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[2025] NSWCA 255
plaintiff. The Court declared that the respondent was not a fit and proper person to remain on the Roll, ordered his name removed, and ordered him to pay the Council's costs ([43]).
The Court of Appeal removed Sevag Chalabian from the New South Wales Roll of Australian lawyers after considering his conviction for dealing with proceeds of crime through his firm's trust account and creating sham documents. His consent did not determine the matter: the Court had to assess the evidence and decide for itself whether the orders were justified. It found that the conduct demonstrated present unfitness and likely unfitness for the indefinite future. It also ordered him to pay the Council's costs.
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2,168 words · generated 06/10/2026
The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales applied to the Court of Appeal for a declaration that Sevag Chalabian was not a fit and proper person to remain on the New South Wales Roll of Australian lawyers, an order removing his name, and costs. The Court decided the application on the papers. Chalabian consented to the relief, including costs, but the Court emphasised that consent did not dispose of the merits: it had to be independently satisfied that the orders were appropriate ([1]-[2], [26], [34]).
2 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
Chalabian was admitted in New South Wales in 1993. He was a principal of Lands Legal Pty Ltd from 2004 to 2017, and had access to the firm's trust account ([3]-[5]). The relevant criminal conduct occurred in 2017. Plutus Payroll Australia Pty Ltd and related companies had been used by other people to collect withholding tax and GST without remitting the amounts to the Australian Taxation Office ([13]-[16]). The Court's account makes clear that Chalabian was not one of the Plutus tax-fraud conspirators. The conduct relevant to his conviction arose from a separate plan by two of those conspirators and another person to blackmail others involved in the fraud ([13], [17]).
Over approximately 12 weeks, Chalabian received 53 deposits totalling $24,244,740 into Lands Legal's trust account. He believed the funds were proceeds of crime and disbursed them in 22 distributions on instructions from Daniel Rostankovski and Daniel Hausman. He also created a false paper trail, including negotiating two deeds that purported to present the trust-account transactions as legitimate. He received $51,597.06 in connection with his role, paid into an account held by Lands Legal ([18]-[20]).
A jury convicted him under s 400.3(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth) on 21 April 2022. He was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment, with a non-parole period of seven years and six months. His application for leave to appeal against conviction was refused and his sentence appeal dismissed ([7]-[9]). The Law Society had suspended and then cancelled his practising certificate ([3]). The Court of Appeal made the roll-removal orders on 28 November 2025 ([43]).
The final orders were a declaration that Chalabian was not fit and proper to remain on the Roll, removal of his name, and payment of the Council's costs ([43]). The judgment does not decide any claim for recovery of the money or determine issues in the separate Plutus proceedings. It records those proceedings only as part of the respondent's submissions ([35]).
The Court treated two connected questions as central: present fitness and likely fitness in the indefinite future. The applicable assessment was whether the practitioner was fit and proper to remain in the profession, determined on the civil standard. The judgment describes the purpose of disciplinary proceedings as protection of the public and of confidence in the legal profession ([27]). It also states that removal is warranted where the Court is satisfied that a practitioner is probably permanently, or at least indefinitely, unfit to practise ([27]).
For present fitness, the decisive feature was grave dishonesty in the course of conduct involving a solicitor's trust account and sham documents. The Court said that honesty and integrity are fundamental and indispensable requirements for lawyers, and that preserving the sanctity of trust accounts matters to public confidence in the administration of justice ([38]). It considered the nature of the conduct established in the criminal proceedings, not merely the fact that a conviction existed. The conduct included receiving criminal proceeds through the firm's trust account, distributing them as instructed, and creating false documentation to conceal or disguise the transactions ([18]-[20]).
The judgment's reasoning on trust accounts sits alongside the principle it recites from Barwick: client trust and confidence are basic to the administration of justice, and misuse of trust money harms public confidence ([29]). In this case, the Court described the offending as a “violation of the sanctity” of the firm's trust accounts ([38]). Its analysis therefore connects the personal qualities required of a practitioner with the institutional function of trust accounts.
The declaration was not treated as redundant because removal was also ordered. The Court said that a declaration was appropriate to meet public accountability and deterrence objectives ([38]). The judgment had earlier noted the public-interest value of reaffirming the standing of the profession and assuring the public that such conduct is not tolerated ([25]). Those purposes are expressed in relation to a declaration and the broader disciplinary response.
