit.
5. Mr Thong's report sets out the practitioner registry details of the principals and non principals of Tahota Law and, on page 8, the firm's bank account details including the account numbers of the firm's general bank account and trust account.
6. Mr Thong says he attended the offices of the Practice on three occasions between July and November 2022; further, meeting with the respondent at the Law Society's offices on 6 February 2023. He says that the documents and information referred to in his report were obtained during his attendances, his interviews and email exchanges with the respondent, Mr Hu and Tahota Law.
7. So far as the trust account variances totalling $6,895.01 are concerned, Mr Thong refers at [16.3] to reviewing the firm's trust records relating to the transactions totalling that amount. He found that the withdrawals were made on 1 February 2019, that they were recorded appropriately against the relevant trust records on the day the withdrawals were made, however on 28 October 2020, 17 November 2020 and 18 November 2020 the withdrawal entries were reversed and re-entered. He sets out at [16.3] a table showing details of the reversals and the entries made. He then refers to comments made to him by Mr Hu and by the respondent in interviews. He finds that the variances totalling $6,895.01 were resolved on 27 May 2022, and no evidence of trust ledger accounts being overdrawn.
8. The report then goes through a similar process in relation to a trust account variance of $11,848.70. Mr Thong sets out [16.7] a table showing the movement of the trust ledger account of T19646; that being the referrable matter number. Mr Thong says that on his examination of the trust records relating to that matter number the true position of the money held is not disclosed by reason of the matters that he sets out at [16.8]. He says that the trust records relating to that matter number do not disclose the true position of the money held because a 2 April 2020 invoice issued in the amount of $11,848.70 was made at a time when the trust ledger account for the matter in question had a balance of $10,968.70. Following a withdrawal of $11,848.70 from the trust account in payment of the invoice the trust balance for the matter was negative $880.00. He says further that the withdrawal of the $11,848.70 was not recorded on 9 April 2020 but, rather, recorded on 27 May 2022. He says a deficiency of $880.00 was created and that was potential non compliance with s148 of the Uniform Law.
9. He then says that on 24 April 2020 the trust ledger account for the same matter (having at that point a balance of negative $880.00) showed a withdrawal of $10,968.70, and that amount being paid into the firm's office account for payment of the abovementioned invoice. As a result, Mr Thong says that the balance of the ledger for that matter had increased to negative $11,848.70. He further says that on 10 July 2020 a transfer of $11,848.70 was made from the office account to the trust account and that, as a result of that transfer, the trust ledger account for the matter number had a nil balance and the deficiency of $11,848.70 was restored - after 75 days.
10. Mr Thong then says at [16.11] that consequent upon the variances totalling $18,743.71 the balances in the trust trial balance statements did not agree with the balance of the cash book.
11. Mr Thong then refers to the evidence provided to him by Mr Hu and by the respondent. He records the respondent informing him that the variances were caused by incorrect reversals and that the respondent ". . . . . thought it would be best for [her] to fix it manually". The section of the evidence given by the respondent to Mr Thong reproduced at [16.15] concedes that she did not talk to the partners before fixing the variances manually.
12. At pages 17 to 28 of Exhibit A Mr Thong reports his findings as to the transfer of money from the Practice's trust account. There are nine transactions examined. One of those transactions is recorded as matter T21541. Mr Thong's examination of the relevant records, including trust records for that matter found:

(a) A 19 July 2021 tax invoice for $6,129.95 being issued.

(b) $5,896.00 being transferred from Practice's trust account on 22 July 2021 to the office account.

(c) A 5 August 2021 transfer of $223.95 from the trust account to the office account.

(d) $5,896.00 being transferred from the office account to the respondent's personal NAB account.

