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[2025] NSWSC 1514
Supreme Court of NSW
2025-12-15
McGrath J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: The Adoption of Robbie Tallis-Turner [2025] NSWSC 1514
Hearing dates: On the papers
Date of orders: 15 December 2025
Decision date: 15 December 2025
Jurisdiction: Equity - Adoptions List
Before: McGrath J
Decision: Determinations that on the evidence before the court, the child is not of Aboriginal descent and therefore not an Aboriginal child within the meaning of s 4(1) of the Adoption Act; and that the Secretary has made reasonable inquiries for the purposes of s 34 of the Adoption Act.
Orders for adoption made, consent of birth parents dispensed with, change of name approved and adoption plans approved and registered
Catchwords: CHILD WELFARE — Adoption — where proposed adoptive parent is child’s current foster parent —whether adoption order is in child’s best interests — whether birth parents’ consent should be dispensed with — whether change of name should be approved — whether adoption plans are in the best interests of child and proper in the circumstances — HELD — adoption order is clearly preferable and in child’s best interests — consent dispense orders are in the best interests of child — change of name approved — adoption plans are in the best interests of child and proper in the circumstances — adoption plans registered
CHILD WELFARE — Adoption — Aboriginal placement principles — reasonable inquiries — where birth mother identifies as Aboriginal — where Secretary considers child is not Aboriginal — whether Secretary has made reasonable inquiries as to whether the child is an Aboriginal child — whether child is an Aboriginal child on the evidence before the court — HELD — reasonable inquires made — insufficient evidence to determine the child is an Aboriginal child
Legislation Cited: Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW), s 4
Adoption Act 2000 (NSW), ss 4, 8, 23, 24, 28, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 45F, 46, 50, 52, 54, 55, 59, 66, 67, 72, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 95, 101, 118, 122, 124, 126, 180
Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW), ss 43, 90, ch 16A
Adoption Regulation 2015 (NSW)
Cases Cited: A Child Proposed for Adoption [2019] NSWSC 1653
Adoption of F and IR (anonymised) [2022] NSWSC 262
Adoption of John (a pseudonym) and William (a pseudonym) [2025] NSWSC 109
Adoption of NG (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 680
Adoption of RCC and RZA [2015] NSWSC 813
Director General Department of Human Services; Re M [2011] NSWSC 369
Hackett (a pseudonym) v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2020] NSWCA 83
Re B (A Minor) [2001] UKHL 70; [2002] 1 All ER 641
Re B (Adoption: Jurisdiction to Set Aside) [1995] Fam 239
Re the Adoption of AJH [2017] NSWSC 1751
Re the Adoption of CCS and FLS [2019] NSWSC 71
Secretary, New South Wales Department of Family and Community Services v MB [2017] NSWSC 1087
Sudath v Health Care Complaints Commission (2012) 84 NSWLR 474; [2012] NSWCA 171
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Secretary, New South Wales Department of Communities and Justice (Plaintiff)
Grace Tallis-Turner (First Defendant)
Representation: Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor’s Office (Plaintiff)
Grace Tallis-Turner (Self-represented)
File Number(s): 2024/00351577
Publication restriction: This judgment has been anonymised pursuant to s 180 of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW)
This case concerns an application by amended summons filed on 18 July 2025 by the Secretary of the New South Wales Department of Communities and Justice (DCJ) by their delegate, Principal Officer, Barnardos Australia, seeking that Robbie Tallis-Turner (now 4 years of age) be adopted by the proposed adoptive parent, Emily Lola Connolly, by order of this court pursuant to s 23 of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW) (Act).
The Secretary also seeks orders:
dispensing with the consent of the birth mother, Grace Tallis-Turner;
dispensing with the consent of the birth father, whose identity is unknown;
dispensing with the requirement to give notice of the application to the birth father;
approving the name “Connolly” as the surname and “Robbie Jackson Pierrot” as the given names of the child;
registering the maternal adoption plan; and
registering the paternal adoption plan.
In this judgment, I will refer to each of the family members and other individuals involved by their first names for convenience and without intending any disrespect. In this published version of the judgment, all persons referred to have been assigned pseudonyms in keeping with s 180 of the Act.
This is a decision on the papers. A threshold issue I am required to determine is whether Robbie is an Aboriginal child within the meaning of s 4 of the Act. Following that determination, the central issue I am required to decide is whether the proposed adoption order is in the best interests of Robbie.
For the reasons set out below, I have determined that:
On the limited evidence before me, I am unable to reach the requisite level of satisfaction that Robbie has descended from an Aboriginal person and therefore cannot determine that Robbie is an Aboriginal child for the purposes of s 4(2) of the Act.
An adoption order is plainly in the best interests of Robbie.
In accordance with those determinations, I will make orders for Robbie to be adopted by Emily; dispensing with the consent of both Grace and the unknown birth father; dispensing with the requirement to give notice of the application to the unknown birth father; approving the proposed change of name for Robbie; and requiring the maternal and paternal adoption plans to be registered.
Robbie was born on 24 April 2021 in New South Wales. Robbie is an Australian citizen.
Robbie is a happy, secure and social boy who loves Emily, enjoys playing outdoors and is fascinated by trucks, cars, buses and other vehicles.
Robbie’s health is reviewed regularly, and by all accounts Robbie is developing into a clever, confident child with great communication skills and a delightful personality.
In December 2021, Robbie was diagnosed with microdeletion syndrome, which is a genetic chromosomal abnormality. This condition may increase his risk of neurocognitive differences such as developmental delay, intellectual disability and autism spectrum disorder, as well as behavioural issues such as attention deficit disorder (ADD) and obsessive-compulsive disorder.
Despite these risks, at present there are no concerns regarding Robbie’s development in any respect. Happily, Robbie presents as a healthy child who is meeting all his developmental milestones and has no major health concerns. While Robbie had some early health struggles, including eczema which required his hospitalisation, Emily sought appropriate care for Robbie, and those conditions have since resolved or otherwise lessened in their severity.
In October 2024, Robbie commenced swimming lessons, and in January 2025 Robbie commenced preschool. A developmental summary half year report notes that Robbie enjoys construction play, imaginative play, outdoor play and physical activities. Robbie also has a strong interest in both reading and writing.
Emily was born on 8 June 1975 in New South Wales and is currently 50 years old. Emily is an Australian citizen. Emily completed a Bachelor of Commerce from the University of Western Sydney and is currently employed as a Data Analyst at a large Australian bank.
Emily is an authorised carer who has had the care and responsibility for Robbie under out of home care arrangements pursuant to the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW) (Care Act) since 8 March 2022, when Robbie was just ten months old. Robbie has been living with Emily for a continuous period of over three and a half years, and they share a close and loving bond.
Emily was adopted herself at just six weeks of age. As a result of a closed adoption practice, Emily has no information regarding her birth family and has not sought them out.
Emily is a single applicant and is currently not in a relationship. If an adoption order were to be made, it is proposed that Emily’s older, non-biological sister, Briony Connolly (who was also adopted by the same adoptive parents), would be appointed guardian for Robbie in the event that Emily is no longer able to care for him.
If an adoption order is to be made, Emily is committed to always being honest and open with Robbie about his adoption and considers it is important that Robbie understands this material aspect of his life story. Emily also understands that each person’s experience and feelings toward adoption will be different. Emily does not wish for Robbie to be defined by his adoption as he grows into adulthood and will always be there to support and guide him through that process, regardless of his age.
Emily has been medically examined and is in good health. A nationwide criminal record check conducted in respect of Emily revealed no “disclosable court outcomes” and no outstanding matters recorded.
Emily currently resides together with Robbie in a two-bedroom, two-bathroom apartment in Sydney, New South Wales. The apartment has a balcony and there is also a common swimming pool within the apartment complex. The living room is decorated with colourful playmats and provides a play area for Robbie and all his toys. The apartment is close to Robbie’s preschool and is within walking distance of the local public school.
Grace was born on 8 September 1999 and is currently 26 years old.
There is no signed instrument of consent pursuant to s 61 of the Act for Grace. Grace is a defendant in these proceedings and opposes the adoption of Robbie by Emily. If an adoption order is to be made in respect of Robbie, it will be necessary for me to dispense with Grace’s consent pursuant to s 67 of the Act.
Robbie is the second child of Grace. Sadly, Robbie had a sister, Hermione, who passed away before she was born.
Grace has her own child protection history. Grace was removed from her parents’ care at ten months of age due to significant domestic violence, neglect and parental drug use.
Records of the DCJ indicate that Grace has a history of depression, anxiety and suicidal ideation. DCJ records further indicate that Grace has diagnoses of bi-polar; attachment disorder, ADD, oppositional defiant disorder, specific learning disability, speech articulation disorder, expressive language delay, bilateral eustachian tube dysfunction and mitral valve prolapse and regurgitation. Grace has also disclosed to the DCJ her struggles with bulimia, anorexia, stressed based seizures, asthma and reduced vision in her right eye.
As I have mentioned, the identity of Robbie’s birth father is unknown. There is no birth father listed on Robbie’s birth certificate and, despite the efforts of the Secretary, his identity has not been able to be confirmed as at the time of me determining this application. I have addressed the efforts of the Secretary to identify Robbie’s birth father below.
Consequently, there is no evidence before me as to the birth father’s position in respect of the proposed adoption of Robbie, there is no instrument of consent pursuant to s 61 of the Act for the birth father and there is no evidence that he has been served with notice of the adoption application.
