[2025] FWC 2341
General information, not legal advice.
Fair Work Commission
2025-11-13
Original judgment source is linked above.
s.739 - Dispute resolution
Alleged dispute about matters arising under the Woodside Energy Ltd North West Shelf Gas Platforms Enterprise Agreement 2023
Dispute settlement term and Commission's jurisdiction
'An Employee will perform all duties that are requested of them provided they are within the Employee's skills, competence and training and that it's safe to do so';[50]
Together the parties are committed to the following principles:
(b) The adoption of world's best practice health and safety standards.
(f) Subject to other principles in this clause 2.2, maintaining an operating model that achieves the objective of being the lowest unit operating cost as possible, so as to underpin future investment opportunities which will prolong the life of the North West Shelf Project'.
'Woodside will arrange and pay for air travel for Employees between Perth and the Platform'.
"1. The construction of an enterprise agreement, like that of a statute or contract, begins with a consideration of the ordinary meaning of the relevant words. The resolution of a disputed construction of an agreement will turn on the language of the agreement having regard to its context and purpose. Context might appear from:
(ii) the disputed provision's place and arrangement in the agreement;
(iii) the legislative context under which the agreement was made and in which it operates.
2. The task of interpreting an agreement does not involve rewriting the agreement to achieve what might be regarded as a fair or just outcome. The task is always one of interpreting the agreement produced by parties.
3. The common intention of the parties is sought to be identified objectively, that is by reference to that which a reasonable person would understand by the language the parties have used to express their agreement, without regard to the subjective intentions or expectations of the parties.
4. The fact that the instrument being construed is an enterprise agreement made pursuant to Part 2-4 of the FW Act is itself an important contextual consideration. It may be inferred that such agreements are intended to establish binding obligations.
5. The FW Act does not speak in terms of the 'parties' to enterprise agreements made pursuant to Part 2-4 agreements, rather it refers to the persons and organisations who are 'covered by' such agreements. Relevantly s.172(2)(a) provides that an employer may make an enterprise agreement 'with the employees who are employed at the time the agreement is made and who will be covered by the agreement'. Section 182(1) provides that an agreement is 'made' if the employees to be covered by the agreement 'have been asked to approve the agreement and a majority of those employees who cast a valid vote approve the agreement'. This is so because an enterprise agreement is 'made' when a majority of the employees asked to approve the agreement cast a valid vote to approve the agreement.
6. Enterprise agreements are not instruments to which the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) applies, however the modes of textual analysis developed in the general law may assist in the interpretation of enterprise agreements. An overly technical approach to interpretation should be avoided and consequently some general principles of statutory construction may have less force in the context of construing an enterprise agreement.
7. In construing an enterprise agreement it is first necessary to determine whether an agreement has a plain meaning or it is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one meaning.
8. Regard may be had to evidence of surrounding circumstances to assist in determining whether an ambiguity exists.
9. If the agreement has a plain meaning, evidence of the surrounding circumstances will not be admitted to contradict the plain language of the agreement.
10. If the language of the agreement is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one meaning then evidence of the surrounding circumstance will be admissible to aid the interpretation of the agreement.
11. The admissibility of evidence of the surrounding circumstances is limited to evidence tending to establish objective background facts which were known to both parties which inform and the subject matter of the agreement. Evidence of such objective facts is to be distinguished from evidence of the subjective intentions of the parties, such as statements and actions of the parties which are reflective of their actual intentions and expectations.
12. Evidence of objective background facts will include:
(i) evidence of prior negotiations to the extent that the negotiations tend to establish objective background facts known to all parties and the subject matter of the agreement;
(ii) notorious facts of which knowledge is to be presumed; and
(iii) evidence of matters in common contemplation and constituting a common assumption.
13. The diversity of interests involved in the negotiation and making of enterprise agreements (see point 4 above) warrants the adoption of a cautious approach to the admission and reliance upon the evidence of prior negotiations and the positions advanced during the negotiation process. Evidence as to what the employees covered by the agreement were told (either during the course of the negotiations or pursuant to s.180(5) of the FW Act) may be of more assistance than evidence of the bargaining positions taken by the employer or a bargaining representative during the negotiation of the agreement.
14. Admissible extrinsic material may be used to aid the interpretation of a provision in an enterprise agreement with a disputed meaning, but it cannot be used to disregard or rewrite the provision in order to give effect to an externally derived conception of what the parties' intention or purpose was.