1. Mr Thong then sets out the evidence given to him by the respondent in relation to this withdrawal and deposit at [16.19]. He records her agreeing that $5,896.00 was deposited into her NAB account; further, the respondent agreeing that she recorded a false account number in the payment cash book to hide the fact that it was paid into her account. He further records the respondent agreeing that she had received a monetary gain of $5,896.00 by falsifying the trust records.
2. The examination findings in respect of the second, third and fourth matters in the table at [16.16] are documented at pages 18 to 22 of the Exhibit. In each case the investigator has found monies being transferred from the trust account to the office account and then to the respondent's personal account. The report records, in respect of each, the respondent conceding withdrawal of the monies and deposit into her personal accounts, no authorisation and the recording of false information to the trust records to hide the fact of money being deposited into the respondent's bank accounts. The investigator outlines the same process of enquiry for transactions 5 to 9 in the table at [16.16] at pages 22 to 28 of the Exhibit. Each followed a similar pattern namely the issuing of a tax invoice, the transferring of monies from the Practice's trust account to its office account, the transferring of funds from the office account to the respondent's personal account, admissions being made to the investigator by the respondent of the monies withdrawn from the practice's office account being paid into her personal account and the further admission of recording false information to the trust records to hide the fact that money was being transferred to her bank account.
3. At [16.36] Mr Thong records enquiring of the respondent why she misappropriated the money from the practice's trust account and the respondent saying that at the time she had financial difficulties. He further records enquiring of her why she deliberately attempted to conceal the transactions in the trust account system and the respondent saying "because I know my action is wrong and I can cover it by using the misleading information in the trust".
4. Mr Thong records his conclusions at [17] at pages 32 and 33 of Exhibit A. Relevantly his conclusions are:

(a) A total of $12,517.40, in respect of three different matters, was transferred from the practice's trust account to the respondent's personal accounts but where the trust ledger accounts recorded the monies being paid into the office account.

(b) The respondent admitting that she recorded false information in the trust records to conceal the true purpose of the $12,517.40 made from the trust account;

(c) Further, admission that those payments were not authorised by the practice, and that she had obtained a monetary gain of that amount by falsifying trust records.

(d) The trust trial balance statements for the months of April 2021 to March 2022, as printed from the firm's trust accounting system, disclosed a variance of $18,743.71 yet the statements created by the respondent disclosed no variance.

(e) The respondent admitting that she altered the trust trial balance statements for those months; accordingly, the respondent creating false trust records.

(f) An investigation conducted by the practice related to its business account finding that the respondent had made unauthorised payments from the office account totalling $75,807.33; further, that the respondent used the payroll and office record systems to make the unauthorised payments.

(g) The respondent making an admission that she caused the $75,807.33 to be paid from the office account to her personal accounts; further, that the payments were not authorised.

(h) Tahota Law and the respondent entering into an agreement whereby those parties agreed on a settlement sum of $200,000.00 which, amongst other costs, includes the money withdrawn by the respondent from the practice's office and trust accounts.