For future fitness, the Court considered the deliberate and serious nature of the wrongdoing, Chalabian's imprisonment, and the fact that he had put forward no suggested safeguards for future practice. It also acknowledged his expression of remorse ([37], [39]). The judgment does not say that remorse was irrelevant; rather, it identifies it alongside the matters supporting its conclusion that unfitness was likely to continue indefinitely. On that assessment, removal was appropriate ([39]).
Finally, the Court ordered costs against Chalabian. His cooperation and timely responses to the Council were not disputed, but the Court found no reason to depart from the usual order. His serious misconduct had necessitated the proceedings, and the relief could not be obtained merely by agreement between the parties ([41]-[42]).
The judgment does not purport to announce a new legal test. It applies principles from earlier decisions about the protective purpose of lawyer discipline, the fitness assessment, and the conditions for removal from the Roll ([27]-[29]). It states that the Court must be independently satisfied of the relevant facts and the appropriateness of removal even when the respondent consents ([26], [34]).
The pre-existing framework set out in the judgment has several parts. First, fitness is assessed on the civil standard and concerns whether the practitioner is fit and proper to remain a member of the profession ([27]). Secondly, disciplinary proceedings are directed to protecting the public and public confidence, rather than simply punishing past conduct ([27]). Thirdly, removal requires a finding of present unfitness and likely permanent or indefinite future unfitness ([26]-[27]). The judgment also notes that a criminal conviction does not invariably disqualify someone from practice, while dishonesty and misappropriation-related crimes may more readily support removal ([28]).
The decision's application is fact-specific. It finds that this conviction involved grave dishonesty and the use of professional status and a firm's trust account, alongside deliberate false documentation. Those circumstances led the Court to find present unfitness and likely indefinite unfitness ([38]-[39]). The decision therefore illustrates the operation of the existing framework in a case involving large-scale criminal proceeds and trust-account misuse. It does not state that every conviction under s 400.3, every period of imprisonment, or every instance of dishonesty requires removal.
The judgment does not identify a change in the law after the decision. Its effect in this proceeding was to make the declaration and removal orders, not to amend the statutory framework or formulate a different threshold.
At [26], the Court says it must be independently satisfied that the respondent is presently unfit and likely to remain unfit indefinitely, notwithstanding his consent. In plain English, the parties could agree about the orders they wanted, but the Court still had to decide whether the evidence justified them.
At [27], the Court describes the question as whether the practitioner is fit and proper to remain a member of the profession, applying the civil standard. It also explains that the relevant disciplinary purpose is protection of the public and confidence in the profession. This places the focus on professional suitability and public protection, rather than treating the proceedings as a second criminal sentence.
At [28], the Court notes that conviction alone does not invariably disqualify a person from legal practice. It also records that the consequences of a conviction may follow more readily for crimes involving dishonesty and misappropriation. The passage is important because it avoids a categorical rule based solely on criminal conviction.
At [38], the Court concludes that Chalabian was presently unfit. It calls honesty and integrity indispensable requirements and says that grave dishonesty of the kind established was incompatible with practice. It also identifies public accountability and deterrence as reasons for making a declaration. In ordinary terms, the Court considered the conduct to undermine the qualities and public trust required of a lawyer.
At [39], the Court finds likely unfitness for the indefinite future, referring to the respondent's incarceration, the lack of proposed safeguards, his remorse, and the deliberate nature of the wrongdoing. It then orders removal. This passage shows how the Court addressed future risk separately from the conclusion about present unfitness.
At [42], the Court explains the costs order. Even though Chalabian cooperated and did not oppose costs, the Court considered that his misconduct had made the proceedings necessary. The public-law relief could not simply be made by private agreement.
The decision is most directly relevant to disciplinary proceedings involving a practitioner whose proven conduct combines serious dishonesty with misuse of a solicitor's trust account and deliberate concealment through false or sham documents. The facts that mattered here included the volume and value of the money, the repeated deposits and distributions, the respondent's belief that the money was criminal proceeds, and his use of professional status and a trust account in the conduct ([18]-[20], [38]).