15. In the industrial context it has been accepted that, in some circumstances, subsequent conduct may be relevant to the interpretation of an industrial instrument. But such post-agreement conduct must be such as to show that there has been a meeting of minds, a consensus. Post-agreement conduct which amounts to little more than the absence of a complaint or common inadvertence is insufficient to establish a common understanding."[85]
"(i) The starting point is the ordinary meaning of the words, read as a whole and in context.
(ii) A purposive approach is preferred to a narrow or pedantic approach - the framers of such documents were likely to be of a "practical bent of mind". The interpretation "turns upon the language of the particular agreement, understood in the light of its industrial context and purpose".
(iii) Context is not confined to the words of the instrument surrounding the expression to be construed. It may extend to "... the entire document of which it is a part, or to other documents with which there is an association".
(iv) Context may include "... ideas that gave rise to an expression in a document from which it has been taken".
(v) Recourse may be had to the history of a particular clause "Where the circumstances allow the court to conclude that a clause in an award is the product of a history, out of which it grew to be adopted in its present form...".
(vi) A generous construction is preferred over a strictly literal approach, but "Awards, whether made by consent or otherwise, should make sense according to the basic conventions of the English language. They bind the parties on pain of pecuniary penalties".
(vii) Words are not to be interpreted in a vacuum divorced from industrial realities but in the light of the customs and working conditions of the particular industry."[87]
"[197] The starting point for interpretation of an enterprise agreement is the ordinary meaning of the words, read as a whole and in context. The interpretation "... turns on the language of the particular agreement, understood in the light of its industrial context and purpose ...". The words are not to be interpreted in a vacuum divorced from industrial realities; rather, industrial agreements are made for various industries in the light of the customs and working conditions of each, and they are frequently couched in terms intelligible to the parties but without the careful attention to form and draftsmanship that one expects to find in an Act of Parliament. To similar effect, it has been said that the framers of such documents were likely of a "practical bent of mind" and may well have been more concerned with expressing an intention in a way likely to be understood in the relevant industry rather than with legal niceties and jargon, so that a purposive approach to interpretation is appropriate and a narrow or pedantic approach is misplaced."
'Employees of the Respondent engaged to work on a Platform who are classified within a Job Grade as set out in clause 12.2, including those who are on Temporary Operations Transfer'.
In the event that Woodside's operations are affected by a cyclone or other adverse weather event which prevents the safe performance of work on a Platform, Employees will continue to be paid as usual (excluding planned overcycle that is not worked) for the hours they would have worked if they:
(a) are ready, willing and able to work, mobilise or demobilise; and
(b) resume duty immediately following the 'all clear' being announced at Woodside's direction."
(1) An employer may, under this subsection, stand down an employee during a period in which the employee cannot be usefully employed because of one of the following circumstances:
(a) a stoppage of work for any cause for which the employer cannot reasonably be held responsible.
(1) If an employer stands down an employee during a period under subsection (1), the employer is not required to make payments to the employee for that period.
(a) an enterprise agreement, or a contract of employment, applies to the employer and the employee; and
(b) the agreement or contract provides for the employer to stand down the employee during that period if the employee cannot be usefully employed during that period because of that circumstance.
What conditions must an employee meet to get the entitlement in clause 11.9?
Contention that an employee cannot 'resume duty immediately following' the 'all clear' being announced if they have been sent to Perth
When does the Agreement contemplate working from Perth?
'From time to time, Woodside may require an Employee to undertake a Temporary Operations Transfer to another location for a maximum period of 24 months'.
'(a) If an Employee who lives outside the metropolitan Perth area, and cannot reasonably return to their residence at the end of each working day, is required to attend Perth for training, work or meetings, Woodside will provide:
'Economy fare flight/s between the nearest Major Regional Centre from the Employee's residence to Perth at the commencement and conclusion of the period the Employee is required to be in Perth for training, work or meetings'.
Does the Agreement deal with travel between Perth and a Platform?
'Flight bookings will be made based on an Employee's permanent place of residence. The expectation is that Employees will board all flights booked in line with the roster arrangement, Flight bookings will be made in advance and provided on the basis of the optimal flight route to return the Employee to their nominated place of residence as quicky as possible after demobilisation. They will not be subject to temporary or ad-hoc changes except in limited circumstances.'
'No contractual "Place of Residence" entitlement'.
It is apparent that clauses 12.7(d) - (f) that appear below this text were intended to apply in circumstances where an employee does not have a "Place of Residence" clause in their contract.