1. Pages 781 to 789 of Exhibit CKT-1 is a Deed made on 16 November 2022 between Tahota Law and the respondent. Recital B records that after 14 April 2022 (being the last day of the respondent's employment with the firm) it had ". . . . . discovered and identified actions by [the respondent] during her time at the company that has led to multiple negligence, fraud and misappropriation of funds which caused significant loss and damages to the [firm]". The recitals then record an agreement between the parties to the Deed whereby the respondent would pay to the firm a settlement sum of $200,000.00.
2. Clause 2.1 of the Operative Part of the Deed records "On 26 September 2022 [the respondent] has made a disclosure that [she] has misappropriated a total of $88,324.73 of [the firm's] funds".
3. At page 797 of the Exhibit is an email of the respondent to Mr Thong attaching what are described as "payment records" for the payment of $20,000.00 to the firm - being payments made on 14 and 15 November 2022.
4. The respondent in her affidavit (Exhibit 1) deposes to commencing employment as a bookkeeper with Tahota Law on 3 December 2018 and that, in addition, the undertaking of general administrative tasks. She refers to a September 2019 purchase of a unit in Ryde for $600,000.00, to borrowing $120,000.00 from her parents and obtaining the balance of the purchase monies via a loan through the National Australia Bank. She says that her monthly mortgage payments as at January 2020 were $1704.25. She deposes at [31] to financial pressure and at [33] to realising in April 2021 that she had taken on more debt than she could afford to repay. Her monthly income at that time was $4,600.00 gross and her monthly expenses, before living expenses, totalled $3,514.97.
5. She concedes at [37] that on or around 9 April 2022 she transferred $218.35 from the office account of the Practice to her personal account, recording it as salary. She deposes to a further $1,000.00 being transferred from the office account to herself on 13 April 2021 and a total of $87,014.14 transferred from the Tahota Law office account to her personal accounts between 9 April 2021 and 14 April 2021. She deposes at [41] to receiving a message from Ms Hua, a principal of Tahota Law, to Ms Hua asserting that the respondent had stolen money and, at [44], to knowing that what she had done was wrong but "not thinking straight at the time". She says that from April 2022 to November 2022 she was in touch with Tahota Law about "fixing up" what she had done.
6. The respondent says at [46] that after her April 2022 telephone conversation with Ms Hua she felt ashamed of herself and that she had ruined her life. She could not tell her parents. The reality of what she had done hit her at once. She was terrified of going to jail. She says at [49] that that evening she took a number of Aspro Clear dissolvable tablets. She became unwell, called an ambulance and was taken to Royal North Shore Hospital where she was admitted.
7. The respondent concedes at [52] that she has been unable to tell her parents, husband and friends about what she did and, at [52], of entering into a Deed of Settlement with Tahota Law on or around 16 November 2022 by which she agreed to pay them $220,000.00 as compensation. In her mind paying such compensation was an acceptance of responsibility for what she did. She says at [54] that to pay the $200,000.00 she sold a vehicle for $20,000.00, borrowed $80,000.00 from her parents and borrowed $100,000.00 from friends. She says at [55] that she did not tell her parents or her friends what the money was for. Instead she says that she told them that a property she had would "settle soon" and that she would be able to repay them in two to three weeks.
8. She also says at [56] that she has been unable to tell her husband about what happened.
9. At [57] she says that on or around 30 June 2023 she sold her unit, obtained $205,071.50 from the sale and paid $200,000.00 to Tahota Law. At [59] to [63] the respondent details subsequent employment as an assistant accountant with a development and construction company and a private tertiary education provider for a company that commenced in June 2023.
10. The respondent says at [64] that in September 2019 she registered as a member with CPA Australia to qualify as a certified public accountant and started the CPA course in April 2020. She says at [65] that her career aspirations are to become a CPA and a registered tax agent.
11. In the respondent's Reply lodged with the Tribunal on 20 June 2025 at [1] and [2] she admits that:

(a) she is guilty of conduct that, if she were an Australian legal practitioner, would have constituted unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, and

(b) that she is not a fit and proper person to be employed or paid in connection with the practice of law or be involved in the management of a law practice.

1. She admits that on 9 and 24 April 2020 she caused money to be withdrawn from the trust account of the practice and for such monies to be deposited into the office account of the firm; the amounts being $11,848.70 and $10,968.70. She further admits at [5] that at no time was she authorised or entitled to cause the above transactions to be made.
2. There is a further admission at [6] of nine transactions being effected between 22 July and 17 September 2021 - a total of $12,517.40 - being withdrawn from the trust account of the practice and deposited into her personal account.
3. The respondent further admits that in transactions 1 to 49 in Schedule 2 of the Reply she caused a total of $48,827.27 to be withdrawn from the firm's office account and deposited into other bank accounts; further, that at no time was she authorised to do so; further, that she used the monies withdrawn for her own benefit. She further admits that the amounts referred to in items 50 and 52 of Schedule 2 of the Reply are the cumulative sum of unauthorised salary payments to her and that items 51 and 53 of Schedule 2 are the cumulative sum of superannuation liabilities incurred by the firm in respect of the sums in items 50 and 52.
4. At [17] the respondent admits that in the circumstances referred to in her Reply an order pursuant to s119 of the Uniform Law that she be disqualified is justified.