It is also relevant where a practitioner consents to removal or a declaration. The decision confirms that consent does not replace the Court's independent assessment of fitness and the statutory or inherent power to make the orders ([26], [34], [42]). The Court must still be satisfied on the material before it.
The case should not be read as establishing that any criminal conviction automatically results in removal. The judgment expressly notes that conviction may not always disqualify a person, while explaining why dishonesty and misappropriation can carry particular weight ([28]). Nor does it establish that imprisonment alone proves indefinite unfitness. The Court considered the nature of the wrongdoing, future safeguards, incarceration, and remorse together ([39]).
The reasoning may be relevant to declarations as well as removal orders. The Court treated public accountability and deterrence as legitimate purposes of a declaration ([38]). It also shows that the costs question can remain separate from the fitness assessment: cooperation was acknowledged, but did not alter the Court's conclusion that the proceedings had been required ([41]-[42]).
The supplied judgment is dated 28 November 2025 and contains no discussion of later judicial treatment of this decision. The document therefore does not establish whether a later court has followed, distinguished, applied, or otherwise considered it. No later case history can be reliably stated from this source alone.
The judgment itself refers to earlier authorities when describing the legal framework. It cites Re Davis and Yousif on the fitness inquiry and standard, Thomson on the protective purpose of disciplinary proceedings, and Karimjee and Zhukovska on the threshold for removal ([27]). It discusses Ziems on the significance of criminal conviction and Barwick on trust accounts ([28]-[29]). Those are authorities relied on or described in this judgment, not later treatment of Chalabian.
The source's amendments section records a change on 15 December 2025 to the name in the headnote and paragraph 17. That is a recorded amendment to this judgment text, not evidence of subsequent judicial consideration ([Amendments section]).
The judgment resolves the application before it but does not provide a detailed account of what safeguards might have been capable of addressing future concerns. It says that Chalabian had put forward none, and treats that absence as relevant to indefinite unfitness ([39]). It does not identify particular safeguards or state how a court should assess them in another case.
The decision also does not specify how remorse would affect the future-fitness assessment in a different factual setting. It records remorse but concludes, in the circumstances before it, that the respondent was likely to remain unfit indefinitely ([37], [39]). The judgment does not give a general formula for weighing remorse against seriousness, deliberateness, or evidence of rehabilitation.
Nor does the decision define a quantitative threshold for the role of the value of funds or number of transactions. It records the amounts and transaction counts as facts, but its stated conclusions rely more broadly on grave dishonesty, trust-account misuse, sham documentation, and the deliberate nature of the wrongdoing ([18]-[20], [38]-[39]). It would therefore be unsafe to infer a numerical rule from this case.
Finally, the judgment does not address how its reasoning would apply to materially different conduct, such as a conviction unrelated to practice, dishonesty without trust-account involvement, or a case with evidence of developed safeguards and rehabilitation. It notes that conviction does not invariably disqualify a person, leaving those questions to assessment under the stated fitness principles and the particular evidence ([28]).
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Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Chalabian [2025] NSWCA 255
Hearing dates: On the papers
Date of orders: 28 November 2025
Decision date: 28 November 2025
Before: Ward P; Stern JA; Price AJA
Decision: 1. Declare that the respondent (Sevag Chalabian) is not a fit and proper person to remain on the roll of Australian lawyers maintained by the Supreme Court of New South Wales in accordance with s 22 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) (Roll);