If an adoption order is to be made in respect of Robbie, it will not only be necessary for me to dispense with the consent of the birth father (being a person who, after reasonably inquiry, cannot be found or identified) pursuant to s 67(1)(a) of the Act, but it will also be necessary for me to dispense with the requirement that he be provided with notice of the application (ss 88(1)(a) and 88(4) of the Act).
Between 1 October 2020 and 3 May 2021, the DCJ received 12 risk of significant harm reports (ROSH reports) in relation to Robbie before he was born. The ROSH reports raised concerns regarding domestic violence, mental health and suspected substance use by Grace.
Robbie was born on 24 April 2021 at 38 weeks gestation and was admitted to the neonatal intensive care unit for observation following a complicated birth.
Robbie was discharged from hospital into Grace’s care on 26 April 2021.
From 29 April 2021 to 3 May 2021, a doula service was engaged to attend Grace’s home to assist in developing parenting capacity. During this period, the doula raised concerns that Robbie’s needs were not being met including unsafe sleeping practices, cigarette smoking in the home and it was noted that Grace was often directing others in the home to provide care for Robbie rather than doing this herself.
On 4 May 2021, the DCJ attended Grace’s home to discuss the concerns raised by the ROSH report received on 3 May 2021. During the meeting, Grace stated she was sick of the DCJ’s interventions, asserting they were not needed. Grace indicated she was going to pack up and leave with Robbie. Grace’s behaviour was reported to have escalated significantly, including reported screaming and yelling at DCJ caseworkers while holding Robbie. As a result of Grace’s unwillingness to work constructively with the DCJ or the services provided and her inability to meaningfully engage with safety planning, a determination was made that the home was not safe for Robbie and that Robbie would need to be removed from the home.
On 4 May 2021, the police were called by the DCJ to attend Grace’s home and Robbie was removed from her care.
On 7 May 2021, the DCJ filed an application initiating care proceedings in the Children**’s Court in relation to Robbie (Children’**s Court proceedings).
On 10 May 2021, an interim order was made allocating parental responsibility for Robbie to the Minister for Families, Communities and Disability Services until further order of the court.
Grace participated in the Children’s Court proceedings and was legally represented.
During the Children’s Court proceedings, no suitable family members were identified as being able to care for Robbie.
On 28 May 2021, the DCJ filed a summary of the proposed plan in relation to Robbie. This document outlined various changes required to be made by Grace in order for the DCJ to consider restoring Robbie to her care.
On 3 September 2021, the DCJ filed a Care Plan in relation to Robbie in the Children’s Court proceedings. The Care Plan stated that there was no realistic possibility of restoring Robbie to Grace’s care as she showed no ability to understand the child protection concerns relating to her care of Robbie and she was unwilling and unable to engage meaningfully with the doula service the DCJ had engaged to assist in developing her parenting capacity.
On 15 October 2021, the DCJ filed an A****mended Care Plan in relation to Robbie in the Children’s Court proceedings. The Amended Care Plan recommended adoption for Robbie. The Amended Care Plan stated that adoption would benefit Robbie’s development and emotional wellbeing, as well as provide him with a forever home which would not be limited by his age.
On 18 October 2021, the Children’s Court made final orders allocating parental responsibility to the Minister in relation to Robbie until he reaches 18 years of age. These orders remain in effect.
On 20 January 2022 and 16 September 2022, the DCJ filed reports pursuant to s 82 of the Care Act (s 82 Reports) in the Children’s Court proceedings, which provided an update in relation to Robbie’s placement and contact with Grace.
On 8 November 2019, Emily was assessed and approved as a dually authorised carer and adoptive parent for one child of either gender aged zero to three years.
On 4 May 2021, Robbie was assumed into care and placed in a short-term placement with Barnardos temporary foster carers. Robbie remained in this placement until 7 March 2022.
On 27 January 2022, Emily was matched with Robbie. The matching approval highlighted that Emily was willing to facilitate all of Robbie’s health needs and that she had an understanding that there was a level of uncertainty regarding Robbie’s development given his then recent diagnosis of microdeletion syndrome. Despite these uncertainties, Emily expressed her commitment to supporting Robbie to ensure that he reached his developmental milestones.
On 7 March 2022, case management for Robbie was transferred to Barnardos out of home adoptions program and the DCJ delegated parental responsibility for Robbie to Barnardos.
On 8 March 2022, Robbie was placed with Emily with an open adoption goal.
On 6 April 2022, Barnardos prepared a case plan for Robbie, providing for permanent care with an adoption goal with Emily.
In the time since Barnardos has been delegated parental responsibility for Robbie, day-to-day responsibility for casework in relation to Robbie has been held by case managers Sharon So, Lilly Sparrow and Ruilin Zhu.
On 17 September 2024, the Secretary filed a summons seeking adoption orders for Robbie.
On 3 October 2024, Grace was personally served with documents, including a notice of application for adoption order, a copy of the maternal and paternal adoption plans and a leaflet from Legal Aid NSW on court proceedings concerning adoption.
On 8 October 2024, Grace filed an appearance in these proceedings and opposed the making of an adoption order.
On 6 November 2024, Stevenson J joined Grace as the defendant to these proceedings pursuant to s 118 of the Act. Grace was not in attendance at that directions hearing.
On 4 December 2024, Stevenson J made orders which included timetabling for the service of evidence by Grace, setting the matter down for a preliminary hearing on 24 March 2025 and noted the parties agreed to undertake a mediation in the interim. Grace was in attendance on this occasion and was represented by Sheridan Duck of Legal Aid NSW.
On 21 March 2025, the preliminary hearing set down for 24 March 2025 was vacated to allow the parties a further opportunity to engage in mediation.
On 2 April 2025, the matter came before me for directions at which time it was set down for preliminary hearing on 17 June 2025. Grace was not in attendance on this occasion but was again represented by Ms Duck of Legal Aid NSW.
In May 2025, the parties attended a mediation.
On 17 June 2025, the preliminary hearing in this matter took place before me. Grace was in attendance and was again represented by Ms Duck of Legal Aid NSW. At that preliminary hearing, Ms Duck conveyed that Grace wished for Robbie be restored to her care. Failing this, if an adoption order were to be made, Grace wanted to have an ongoing role in Robbie’s life and to have regular and meaningful contact with him.
It was at this preliminary hearing that the parties also outlined their respective positions on the issue as to whether or not Robbie is an Aboriginal child within the meaning of the Act.
Grace indicated that she was on a journey herself learning about her cultural identity. She accepted her knowledge of her Aboriginal culture is limited and sought timetabling orders to allow her to file further evidence that went to that issue.
The Secretary indicated their position was that by this time, two reports on that issue had been prepared (one by the Barnardos and the other by the CSO). Neither report was able to confirm any Indigenous ancestry for Robbie. There was an Aboriginal connection identified on the maternal side but that was a connection based upon marriage (i.e. Robbie’s great great great great uncle married an Aboriginal woman), not descent. The crux of the Secretary’s position was that reasonable inquiries had been made, and Robbie had not been identified as an Aboriginal child for the purposes of the Act.
As I have mentioned, a threshold issue for me to determine in this application is whether or not Robbie is an Aboriginal child within the meaning of the Act.
This, of course, is a matter to which significant attention is given within the statutory scheme: see ss 33–39 of the Act and, in particular, the “Aboriginal Child Placement Principles” contained in s 35 of the Act.
This is not an issue that the court approaches lightly as a finding that a child is Aboriginal or not can be of “profound importance to the child and the child’s family”: Adoption of John (a pseudonym) and William (a pseudonym) [2025] NSWSC 109, Stevenson J at [6] citing, by way of example, Adoption of F and IR (anonymised) [2022] NSWSC 262, Sackar J at [19].
At the outset, I observe that a determination one way or the other on this issue is strictly on evidence placed before this court at the time of the application and, in many cases, there is simply insufficient evidence to reach the requisite the level of satisfaction that a child is an Aboriginal child for the purposes of the Act.
Determinations of this kind are necessarily technical and to some degree place emphasis on abstract or stringent statutory definitions which do not reflect the complexity of the matters concerned. However, the technical and abstract nature of this inquiry should not be seen to ignore or detract from the deeply personal and complex considerations involved. The colonial origins of the law in this country, together with the consequences of historical policies enacted in respect of Aboriginal people, have left a legacy which makes the ascertainment of Aboriginal descent both a difficult and sombre task.
The possibility that Robbie may be an Aboriginal child was first raised by Grace with officers of Barnardos on 8 March 2023, some 22 months after he was assumed into care.
On 8 March 2023, Grace advised Barnardos that she may be Aboriginal, as her mother, Cecilia Quincey, and maternal sister, Arabella Hardman, both identify as Aboriginal. Grace also stated that she believed Robbie was Aboriginal as his putative father, Danny Marshall, was Aboriginal. During this call, Grace stated that “if Robbie is Aboriginal then he will come home”. As I have addressed below, subsequent DNA testing has since excluded Danny as being Robbie’s birth father.
On 19 April 2023, a referral was made to the Barnardos Aboriginal Cultural Unit, Gurung Wellama, to investigate Grace’s assertion that Robbie is an Aboriginal child.
On 21 November 2023, Gurung Wellama concluded that the investigation could not confirm Aboriginality in Robbie’s maternal family. Gurung Wellama concluded that Robbie’s maternal heritage was of Irish and English descent as far back as four generations.
On 15 May 2023, Grace advised a Barnardos Case Manager that her sister, Cyril, and brother, Leon, also identified as Aboriginal but that she would prefer to “keep them out of this”.