1. The applicant submits that its evidence shows that the respondent did engage in the conduct alleged. It refers to Mr Thong's affidavit and the documents exhibited to that affidavit as identifying the trust and office accounts being operated by the practice as well as the accounts controlled and/or operated by the respondent. It relies on the report of Mr Thong annexed to his affidavit establishing the transfer of monies between the office and trust accounts of the practice, the respondent's unauthorised transfer of money from the trust account to herself, being the nine transactions referred to earlier in these Reasons, and the monies totalling $12,517.40.
2. The applicant says that the respondent used the monies withdrawn from the trust account and deposited into her own accounts for her own purposes including paying off her credit card debt.
3. Reliance is, similarly, placed on the Thong report in establishing the respondent making false entries in the practice's trust account ledger records and the statement of Mr Hu within the annexure to Exhibit A establishing the unauthorised transfer by the respondent of money from the practice's office account to her personal bank accounts. The applicant submits that the evidence establishes no authority entitling the respondent to cause any of the transactions to be made and that she has used the money withdrawn for her own purposes.
4. It submits that the evidence ought satisfy the Tribunal to find that the respondent is not a fit and proper person to be employed or paid in connection with the practice of law or to be involved in the management of a law practice and further, is guilty of conduct that, if she were an Australian legal practitioner, would have constituted unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct. It says that reliability and integrity in the handling of trust funds are fundamental prerequisites in determining whether a person is fit and proper to be entrusted with the responsibilities belonging to a member of the legal profession, and that these prerequisites are also fundamental to determining whether a lay person is fit and proper to be entrusted with such responsibilities. It says that the respondent's conduct was deliberate, dishonest and for her own benefit. The conduct involved, the applicant says amounts to substantial and consistent failure to reach reasonable standards of competence and diligence.
5. The Council submits that at present, and indefinitely, the respondent is not a fit and proper person to be employed or paid in connection with the practice of law or to be involved in the management of a law practice. It says that notwithstanding the respondent admitting to the conduct and the respondent entering into the Deed of Settlement with the Practice, the conduct nevertheless demonstrates that she cannot be entrusted with those responsibilities and to do so would place the public at risk. The Tribunal, the applicant submits, ought find that the respondent's conducts falls within the category of professional misconduct. It was, it says, serious and substantial, as well as consistent.
6. The applicant Council further submits that an order disqualifying the respondent indefinitely is justified as such an order would protect the public by preventing the respondent from engaging in similar conduct, discouraging others from doing likewise, and protect the reputation of - and promote the public's confidence in - the legal profession.
7. Mr Lynch SC for the respondent concedes the theft from her employer of over $87,000.00. He says that the issue for the Tribunal is whether, having regard to what has transpired in the intervening three years, an indefinite disqualification is justified.
8. He says there was an immediate admission of wrongdoing; the admission being repeated in writing. That, he says, is an acceptance of responsibility.
9. A submission is further made that the respondent was unreservedly candid with the Law Society investigator and paid the agreed compensation fund to Tahota Law. Mr Lynch further submits that following leaving Tahota Law the respondent did not seek employment with another law practice and has not since sought employment in a law practice. That, he says, points to the genuineness of immediate and continuing shame and contrition for what she did.
10. Finally, the submission is made that disqualification for an indefinite period is not in the particular circumstances required or justified.

1. Section 119 of the Uniform Law makes it clear that, independently of admissions made by the respondent, the Tribunal needs to be satisfied that a ground for the making of an order under the section has been established, and that the disqualification is justified.
2. In Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Jarfari [2020] NSW CA 53 the Court of Appeal, in proceedings brought by the Council in which a declaration was sought that the respondent was not a fit and proper person to remain on the roll of Australian lawyers, and an order that his name be removed from the roll, said:

"The relief sought is not opposed. The court must be satisfied, nevertheless, that it is appropriate to grant the relief sought, even if the relief is not contested by the solicitor".

1. The first issue for our determination is whether we are satisfied that a ground for the making of the order sought under s119 has been established by the applicant.
2. We accept the evidence of the Law Society Trust Account Investigator, Mr Thong, as set out in Exhibit A including, and in particular, the material exhibited to that affidavit; the primary document being the deponent's 11 May 2023 report.
3. We are satisfied on the evidence to the requisite Briginshaw[1] standard that the respondent engaged in the conduct alleged in the Application; specifically that:

(a) Tahota Law operated a Trust Account with the National Australia Bank as well as an Office Account with the same bank.