2. Order that the name of the respondent (Sevag Chalabian) be removed from the Roll;
3. Order that the respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the proceedings.
Catchwords: LEGAL PRACTITIONERS – disciplinary proceedings – practitioner convicted of offence under s 400.3(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth) of dealing in proceeds of crime – sentence of imprisonment – declaration that the practitioner is not a fit and proper person to remain on the roll of Australian lawyers – order that practitioner’s name be removed from roll – orders not opposed
Legislation Cited: Criminal Code 1995 (Cth), ss 135, 400.3
Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW), ss 14, 22, 23, 89(2), 264
Cases Cited: Barwick v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [2004] NSWCA 32; [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-730
Chalabian v R [2024] NSWCCA 47
Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Clarke [2022] NSWCA 57
Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Croke [2024] NSWCA 195
Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Duncan [2024] NSWCA 147
Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Green [2022] NSWCA 257
Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Jafari [2020] NSWCA 53
Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Karimjee [2021] NSWCA 179
Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Parente [2019] NSWCA 33
Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Zhukovska [2020] NSWCA 163
Council of the Law Society v Sideris [2025] NSWCA 159
New South Wales Bar Association v Cummins (2001) 52 NSWLR 279; [2001] NSWCA 284
Plutus Payroll Australia Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Saikali [2024] NSWSC 1093; (2024) 389 FLR 58
Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Dimitrious [2015] NSWCA 258
Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Thomson [2018] NSWCA 230
Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Yousif [2025] NSWCA 77
R v Chalabian (No 14) [2022] NSWSC 829
Re Davis (1947) 75 CLR 409; [1947] HCA 53
The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v O’Brien [2025] NSWCA 215
The Prothonotary v X [2024] NSWCA 251
Ziems v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (1957) 97 CLR 279; [1957] HCA 46
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (Applicant)
Sevag Chalabian (Respondent)
Representation: Counsel:
Ms A Horvath SC with Mr M P Nesbeth (Applicant)
Mr S Chalabian (self represented)
Solicitors:
The Law Society of New South Wales (Applicant)
File Number(s): 2025/00146138
Publication restriction: Nil
[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment]
The respondent was admitted to the legal profession in New South Wales on 15 December 1993 and held a practising certificate issued by the Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (Council) in each practising year from 1 July 1994 to 30 May 2022, when the Council resolved to cancel the respondent’s practising certificate pursuant to s 89(2) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) (Uniform Law). The matters giving rise to the present proceedings relate to the respondent’s time as a principal of the law firm Lands Legal Pty Ltd (Lands Legal). At all relevant times, Lands Legal operated a trust account to which the respondent had access.
On 13 July 2018, the respondent disclosed to the Law Society of New South Wales that on 11 July 2018 he had been charged with an offence of contrary to s 135.4(3) of the Criminal Code (Cth) of conspiring with the intention of dishonestly causing a loss to the Commonwealth. On 21 April 2022, he was arraigned at the Supreme Court of New South Wales on an indictment charging him with one count of money laundering (dealing with money or property that was, and that he believed to be, the proceeds of crime, to the value of $1 million or more) contrary to section 400.3(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth). The respondent pleaded not guilty to that offence. The respondent had offered to plead guilty to a lesser offence of recklessly dealing with the proceeds of crime in a sum greater than $1 million contrary to s 400.3(2) of the Criminal Code.
The matter proceeded to trial by jury in the Supreme Court between 21 February 2022 and 21 April 2022. On 21 April 2022, the jury found the respondent guilty of the offence charged. On 23 June 2022, the respondent was sentenced to a period of twelve years’ imprisonment, commencing on 23 June 2022 with a non-parole period of seven years and six months.
The conviction related to a conspiracy (to which the respondent was not party), the Plutus conspiracy, to defraud the Australian Taxation Office. The respondent’s conviction related to a plan executed by two of the Plutus payroll tax fraud conspirators, Daniel Rostankovski and Daniel Hausman, with another person, Person X, to blackmail the co-conspirators, demanding payment of $25 million. The respondent engaged in a course of conduct by which he received into the Lands Legal trust account 53 deposits worth $24,244,740, believing those funds were the proceeds of crime, and disbursed the funds in 22 distributions on instructions from Messrs Rostankovksi and Hausman. In the same period, the respondent created a false paper trail, which included negotiating the terms of two deeds which purported to pass off as legitimate the transactions into Lands Legal’s trust account. The respondent also received a total of $51,597.06 from Messrs Rostankovski and Hausman in respect of his role in laundering the money, paid into an account held by Lands Legal.
On 24 May 2023, the Council resolved to commence these proceedings seeking a declaration of unfitness to practice and an order for the removal of the respondent’s name from the roll of Australian lawyers maintained by the Supreme Court of New South Wales (the Roll) and an order for its costs of the proceedings. The respondent consented to the orders sought, including as to costs.
(1) There is no doubt that the conduct of the respondent is such that he is presently unfit to practise as a lawyer. The serious nature of the respondent’s criminal conduct, which involved violation of the sanctity of the trust accounts of his firm and the creation of sham documents, makes such a conclusion inevitable, as the respondent himself concedes. It is appropriate to make the declaration sought in order to meet the objectives of public accountability and deterrence: [37].
