9 These provisions give no right to the plaintiff to retain any part of the claimed debt.
10 The defendant's evidence shows that on 23 September 2008 the plaintiff approved payment of invoice 2543. The plaintiff sent by email to the defendant a copy of the invoice with an authorisation stamp from the plaintiff with a notation on the invoice as being marked "Approved". There is no evidence that the plaintiff disputed that the work the subject of the invoice had been done, or that there was any dispute in relation to that particular invoice, as distinct from a dispute in relation to other aspects of that project or other projects.
11 Paragraph 23(b) of Mr Whaling's affidavit, which I have quoted above, does not raise a ground for disputing the debt the subject of the statutory demand, whatever dispute there might be in relation to the acceptance and rejection of the defendant's claims for variations.
12 So far as paragraph 23(c) is concerned, there has been no attempt to identify what cause of action the plaintiff might have against the defendant from the defendant's having allegedly approached the plaintiff's clients. Nor was there any attempt to quantify such a claim. I am not satisfied that the plaintiff has a genuine claim for damages by reason of the alleged approaches to its clients. There is no evidence of any damage having been suffered as a result of the alleged approaches. It would not be possible to ascribe more than a nominal value as the substantiated amount of an offsetting claim, even if I were satisfied that the plaintiff had a genuine claim for damages (Macleay Nominees Pty Ltd v Belle Property East Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 743 at [17] and [18]; and Karimbla Construction Services Pty Ltd v Alliance Group Building Services Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 617 at [28]).
13 It was also submitted for the plaintiff that the statutory demand should be set aside because the defendant had failed to comply with clause 24 of the contract between the parties, which it was said required any dispute arising under the contract to be referred to arbitration. Clause 24 provides:
" Any dispute that may arise hereunder or in any way in connection with the Works and whether before or after the completion or determination hereof shall be submitted at the instance of either party to the Institute of Arbitrators of the State or Territory in which the works are carried out or in the event of his unwillingness to act of his nominee.
Either party may give to the other a notice in writing of such dispute and in serving this notice of dispute the party giving the notice shall provide evidence that he has deposited with the Institute of Arbitrators of the State or Territory in which the works are curried [sic] out the sum of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) by way of security for costs and expenses of arbitration proceedings. This sum shall be applied in accordance with the directions of the arbitrator. "
14 There is nothing in clause 24 that prevents a debt owed to the defendant from being due and payable and recoverable by action in the absence of an arbitration. There is no evidence that the plaintiff took any step to refer the alleged dispute to arbitration. Moreover, the evidence does not show that there is a dispute in relation to the defendant's claim to be entitled to be paid the sum demanded in invoice 2543, which is the subject of the statutory demand.
15 It is therefore unnecessary to express any view on the opinion expressed by the learned authors of Finnane, Newton and Wood, Equity Practice and Precedents, (2008) at [24.25] that "Many contracts have dispute resolution procedures which, if they are not followed before a party resorts to a statutory demand, may result in the demand being set aside." Support for that proposition is not to be found in the judgment of Macready M (as his Honour then was) in Reinsurance Australia Corp Ltd v Odyssey Re (Bermuda) Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1118; (2001) 19 ACLC 401 at [55]).
16 I doubt that this ground was raised in the supporting affidavit. Mr Whaling made no reference to the provision for arbitration, and I doubt that the ground would be raised by reasonable inference by the annexing of the contract which included the arbitration clause in question. But, assuming that it is open to the plaintiff to rely upon this ground, the existence of the arbitration clause does not raise a genuine dispute as to the debt, nor, in the circumstances of this case, could it be "some other reason why the demand should be set aside" pursuant to s 459J(1)(b).
17 For these reasons, I order that the originating process be dismissed.