(b) The respondent had, at material times as alleged in the Application, control of and operated personal bank accounts with the National Australia Bank and ANZ - as described in Mr Thong's report.

(c) On 9 April, 24 April and 10 July 2020 the respondent caused $11,848.70, $10,968.70 and $11,848.70 respectively to be withdrawn from the Trust Account of the Practice and for those monies to be deposited into the Office Account of the firm.

(d) These transactions occurred without the authority or direction of the Practice, or without the authority or direction of the clients on whose behalf the Practice held the monies on trust.

(e) On the dates referred to in [6] of the Application the respondent wilfully caused the monies set out in the second column of [6] to be withdrawn from monies held on trust for the Practice's clients, and deposited those monies into the accounts set out in the third column of [6] - a total of $12,517.40.

(f) The monies referred to above caused to be withdrawn from the Trust Account and deposited into the respondent's personal bank accounts were monies held in the Trust Account of the Practice and were to be transferred to the Office Account.

(g) At no time was the respondent authorised or otherwise entitled to cause any of the transactions referred to in (e) above to be made.

(h) The respondent used the monies withdrawn from the Trust Account and deposited into her personal bank accounts.

(i) The respondent did not record any of the transactions referred to in (e) into the Trust Account ledger of Tahota Law.

(j) Between 22 July and 17 September 2021 the respondent made entries into the Trust Account ledger of the firm which falsely indicated that the monies were deposited into the Office Account; this to conceal that she had caused the monies to be transferred into her personal accounts.

(k) Between 9 April 2021 and 15 April 2022 the respondent caused a total of $75,338.71 to be withdrawn from the Office Account of Tahota Law, and deposited the monies into her personal bank accounts on the dates set out in the second column of [12] of the Application.

(l) The monies referred to in (k) above were held in the Office Account of the Practice and that, at no time, was the respondent authorised or otherwise entitled to cause any of the transactions referred to in (k) above to be made.

(m) The respondent used the monies withdrawn from the Office Account and referred to in (k) above.

(n) Between 9 April and 15 April 2022 the respondent made entries into the salary payroll records of Tahota Law which falsely provided that the transactions referred to in (k) above were made on account of "attached salary extra pay"; this to conceal that she caused the monies referred to in (k) to be transferred to her personal bank accounts in circumstances where she had no authority or other entitlement to do so.

1. The first ground relied upon by the applicant is that the respondent is not in the circumstances a fit and proper person to be employed or paid in connection with the practice of law or to be involved in the management of a law practice; that being the ground set out in subsection (2)(b) of s119.
2. The Council refers to what this Tribunal has said in Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Ip [2023] NSWCATOD 157, that the test for determining whether or not the respondent is a fit and proper person to be employed or paid in connection with the practice of law, or be involved in the management of a law practice, is the same test as determining whether a lawyer is or is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practise. We agree.
3. Reliability and integrity in the handling of trust funds are fundamental prerequisites in determining whether a person is fit and proper to be entrusted with the responsibilities belonging to a member of the legal profession. Members of the legal profession are held to a high standard with respect to their handling of trust money.
4. The New South Wales Court of Appeal in Barwick[2] said:

"The trust and confidence which clients place in their solicitors are a basic element of the administration of justice in this country. Violations by legal practitioners of Trust Accounts betray that trust and harm public confidence in the legal system. This explains the sacrosanct nature of Trust Accounts and the acute concerns that courts have when practitioners, in breach of their fiduciary obligations, misuse trust monies for their own benefit".

1. The applicant submits, and we agree, that the issues of reliability and integrity in the handling of trust funds are also fundamental to determining whether a lay person is fit and proper to be entrusted with the responsibilities belonging to persons employed or paid in connection with the practise of law.
2. In Brincat the Tribunal was dealing with a matter involving a person who was not a legal practitioner but employed in a legal practice misappropriating trust moneys. The Tribunal said at [18]:

"Whilst there is no evidence about the training or instructions that the respondent received when she commenced employment with the law firm, there can be no doubt on the basis of the factual matters which we have found proven, that the respondent must have been aware that moneys with which she was dealing inappropriately were held in trust for particular clients of the law firm. It was the respondent who initiated the transfers out of the trust account. Such conduct demonstrates that the respondent is not a fit and proper person to be employed or paid in connection with the practice of law or to be involved in the management of the law practice."