(2) The respondent is likely to be unfit to practise as a lawyer for the indefinite future. The respondent is presently incarcerated. He has not put forward any suggested safeguards for future practice, although he has expressed remorse for his conduct. In all the circumstances, including the deliberate and intentional nature of the serious wrongdoing, it is appropriate that an order be made for the removal of the respondent's name from the Roll: [38].
(3) There is no reason to depart from the usual order as to costs. The need for the proceedings to be commenced was the respondent's own serious misconduct. Orders for the removal of his name from the Roll could not have been made simply by consent (nor could the declaratory relief sought by the Council). There is no suggestion that the proceedings were unnecessary: [41].
THE COURT: The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (Council), by Amended Summons filed on 19 May 2025, seeks a declaration and orders to be made by this Court in its inherent jurisdiction to the effect that the name of the respondent, Sevag Chalabian, an Australian lawyer admitted to the Australian legal profession in New South Wales and recorded as a lawyer on the roll maintained by the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Roll) pursuant to s 22 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) (Uniform Law), be removed from the Roll, he not being a fit and proper person to remain on the Roll.
The respondent consents to the orders sought, including as to costs.
The respondent was admitted to the legal profession in New South Wales on 15 December 1993 and held a practising certificate issued by the Council in each practising year from 1 July 1994 to 1 June 2017, when he voluntarily surrendered his practising certificate for the practising year ending 30 June 2017, and from 1 September 2017 to 30 May 2022, when the Council resolved to cancel the respondent’s practising certificate pursuant to s 89(2) of the Uniform Law. The respondent’s practising certificate was suspended on 29 April 2022 prior to being cancelled on 30 May 2022.
The respondent practised as a lawyer: from 1 July 1994 to 30 April 2004, at the law practice then known as Phillips Fox (from 1 July 1994 to 3 June 2000 as an employee, and from 1 July 2000 to 30 April 2004 as a principal); from 10 May 2004 to 1 June 2017, at the law practice known as Lands Legal Pty Ltd (Lands Legal) as a principal; from 13 February 2019 to 1 November 2019, at the law practice known as Visionary Investment Group Pty Ltd as a corporate legal practitioner; from 1 September 2017 to 30 May 2022, at the law practice known as Reign Consulting Pty Ltd as a principal; and from 16 November 2020 to 30 May 2022, at the law practice known as Blackstone Waterhouse Pty Ltd as an employee.
The matters giving rise to the present proceedings relate to the respondent’s time at Lands Legal. At all relevant times, Lands Legal operated a trust account to which the respondent had access.
On 13 July 2018, the respondent disclosed to the Law Society of New South Wales that on 11 July 2018 he had been charged with the offence of conspiring with other persons with the intention of dishonestly causing a loss to a third person (the Commonwealth), contrary to s 135.4(3) of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) (Criminal Code). The respondent included in that Notice of Charge a copy of the Court Attendance Notice and police factsheet in relation to the matter.
On 21 April 2022, the respondent was arraigned at the Supreme Court of New South Wales before Johnson J. The indictment charged the respondent with one count of money laundering (dealing with money or property that was, and what he believed to be, the proceeds of crime, the value of which was $1 million or more) contrary to section 400.3(1) of the Criminal Code*,* particularised as follows:
Between about 1 February 2017 and about 18 May 2017 at Sydney in the State of New South Wales and elsewhere, did deal with money or property that was, and that he believed to be, proceeds of crime, and at the time of dealing the value of the money or property was $1,000,000 or more.
At the arraignment, the respondent pleaded not guilty. The matter proceeded to trial by jury in the Supreme Court of New South Wales between 21 February 2022 and 21 April 2022. On 21 April 2022, the jury found the respondent guilty of the offence charged.
On 23 June 2022, the respondent was sentenced to a period of twelve years’ imprisonment, commencing on 23 June 2022 with a non-parole period of seven years and six months. The respondent will first be eligible for release on parole on 23 December 2029. The respondent’s subsequent application for leave to appeal against conviction was refused and the respondent’s appeal against sentence was dismissed (Chalabian v R [2024] NSWCCA 47).
The respondent remains in custody and, as at 27 August 2025, was being held in Geoffrey Pearce Correctional Centre, South Windsor, New South Wales.