On 16 June 2023, Robbie’s maternal grandmother, Cecilia, confirmed that she identifies as an Aboriginal woman, that she believes her Aboriginality can be traced to her maternal family, that she does not know where her mob is from but believes it is in Orange, New South Wales, and that she did not then have any connection with an Aboriginal community.
On 14 July 2023, Grace advised Barnardos that Legal Aid NSW was assisting her prove that she is Aboriginal.
On 4 January 2024, Grace advised Barnardos that her birth mother, Cecilia, had a document stating or proving Aboriginality. Grace was advised that document had to be evidenced.
On 23 January 2024, Gurung Wellama advised that they had been “unable to prove a clear link to any Aboriginal heritage bloodlines” and recommended that neither Robbie nor Grace met the legislative definition of an “Aboriginal person” pursuant to s 4 of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW).
On 31 October 2024, Senior Research Officer Timothy Dauth of the CSO Family History Research team was asked to conduct research into the family history and ancestry of Robbie and provide a report as to Robbie’s family history and cultural background (Family History Report).
On 29 November 2024, Mr Dauth completed the Family History Report, concluding that no direct Aboriginal ancestor could be confirmed in relation to Robbie.
In placing a child (other than an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander child) for adoption, the decision maker must take into account the culture, any disability, language and religion of the child and the principle that the child’s given name, identity, language and cultural and religious ties should, as far as possible, be preserved.
There is then a bespoke regime where the child to be placed for adoption is either an Aboriginal child or Torres Strait Islander child within the meaning of the Act.
For the purposes of the Act, “Aboriginal” has the same meaning given to “Aboriginal person” in the Aboriginal Land Rights Act: s 4(1) of the Act.
Section 4(1) of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act defines an “Aboriginal person” to mean a person who:
(a) is a member of the Aboriginal race of Australia, and
(b) identifies as an Aboriginal person, and
(c) is accepted by the Aboriginal community as an Aboriginal person.
a child descended from an Aboriginal and includes a child who is the subject of a determination under subsection (2).
Despite the definition of Aboriginal in subsection (1), the Court may determine that a child is an Aboriginal for the purposes of this Act if the Court is satisfied that the child is of Aboriginal descent.
It follows that there are two ways in which a child may be found to be an Aboriginal child for the purposes of the Act.
First, a child may be Aboriginal if the child has descended from an “Aboriginal” person, adopting the well-recognised tripartite test for Aboriginality, namely that the person:
(a) is a member of the Aboriginal race of Australia; and (b) identifies as an Aboriginal person; and (c) is accepted by the Aboriginal community as an Aboriginal person.
Second, the court has a discretion under s 4(2) of the Act to determine that a child is an Aboriginal child if the court is satisfied that the child is of Aboriginal descent.
A child “descended from an Aboriginal person” for the purposes of 4(1) of the Act would include, for example, a child with a single great grandparent who was Aboriginal within the three-limb definition of “Aboriginal person”, even if none of the child’s parents or grandparents identified, or were recognised as, Aboriginal. So much was observed in Hackett (a pseudonym) v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2020] NSWCA 83 by Leeming JA at [53]:
I think one thing is clear. There is no requirement in order for a child to be an Aboriginal child for the child to have a specified proportion of genetic inheritance. If for example seven great grandparents of a child were Europeans or Chinese, and the eighth was an Aboriginal as that term is defined, then the child is an “Aboriginal child” as that term is defined. It is also clear that that will be so even if none of the child’s parents or grandparents identified as, or was recognised as, Aboriginal.
Section 4(2) of the Act then operates to expand the class of persons who might come within the definition of an “Aboriginal child”, conferring on the court a discretionary power to determine on the evidence that a child is of Aboriginal descent even if no ancestor of the child satisfies the three-limb definition of “Aboriginal person”: Hackett, Leeming JA at [86] and Basten JA at [154].
A court may determine that a child is of Aboriginal descent, so as to be an “Aboriginal child” under s 4(2) of the Act, but there is no obligation to do so and a determination will only be made if the court reaches the requisite level of satisfaction. In Hackett, Leeming JA observed at [82]:
A final point should be made on s 4(2). The Secretary made submissions under the heading “Is s 4(2) discretionary or empowering?”, favouring a construction whereby a child who was of Aboriginal descent within the meaning of s 4(2) was not automatically an “Aboriginal child”, but was so only if the Court so determined. This aspect of the provision is not complex. The section authorises the Court to make a determination, if it is satisfied that the child is of Aboriginal descent. The second, inclusive limb of the definition only applies if such a determination is made. There is no obligation to make such a determination, and such a determination will only be made if the Court reaches the specified state of satisfaction. I referred to the provision as a “discretionary power” above because that is an accurate statement of the provision: the Court is empowered to make a determination in certain circumstances, which will have consequences for the status of the child, but also has a discretion whether or not to exercise that power. Contrary to the question framed by the Secretary’s written submissions, the distinction whether the provision is discretionary or empowering is unhelpful. It is both. However, children of Aboriginal descent, however remote, are not automatically “Aboriginal children” by reason of s 4(2).
The Secretary has a statutory obligation to make reasonable inquiries as to whether a child to be placed for adoption is an Aboriginal child: s 34(1) of the Act.
When the Secretary is satisfied that a child is an Aboriginal child for the purposes of the Act, further obligations arise in relation to the child’s placement, namely:
The Secretary must consult with:
(a) an approved Aboriginal person (see s 195 of the Act); or (b) a nominated person with expertise in relation to the adoption or substitute care of Aboriginal children; and (c) a local, community-based and relevant Aboriginal organisation: ss 33(1)–(2) of the Act.
The “Aboriginal child placement principles” are to be applied in placing a child that the Secretary is satisfied is an Aboriginal child for adoption: ss 34(2) and 35 of the Act.
Alternatives to placement for adoption must be considered such that an Aboriginal child is not to be placed for adoption “unless the Secretary is satisfied that the making of the adoption order is clearly preferable in the best interests of the child to any other action that could be taken by law in relation to the care of the child”: s 36 of the Act.
The “Aboriginal child placement principles” place emphasis on self-determination and provide a statutory preference to the effect that, where an Aboriginal child is to be placed for adoption, it is preferred for that child to be placed with a prospective adoptive parent or parents belonging to the same Aboriginal community, or one of the communities, to which the child’s birth parent or parents belong; or with a prospective adoptive parent or parents belonging to another Aboriginal community: ss 35(2)(a)–(b) of the Act.
If facilitation of these first two preferences “is not practicable or in the best interests of the child”, the child is to be placed with a non-Aboriginal prospective adoptive parent or parents: s 35(2)(c) of the Act.
Under s 35(3) of the Act, an Aboriginal child is not to be placed with a non-Aboriginal prospective adoptive parent or parents unless the court is satisfied that the prospective adoptive parent or parents:
(a) has the capacity to assist the child to develop a healthy and positive cultural identity, and
(b) has knowledge of or is willing to learn about, and teach the child about, the child’s Aboriginal heritage and to foster links with that heritage in the child’s upbringing, and
(c) has the capacity to help the child if the child encounters racism or discrimination in the wider community,
and that the Aboriginal child placement principles have been properly applied.
Except as otherwise provided by the Act or the regulations made under the Act, a court in the hearing of any adoption proceedings or in determining any application or matter under the Act or the regulations, may act on any statement, document, information or matter that may in its opinion assist it to deal with the matter of proceedings or before it for determination, whether or not that statement would be admissible in evidence: s 126 of the Act.
It is well established that in making determinations of this kind, the court may have regard not only to direct evidence but also hearsay evidence in keeping with the oral histories and traditions of the culture with which the court is concerned: Adoption of F and IR, Sackar J at [16].
Regardless of the evidentiary standards that apply, the court can only work with the material placed before it and must base its decisions on material which carries probative value*:* Hackett, Basten JA at [168] and [174]; Adoption of F and IR, Sackar J at [15], citing Sudath v Health Care Complaints Commission (2012) 84 NSWLR 474; [2012] NSWCA 171, Meagher JA at 492–493.
In Adoption of F and IR, Sackar J at [19]–[20] made the following remarks about the bespoke regime, the seriousness of the task involved and (echoing remarks made in Hackett by Leeming JA) emphasised that the primary consideration in every case is the best interests of the child:
[19] The finding that a child is Aboriginal or not can be of profound importance. Most obviously because of the need for the relevant agencies to engage with the placement principles but it does not stop there. It may well have a profound effect on the individual concerned, especially when it is made in relation to a child who has no capacity to express a view one way or the other.
[20] As Leeming JA remarked in Hackett at [16] the differences in the way the Adoption Act treats the adoption of an “Aboriginal child” and the adoption of a child who is not an “Aboriginal child” should not be overstated. The primary consideration in every case is the best interest of the child and where that clashes with the Aboriginal child placement principles, the best interests of the child have priority.
I have outlined the inquiries made by the Secretary to confirm whether or not Robbie is an Aboriginal child. Those inquiries included the referral of the matter to Gurung Wellama (together with their subsequent investigation), several interviews conducted with Grace and other members of Robbie’s maternal family, and the referral to the CSO Family History Research team which led to the production of a careful, lengthy and comprehensive Family History Report prepared by a senior family history researcher, Mr Dauth.
Mr Dauth has over 20 years’ experience in this field and has examined, with great care, such records as are available which might cast light on the question of whether Robbie has Aboriginal ancestry that would warrant the conclusion that Robbie is an Aboriginal child. I have read Mr Dauth’s Family History Report with great care and will address its contents below.
I am satisfied that the Secretary has made reasonable inquiries as to whether Robbie is an Aboriginal child. I acknowledge the difficulty of making these inquiries in circumstances where records may be lost due to a history of members of the maternal family being in out-of-home care, Grace’s strained relationships or lack of contact with her birth family, and in circumstances where the identity of Robbie’s birth father is unknown to the Secretary. I also note that, unfortunately, inquiries of this kind will only be made all the more difficult because historical policies and practices in this country have attempted to break the ongoing connections that Aboriginal persons have with their culture, country and kin.
As I have said, the basis on which it is suggested that Robbie may be an Aboriginal child is the fact that Grace identifies herself as an Aboriginal person, as do other members of Robbie’s maternal family.
As set out above, Grace identifies as Aboriginal and it is her understanding that she is an Aboriginal on her maternal side, although she does not know where her “mob” or family are from. Grace was removed from her mother’s care as an infant and says she discovered that she had Aboriginal heritage on her maternal side whilst she was in care. Grace recalls participating in programs for Aboriginal children when attending school.
As outlined above, Grace does not currently have any contact with her mother, her extended family or her foster carer. Consequently, Grace has not been able to learn much about her Aboriginal heritage or culture and accepts that there is presently “limited evidence” about her Aboriginality. Grace maintains that she is working hard to connect with, and learn more about, her Aboriginal culture, not only for herself but also for Robbie. If successful in these endeavours, Grace plans to share this information with Emily and Robbie.
On the totality of the evidence before the court, the Secretary submits that Robbie should not be considered an Aboriginal child for the purposes of the Act and these proceedings.
The Secretary submits that:
the evidence in support of Robbie being an Aboriginal child “falls short” of what is required for s 4 of the Act.
there is no cogent evidence that Robbie has descended from an Aboriginal person for the purposes of s 4(1) of the Act, or that he is of Aboriginal descent for the purposes of s 4(2) of the Act.
Robbie’s ancestry has been traced back to Ireland and England.
Whilst there is clearly evidence that some maternal family members hold a belief of Aboriginal heritage and that some, including Grace and the maternal grandmother, self-identify as Aboriginal, there is no evidence that any are members of the Aboriginal race or accepted by the Aboriginal community.
The Secretary acknowledges that, even if no ancestor of Robbie satisfies the tripartite definition for the purposes of s 4(1), it is still open to the court to determine that Robbie is of Aboriginal descent and so is an Aboriginal child for the purposes of the Act. However, the Secretary submits that there is simply no evidence which would justify the exercise of my discretion under s 4(2) of the Act in circumstances where Robbie’s maternal ancestors have been traced to England and Ireland and there is only one indirect connection to an Aboriginal family through marriage in respect of whom Robbie is not a descendant.
In the Family History Report, Mr Dauth’s research identified at least one indirect Aboriginal family connection by marriage. That connection was Cecilia’s great great grandfather’s brother (Jack Rivers) who had children with an Aboriginal woman by the name of Rowe. According to Mr Dauth, Robbie would be Jack and Betty’s fourth great grandnephew, but this is necessarily an indirect connection, and Robbie is not a descendant of Betty. At least one member of the maternal family, Cecilia’s cousin, Fiona, confirmed that this was the only Aboriginal family connection of which she was aware. Mr Dauth concluded that there is no information of which he is aware to indicate acceptance of any relevant family by the Aboriginal community as an Aboriginal person and that no direct Aboriginal ancestor could be confirmed in relation to Robbie.
23 Jurisdiction
(1) Subject to this Act, the Court may make an order for the adoption of a child (an adoption order) solely in favour of one person or jointly in favour of a couple.
(2) The Court must not make an adoption order unless, when the application for the order is filed—
(a) the child is present in the State, and
(b) the applicant, or if the application is a joint application, each of the applicants, resides, or is domiciled, in the State.
Section 24(1) of the Act provides that an adoption order may be made in relation to a child who is less than 18 years of age as at the date of the application; or who is more than 18 years of age on that date but was cared for by the applicant/s prior to attaining that age.
In respect of an application for adoption by one person, s 27 of the Act requires that person to be:
resident or domiciled in New South Wales (s 27(1)(a));
of good repute and a fit and proper person to fulfil the responsibilities of a parent (s 27(1)(b)); and
21 or more years of age and at least 18 years older than the child (s 27(3)).
Section 90(1)(c) of the Act requires that proposed adoptive parents must also be selected in accordance with the Act. Section 45F of the Act requires proposed adoptive parents to be assessed and determined to be suitable to adopt.
Section 59 of the Act requires the Secretary to ensure that a person whose consent to an adoption is needed is given the “mandatory written information” before that person consents or refuses consent to the adoption.
Section 87 of the Act provides:
87 Application to be consented to by Secretary
(1) The Court may make an adoption order only on application made by—
(a) the prospective adoptive parent or parents with the consent of the Secretary, or
(b) the Secretary or by a principal officer on behalf of the prospective adoptive parent or parents, or
…
(d) a child who is 18 or more years of age for his or her adoption.
(2) Despite subsection (1) (a), the consent of the Secretary to an application for an adoption order is not required—
(a) if the applicant is a step parent or relative of the child, or
(b) if the application relates to an intercountry adoption.
Section 88 of the Act states that this court cannot make an adoption order unless 14 days’ notice of the adoption application has been given to any person whose consent to the adoption is required under the Act.
Section 91 of the Act requires the applicant to provide a written report prepared by the Secretary or an authorised person.
In the present case, all of the formal requirements under the Act are met. Specifically:
The adoption application is made by the Secretary on behalf of the proposed adoptive parent (s 87 of the Act).
When the adoption application was filed, Robbie was present in New South Wales and less than 18 years of age (ss 23(2)(a) and 24(1)(a) of the Act).
When the application was filed, Emily resided and was domiciled in New South Wales (ss 23(2)(b) and 27(1)(a) of the Act).
Emily is over the age of 21 years and is 18 years or more older than Robbie (s 27(2) of the Act).
For reasons more fully explained below, Emily is of good repute and is a fit and proper person to fulfil the responsibilities of a parent (s 27(1)(b) of the Act).
Emily has been assessed and determined to be suitable to adopt and selected to adopt (ss 45F and 90(1)(c) of the Act).
A written report prepared by Ruilin Zhu in accordance with s 91 of the Act has been received and read (s 91 Report). Ms Zhu provided the s 91 Report in her capacity as an “approved assessor” within the meaning of s 91(2A)(a) of the Act. The s 91 Report was filed on 17 September 2024.
The mandatory written information was provided to Grace on 10 April 2024 (s 59 of the Act).
Grace has been provided with at least 14 days’ notice of the adoption application (s 88 of the Act).
I am satisfied that all of the formal requirements of an adoption application have been met.
90 Court to be satisfied as to certain matters
(1) The Court must not make an adoption order in relation to a child unless the Court is satisfied—
(a) that the best interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption, and
(b) that, as far as practicable and having regard to the age and understanding of the child, the wishes and feelings of the child have been ascertained and due consideration given to them, and
(c) if the prospective adoptive parent or parents are persons other than a step parent or relative of the child-that the prospective adoptive parent or parents have been selected in accordance with this Act, and
(d) that consent to the adoption of the child has been given by every person whose consent is required under this Act or that consent has been, or should be, dispensed with, and
…
(h) in the case of a child (other than an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander child)—that the culture, any disability, language and religion of the child and, as far as possible, that the child’s given names, identity, language and cultural and religious ties have been taken into account in the making of any adoption plan in relation to the adoption.
The Court may not make an adoption order if the parties to the adoption have agreed to an adoption plan unless it is satisfied that the arrangements proposed in the plan are in the child’s best interests and are proper in the circumstances.
The Court may not make adoption order should unless it considers that the making of the order would be clearly preferable in the best interests of the child than any other action that could be taken by law in relation to the care of the child.
Note—
Other action that could be taken in relation to a child includes a parenting order under the Family Law Act 1975 of the Commonwealth or a care order under the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998. Part 1 of Chapter 4 describes the persons who may be adopted and the persons who may adopt.
Determining adoption applications is an important part of the court’s work: Secretary, New South Wales Department of Family and Community Services v MB [2017] NSWSC 1087, Sackar J at [9].
An order for adoption is one of great magnitude, particularly because the legal and social consequences that flow from an adoption are far-reaching (for the child themselves, as well as persons connected to the child) and involve a particular degree of finality: Re the Adoption of CCS and FLS [2019] NSWSC 71, Hallen J at [157], citing Re B (Adoption: Jurisdiction to Set Aside) [1995] Fam 239, Sir Thomas Bingham at 251G-H.
As observed by Hallen J in Re the Adoption of CCS and FLS at [150]:
An adoption order is status changing. It severs, in law, but not in fact, the existing relationship of blood, and creates an adoptive relationship in place of the natural relationship, which in fact, although not in law, continues, unchanged. New family ties are created which approximate blood ties. The child becomes part of his, or her, adoptive parents’ family, solely through operation of law, and there is no necessity for any actual blood relationship to exist between them. He, or she, thereafter, is regarded, in law, as the child of the adoptive parents, and the adoptive parents are regarded in law as the parents of the adopted child: s 95(2) of the Act. The adopted child also ceases to be regarded, in law, as the child of the birth parents and the birth parents cease to be regarded in law as the parents of the adopted child: s 95(2)(d) of the Act. The effect of an adoption order is to extinguish any parental responsibility of the birth parents. They no longer qualify as parents for the purpose of taking part in any future proceedings about the child. Thus, the adoption order directly affects three parties, namely the child, the birth parents and the adoptive parents.