1. Similar circumstances occurred here. There is, similarly, no evidence as to the level of training or instruction that the respondent received from Tahota Law however we find, consistently with the finding made by the Tribunal in Brincat, that the respondent must have been aware that moneys with which she was dealing inappropriately were held in trust for particular clients of Tahota Law.
2. The respondent's conduct was dishonest. She deliberately took the money for her own benefit. She did so without authority; either of the principals of Tahota Law or (in respect of trust moneys) of clients of the firm on whose behalf the money was being held.
3. The respondent's conduct involved a substantial and consistent failure to reach reasonable standards of competence and diligence. Honesty and integrity are prerequisites to a practitioner's fitness to engage in legal practice.[3]
4. On the evidence presented we are comfortably satisfied that the respondent is not a fit and proper person to be employed or paid in connection with the practice of law of to be involved in the management of a law practice. The respondent admits at [17(2)] of her Reply that she is not a fit and proper person to be employed or paid in connection with the practice of law or to be involved in the management of a law practice. Whilst that admission is noted and relevant we are - irrespective of the admission - satisfied on the evidence that the applicant's ground 1 has been established.
5. Ground 2 asserts that the respondent is guilty of conduct that, if she were an Australian legal practitioner, would have constituted unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct. The evidence, we find, establishes this ground. The conduct falls within the category of professional misconduct. This for a number of reasons.
6. Firstly, the conduct was serious and substantial. Any misuse of trust money by a solicitor constitutes a serious breach of the solicitor's obligations. There was misappropriation of $12,517.40 from the Trust Account of Tahota Law and $75,338.71 from the Office Account. Not insubstantial amounts.
7. Secondly, we agree with the applicant's submission that the conduct was consistent. There were numerous contravening transactions across a 12 month period.
8. Thirdly, the respondent must have known that the transactions involved trust money. She realised the seriousness of what she was doing. She had an interest in each of the transactions. She used the moneys for her own benefit.
9. The respondent says at [52] of Exhibit 1 being ashamed of her actions. She conceded when interviewed by Mr Thong that she recorded "false information" to the Trust Account records; further, that the reason for the misappropriation of the trust money was because she was having financial difficulties; further, conceded that she knew her actions were wrong but could "cover it" by using misleading information. She says in the signed statement at page 52 of Exhibit A that she "... fraudulently transferred funds from the company account and trust account without any authorities".
10. The New South Wales Court of Appeal in Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW v Alcorn [2007] NSWCA 288 reiterated that professional misconduct is:

"Behaviour on the part of the practitioner which would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful and dishonourable by his professional brethren of good repute and competency."

1. As the applicant points out in its submissions, the Tribunal in both Ip and Brincat has found that associates of law practices who have used trust moneys they were not entitled to use were guilty of conduct that, if carried out by an Australian legal practitioner, would have constituted professional misconduct.
2. We are satisfied on the evidence that the conduct engaged in by the respondent involved both a substantial and consistent failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence; further, was conduct that, if she were an Australian legal practitioner, would have constituted professional misconduct.
3. The third element for consideration is whether or not disqualification is justified.
4. The Council submits that there is justification as such an order would (a) protect the public by preventing the respondent and discouraging other persons from engaging in similar conduct and, (b) protect the reputation of, and promote the public's confidence in, the legal profession by publicly marking the Tribunal's disapprobation of the conduct.
5. Consistently with the way in which we have approached our consideration of the Application grounds, we are satisfied on the evidence that a disqualification order is justified independently of the respondent's admission of such justification at [17(3)] of her Reply.
6. We agree with the applicant's submissions set out above as to the justification of an order and the protection of the public and the promotion of the public's confidence in the legal profession; especially in the holding by legal practices of trust moneys.
7. There is no evidence that would cause us to exercise the discretion against the making of an order. The respondent makes no submission to that effect.
8. The final issue for determination is whether or not disqualification ought be for a specified period or indefinitely.
9. The applicant submits that the disqualification order ought be for an indefinite period citing, as indicated above, protection of the public by preventing the respondent from engaging in similar conduct. The respondent submits that disqualification for an indefinite period is not, in the particular circumstances, justified. My Lynch SC says that 18 months is appropriate.
10. We disagree with the respondent's submission and find that indefinite disqualification is required and is justified. This for the following reasons:

(1) Firstly, although the respondent at [66] of Exhibit 1 says she feels ashamed of her actions and talks of her aspirations to become a CPA and a registered tax agent she does not depose to informing her two employers since leaving Tahota Law of either her conduct or the order sought against her in these Tribunal proceedings. Having admitted to the conduct asserted we would expect that if the respondent concedes that a disqualification ought be made and is justified but that it ought not be indefinite, she would demonstrate that the Tribunal could have confidence that no similar conduct would be engaged in again by producing evidence of disclosure to the two employers referred to in [59] to [63] of her affidavit.

(2) There is in the evidence a concerning failure by the respondent to tell the truth to her parents, her friends who have lent her money and her husband. She says at [55] of her affidavit that despite borrowing $80,000 from her parents and $100,000 from her friends (in order to make the $200,000 settlement payment to Tahota Law) she did not tell the parents or friends what the money was for. Instead, she falsely told her parents that she needed the $80,000 to purchase a new property. She falsely told her friends that she was borrowing $100,000 from that the money was for a property transaction. She says at [56] that she married in February 2023 she has not told her husband what has occurred. We do not have confidence in the respondent's statement at [65] of her affidavit that she "will need to disclose" "...what [she] did at Tahota and these proceedings" when there has been no such disclosure to persons close to her namely her parents, her friends from whom she borrowed money or her husband; nor to the two post‑Tahota employers.

(3) We are also concerned that the respondent has been less than truthful with medical practitioners. The Royal North Shore hospital assessment document at page 2 of Annexure ZL2 of Exhibit 1, being a service date of 23 April 2022, records a history given as having been "stressed with work" and to being informed by her former manager that legal action would be taken "due to her mistakes". The history given does not record the respondent conceding misappropriation of trust monies. Similarly at page 4 of the same annexure, the history given is that of workplace bullying and threats of legal action. There is no evidence before the tribunal of workplace bullying yet that is what the respondent, falsely, asserts to medical practitioners as to the reason for her self‑harm and hospital admission.

(4) There is reference at page 83, in a discharge document dated 8 June 2022 that the respondent planned to contact alternative psychologists to begin sessions. There is no medical or other evidence to suggest that the respondent has consulted a psychologist or sought psychological treatment.

1. On the evidence as adduced we have no present confidence that if the respondent fell into financial difficulties again she would not reoffend or engage in similar conduct.
2. The Uniform Law does by section 119(3) permit a person against whom a disqualification order has been made - with leave of the Tribunal or the Council - to apply to vary or revoke such an order if it considers appropriate to do so. If the applicant did seek medical treatment and was able to put before the Tribunal, at a future date, evidence that caused the Tribunal at that point to be satisfied that the order that we now make of indefinite disqualification ought be varied or revoked the legislation gives her the ability to do so.
3. On the evidence as it presently is we consider that an order ought to be made disqualifying the respondent for the purposes of the Uniform Law indefinitely. We reject the respondent's submission made at the conclusion of the hearing that the disqualification ought be for a specified period of 18 months.

1. It is noted that the applicant Council does not seek an order with respect to costs. It says that, per section 60 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 NSW, there are no special circumstances warranting an award of costs.

1. (1) The Tribunal, having found that the respondent:

(a) is not a fit and proper person to be employed or paid in connection with the practice of law or to be involved in the management of a law practice; and

(b) guilty of conduct that, if she were an Australian legal practitioner, would have constituted unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct,

disqualifies the respondent for the purposes of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) indefinitely.

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I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the Reasons for Decision of the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.

05 September 2025 - V Griswold added as a Counsel and C Flax added as a solicitor for the Applicant.

[1] Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; [1938] 60 CLR 336.

[2] Barwick v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [2004] NSW CA 32 at [118].

[3] NSW Bar Association v Cummins [2001] NSWCA 284.