On 24 May 2023, the Council resolved to commence these proceedings.
The circumstances giving rise to the money laundering offence, as emphasised by the Council, are as follows.
Between 1 March 2014 and 17 May 2017, a number of people (the Plutus conspirators), not including the respondent, obtained large sums of money by fraudulently collecting tax revenue and not remitting it to the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). The tax fraud was executed in the following way.
In 2014, the Plutus conspirators established a company called Plutus Payroll Australia Pty Ltd (Plutus), and a number of related subcontracting companies, which provided payroll administration services on behalf of a number of large corporate employers. Those large corporate employers made regular transfers to Plutus on the understanding that those funds would be used to pay the wages and salaries of relevant employees and contractors, and also that Plutus would withhold, and remit to the ATO, the required Pay As You Go Withholding contributions.
The Plutus conspirators used Plutus and the related companies (and the use of “straw directors”) to collect Pay As You Go Withholding contributions and Goods and Services Tax and, rather than pay those amounts to the Commissioner of Taxation, retained them for their own benefit (the tax fraud conspiracy).
Between 1 March 2014 and 18 May 2017, Plutus collected at least $105,625,304 through the tax fraud conspiracy.
Between 1 October 2016 and 17 May 2017, two of the Plutus conspirators, Daniel Rostankovski and Daniel Hausman, and another person, Person X, agreed upon and executed a plan to blackmail the other Plutus conspirators, demanding payment of $25 million, failing payment of which Messrs Rostankovksi and Hausman threatened to publicise the tax fraud conspiracy. Messrs Rostankovski and Hausman arranged with the respondent that they would deposit funds into Lands Legal’s trust account and that he would disburse those funds at their direction.
Over a 12-week period from 1 February 2017 to 18 May 2017, the respondent engaged in a course of conduct by which he received into the Lands Legal trust account 53 deposits worth $24,244,740, believing those funds were the proceeds of crime, and disbursed the funds in 22 distributions on instructions from Messrs Rostankovski and Hausman.
In the same period, the respondent created a false paper trail, which included negotiating the terms of two deeds (the first of those being negotiated from 1 February 2017 and the second being executed on 6 March 2017), which purported to pass off as legitimate the transactions into Lands Legal’s trust account.
The respondent also received a total of $51,597.06 from Messrs Rostankovski and Hausman in respect of his role in laundering the money, paid into an account held by Lands Legal.
The Offender played a critical and indispensable role in the laundering of the proceeds of crime between February and May 2017. It was Hausman who was the principal point of contact with the Offender and Hausman was the driving force for the scheme in conjunction with Rostankovksi. However, the Offender, as a solicitor, played a critical role in the offending, utilising his professional status as a solicitor and access to a trust account which provided a level of cover for the criminal activity involved.
The Offender was prepared to modify the action required to advance the criminal course of conduct as time passed. The events took place over a three-month period and involved many transactions and a very substantial sum of money was laundered as the proceeds of crime.
The Offender was directly involved with the obviously unfit “straw directors” in ways which heightened his objective criminality and emphasised that the process which was being undertaken operated in the interests of Hausman, Rostankovski and the Offender, and not any of the “straw directors”. The Offender created or adopted documentation that was intended to mislead others as to the nature of his legal services, and concealed the involvement of Hausman and Rostankovski and of the funds. In doing so, he took advantage of his knowledge as a solicitor.
The Council seeks a declaration of unfitness and an order for the removal of the respondent’s name from the Roll in this Court’s inherent jurisdiction (as adverted to above); that inherent jurisdiction being preserved by ss 22, 23 and 264 of the Uniform Law.
Section 23(1)(b) of the Uniform Law provides that the Supreme Court may order the removal of a person’s name from the Roll on the recommendation of the designated local regulatory authority. The Council is a designated local regulatory authority for the purposes of Chapter 2, ss 14 and 23 of the Uniform Law. The resolution of the Council dated 13 June 2024 and the Amended Summons amount to such a recommendation. The Council contends that, having regard to the severity of the conduct in question, which is not in dispute, this is an appropriate case for the Court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction relating to the control and discipline of lawyers.