[8] Applicant's 'Form F10 - Application for the FWC to deal with a dispute in accordance with a dispute settlement procedure', response to q. 2.1
[10] Applicant's Submissions at [10].
[11] Applicant's Submissions at [11].
[12] Applicant's Submissions at [12].
[42] Respondent's Submissions at [27] with reference to Ransom Statement at [26].
[43] Respondent's Submissions at [20].
[44] Respondent's For Ransom Statement at [19].m F1 Response, response to q. 2.2 at [5]; Respondent's Submissions at [5].
[45] Respondent's Form F1 Response, response to q. 2.2 at [5].
[46] Respondent's Form F1 Response, response to q. 2.2 at [6].
[47] Respondent's Form F1 Response, response to q. 2.2 at [6].
[48] Respondent's Form F1 Response, response to q. 2.2 at [7].
[49] Respondent's Submissions at [17].
[50] Respondent's Submissions at [18].
[51] Respondent's Submissions at [18] with reference to R v Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd; Ex parte Halliday; Ex parte Sullivan [1938] HCA 44(1938) 60 CLR 601 at 621-622; One Key Workforce Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union ([2018] FCAFC 77; 2018) 262 FCR 527 at [187]; Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Mt Arthur Coal Pty Ltd (t/as Mt Arthur Coal) [2021] FWCFB 6059 (2021) 310 IR 399 at [65]- [67].
[52] Respondent's Submissions at [19].
[53] Respondent's Submissions at [21]; Agreement cl 2.2(f).
[54] Respondent's Submissions at [21]; Agreement cl 2.2(b).
[55] Respondent's Submissions at [21] with reference to BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) CLR 266.
[56] Respondent's Submissions at [21].
[57] Respondent's Submissions at [21] with reference to Danica Rochelle Hall v St Bartholomew's House Inc [2022] FWC 591, [46].
[58] Respondent's Submissions at [39] with reference to Danica Rochelle Hall v St Bartholomew's House Inc [2022] FWC 591, [46].
[59] Respondent's Submissions at [39] with reference to Police Federation of Australia v Victoria Police / Chief Commissioner of Police [2015] FWC 924, [21] - [24], cited in United Workers Union v Aspen Pharma Pty Ltd [2021] FWC 4231, [50].
[60] Respondent's Submissions at [39] with reference to Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v HWE Mining Pty Ltd, [10].
[61] Respondent's Submissions at [40].
[62] Respondent's Submissions at [41].
[63] Respondent's Submissions at [42] with reference to Dover Fisheries Pty Ltd v Bottrill Research Pty Ltd (1994) 63 SASR 557 at 573.
[64] Respondent's Submissions at [25] - [26].
[65] Respondent's Submissions at [27] with reference to Ransom Statement at [26].
[66] Respondent's Submissions at [29] - [31].
[67] Respondent's Submissions at [32].
[68] Respondent's Submissions at [34] with reference to BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) CLR 266, 282 - 283, applied in Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337, 347; Bunnik v Boeing Defence Australia Ltd [2025] FWC 1442, [21].
[69] Respondent's Submissions at [32].
[70] Respondent's Submissions at [37] with reference to Ex parte Sullivan [1938] HCA 44(1938) 60 CLR 601.
[71] Respondent's Submissions at [34] with reference to Australian Nursing and Midwifery Federation v Bupa Aged Care Australia Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 1246, [50] and authorities cited therein; "Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union" known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers' Union (AMWU) v Skilled Engineering Ltd [2003] FCA 260, [18].
[72] Respondent's Submissions at [35] with reference to Bunnik v Boeing Defence Australia Ltd [2025] FWC 1442, [20].
[73] Respondent's Submissions at [35] with reference to Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union (105N) v Flinders Logistics Pty [2022] FWC 2823, [59].
[74] Respondent's Submissions at [43].
[75] Respondent's Submissions at [44].
[76] Respondent's Submissions at [45].
[77] Respondent's Submissions at [45].
[78] Respondent's Submissions at [46].
[79] Respondent's Submissions at [47].
[80] Respondent's Submissions at [47].
[81] Respondent's Submissions at [47].
[82] Respondent's Submissions at [48].
[83] Respondent's Submissions at [49].
[89] Respondent's Submissions at [46].
[90] Statement of Agreed Facts at [4].
[92] Respondent's Submissions at [9].
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
The Australian Workers' Union
Woodside Energy Ltd [2025] FWC 2341
(2021) 310 IR 399
(1994) 63 SASR 557
(1982) 149 CLR 337