Because of the seriousness and significance of the decision, and in line with ss 90(1)(a) and (b) of the Act, I must not make an adoption order for Robbie unless I am satisfied that his best interests will be promoted by the adoption; and that, as far as practicable and having regard to his age and understanding, the wishes and feelings of Robbie have been ascertained and duly considered.
I must have regard to Robbie’s best interests, both in youth and later life, this being the paramount consideration as stated in s 8(1)(a) of the Act. I must also have regard to the principles that adoption is to be regarded as a service for the child (s 8(1)(b) of the Act) and that no adult is entitled as of right to adopt the child (s 8(1)(c) of the Act).
In determining the best interests of a child, I must have regard to the matters contained in s 8(2) of the Act, including:
any wishes expressed by the child;
the child’s age, maturity, level of understanding, gender, background and family relationships and any other relevant characteristics of the child;
the child’s physical, emotional and educational needs, including the child’s sense of personal, family and cultural identity;
any wishes expressed by either or both of the parents of the child;
the relationship that the child has with his or her parents and any siblings (if any) and any significant other people (including relatives);
the attitude of the proposed adoptive parent to the child and to the responsibilities of parenthood;
the nature of the relationship of the child with the proposed adoptive parent;
the suitability and capacity of the proposed adoptive parent, or any other person, to provide for the needs of the child, including the emotional and intellectual needs of the child;
the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm caused, or that may be caused, by being subjected or exposed to abuse, ill-treatment, violence or other behaviour, or being present while a third person is subjected or exposed to abuse, ill-treatment, violence or other behaviour; and
the alternatives to the making of an adoption order and the likely effect on the child in both the short and longer term of changes in the child’s circumstances caused by an adoption, so that adoption is determined among all alternative forms of care to best meet the needs of the child.
Fundamental considerations in matters of this kind, the presence or absence of which underlie many of the above-listed matters, is a child’s need for a sense of identity, autonomy, security and belonging. These are complex and core psychological needs of humanity and it has been recognised in this court that any perceived absence or precariousness in this regard can have ongoing consequences for a child in care. The notion of providing a child in care with a sense of security as soon as possible to aid their development in the future was well-described in [2017] NSWSC 1751 by Hallen J at [297]–[299] as follows:
[297] It is often referred to in the literature that a child placed with foster carers has an abiding need for a sense of security and identity and that she, or he, will feel most secure when she, or he, is assured that no one can take her, or him, away from the family of which she, or he, is a legal member. It is recognised that the sooner a child can feel this sense of security, the better for her, or his, development in the future: see Re Peter [2009] NSWSC 697, per Palmer J, at [35].
[298] As was written in Re W (A Child) (Adoption: Grandparents’ Competing Claim) [2017] 1 WLR 889; [2016] EWCA Civ 793, by McFarlane LJ, with agreement of the other two members of the Court of Appeal (Jackson and Lindblom LJJ), at [64]:
“One of the principal benefits of adoption is to achieve a secure, stable, reliable, permanent, lifetime placement for the child in the adoptive family as the adoptive son or daughter of the adopters.”
[299] Also, if the carers who have developed a strong bond of family relationship with the child feels that they are under threat of an application to the Children’s Court, at any time, for vacation of a care order and the consequent removal of the child from them, then they could be subjected to a level of stress and anxiety that must affect the parental relationship with the child who is in their care: Re Peter at [36].
The requirement in s 90(3) of the Act that the making of the order must be clearly preferable in the best interests of the child rather than any other action that could be taken by law in relation to the care of the child “requires something more than a slight preponderance of considerations in favour of adoption over the alternatives”; and “the requirement that the Court consider that an adoption order be “clearly preferable” is one that adoption be obviously, plainly or manifestly preferable to any other action that could be taken by law”: Adoption of RCC and RZA [2015] NSWSC 813, Brereton J at [14].
Consideration of whether adoption would promote the child’s best interests, and whether it is clearly preferable to any other order that could be made, involves identification of the likely effects of adoption, and of the various available alternatives, and examining their respective benefits and detriments from the perspective of the best interests of the child, so as to conclude whether adoption is, or is not, clearly preferable to all the others: Adoption of NG (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 680, Brereton J at [74].
The question of what is in a child’s best interests involves the making of a judicial evaluation and the balancing of many factors from which an overall conclusion must be reached. It will, inevitably, be impressionistic and inexact: Re B (A Minor) [2001] UKHL 70; [2002] 1 All ER 641, Nicholls LJ (with whom Mackay, Hoffmann, Millett and Rodger LLJ agreed) at [16], cited with approval in Director General Department of Human Services; Re M [2011] NSWSC 369, Hallen J at [90].
Robbie is currently four years old and is therefore of insufficient age and maturity and lacks the requisite level of understanding to express his opinion or wishes in respect of his adoption.
In accordance with ss 54(2) and 55 of the Act, Robbie is unable to consent to his own adoption. Consequently, if an adoption order is to be made, it will be necessary for me to dispense with the consent of each of Grace and the birth father pursuant to s 67(1) of the Act, an issue I have addressed below.
Robbie has been observed to be happy and settled in his placement and has developed a strong and loving bond with Emily. Robbie plainly feels a strong sense of belonging with Emily, and that sense of belonging and familial unity is clearly reciprocated.
As I have mentioned, Robbie has his health reviewed regularly and has no major health concerns. Robbie is meeting all developmental milestones commensurate with his age. Emily supports Robbie with regular medical appointments and care to keep his eczema under control.
The evidence indicates that Emily has demonstrated an ability to meet all of Robbie’s individual needs, including his psychological and emotional needs. I have no doubt that Emily’s unique position of having been adopted herself will provide invaluable insight, empathy and reassurance as Robbie matures through to adolescence and adulthood.
Emily is clearly committed to Robbie’s education. Robbie commenced daycare in October 2022 and preschool in January 2025. Emily plans for Robbie to commence kindergarten in 2027. At home, Robbie is surrounded by age-appropriate books and educational toys. Ms Zhu in the s 91 Report notes that Emily frequently reads books and watches educational television shows with Robbie.
Emily has demonstrated a sustained commitment to maintaining Robbie’s relationship with his maternal family. Emily continues to facilitate contact with Grace, despite challenges arising from those interactions and Grace’s inconsistent attendance.
In terms of Robbie’s cultural identity, Emily agrees to consider any cultural requests made by Grace in the future. Emily agrees to help Robbie learn about his culture in the event any new or additional information is provided that supports Robbie being identified as an Aboriginal child, despite the lack of evidence which supports such a finding at this stage.
On the evidence before me, Emily has provided a stable, nurturing and culturally responsive environment that enables Robbie to thrive physically, emotionally and educationally. Emily is plainly suitable and capable to provide for the needs of Robbie. He is thriving in her care.
As I have mentioned, Emily has been assessed and determined to be suitable to adopt Robbie in accordance with s 45F of the Act, and has been deemed a fit and proper person to adopt in accordance with s 28(1)(b) of the Act.
Robbie has no relationship with his birth father in circumstances where his identity is unknown.
Robbie’s relationship with Grace is strained only by reason of the circumstances which necessitated his assumption into care and his eventual placement into care. Interactions between the pair, when they occur, are mostly positive.
Robbie refers to Grace as “Mummy Grace” or “Mummy Lishia”.
On 4 September 2024, during a face-to-face contact visit between Grace and Robbie, Grace became upset when Robbie did not refer to her as “Mummy”. Later in the visit, Robbie did refer to Emily as “Mama” and Grace as “Mummy Grace” or “Mummy Lishia”. Grace ended the visit after 30 minutes due to her mental health. Emily later offered an additional or make-up visit to compensate for this, but Grace did not respond to that message.
On 16 December 2024, Grace confirmed her attendance at a face-to-face contact visit with Robbie scheduled for 18 December 2024. Grace did not attend that visit and was not contactable on the day. Grace later reported to Ms Zhu that the reason she missed that visit was because she was in hospital.
On 5 February 2025, during a face-to-face contact visit between Grace and Robbie, Robbie became confused when Grace referred to herself as “Mummy”. Grace also mentioned that she had a new partner and that her siblings were helping Grace prepare for when Robbie returned to her care.
Grace confirmed her attendance for a face-to-face contact visit scheduled for April 2025 but did not attend that visit.
Grace currently has in-person contact with Robbie four times each year, with one of those visits usually falling within a few days of Robbie’s birthday. Usually, Grace and Robbie will play in the park or go to the shops together. These contact visits are supervised by Emily, who Grace considers can be very protective of Robbie. Grace finds that Emily’s presence at these contact visits can sometimes make it more difficult for Grace and Robbie to bond. Occasionally, Grace and Emily will arrange for Grace to have telephone or video contact in addition to these in-person visits.
Whilst Grace does not consent to the adoption of Robbie, Grace does agree to the maternal adoption plan and wishes that it be registered so that, in the event an adoption order is made, it can be reviewed if things change in the future. Specifically, Grace hopes that in the future she and Emily will be able to agree on changes to the contact arrangements, including Robbie spending more time with Grace or having more telephone contact with Grace as he gets older.
Emily agrees to and has signed both the maternal adoption plan and the paternal adoption plan. Emily’s approach to birth family contact is as follows:
Emily considers it is important that Robbie maintains contact with his birth family so as to foster a sense of identity, connection and understanding of his family history.
Emily wants to adopt Robbie because she loves him very much and because she believes adoption will provide Robbie with a sense of permanency and stability. Emily recognises that open adoption means that, not only will Robbie maintain his connection to his maternal family, but also that he gains another family as well. That family extends beyond Emily to his adoptive grandparents, aunt and cousins.