As to the declaration of unfitness which is here sought, the Council notes that declarations of unfitness have been made in a number of cases (citing Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Parente [2019] NSWCA 33 (Parente) at [14]; Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Jafari [2020] NSWCA 53 (Jafari) at [44]: Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Clarke [2022] NSWCA 57 (Clarke) at [12]; Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Duncan [2024] NSWCA 147 at [21]; Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Green [2022] NSWCA 257 (Green) at [73]-[77]; Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Croke [2024] NSWCA 195 at [14] and The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v O*’*Brien [2025] NSWCA 215 at [34]).
As noted in New South Wales Bar Association v Cummins (2001) 52 NSWLR 279; [2001] NSWCA 284 (Cummins) at [32] (quoted with approval in Jafari at [44]), a declaration of unfitness serves the public interest “not least by reaffirming the high regard the Court has for the reputation and standing of the legal profession” and to assure the public that conduct of the kind there (and here) in question is not tolerated in the profession.
As to the application for the removal of the respondent’s name from the Roll, while the respondent consents to the orders sought, it is necessary that this Court be independently satisfied that the respondent is not presently fit to practise and is likely to be unfit in the indefinite future, such that the removal of his name from the Roll is appropriate.
The trust and confidence which clients place in their solicitors are a basic element of the administration of justice in this country. Violations by legal practitioners of trust accounts betray that trust and harm public confidence in the legal system. This explains the sacrosanct nature of trust accounts and the acute concern that courts have when practitioners, in breach of their fiduciary obligations, misuse trust moneys for their own benefit….
The Council here contends that, having regard to the circumstances and gravity of the respondent’s criminal offending, which involved utilising his knowledge and professional status as a solicitor to play a “critical and indispensable role” in a complex money laundering operation, the respondent is permanently unfit to practice. The Council contends that the integral role played by the respondent, the considerable amount of money involved and the manner in which the respondent’s conceit was discovered are aggravating features with respect to the respondent’s conduct.
The Council emphasises that fitness to practise law requires the person concerned to demonstrate honesty and integrity, referring to Cummins (at [19]-[20]) per Spigelman CJ (with whom Mason P and Handley JA agreed) and notes that the protective jurisdiction is concerned not only with the protection of clients and other practitioners but also with the protection of the reputation of the profession and maintenance of public confidence in it (citing Parente at [49]).
As to whether the respondent is likely to remain unfit to practise as a solicitor for the indefinite future, the Council submits that the deliberate and intentional nature of the conduct and the absence of any evidence suggesting the respondent has taken steps to address the way he might safeguard against such conduct in the future are relevant matters to take into account (citing Green at [71]).
As noted, the respondent accepts that the relief sought by the Council should be made because of his conviction of an offence under s 400.3(1) of the Criminal Code and because of the preparation of sham documents relating to the receipt of moneys into Land Legal’s trust account, both of which occurred in the course of legal practice.
The respondent accepts that this Court “retains the responsibility to be satisfied that the orders sought are appropriate on the facts found which is to say that the Court must independently exercise the power under s 23(1)(c) [or in this case, s 23(1)(b)] of the [Uniform Law] on the evidence and material before it” (citing Council of the Law Society v Sideris [2025] NSWCA 159 at [6]) and that it is in the public interest for this Court to examine his conduct and make findings which reflect the disapprobation required (citing Cummins at [24]; [32]).
As to his conviction, which the respondent accepts speaks for itself, the respondent notes that, even if he had not been convicted of an offence under s 400.3(1) of the Criminal Code, his offer to plead guilty to a lesser offence under s 400.3(2) of the Criminal Code (of recklessly dealing with the proceeds of crime) necessarily produces the same result (referring to the remarks on sentence in R v Chalabian (No 14) at [28]-[30]). As to the sham transactions, the respondent refers to the findings by Johnson J (at [63]; [74]-[84] of the sentencing judgment), as well as the similar findings made by Nixon J in Plutus Payroll Australia Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Saikali [2024] NSWSC 1093; (2024) 389 FLR 58 at [216]-[218]; [229]. The respondent notes that those proceedings resulted in a substantial judgment for the recovery of moneys which had passed through the Lands Legal trust account.
The respondent accepts that the creation of false documents is conduct inimical with the obligations of a legal practitioner as an officer of the Court, accepting that honesty and integrity are the hallmarks of a legal practitioner (see Cummins at [19]).
