Whether the refusal to allow inspection amounted to a breach of contract leading to an inference that there was a genuine dispute as to the existence of the debt.
25 Article 16 of the policy provides that loss settlements made by the reinsured are binding upon the reinsurers and that all that is necessary to make a claim is to present reasonable evidence of the amount having been paid to the reinsurer. There are two conditions to which that obligation is subject. One is that the settlements are within the terms of the original policies. Secondly that they are within the terms of the policy of reinsurance. The reinsurer is not normally privy to the details of the loss claims. Indeed these are matters which are peculiarly within the knowledge of the reinsured. For this reason, absent an access to records clause, the reinsurer has no means of knowing whether the conditions are fulfilled. Plainly the purpose of the access to records clause as set out in Article 18 is to provide protection for the reinsurer in these circumstances. Such a view of the operation of a similar policy was adopted by His Honour Mr Justice Hoffman in Re a Company ex parte Pritchard (1992) 1 Re LR 288. There His Honour was concerned with a situation extraordinarily similar to the present matter before me. There had been claims on policies of reinsurance, non payment and then the reinsurers sought access pursuant to an access to records clause. This was denied on the basis that as there were claims unpaid no inspection would be allowed until payment had been received. In due course a petition was presented to wind up the company. That petition was opposed on the basis that it was an abuse of process because the indebtedness was bona fide disputed on substantial grounds. His Honour referred to the submission that the obligation to pay and the obligation to give access were concurrent obligations and that, therefore, a company had no right to refuse to make a payment until it had exercised the right to inspect. His Honour went on to say:-
"This may be true at the point when no request to inspect has been made and refused. But I think that the situation is different if inspection has not allowed. That is, in my judgment, sufficient given the particular terms of the reinsurance treaty to raise the inference that there is a dispute on substantial grounds. Just as a refusal to pay an indisputable debt gives rise to an inference that the company cannot pay and is therefore insolvent so it seems to me that a refusal to allow an inspection to which the company is plainly entitled gives rise to a inference that there are matters in the possession of the syndicates which would justify non payment by the company. It would, in my view, be unfair to allow the syndicates to enforce their claim by a winding up petition when they have flatly refused to allow any inspection at all."
26 It is submitted that, in the circumstances, of this case which is on all fours with the case I have just referred to, that I should infer that by reason of the refusal of the right to inspect there is a genuine dispute as to the existence of the debt. In order to consider this it is necessary to refer in a little more detail to the facts. I have already set out a number of the background facts relating to this matter. I will now look at them in a little more detail.
27 On 25 January 2000 the plaintiff created a case reserve of $5 million on the relevant policy of insurance. At that time it had been notified of a possible claim
28 The purpose of creating a reserve was to provide against any claim which might be made under the policy. It was clearly not an admission of liability.
29 The commutation process started in late February. The intent of the parties was that the process would take two to four weeks in total. It was a two stage process: first all of the relevant contracts of insurance were to be agreed, and then the commutation number was to be negotiated.
30 The draft list of contracts was provided by De Maria on 9 March. Mr De Maria was a senior executive with Riverstone Reininsurance Services Ltd, a company retained by the Fairfax Group to represent it in the commutation process. The plaintiff's response was made on 12 April. De Maria replied on 18 April. Thus it had taken two months to get close to the end of stage one of the commutation. The reason for the delay was the complexity in identifying the various companies and contracts in the Fairfax Group.
31 On or about 29 March 2000, the defendant changed its demand to one in respect of the Turkish earthquake. This was the first such advice. Mr Smith, an officer of the plaintiff handling the claim, who reported to Mr Moyes, raised a query to AON, the insurance brokers, on 3 April as to whether the loss was in Europe.
32 The response of AON of 3 April was to proffer the Sigma catastrophe list to verify both location of loss and quantum of loss. Under the contract, however, Sigma did not have an agreed role to verify location of loss.
33 There was consideration within the plaintiff, below the level of Mr Moyes, the General Manager, of various arguments as to whether the place of the loss was in Europe for the purpose of the policy. Eventually these arguments were rejected by Smith, Wareburn (the current but not the relevant Underwriter) and certain other unidentified persons.
34 Mr Moyes learnt of these views in an email from Smith of 4 April. He did not hold the same view. He always considered that it was arguable that the place of the loss was in Europe for the purpose of the policy but not necessarily for the reasons given in the email.