Emily is well aware of the alternatives to an adoption order and describes them as “unnerving, worrying and unsettling” from a child’s perspective. Emily is committed to always putting Robbie’s needs first and providing him with a permanent sense of belonging to her family.
Referees for Emily described her as a fantastic person with a great sense of humour. Emily is said to be kind, caring, determined, organised, sensible and responsible. In her interactions with Robbie, Emily has been observed to be an “amazing mum” who always has Robbie’s best interests in mind. Of particular note was the diligent and loving manner in which Emily cared for Robbie when he first came into her care, managing his health issues with courage and commitment, displaying an unwavering devotion which has evolved and grown along with Robbie himself.
Both referees for Emily consider her unique position of being adopted herself will allow her to have genuine empathy and understanding regarding Robbie’s unique experience of adoption. Emily understands the importance of Robbie maintaining a connection with his birth family, that is her role to facilitate that connection and, despite some let downs and difficulties, Emily will always make effort in that regard for Robbie’s sake.
Emily is committed to being open and honest with Robbie about adoption and respond to his questions about adoption in an age-appropriate and honest way. Emily has developed a Life Story book for Robbie, which includes information and photographs of Robbie’s birth family, which are also displayed around the home (including in Robbie’s bedroom). Robbie seeks out Emily for reassurance, affection and support.
Overall, Emily demonstrates a deep sense of responsibility and commitment to Robbie’s wellbeing. Emily prioritises Robbie’s needs and ensures that Robbie is raised in an environment grounded in stability, empathy and respect for his identity and connections.
As I have mentioned, there is no signed instrument of consent in respect of Grace. Grace opposes Robbie’s adoption and wishes to have Robbie returned to her care. Grace has foreshadowed an intention to bring an application pursuant to s 90 of the Care Act in the future to see Robbie restored to her care.
Grace loves Robbie “a great deal” and wants him to return to her care. It is important to Grace that Robbie knows that she fought for him and that she did not give up on him.
Grace acknowledges that Emily has taken good care of Robbie and has provided him with a safe and loving home. Grace is grateful for this but also wants the opportunity to care for Robbie herself.
Robbie’s care and protection history raises concerns regarding his welfare in Grace’s care, particularly given her inconsistent engagement with him, her unwillingness to engage with support services, her inability to understand their concerns and her inability meet Robbie’s needs.
I have no doubt these concerns are at least particularly connected to Grace’s own struggles with her mental health.
It is clear from the evidence before me that Emily is able to provide a safe, stable and nurturing environment that supports Robbie’s physical, emotional and psychological wellbeing. Robbie is physically, mentally and emotionally well in her care, and no concerns about his welfare have been raised by his treating practitioners or caseworkers.
I may not make an adoption order unless satisfied that such an order is “clearly preferable” in the best interests of Robbie, compared with any other legal measure that could be taken in relation to his care: s 90(3) of the Act.
I must therefore be satisfied that the balance weighs more than slightly in favour of the proposed adoption over other alternatives. The making of an adoption order must be obviously, plainly or manifestly preferable to any other action that could be taken by law. I must reach the degree of conviction in favour of the adoption commensurate with the gravity of the decision: Adoption of RCC and RZA, Brereton J at [14]; Adoption of NG (No 2), Brereton J at [74].
The alternatives to making an adoption order in respect of Robbie are:
An order allocating parental responsibility to Grace pursuant to s 92 of the Act.
Make no order and maintain the status quo, which is that Robbie remains under the parental responsibility of the Minister until he is 18 years old.
An order allocating parental responsibility to Emily pursuant to s 92 of the Act (also known as a guardianship order).
The Secretary submits that restoration to either Grace is not a “realistic possibility”. I agree with that assessment.
Grace has not had Robbie in her care since he was removed on 4 May 2021, when he was just two weeks old and Grace has since struggled with the same instability which necessitated his assumption into care.
After over three years living with Emily, I am of the view that restoration would have a significant adverse impact on Robbie. Grace’s poor mental health and lack of ability to understand Robbie’s needs and to care for him, which led to his removal from her care in 2021, do not appear to have been addressed or improved over the intervening years.
On 20 September 2021, the Children’s Court in making the final care order made a finding that there is no realistic prospect of restoration of Robbie to Grace. No challenge has been brought to that finding or that order, either on appeal, or by way of application under s 90 of the Care Act.
Making no order and maintaining the status quo of Robbie remaining under the parental responsibility of the Minister until he reaches 18 years old would be highly detrimental to Robbie. It would cause the ongoing stress of instability, insecurity and uncertainty to remain with him. Additionally, maintaining the status quo would also mean that he would remain a ward of the state until he attains the age of 18 years and that Emily would be unable to make significant decisions in regard to him without the approval of the Minister’s delegate.
If I were to maintain the status quo and make no order, this would mean that, notwithstanding her assumption of the role of parent and the provision of care in kind by Emily to Robbie for the past three years, and Robbie’s perception of Emily as his mother and primary caregiver, Emily would not be legally recognised as Robbie’s parent. It would also place additional pressures on the placement, owing to the need for Emily to seek consents and approvals regarding decisions about Robbie on an ongoing basis. An adoption order has the advantages of certainty and permanency. Making no order risks that Robbie may experience insecurity, uncertainty and ongoing trauma, or at least internal disquiet, arising, for instance, from the fact that he would continue to be the foster-child of Emily rather than her son, at least so far as the law is concerned. Robbie deserves a more certain outcome.
An order allocating parental responsibility to the proposed adoptive parents would address some deficiencies arising with the alternative of maintaining the status quo. An order allocating parental responsibility to the proposed adoptive parents would allow them to make significant decisions about the child. But it still lacks the permanency of an adoption order: Adoption of NG (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 680, (at [75]-[82]). And a major disadvantage of this alternative is that when the child reaches 18 years of age [they] would lose [their] legal connection to the proposed adoptive parents and their children, despite the reality that the proposed adoptive parents have been acting in the role of [their] parents almost since [their] birth.
Pursuant to s 52 of the Act, in conjunction with s 90(1)(d) of the Act, the consent to the proposed adoption of each of a child’s birth parents and any person who has parental responsibility for the child is generally required. However, parental consent may be dispensed with if the court so orders: s 66 of the Act. If consent is dispensed with by the court, consent is not required under s 52 of the Act: s 54(1)(a) of the Act.
Parental consent is therefore required unless:
consent has been dispensed with (s 54(1)(b) of the Act); or
the child has provided sole consent to their own adoption (s 54(1)(c) of the Act).
If the child is 18 or more years of age, parental consent is not required for an adoption order: s 54(1)(d) of the Act. If a child is 12 or more years of age and of sufficient maturity to understand the effect of giving consent, he or she may give sole consent to his or her adoption by a proposed adoptive parent or parents if the child has been cared for by the proposed adoptive parent or parents for at least two years: s 54(2) of the Act.
Section 67 of the Act sets out the circumstances in which a consent dispense order may be made, providing:
67 When can Court dispense with consent of person other than the child?
(1) The Court may make a consent dispense order dispensing with the requirement for consent of a person to a child’s adoption (other than the child) if the Court is satisfied that—
(a) the person cannot, after reasonable inquiry, be found or identified, or
(b) the person is in such a physical or mental condition as not to be capable of properly considering the question of whether he or she should give consent, or
(c) if the person is a parent of, or person who has parental responsibility for, the child-there is serious cause for concern for the welfare of the child and it is in the best interests of the child to override the wishes of the parent or person who has parental responsibility, or
(d) if an application has been made to the Court for the adoption of the child by one or more persons who are authorised carers or the guardians for the child—
(i) the child has established a stable relationship with those carers or guardians, and
(ii) the adoption of the child by those carers or guardians will promote the child’s welfare, and
(iii) in the case of an Aboriginal child, alternatives to placement for adoption have been considered in accordance with section 36.
(2) The Court must not make such a consent dispense order unless satisfied that to do so is in the best interests of the child.
Robbie is four years old and therefore cannot consent to his own adoption. If an adoption order is to be made in relation to Robbie, it will be necessary for me to dispense with the consent of each of Grace and Robbie’s birth father.
The Secretary seeks an order to dispense with the requirement for the consent of Robbie’s birth father pursuant to s 67(1)(a) of the Act and the consent of Grace pursuant to s 67(1)(d) of the Act.
It is convenient to deal with Robbie’s birth father first.
The court may dispense with the consent of a birth parent under s 67(1)(a) of the Act if satisfied that the birth parent cannot be found or located after reasonable inquiry, but not unless it is also satisfied that to do so would be in the child’s best interests. What “reasonable” inquiries entails is fact specific and it is to be considered from the perspective of both the applicant and the person whose consent is required: Re K and the Adoption Act 2000 [2005] NSWSC 858, White J at [22]; Re Dyk and the Adoption Act 2000 [2005] NSWSC 1045, Brereton J at [17]; Re KN and the Adoption Act 2000 [2005] NSWSC 896, Campbell J at [14].
In circumstances where the birth father cannot be found or identified after reasonable inquiry, notice of the application for a consent dispense order is not required: s 72(2)(a) of the Act. Additionally, to the extent that notice of the adoption application generally is required to have been given to the birth father, it is dispensed with: ss 88(1)(a) and 88(4) of the Act.
The Secretary submits that reasonable inquiries have been made to locate Robbie’s birth father. I have outlined those inquiries earlier in this judgment.
Two individuals previously identified by Grace as the putative birth father of Robbie have undergone DNA testing and both were determined not to be Robbie’s biological father. Grace informed Barnardos that those two individuals were the only intimate relationships she had before she moved to Sydney and to date Grace has not named any other potential birth father for Robbie.
During the Children’s Court proceedings, Grace identified Robbie’s father as Paul Cornet. In June 2021, a paternity test was completed and it was determined that Paul was not the father of Robbie.
Grace then identified Danny (referred to earlier in this judgment) as a putative father for Robbie. After Danny was located, a paternity test was completed and it was determined that Danny was not the father of Robbie.
Prior to that DNA testing, various casework had been conducted in an attempt to locate the birth father, including searches via the internet and under Chapter 16A of the Care Act (which allows certain government and non-government agencies to share and exchange information that relates to the safety, welfare or wellbeing of a child or young person).
Robbie has developed a positive and strong bond with [Emily] and views himself as part of the household. Robbie calls the proposed adoptive parent “mummy” and her parents “Nanny” and “Pop” …Robbie settled into the placement quickly and appears to have felt safe, seeking out [Emily] when in need of comfort …
Robbie is thriving in the care of Emily, who provides a stable, nurturing and supportive environment that meets his emotional, developmental and physical needs. Emily is also committed to maintaining contact that supports Robbie’s ongoing connection with his birth family, as reflected in the maternal and paternal adoption plans set out below.
Having regard to the whole of the evidence before me, I am satisfied that dispensing with the consent of Grace and the unknown birth father to enable the making of an adoption order in favour of Emily is in Robbie’s best interests.
101 Names of adopted children
(1) On the making of an adoption order—
(a) an adopted child who is 18 or more years old is (unless he or she decides otherwise) to have the same surname and given name or names as he or she used immediately before the order is made, and
(b) an adopted child who is less than 18 years of age is to have as his or her surname and given name or names such name or names as the Court, in the adoption order, approves on the application of the adoptive parent or parents.
(2) Before changing the surname or given name or names of a child, the Court must consider any wishes expressed by the child and any factors (such as the child’s maturity or level of understanding) that the Court thinks are relevant to the weight it should give to the child’s wishes.
(3) If, before the making of the adoption order, the adopted child has been generally known by a particular surname, the Court may, in the adoption order, order that the child is to have that name as his or her surname.
(4) An approval of a change in the given name or names of a child who is over the age of 12 years must not be given by the Court unless the child has, in a consent given under section 55, consented to the change.
(5) The Court must not approve a change in the given name or names of a child who is more than one year old, or a non-citizen child, unless the Court is satisfied that the name change is in the best interests of the child.
The effect of s 101(2) of the Act is that I cannot change Robbie’s name without first considering his express wishes and any factors (such as his maturity and understanding) that I consider relevant to the weight to be given to his wishes.
The effect of s 101(5) of the Act is that I cannot change Robbie’s name unless I am satisfied that the name change is in his best interests.
The Secretary seeks approval for the name “Robbie Jackson Pierrot Connolly”. The proposed change retains Robbie’s original first name, adds “Jackson Pierrot” as his middle names and changes his surname from “Tallis-Turner” to “Connolly”.
It was only recently proposed that Robbie was to have a middle name or middle names at all. The previously proposed change of name in relation to Robbie would have retained Robbie’s first name and changed his surname from “Tallis-Turner” to “Connolly”.
This amendment partly reflected a request made by Grace at the preliminary hearing that her father’s name, “Pierrot”, might be reflected in Robbie’s proposed change of name by way of an addition as a middle name. At the preliminary hearing, Grace explained that this was the middle name she intended to give to Robbie when he was born but she did not have the opportunity to register Robbie’s birth or otherwise have this recorded on Robbie’s birth certificate before he was assumed into care.
Emily would like to acknowledge Grace’s wishes by including “Pierrot” in Robbie’s name. Emily would also like to include the name “Jackson” as an additional middle name. Emily believes that “having a first name and middle name chosen by Grace, and a middle name and surname chosen by [her], will connect Robbie to his birth family and his adoptive family equally”.
Robbie is currently four years of age. When first asked by Emily what he would like his middle name to be, Robbie first responded that he would like it to be “Mama”, an affectionate name he calls Emily. In a later conversation between the pair, upon learning that “Lola” was Emily’s middle name, Robbie asked for that to be his middle name as well. I note that neither of those proposed middles names are sought and, to the extent it is necessary that I consider any wishes Robbie has expressed in relation to this matter, I am of the view that Robbie is currently of insufficient maturity and understanding to afford substantial weight to those wishes.
The Secretary submits that the proposed name is in Robbie’s bests interests as it preserves Robbie’s first name to maintain a connection to his birth family, while also recognising his growth in the care of Emily. It allows him to maintain the first name, recognises the middle names (selected for him by Grace at birth and selected for him by Emily, respectively) and shares Emily’s surname to reflect and affirm his inclusion in the Connolly family.
Grace agrees that Robbie should retain the given names that she selected for Robbie when he was born, with that submission also embracing formal recognition of “Pierrot” as Robbie’s middle name. Grace has not expressed a firm view one way or the other on the addition of “Jackson” as an additional middle name for Robbie but appears to oppose any proposed change to Robbie’s name beyond recognition of “Pierrot” as his middle name.
46 What is an adoption plan?
(1) An adoption plan is a plan agreed to by two or more of the parties to the adoption of a child that includes provisions relating to—
(a) the making of arrangements for the exchange of information between the parties in relation to any one or more of the following—
(i) the child’s medical background or condition,
(ii) the child’s development and important events in the child’s life,
(iii) the means and nature of contact between the parties and the child, and
(b) any other matter relating to the adoption of the child.
(2) Without limiting the matters for which an adoption plan may make provision—
(a) it may set out the ways in which the child is to be assisted to develop a healthy and positive cultural identity and for links with that heritage to be fostered, and
(b) it may provide for the giving of certain financial and other assistance as referred to in section 201.
(2A) A birth parent who has not consented to the adoption of a child (a non-consenting birth parent) is, as far as possible, to be given the opportunity to participate in the development of, and agree to, an adoption plan in relation to the child.
The Adoption Regulation 2015 (NSW) does not contain any requirements in respect of an application for registration of an adoption plan.
There is a maternal adoption plan and a paternal adoption plan prepared in these proceedings in accordance with the requirements in s 46 of the Act.
An amended maternal adoption plan was signed by Grace on 27 June 2025 and by Emily and the delegate of the Secretary on 1 July 2025. In summary, the maternal adoption plan provides as follows:
The purpose of the plan is to support Robbie with his development and assist him to be connected with and build on his knowledge of his birth family and his sense of identity.
Contact arrangements should be structured in a way that will meet Robbie’s needs, taking into account his age, stage of development and any expressed wishes.
Emily will be present at all contact visits and will be responsible for transporting Robbie to and from those visits. Any children Grace may have in the future are also welcome to attend.
Robbie will have face-to-face contact visits with Grace four times a year, for a minimum of two hours each, with those visits to be arranged between Emily and Grace, and in consultation with Robbie when he is old enough to participate in making those arrangements.
At the beginning of each year, Emily will provide Grace with proposed dates for face-to-face contact visits in that year. The time and location of each visit will be confirmed four weeks prior.
Should Grace attend all four scheduled visits with Robbie in a year, Emily agrees to facilitate an additional two visits a year, and additional visits may be arranged subject to Robbie’s needs and wishes.
Where any person presents as affected by alcohol or some other substance, or behaves in a violent or aggressive manner, the visit will be cancelled immediately.
Emily will remind Grace of any upcoming face-to-face visit seven days prior (with the option for an additional reminder 24 hours prior).
Each of Emily and Grace have agreed to a regime to provide notice to the other should they need to reschedule any visit.
Grace must confirm her attendance at a proposed face-to-face visit at least two hours prior to it taking place. If this confirmation does not occur, the visit will not proceed and will be forfeited.
In addition to face-to-face contact visits, Emily agrees to facilitate telephone or video calls between Grace and Robbie up to four times a year if requested. Emily will supervise these calls. If Robbie requests further telephone or video contact, Emily will facilitate this occurring. In the event Grace is not contactable at the time of a scheduled call, Emily will consider sending a video of Robbie in lieu of the call. Calls between Robbie, and his extended maternal family will be subject to Robbie’s wishes.
Emily agrees to contact Grace as soon as possible in the event of Robbie sustaining a serious illness, injury or in the event of his death.
A paternal adoption plan was signed by Emily on 3 July 2025 and by the delegate of the Secretary on 7 July 2025. In summary, the paternal adoption plan is premised upon a putative father coming forward and paternity being confirmed. The paternal adoption plan provides as follows:
Emily is supportive of Robbie having information about his father should paternity be confirmed. Should a putative father come forward in the future, he may be required to undertake DNA testing prior to any contact with Robbie occurring. On Emily’s request, Barnardos will pay the reasonable costs of any such testing and provide her with assistance and advice regarding it.
The father may be asked to meet with Emily and/or provide some basic information about himself, including photographs. Emily can then use this information to assist Robbie to learn about his father.
Any contact will occur as agreed between Robbie, Emily and the father.
In accordance with s 90(2) of the Act, I consider that the arrangements proposed in the paternal adoption plan are in Robbie’s best interests and proper in the circumstances, and that the paternal adoption plan be registered.
For the reasons given above, I propose to make the following determinations, orders and notations:
Pursuant to s 4(2) of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW), the court determines that, on the evidence before the court, the child is not of Aboriginal descent and therefore not an Aboriginal child within the meaning of s 4(1) of the Act.
For the purposes of s 34 of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW), the court determines that the Secretary has made reasonable inquiries as to whether the child is an Aboriginal child.
Pursuant to s 67(1)(a) of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW), the requirement for the consent of the child’s birth father is dispensed with.
Pursuant to s 67(1)(d) of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW), the requirement for the consent of the child’s birth mother, Grace Tallis-Turner, is dispensed with.
Pursuant to s 88(4) of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW), the requirement of giving notice of the application to the child’s birth father, is dispensed with.
Pursuant to s 23 of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW), order for the adoption of the child, Robbie Tallis-Turner, in favour of the adopting parent, Emily Lola Connolly.
Pursuant to s 101(1) of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW), order the approval of the name “Connolly” as the surname and “Robbie Jackson Pierrot” as the given names of the child.
It is noted that the court is satisfied that the arrangements proposed in the Maternal Adoption Plan signed by Grace Tallis-Turner on 27 June 2025, Olivia Rennie (Delegate of the Secretary, New South Wales Department of Communities and Justice) and Emily Lola Connolly on 1 July 2025, copies of which will be annexed to the orders and marked “A”, are in the child’s best interests and are proper in the circumstances.
Pursuant to ss 50(1) and (3) of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW), the Maternal Adoption Plan signed by Grace Tallis-Turner on 27 June 2025, Olivia Rennie (Delegate of the Secretary, New South Wales Department of Communities and Justice) and Emily Lola Connolly on 1 July 2025, be registered.
It is noted that the court is satisfied that the arrangements proposed in the Paternal Adoption Plan signed by Emily Lola Connolly on 3 July 2025 and Olivia Rennie (Delegate of the Secretary, New South Wales Department of Communities and Justice) on 7 July 2025, copies of which will be annexed to the orders and marked “B”, are in the child’s best interests and are proper in the circumstances.
Pursuant to ss 50(1) and (3) of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW), the Paternal Adoption Plan signed by Emily Lola Connolly on 3 July 2025 and Olivia Rennie (Delegate of the Secretary, New South Wales Department of Communities and Justice) on 7 July 2025, be registered.
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Paragraphs [7] and [29] - Rectified birthdate.
(2012) 84 NSWLR 474
At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, I made the following orders:
That the Defendant file and serve any evidence on which she seeks to rely by 27 June 2025.
The matter be listed in the Adoptions List on 2 July 2025 for further directions.
On 1 July 2025, Grace filed an affidavit in these proceedings (affirmed on 27 June 2025) which set out her understanding of her Aboriginality, as well as her clear opposition to Robbie’s adoption.
On 2 July 2025, the matter came before me for directions at which time Ms Duck appeared for Grace and advised that Grace was content for the matter to be determined on the papers without the need for a hearing. The Secretary agreed with that course. I then made the following orders:
That the plaintiff file and serve any updating evidence to be relied upon by 5.00pm on 18 July 2025.
Leave is granted to the plaintiff to file an amended summons by 18 July 2025.
That the plaintiff file and serve written submissions by 5.00pm on 18 July 2025.
The defendant to file and serve any written submissions in reply by 5.00pm on 1 August 2025.
After 8 August 2025, that the matter be determined in chambers.
On 18 July 2025, the Secretary filed the amended summons for adoption and updating evidence to be relied upon.
On 21 July 2025, the Secretary filed updated written submissions, along with a further affidavit affirmed that day by Emily.
No further evidence or submissions in reply were filed on behalf of Grace.
As I have mentioned above, on 17 June 2025, the preliminary hearing in this matter took place before me and each of Grace and the Secretary outlined their respective positions as to whether or not Robbie is an Aboriginal child for the purposes of the Act.
On 1 July 2025, Grace filed an affidavit in these proceedings (affirmed 27 June 2025) in which she states that she identifies as Aboriginal; it is her understanding that she is an Aboriginal on her maternal side, although she does not know from where her “mob” or family are from. Grace was removed from her mother’s care as an infant and says she discovered that she had Aboriginal heritage on her maternal side whilst she was in care. Grace recalls participating in programs for Aboriginal children when attending school.
Grace does not currently have any contact with her birth mother, Cecilia, her extended family or her foster carer. Consequently, Grace has not been able to learn much about her Aboriginal heritage or culture and accepts that there is presently “limited evidence” about her Aboriginality.
Grace maintains that she is working hard to connect with, and learn more about, her Aboriginal culture, not only for herself but also for Robbie. If successful in these endeavours, Grace plans to share this information with both Emily and Robbie.
My conclusion is that, as the Secretary submitted, there is insufficient evidence before me to find that Robbie is of Aboriginal descent and is an Aboriginal child within the meaning of s**s *4(1)–(*2) of the Act.
I am not meaning to conclude that Robbie is not an Aboriginal child. It is important to be very clear about that. It will be for Robbie to determine, in due course, whether he wishes to embark on his own journey in exploring his ancestry and heritage. In the comprehensive Family History Report, Mr Dauth himself notes that failure to identify an Aboriginal family connection may be the result of undocumented family relationships, lost or incomplete records, or other uncertainties and limitations common in genealogical research.
However, for the purpose of these proceedings, I make the following determinations:
For the purpose of s 34 of the Act, the Secretary had made reasonable inquiries as to whether Robbie is an Aboriginal child.
For the purpose of s 4 of the Act, there was insufficient evidence to find that Robbie is an Aboriginal child within the meaning of ss 4(1)–(2) of the Act.
Emily also considers that birth family contact will allow Robbie to grow into adulthood without unhealthy fantasies or idealisations of his birth family and will enable Robbie to see and hear first-hand some of the reasons why he was initially brought into care.
Emily considers the current level of in-person contact with Grace is appropriate and says that she will be guided by Robbie’s wishes as he grows older. Should Robbie wish to increase the level of his engagement or contact with Grace, including by way phone calls or gifts then Emily will facilitate this provided it is safe for Robbie to do so.
Emily has maintained the personal items given by Grace to Robbie when he was younger, including a baby blanket and teddy bear, and will continue to do so. There are also photographs of Robbie with Grace in Robbie’s bedroom which are labelled “Mummy Grace”.
Similarly, if Robbie’s birth father is identified in the future, then Emily would be open to, and encouraging of, Robbie being introduced to him with the potential for regular contact provided it is safe for Robbie to do so.
I have no doubt Emily will continue to make great efforts to foster and nurture Robbie’s relationship with his maternal family so that he enters adulthood with a firm sense of identity and can navigate the inherent complexities of life with connection to at least one side of his biological heritage.
Robbie’s most secure and loving relationship is with Emily. Robbie enjoys a close and affectionate relationship with Emily, who he refers to as “Mummy” and “Mama” and clearly considers part of his family. Emily has facilitated a stable and supportive environment that enables Robbie to maintain, where appropriate, connections with his birth family while prioritising his emotional wellbeing. Robbie refers to the home he shares with Emily as “my house”.
Robbie refers to Emily’s parents as “Nanny” and “Pop” respectively. Robbie clearly sees himself as an integral part of Emily’s broader family unit.
I am satisfied that:
the birth father’s consent can be dispensed with under s 67(1)(a) of the Act as the birth father cannot be found after reasonable inquiry; and
it is clearly in Robbie’s best interests to dispense with the birth father’s consent in accordance with s 8(2) of the Act.
There is no signed instrument of consent for Grace in regard to Robbie’s adoption by Emily in circumstances where Grace actively opposes the application. I am satisfied that Grace has been served with the requisite documents and is on notice of the application to make a consent dispense order.
Sections 67(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act make clear that I may not make a consent dispense order unless I am satisfied that Robbie has established a stable relationship with Emily as his authorised carer, and that adoption by Emily will promote the welfare of Robbie. I must not make any consent dispense order unless I am satisfied that to do so would be in Robbie’s best interests: s 67(2) of the Act.
For the reasons outlined above, I am satisfied as to these matters. Robbie has lived with Emily for the vast majority of his life, since he was ten months old. He is secure and comfortable in her care and shares a strong, affectionate relationship with her. Robbie clearly views Emily as his “Mummy” or “Mama” and considers himself part of the Connolly family unit. In the s 91 Report, Ms Zhu stated:
Grace does not consent to the proposed change to Robbie’s surname. Grace believes that it is in Robbie’s best interests to keep his current surname, maintaining Robbie’s connection with her and with his broader maternal family.
I am satisfied that the proposed name change is in Robbie’s best interests. The proposed name change gives formal legal recognition to the family life he shares with Emily while maintaining his connection with his birth family. The inclusion of both middle names is a compromise between the respective positions of Emily and Grace on that issue with the result that each has contributed a middle name which reflects an important aspect of their respective relationships with Robbie. I consider that Robbie sharing Emily’s surname will contribute meaningfully to his sense of identity, stability and belonging as he grows older.
Taking all these matters into account, I am satisfied that the proposed change of name to “Robbie Jackson Pierrot Connolly” is in Robbie’s best interests and should be approved.
Emily agrees to provide Grace with news and information about Robbie (including photographs and redacted school reports), both during and prior to any face-to-face contact visits.
Emily agrees to facilitate the sharing of cards, letters, photographs and gifts as between Grace and Robbie.
Emily agrees to consider any cultural requests made by Grace in the future. Emily agrees to help Robbie learn about his culture in the event any new or additional information is provided that supports Robbie being identified as part of a part of a particular cultural group.
In accordance with s 90(2) of the Act, I consider that the arrangements proposed in the maternal adoption plan are in Robbie’s best interests and proper in the circumstances, and that the maternal adoption plan should be registered.