The respondent in his submissions expresses remorse for what he has done and acknowledges that his conduct was detrimental to the reputation of the legal profession and to other legal practitioners.
There is no doubt that the conduct of the respondent is such that he is presently unfit to practise as a lawyer. Honesty and integrity are fundamental and indispensable requirements for lawyers and the observance of those requirements and the preservation of the sanctity of solicitors’ trust accounts are important to the maintenance of public confidence in the administration of justice. It must always be remembered that it is a privilege, not a right, to practise law. The serious nature of the respondent’s criminal conduct, which involved violation of the sanctity of the trust accounts of his firm and the creation of sham documents, makes inevitable the conclusion that the respondent is unfit to practise as a lawyer, as the respondent himself concedes. Grave dishonesty of the kind here established is clearly incompatible with fitness to practise as a lawyer. It is appropriate to make the declaration sought in order to meet the objectives of public accountability and deterrence.
Further, we are of the opinion that the respondent is likely to be unfit to practise as a lawyer for the indefinite future. The respondent is presently incarcerated. He has not put forward any suggested safeguards for future practice, although he has expressed remorse for his conduct. In all the circumstances, including the deliberate and intentional nature of the serious wrongdoing, it is appropriate that an order be made for the removal of the respondent’s name from the Roll.
The Council seeks an order, which the respondent does not oppose, that the respondent pay the Council’s costs. The Council points out that it was the respondent’s grave and criminal conduct that necessitated the commencement of these proceedings to seek orders to protect the public (referring in this regard to The Prothonotary v X at [72]).
As noted, the respondent does not oppose such an order, though he submits that he has at all times complied with his reporting obligations and responded to all requests in a prompt and timely manner and cooperated with the Council in respect of this application, a proposition from which the Council does not demur.
In our opinion, there is no reason to depart from the usual order as to costs in the present case. The need for the proceedings to be commenced was the respondent’s own serious misconduct and orders for the removal of his name from the Roll could not have been made simply by consent (nor could the declaratory relief). There is no suggestion that the proceedings were unnecessary.
For the above reasons, we make the following declaration and orders:
Declare that the respondent (Sevag Chalabian) is not a fit and proper person to remain on the roll of Australian lawyers maintained by the Supreme Court of New South Wales in accordance with s 22 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) (Roll);
Order that the name of the respondent (Sevag Chalabian) be removed from the Roll;
Order that the respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the proceedings.
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Name change in headnote and paragaph 17
The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales
Chalabian [2025] NSWCA 255
(2001) 52 NSWLR 279
(2024) 389 FLR 58
(1947) 75 CLR 409
(1957) 97 CLR 279
The Court declared that the respondent was not a fit and proper person to remain on the Roll, ordered his name removed, and ordered him to pay the Council's costs ([43]).
What must be determined, on the civil standard of proof is whether the practitioner is a fit and proper person to remain a member of the profession (see Re Davis (1947) 75 CLR 409 at 416; [1947] HCA 53; Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Yousif [2025] NSWCA 77 at [45]). This requires the application of established principles reflecting the purpose of disciplinary proceedings, namely, the protection of the public and its confidence in the legal profession (Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Tho**mson [2018] NSWCA 230 (Thomson) at [12]). An order for removal of a practitioner’s name from the Roll is warranted where the Court is satisfied that the respondent is “probably permanently, or at least indefinitely, unfit to practise” (see Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Karimjee [2021] NSWCA 179 at [29] affirming Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Zhukovska [2020] NSWCA 163 at [115]).
Although, as noted in Thomson at ([14]), the fact of a criminal conviction may not always disqualify a person from legal practice, the defects of character and the disgrace flowing from the conviction may be incompatible with continued practice (the Court there citing Ziems v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (1957) 97 CLR 279 at 288; 298; [1957] HCA 46) and the consequence of Roll removal was there said to follow more readily in relation to crimes involving dishonesty and misappropriation (see also Parente at [26], Clarke at [9] and The Prothonotary v X [2024] NSWCA 251 (The Prothonotary v X) at [12]).
In Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Dimitrious [2015] NSWCA 258 (at [21]) the Court quoted the following statement of Ipp JA in Barwick v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [2004] NSWCA 32; [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-730 at [118]: