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[2026] NSWSC 1047
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-08-17
Coleman J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: The Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Ilyas & Ors [2026] NSWSC 1047
Hearing dates: 17 August 2026
Date of orders: 17 August 2026
Decision date: 17 August 2026
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Coleman J
Decision: See [43]
Catchwords: PROCEEDS OF CRIME — whether there are reasonable grounds for suspicions — threshold for suspicion to be held on reasonable grounds is not particularly high — orders granted
Legislation Cited: Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW)
Cases Cited: Application of the Commissioner of Australian Federal Police; In the matter of Rifai [2019] NSWSC 914
Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Bigatton [2020] NSWSC 245
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Australian Federal Police (Plaintiff)
Muhammed Ilyas (Defendant 1)
Muhammed Imran Maqsoodi (Defendant 2)
Ilyas and Brothers Pty Ltd (Defendant 3)
Representation: Counsel:
S Short (Plaintiff)
Solicitors:
Australian Federal Police (Plaintiff)
File Number(s): 2026/00334492
Publication restriction: Nil
HIS HONOUR: The Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (the plaintiff) seeks orders pursuant to the (Cth) (the Act), including restraining orders, custody and control orders and ancillary orders in respect of the defendants Muhammad Ilyas, Muhammad Imran Maqsoodi, and Ilyas and Brothers Pty Ltd as trustee for the Ilyas Family Fixed Unit Trust.
The plaintiff seeks an order pursuant to r 6.15 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR) that the summons be made returnable immediately. I am satisfied in light of the nature of the application and the contents of the affidavit of Ryan Bull affirmed 12 August 2026, that it is appropriate that the summons be made returnable immediately.
The plaintiff also seeks an order, pursuant to ss 26(4) and 39(3A) of the Act, and UCPR 18.2(2), that the application for relief in prayers 1 to 40 of the summons be heard and determined without notice. I am satisfied that it is appropriate to make this order as one of the purposes of the orders is to prevent the defendants dealing with the property which might in any way tend to compromise the Commissioner's interests under the Act. In any event, s 26(4) of the Act provides: "The court must consider the application without notice having been given if the responsible authority requests the court to do so." The notice referred to in that section is the application contained in the summons. I am satisfied that the responsible authority – namely, the Commissioner of the AFP – has requested the Court to hear the matter without notice, and I must do so.
The summons seeks restraining orders pursuant to ss 18 and 19 of the Act in respect of the first and second defendants and the third defendant.
The first defendant, Mr Ilyas, has pleaded guilty to an offence contrary to s 400.3(2B) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (Criminal Code Act), namely, that on two or more occasions, he engaged in conduct in relation to money or other property which is, and he was reckless as to the fact that the money or property is, the proceeds of general crime and the sum of the value of the money or other property was at least $1 million. He has also pleaded guilty to an offence contrary to s 400.4(2A) of the Criminal Code Act, namely, that he engaged in conduct in relation to money or other property which is, and he was reckless as to the fact that the money or property is, the proceeds of general crime and the sum of the value of the money or other property was at least $100,000.
Mr Maqsoodi, the second defendant, has pleaded guilty to an offence contrary to s 400.4(2B) of the Criminal Code Act, namely, that on two or more occasions, he engaged in conduct in relation to money or other property which is, and he was reckless as to the fact that the money or the property is, the proceeds of general crime and the sum of the value of the money or other property was at least $100,000, He has also pleaded guilty to an offence contrary to s 400.4(2A) of the Criminal Code Act, namely, that he engaged in conduct in relation to money or other property which is, and he was reckless as to the fact that the money or property is, the proceeds of general crime and the sum of the value of the money or other property was at least $100,000.
These pleas of guilty were entered by the first and second defendants on 4 May 2026 in the District Court of New South Wales at Parramatta. Each of the defendants has signed a set of agreed facts, which are in evidence before me. They will be sentenced at a later date.
In support of the application, the plaintiff reads the affidavit of Ryan Bull. Mr Bull is a special member of the Australian Federal Police and an authorised officer within the meaning of the Act. He sets out in his affidavit his experience with the New South Wales Crime Commission and details the background facts of this matter. He sets out in that affidavit his concerns giving rise to the need for ex parte orders and then details of the property sought to be restrained.
Further relevant background of the matters giving rise to the offending to which the first and second defendants have pleaded guilty is contained in the useful outline of submissions prepared on behalf of the plaintiff by Ms Short. I do not think it is necessary for the purposes of this interlocutory judgment to detail those matters, and the submissions have been marked MFI 1.
The property the subject of the application falls into the following categories. First, there is real property located at 44 Bright Street, Guildford, NSW, being Lot 36 of Section 1 in Deposited Plan 868 (44 Bright Street). Next is real property located at 54 Bright Street, Guildford, NSW, being Lot 41 of Section 1 in Deposited Plan 868 (54 Bright Street). Next, is real property located at 17 Lisbon Street, Fairfield East, NSW (17 Lisbon Street). Apart from real property, the other property the subject of the application is cash, being cash said to be the property of, first, Mr Ilyas and, next, Mr Maqsoodi; and then two motor vehicles, first, a Toyota LandCruiser bearing NSW registration EBO17G and a Toyota Camry bearing NSW registration EMH30D. Finally, there is a bank account with the Australian and New Zealand Banking Corporation (ANZ Bank).
The summons identifies the relevant property in its schedules. Schedule 1 deals with 44 Bright Street; schedule 2 with 54 Bright Street; schedule 3 with 17 Lisbon Street; schedules 4, 5 and 6 with what can be described as the Ilyas cash; schedule 7 with what can be described as the Maqsoodi cash; schedule 8 with the Toyota LandCruiser; schedule 9 with the Toyota Camry; and schedule 10, being the last category of property sought to be restrained, with a bank account with the ANZ Bank with a specified account number in the name of Mr Maqsoodi.
Section 18 of the Act makes provision for the Court to make restraining orders in certain circumstances and relevantly provides:
18 Restraining orders—people suspected of committing serious offences
When a restraining order must be made
(1) A court with proceeds jurisdiction must order that:
(a) property must not be disposed of or otherwise dealt with by any person; or
(b) property must not be disposed of or otherwise dealt with by any person except in the manner and circumstances specified in the order;
if:
(c) a proceeds of crime authority applies for the order; and
(d) there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a person has committed a serious offence; and
(e) any affidavit requirements in subsection (3) for the application have been met; and
(f) the court is satisfied that the authorised officer who made the affidavit holds the suspicion or suspicions stated in the affidavit on reasonable grounds.
Note: A court can refuse to make a restraining order if the Commonwealth refuses to give an undertaking: see section 21.
Property that a restraining order may cover
(2) The order must specify, as property that must not be disposed of or otherwise dealt with, the property specified in the application for the order, to the extent that the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that that property is any one or more of the following:
(a) all or specified property of the suspect; …
(c) specified property of another person (whether or not that other person’s identity is known) that is subject to the effective control of the suspect;
(d) specified property of another person (whether or not that other person’s identity is known) that is:
(i) in any case—proceeds of the offence; or
(ii) if the offence to which the order relates is a serious offence—an instrument of the offence.
Affidavit requirements
(3) The application for the order must be supported by an affidavit of an authorised officer stating:
(a) that the authorised officer suspects that the suspect committed the offence; and
(b) if the application is to restrain property of a person other than the suspect but not to restrain bankruptcy property of the suspect—that the authorised officer suspects that:
(i) the property is subject to the effective control of the suspect; or
(ii) in any case—the property is proceeds of the offence; or
(iii) if the offence to which the order relates is a serious offence—the property is an instrument of the offence.
The affidavit must include the grounds on which the authorised officer holds those suspicions.
Restraining order need not be based on commission of a particular offence
(4) The reasonable grounds referred to in paragraph (1)(d) need not be based on a finding as to the commission of a particular serious offence.
Risk of property being disposed of etc.
(5) The court must make a restraining order even if there is no risk of the property being disposed of or otherwise dealt with…
I am satisfied that this Court is a court with “proceeds jurisdiction” within the meaning of ss 18(1), 335 and 338 of the Act as it has jurisdiction over indictable offences.
I also observe that s 18 requires the Court to make restraining orders if certain conditions are met, including that the Court is satisfied that the authorised officer who made the affidavit in support of the application holds the relevant suspicions stated in the affidavit on reasonable grounds: see s 18(1)(f). Another condition is that a proceeds of crime authority applies for the order: see s 18(1)(c).