35 Moyes did not respond on this point immediately to AON and the matter continued to be handled on the part of the plaintiff by Mr Smith.
36 On 14 April 2000 Smith sent a request to AON for a bordereau. A response came in on 17 April. Mr Moyes thought it was an inadequate response. He did not immediately respond.
37 On 18 April Mr Smith sent a fax to AON asking what discount their client would accept. Thereafter Mr Smith appears to have taken no further part in the matter. Given the terms of the correspondence and the evidence of usual practice, it seems clear that by this time that the reinsured had provided "reasonable evidence of the amount paid" under Article 16. The liability to pay had thus arisen.
38 The commutation proposal was received by Mr Moyes on 16 May 2000. It was for $91 million and the amount was a great shock to him.
39 On 15, 16 and 18 May 2000, REAC requested inspection of records relating to three companies within the Fairfax Group, one of which was Sphere Drake/Odyssey of Bermuda. The latter group included the contract the subject of the Turkish claim. One of the stated purposes of the inspection was to validate the amounts presented to the plaintiff for settlement. Mr Moyes stated that it was illogical to have to pay the claims first and then carry out the inspections. This was clearly a reference to the claims which had been made, including the Turkish claim. He was responding to the position taken by Riverstone in the commutation discussions that inspection would not be allowed until all payments were made.
40 On 26 May 2000 the plaintiff made a further request for inspection of records. In particular Mr Moyes referred to the very large claim which had been submitted for the Turkish earthquake. He stated it had no way of verifying the claim without carrying out the inspection.
41 There have been a number of conversations between the relevant parties to the commutation discussions. The first one was between Mr De Maria and Mr Moyes on 15 May which it will be recalled was the day before the receipt of the commutation proposal which so surprised Mr Moyes when it was received by him. He says that Mr Moyes said that they would not pay US$14.6 million in the balances due outside a commutation because of the plaintiff's serious financial condition. Mr Moyes denies that account but concedes that he would have said he would not be paying any claims until a commutation proposal had been submitted and agreed to by the plaintiff. Mr De Maria had some notes of the conversation and his reconstruction in the affidavit of the conversation tends not to follow the order of matters appearing in his notes. He had difficulty recalling it in the witness box without reference to his affidavit. Given the fact that the large commutation proposal had not been received, I think it unlikely that Mr Moyes would have responded as alleged by Mr De Maria. I accept that certainly Mr Moyes would have said that they would not be paying any claims until a commutation proposal had been submitted to and agreed by the plaintiff.
42 The next conversation took place on either 17 or 18 May and it was between Mr Vines, Mr Lee and Moyes of the plaintiff and Mr Becker Jones, Mr Gibbs and Mr De Maria from Riverstone. The position taken by the plaintiff before they discussed the proposal any further was that they wanted to carry out an audit of records as they were entitled to do. This conversation seems to traverse the positions of both parties and during the course of it Mr De Maria asked if there was an inspection and legitimate problems were not identified whether the claims would be paid. Apparently, Mr Vines, according to him, said that they could not answer such a hypothetical question but in the end it would depend upon their financial condition at that point in time. According to Mr Moyes the question of financial condition was not mentioned but the position simply taken that they would not be able to determine the position until the audit had been completed. It would seem that the answer is somewhere between the two versions. Mr De Maria's file note referred to Mr Vines saying that he would need to know the result of the audit and the financial condition in order to be able to respond. I will accept that that was said in the conversation.
43 The next relevant conversation is the 26 May between Mr Moyes and Mr Becker Jones of Riverstone. Mr Becker Jones seems to have accepted Mr Moyes' version. In cross examination it is clear the parties were talking about what they thought the real position was in commutation discussions. Mr Moyes was suggesting that his real figure was $22 million and Mr Becker Jones a figure of $40 million to $50 million. According to Mr Moyes he concluded by saying that they still wanted to inspect all documents. The letter of 26 May to Mr De Maria from Mr Moyes of 26 May made it perfectly plain, albeit in the context of the commutation discussions, that they wished to inspect the policies. In particular reference was made to two very large claims, one of which was the Turkish earthquake. The plaintiff's position was clearly put that they needed those claims to be verified and suggested that there were some inconsistencies in the documentation. The letter then went on to deal with inspection generally in respect of the whole commutation proposal.
44 The position that had been reached by 26 May would appear from the cross examination to be as follows:-