The plaintiff is a proceeds of crime authority as identified in s 338 of the definitional section of the Act. Section 18(1)(d) requires that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a person has committed a "serious offence". "Serious offence" is defined by s 338 of the Act. It must be an indictable offence punishable by imprisonment for three years or more, and involve relevantly unlawful conduct by or relating to a breach of s 81 of the Act or Part 10.2 of the Criminal Code Act, being money laundering. The offences for which the first and second defendants have pleaded guilty are offences within Part 10.2 of the Criminal Code Act*.*
I am satisfied that the offences I have mentioned to which each of the first and second defendants have pleaded guilty are "serious offences" within the meaning of s 338 of the Act.
Next, s 18(1)(e) requires that any affidavit requirements in subsection (3) have been met. Subsection (3), as set out above, requires that the application for an order be supported by the affidavit of an authorised officer. That is Mr Bull. That affidavit must set out that the authorised officer suspects that, relevantly, the defendants committed the offences and must include the grounds on which the officer holds that suspicion. The very comprehensive affidavit of Mr Bull sets out details with respect to each of the categories of property that I have mentioned and details his suspicions with respect to each of those categories of property and the offences.
Section 19 of the Act provides an additional basis for restraining orders, dealing with property suspected of being proceeds of indictable offences or instruments of serious offences. It provides:
19 Restraining orders—property suspected of being proceeds of indictable offences etc.
When a restraining order must be made
(1) A court with proceeds jurisdiction must order that:
(a) property must not be disposed of or otherwise dealt with by any person; or
(b) property must not be disposed of or otherwise dealt with by any person except in the manner and circumstances specified in the order;
if:
(c) a proceeds of crime authority applies for the order; and
(d) there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the property is:
(i) the proceeds of a terrorism offence or any other indictable offence, a foreign indictable offence or an indictable offence of Commonwealth concern (whether or not the identity of the person who committed the offence is known); or
(ii) an instrument of a serious offence; and
(e) the application for the order is supported by an affidavit of an authorised officer stating that the authorised officer suspects that:
(i) in any case—the property is proceeds of the offence; or
(ii) if the offence to which the order relates is a serious offence—the property is an instrument of the offence;
and including the grounds on which the authorised officer holds the suspicion; and
(f) the court is satisfied that the authorised officer who made the affidavit holds the suspicion stated in the affidavit on reasonable grounds.
Property that a restraining order may cover
(2) The order must specify, as property that must not be disposed of or otherwise dealt with, the property specified in the application for the order, to the extent that the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that that property is:
(a) in any case—proceeds of the offence; or
(b) if the offence to which the order relates is a serious offence—an instrument of the offence.
Refusal to make a restraining order
(3) Despite subsection (1), the court may refuse to make a restraining order in relation to an indictable offence that is not a serious offence if the court is satisfied that it is not in the public interest to make the order.
Note: A court can also refuse to make a restraining order if the Commonwealth refuses to give an undertaking: see section 21.
Restraining order need not be based on commission of a particular offence
(4) The reasonable grounds referred to in paragraph (1)(d) need not be based on a finding as to the commission of a particular offence.
Risk of property being disposed of etc.
(5) The court must make a restraining order even if there is no risk of the property being disposed of or otherwise dealt with.
As I have observed above, I am satisfied that this Court has proceeds jurisdiction and it must order that restraining orders be made if conditions in subsection (1)(c) and following are met. I have already said that I am satisfied that a proceeds of crime authority is applying for such orders (s 19(1)(c)). Section 19(1)(d) provides that there must be reasonable grounds to suspect that the property is the proceeds of an offence or an instrument of a serious offence. Mr Bull comprehensively deals with these matters in his affidavit as well.
The authorities indicate that the threshold for a suspicion to be held on reasonable grounds is not particularly high. It falls much short of satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt, satisfaction on the balance of probabilities or what would be sufficient to constitute grounds to believe: see Application of the Commissioner of Australian Federal Police; In the matter of Rifai [2019] NSWSC 914 per Adamson J at [14] and Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Bigatton [2020] NSWSC 245 per Cavanagh J at [22]. Each of those decisions also refer to the High Court in George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104; [1990] HCA 26, where the Court (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ) said at 115-116:
Suspicion, as Lord Devlin said in Hussien v Chong Fook Kam [1969] UKPC 26; (1970) AC 942, at p 948, 'in its ordinary meaning is a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking: "I suspect but I cannot prove.”’ The facts which can reasonably ground a suspicion may be quite insufficient reasonably to ground a belief, yet some factual basis for the suspicion must be shown. In Queensland Bacon Pty Ltd v Rees [1966] HCA 21; (1966) 115 CLR 266, a question was raised as to whether a payee had reason to suspect that the payer, a debtor, 'was unable to pay (its) debts as they became due' as that phrase was used in s 95(4) of the Bankruptcy Act 1924 (Cth). Kitto J. said ((1966) 115 CLR 266 at p 303):
'A suspicion that something exists is more than a mere idle wondering whether it exists or not; it is a positive feeling of actual apprehension or mistrust, amounting to "a slight opinion, but without sufficient evidence", as Chambers's Dictionary expresses it. Consequently, a reason to suspect that a fact exists is more than a reason to consider or look into the possibility of its existence. The notion which "reason to suspect" expresses in sub-s.(4) is, I think, of something which in all the circumstances would create in the mind of a reasonable person in the position of the payee an actual apprehension or fear that the situation of the payer is in actual fact that which the sub-section describes – a mistrust of the payer's ability to pay his debts as they become due and of the effect which acceptance of the payment would have as between the payee and the other creditors.'
In this case the plaintiff alleges that each of the two defendants have committed the relevant offences and there are ample grounds set out in the affidavit of Mr Bull to ground the reasonable suspicion that this is so. Primarily, amongst those grounds, is the entry of the pleas of guilty by the defendants to each of the offences I have mentioned. Further, in respect to the s 19 orders, Mr Bull sets out in detail the bases of his reasonable suspicions with respect to each of the items of property being the proceeds of crime or the instrument of a serious offence.
With respect to the suspicions as to 44 Bright Street, Mr Bull identifies in paragraphs [133] to [139] of his affidavit the bases of his suspicions. I am satisfied that by reason of those matters, he has a reasonable grounds for his suspicion that (a) Mr Ilyas committed the offences I have mentioned; (b) 44 Bright Street is the property of Mr Ilyas within the meaning of s 18(2)(a) of the Act; (c) 44 Bright Street is the proceeds of the Ilyas offences within the meaning of s 19(2)(a) of the Act; and (d) 44 Bright Street is the instrument of the Ilyas offences within the meaning of s 19(2)(b) of the Act.
As to 54 Bright Street, Mr Bull details his suspicions with respect to this property in paragraphs [141] to [147] of his affidavit. I am satisfied, based upon those matters, that there are reasonable grounds for him to have those suspicions. I am satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for him to suspect that (a) Mr Maqsoodi committed the Maqsoodi offences that I have referred to; (b) 54 Bright Street and any associated rental income is the property of Mr Maqsoodi within the meaning of s 18(2)(a) of the Act; and (c) 54 Bright Street and any associated rental income is the proceeds of the Maqsoodi offences within the meaning of s 19(2)(a) of the Act.
17 Lisbon Street is a commercial property. In paragraphs [149] to [164] of his affidavit, Mr Bull sets out the basis for his suspicions regarding Mr Ilyas' and Mr Maqsoodi's involvement in a money laundering syndicate and that (a) that property was in the effective control of Mr Ilyas; or (b) it was the property of another person but is the proceeds and/or instrument of the offences committed by the first and second defendants and is the proceeds of those offences; or (d) was an instrument of the offences committed by the defendants. I am satisfied, based upon those paragraphs, that the grounds Mr Bull has set out are reasonable to have the suspicions that (a) Mr Ilyas and Mr Maqsoodi committed the offences I have mentioned; (b) 17 Lisbon Street is within the effective control of Mr Ilyas within the meaning of s 18(2)(a) of the Act; and/or (c) 17 Lisbon Street is the property of another person that is the proceeds and/or instrument of the offences committed by either or each of the first and second defendants within the meaning of s 18(2)(d) of the Act; and (d) 17 Lisbon Street is the proceeds of the Ilyas and/or Maqsoodi offences I have described within the meaning of s 19(2)(a) of the Act and/or 17 Lisbon Street is an instrument of the Ilyas and/or Maqsoodi offences within the meaning of s 19(2)(b) of the Act.
The next category of property is cash that was seized. The total amount of cash seized during the investigation of the apparent money laundering syndicate was $859,780.
There was first cash seized from 44 Bright Street in the sum of $185,805. Mr Bull sets out in his affidavit at [168] the breakdown of this amount being seized on execution of a warrant. I am satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for Mr Bull to have the suspicion regarding each of Mr Ilyas' and Mr Maqsoodi's involvement in the money laundering syndicate and to suspect that (a) Mr Ilyas committed the offences I have referred to; (b) Mr Maqsoodi committed the offences I have referred to; (c) that seized cash was the property of Mr Ilyas and/or Mr Maqsoodi within the meaning of s 18(2)(a) of the Act, and/or that seized cash was within the effective control of Mr Ilyas within the meaning of s 18(2)(c) of the Act, and/or that seized cash was the property of another person that is the proceeds of and/or instrument of the offences committed by either or both of the first and second defendants within the meaning of s 18(2)(d) of the Act, and (i) that seized cash was proceeds of the offences committed by the first and/or second defendants within the meaning of s 19(2)(a) of the Act.
There was also cash seized from 17 Lisbon Street in the sum of $32,145. Mr Bull deals with this in paragraph [170] of his affidavit. I am satisfied that he has reasonable grounds for his suspicions set out in paragraph [171], namely, that (a) Mr Ilyas committed the offences I have referred to; (b) that seized cash there was the property of Mr Ilyas within the meaning of s 18(2)(a) of the Act; and/or (c) that seized cash was within the effective control of Mr Ilyas within the meaning of s 18(2)(c) of the Act, and/or that seized cash was property of another person that is the proceeds of and/or instrument of the offences committed by Mr Ilyas within the meaning of s 18(2)(d) of the Act, and that seized cash was proceeds of the offences committed by Mr Ilyas within the meaning of s 19(2)(a) of the Act.
There was also an amount of cash seized from a Toyota Corolla pursuant to a warrant. This was in the sum of $500,255. Mr Bull deals with this in paragraph [172] of his affidavit. I am satisfied on the evidence that has been put before me that there are reasonable grounds for Mr Bull's suspicion that (a) Mr Ilyas committed the offences I have referred to; (b) that seized cash was the property of Mr Ilyas within the meaning of s 18(2)(a) of the Act, and/or that seized cash was within the effective control of Mr Ilyas within the meaning of s 18(2)(c) of the Act, and/or the seized cash was property of another person that is the proceeds and/or instrument of the offences committed by Mr Ilyas within the meaning of s 18(2)(d) of the Act, and the seized cash was the proceeds of the offences committed by Mr Ilyas within the meaning of s 19(2)(a) of the Act.
Finally, in terms of cash, there was an additional sum of cash seized from the Toyota Camry I have mentioned, again pursuant to warrant. This was cash in the sum of $141,110. Mr Bull deals with this in paragraph [174] of his affidavit. I am satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for Mr Bull's suspicions that (a) Mr Maqsoodi committed the offences that I have referred to; (b) that seized cash was the property of Mr Maqsoodi within the meaning of s 18(2)(a) of the Act; and/or (c) that seized cash was within the effective control of Mr Maqsoodi within the meaning of s 18(2)(c) of the Act; and/or (d) that seized cash was property of another person that is the proceeds of and/or instrument of the offences committed by Mr Maqsoodi within the meaning of s 18(2)(d) of the Act; and (e) that seized cash was proceeds of the offences committed by Mr Maqsoodi within the meaning of s 19(2)(a) of the Act.
The next category of property over which restraining orders are sought are the two motor vehicles: first, the Toyota Camry and, next, the Toyota LandCruiser. The evidence indicates that the Toyota Camry is registered in the name of Mr Maqsoodi and that the LandCruiser is registered in the name of Mr Ilyas.
Mr Bull deals with the Toyota Camry at paragraphs [176] and [177] of his affidavit. Based upon those matters, I am satisfied there are reasonable grounds for his suspicions that the Camry is the property of Mr Maqsoodi within the meaning of s 18(2)(a) of the Act. I am satisfied by reason of the matters in paragraphs [178] and [179] of his affidavit that he has reasonable grounds also to suspect that the Toyota Camry is property that is the instrument of a serious offence within the meaning of s 19(2)(b) of the Act.
As to the LandCruiser, Mr Bull deals with this vehicle at paragraphs [180] and [181] of the affidavit. I am satisfied based upon those matters that there are reasonable grounds for his suspicions that the LandCruiser is the property of Mr Ilyas within the meaning of s 18(2)(a) of the Act.
The final category of property the subject of the application for restraining order is the bank account at ANZ that I have referred to. Mr Bull deals with receipt into the bank account of rental income deposits from the 54 Bright Street property at paragraphs [142] to [144] of his affidavit. He suspects, he says, that the ANZ account was the property of Mr Maqsoodi within the meaning of s 18(2)(a) of the Act. I accept that there are reasonable grounds for that suspicion. I also accept that there are reasonable grounds for his suspicion that the ANZ account became the proceeds of the offences committed by Mr Maqsoodi within the meaning of s 19(2)(a) of the Act from at least 30 May 2023 based upon the matters he deposes to in paragraph [185] of his affidavit.
It is apparent from what I have said that I am therefore satisfied that it is appropriate to make the restraining orders sought in the summons under ss 18 and 19 of the Act.
The summons also seeks custody and control orders over each of the categories of property. These orders are sought under s 38 of the Act. That section provides:
38 Court may order Official Trustee to take custody and control of property
The court may order the Official Trustee to take custody and control of property, or specified property, covered by a restraining order if the court is satisfied that this is required.
It is important in considering whether to make those orders whether the Court is satisfied that such orders are “required”. I am satisfied that the orders are required for the purposes of the seized cash, 44 and 54 Bright Street and 17 Lisbon Street but not with respect to the vehicles.
I am told by Ms Short that if a custody and control order is made with respect to the vehicles, it is usual that the Official Trustee will seize the vehicles and take them away. The evidence establishes that the Toyota Camry is the only vehicle registered in Mr Maqsoodi's name. Whilst there is another vehicle registered in Mr Ilyas' name in addition to the LandCruiser, I do not think it is necessary for that vehicle to be taken into the custody and control of the Official Trustee.
Although each of the first and second defendants have pleaded guilty to the offences I have referred to, until at the sentencing hearing where they are asked whether they maintain their pleas and a conviction is entered, they do remain innocent of the charges and subject to the presumption of innocence. In addition, the vehicles will be the subject of restraining orders, and I see no basis upon which it is necessary or required that the vehicles be seized by the Official Trustee when I infer from the evidence before me that these are the vehicles used by the defendants in their everyday lives. Thus, I will not make prayers for relief 30 or 31 in the summons.
Additionally, I will not make prayer for relief 40 in the summons which seeks an ancillary order under s 39 of the Act with respect to the vehicles that Mr Ilyas and Mr Maqsoodi hand over the keys, registration papers, insurance papers and all other documents and/or items of equipment relating to and necessary for the proper maintenance and upkeep of the vehicles to the official trustee. It was submitted by Ms Short that the basis for these ancillary orders and the custody and control orders with respect to the vehicles was so that those vehicles could be preserved and their value maintained and, for example, that they remain registered, insured and properly serviced. For the reasons I have identified above I do not think that this ancillary order is required with respect to the vehicles. In effect, they amount to seizure orders of the vehicles when they are already restrained such that they cannot be disposed or otherwise dealt with in accordance with the orders I propose to make. I do not think that such orders with respect to the vehicles should be made.
For these reasons therefore, I make orders 1 through 29 in the summons and orders 32 through 39 in the summons noting that 39(e) of the summons is not pressed by the plaintiff. I also make order 63 in the summons, namely, that the orders be entered forthwith. These orders will be reflected in Amended Short Minutes of Order to be provided by the plaintiff to my chambers and, upon so being provided, they will be entered forthwith.
The plaintiff seeks to stand the matter over to 12 October 2026. I consider this is an appropriate period of time by reason of the nature and extent of the orders that I have just made and the evidence that will be served in support of those orders for the defendants to obtain legal advice with respect to them. I also take into account the fact that the first and second defendants have their sentence hearings on 18 September 2026 in the District Court at Parramatta. Whilst it may be that sentences will be imposed on that day, it is also possible there will be a brief delay before the sentences are imposed.
I therefore stand the matter over before the Registrar on 12 October 2026 at 9.30am for directions.
Upon the plaintiff providing, on behalf of the Commonwealth, usual undertaking as to costs and damages, the Court orders that:
Pursuant to rule 6.15 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR), the Amended Summons filed 17 August 2026 (Amended Summons) be made returnable immediately.
Pursuant to sections 26(4) and 39(3A) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) (Act) and UCPR r 18.2(2) the application for relief in prayers 1 to 40 of the Amended Summons be heard and determined without notice.
Section 18 Restraining Orders
Muhammad Ilyas
(a) property of Muhammad Ilyas within the meaning of section 18(2)(a) of the Act; (b) the property within the effective control of Muhammad Ilyas within the meaning of section 18(2)(c) of the Act; and (c) property of another person that is proceeds of Muhammad Ilyas’ offending, within the meaning of section 18(2)(d) of the Act.
(a) property of Muhammad Ilyas within the meaning of section 18(2)(a) of the Act; (b) the property within the effective control of Muhammad Ilyas within the meaning of section 18(2)(c) of the Act; and (c) property of another person that is proceeds of Muhammad Ilyas’ offending, within the meaning of section 18(2)(d) of the Act.
(a) property of Muhammad Ilyas within the meaning of section 18(2)(a) of the Act; (b) the property within the effective control of Muhammad Ilyas within the meaning of section 18(2)(c) of the Act; and (c) property of another person that is proceeds of Muhammad Ilyas’ offending, within the meaning of section 18(2)(d) of the Act.
Muhammad Imran Maqsoodi
(a) property of Muhammad Imran Maqsoodi within the meaning of section 18(2)(a) of the Act; (b) the property within the effective control of Muhammad Imran Maqsood within the meaning of section 18(2)(c) of the Act; and (c) property of another person that is proceeds of Muhammad Imran Maqsoodi offending, within the meaning of section 18(2)(d) of the Act.
Section 19 Restraining Orders
(a) the proceeds of an indictable offence; and or (b) the instrument of a serious offence.
(a) the proceeds of an indictable offence; and or (b) the instrument of a serious offence.
Custody and Control Orders
Ancillary Orders
(a) the interest of Permanent Custodians Limited as registered mortgagee of the property specified in Schedule 1 is not restrained; (b) Permanent Custodians Limited may deal with its interest as registered mortgagee in accordance with the terms of its registered mortgage AV393840; (c) Permanent Custodians Limited is to notify the plaintiff (Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police) and the Official Trustee in writing prior to taking any steps to enter into possession or dispose of the property specified in Schedule 1 in accordance with the terms of its registered mortgage AV393840.
(a) the ‘net proceeds of sale’ is any amount remaining from the proceeds of sale of the property in Schedule 1 less the amount owing to Permanent Custodians Limited and the deduction of expenses in accordance with the terms of registered mortgage AV393840; (b) pursuant to section 39(1) of the Act, the property specified in Schedule 1 is varied to refer to the ‘net proceeds of sale of’ the property as specified in Schedule 1; and (c) Pursuant to section 38 of the Act, the Official Trustee is to take custody and control of the property in Schedule 1 as varied per (b) directly above.
(a) the interest of Westpac Banking Corporation as registered mortgagee of the property specified in Schedule 2 is not restrained; (b) Westpac Banking Corporation may deal with its interest as registered mortgagee in accordance with the terms of its registered mortgage AS630862; (c) Westpac Banking Corporation is to notify the plaintiff (Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police) and the Official Trustee in writing prior to taking any steps to enter into possession or dispose of the property specified in Schedule 2 in accordance with the terms of its registered mortgage AS630862.
(a) the ‘net proceeds of sale’ is any amount remaining from the proceeds of sale of the property at Schedule 2, less the amount owing to Westpac Banking Corporation and the deduction of expenses in accordance with the terms of registered mortgage AS630862; (b) pursuant to section 39(1) of the Act, the property specified in Schedule 2 is varied to refer to the ‘net proceeds of sale of’ the property as specified in Schedule 2; and (c) Pursuant to section 38 of the Act, the Official Trustee is to take custody and control of the property in Schedule 2 as varied per (b) directly above.
(a) the interest of Judo Bank Pty Ltd as registered mortgagee of the property specified in Schedule 3 is not restrained; (b) Judo Bank Pty Ltd may deal with its interest as registered mortgagee in accordance with the terms of its registered mortgage AT901623; (c) Judo Bank Pty Ltd is to notify the plaintiff (Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police) and the Official Trustee in writing prior to taking any steps to enter into possession or dispose of the property specified in Schedule 3 in accordance with the terms of its registered mortgage AT901623.
(a) the ‘net proceeds of sale’ is any amount remaining from the proceeds of sale of the property at Schedule 3, less the amount owing to Judo Bank Pty Ltd and the deduction of expenses in accordance with the terms of registered mortgage AT901623; (b) pursuant to section 39(1) of the Act, the property specified in Schedule 3 is varied to refer to the ‘net proceeds of sale of’ the property as specified in Schedule 3; and (c) Pursuant to section 38 of the Act, the Official Trustee is to take custody and control of the property in Schedule 3 as varied per (b) directly above.
(a) Schedule 1; (b) Schedule 2; and (c) Schedule 3,
(Controlled Real Property):
(d) Gain access to and inspect the Controlled Real Property with 48 hours’ notice to the owner’s last known email address or residential address and, if relevant, the occupier of the Controlled Real Property to their email address, residential address or the Controlled Real Property address; (e) Insure any building on the Controlled Real Property as and when required; (f) Manage residential or commercial occupation arrangements relating to the Controlled Real Property (Arrangements), which may include (without limitation):
(i) Leasing and/or licensing the Controlled Real Property, or any part of it; (ii) doing all things necessary to maintain, renew or renegotiate any existing Arrangements; (iii) negotiate and enter into new Arrangements; (iv) Collect any monies payable in connection with an Arrangement (Income);
(g) Apply any Income derived from a Controlled Real Property to meet any costs or expenses relating to the said property, including management fees and commissions incurred in the ordinary course of business, occupants’ security deposit refunds, valuations, maintenance, costs, insurances, rates, land tax, municipal or statutory charges, mortgage repayments due in respect of mortgages secured against the said property, and arrears of any aforementioned costs or expenses.
SCHEDULE 1
Real property located at xxx, Guildford NSW 2161, being Lot xxx of Section xxx in Deposited Plan xxx together with any income generated by the property from the time of restraint that is not otherwise applied by the Official Trustee in accordance with orders made in these proceedings.
SCHEDULE 2
Real property located at xxx, Guildford NSW 2161, being Lot xxx of Section xxx in Deposited Plan xxx, including any rental income earned thereon together with any income generated by the property from the time of restraint that is not otherwise applied by the Official Trustee in accordance with orders made in these proceedings.
SCHEDULE 3
Real property located at xxx, Fairfield East NSW 2165, being Lot xxx of Deposited Plan xxx, including any rental income earned thereon together with any income generated by the property from the time of restraint that is not otherwise applied by the Official Trustee in accordance with orders made in these proceedings.
SCHEDULE 4
Cash in the sum of $xxx seized during the search warrant at xxx on 27 May 2021.
SCHEDULE 5
Cash in the sum of $xxx seized during the search warrant on the Toyota Corolla bearing NSW Registration Number xxx on 27 May 2021.
SCHEDULE 6
Cash in the sum of $xxx seized during the search warrant at xxx, Fairfield East NSW on 27 May 2021.
SCHEDULE 7
Cash in the sum of $xxx seized during the search warrant on the Toyota Camry bearing NSW Registration Number xxx on 27 May 2021.
SCHEDULE 8
Toyota Landcruiser motor vehicle bearing Vehicle Identifier Number xxx.
SCHEDULE 9
Toyota Camry motor vehicle bearing Vehicle Identifier Number xxx.
SCHEDULE 10
Chose in action enforceable against Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited in respect of bank account number xxx347 xxx341 in the name of Muhammad Imran Maqsoodi and any interest earned thereon.
To Muhammad Ilyas. If you disobey paragraphs 3,4,5,6,7,8,14,16,17,18,19, 20 of this order you will be liable to sequestration of property and to imprisonment.
To Muhammad Imran Magsoodi. If you disobey paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,1 5,16, 20, 21, 22 of this order you will be liable to sequestration of property and to imprisonment.
To Ilyas and Brothers Pty Ltd and its directors. If Ilyas and Brothers Pty Ltd disobeys paragraph 16, 23, 33, 35 of this order, then Ilyas and Brothers Pty Ltd and its directors will be liable to sequestration of property and the said directors to imprisonment.
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Typographical amendment to coversheet
The Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police
Ilyas & Ors