The Adoption of Henry (a pseudonym) [2023] NSWSC 939

Supreme Court of NSW|2023-08-03|Before: Stevenson J

JUDGMENT

By Amended Summons filed on 24 March 2023, "Sally" and "Liam" (the "Proposed Adoptive Parents") seek an order for the adoption of "Henry" in their favour. Sally is the biological mother of Henry.
Henry is currently subject to an adoption order made by the Family Division of the Magistrates Court at Suva, Fiji, on 17 April 2012 ("the Fijian Adoption Order") in favour of Sally's parents, "Amelia" and "William" (the "Maternal Grandparents").
The reason for this is that in late 2011, Amelia was offered an opportunity to work at UNSW in Australia and for the family to relocate. However, Sally needed to finish her law studies in Fiji so Henry was adopted by the Maternal Grandparents, which allowed him to move to Australia. Upon completion of her studies, Sally moved to Australia in 2015.
The Proposed Adoptive Parents have been in a relationship since June 2016 and married since December 2021.
Notwithstanding the Fijian Adoption Order, Henry has continuously resided with the Proposed Adoptive Parents since 2017 and, on 16 December 2022, Henry, and the Proposed Adoptive Parents relocated from New South Wales to the Northern Territory, where the Maternal Grandparents now reside.
Because of the unusual circumstances of this case, I invited the Secretary, New South Wales Department of Communities and Justice, to intervene. I am very grateful for the assistance I have received from the Secretary and, in particular, from Ms Dart of counsel who appeared for the Secretary and provided very helpful submissions.

The requirements of the Act

I may make an order for adoption in favour of a couple jointly even where one of the proposed adoptive parents is a birth parent. [6]
By reason of the Fijian Adoption Order, Sally is technically Henry's sister. Sally is thus a "relative" of Henry.
Section 29 of the Act provides that, in that circumstance I must not make an adoption order in her favour unless: 1. The Maternal Grandparents, as the persons presently having parental responsibility for Henry (under the Fijian Adoption Order) have given their specific consent to the adoption of Henry by Sally; [7] 2. Henry has established a relationship of at least two years' duration with Sally; [8] and 3. I am satisfied that the making of the adoption order is clearly preferable in the best interest of Henry to any other action could be taken by law in relation to Henry. [9]
As Liam is a step parent of Henry, I must not make an adoption order in his favour unless the further requirements of s 30 of the Act are satisfied, namely that: 1. Henry is at least five years old; [10] 2. Liam has lived with Henry and Sally for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately before the application of the adoption order; [11] and 3. The Maternal Grandparents have given their specific consent to the adoption of Henry by Liam. [12]
I am comfortably satisfied about each of these matters.
Henry is now 12 years old and has lived with the Proposed Adoptive Parents continuously at least over five years. He has, obviously, established a relationship of at least 2 years with Sally.
The Maternal Grandparents have both provided the requisite specific consents.
As I set out below, I am satisfied that the making of the adoption order is clearly preferable in the best interests of Henry to any other action that could be taken by law, such that s 30(1)(d) of the Act is satisfied.
I am satisfied that the requirements of ss 29 and 30 of the Act have been complied with and I am entitled to proceed with considering making an adoption order under s 28 of the Act. [13]
Section 28(1) of the Act provides two persons, who are a couple, may adopt child only if "both of them are resident or domiciled" in New South Wales.
The Proposed Adoptive Parents were resident in New South Wales at the time of the filing of the Summons [14] but, as I have set out above, relocated to the Northern Territory last December.
A couple may only "adopt a child" by making an application under the Act to do so. In those circumstances, I read the requirement of residence or domicile in s 28 as applying as at the date of such application, consistently with the requirement in s 23 that the Court must not make an adoption order unless the applicants for adoption reside or are domiciled in New South Wales.
This is consistent with the view expressed by Hallen J in Re the Adoption of CCS and FLS: [15] "… It would not be consistent, or harmonious, for the legislature to have provided for a requirement of proof of residence or domicile of the proposed adoptive parents for jurisdictional purposes, being at the time of the filing of the Summons (in s 23(3) of the Act), whilst when dealing with the "basic requirements" for a couple seeking to adopt a child, requiring proof of their residence or domicile at the time of the making of an adoption order. …"
Section 28 also requires that, in the case of adoption by a couple, each must be 21 years or more and 18 years older than the child and have been living together continuously for no less than 2 years immediately before the making of the application for adoption. [16] Those requirements are satisfied here.
Section 28 also requires that I be satisfied that the Proposed Adoptive Parents are of good repute and fit and proper persons to fulfil the responsibility of parents. [17]
Ms Sarah Collett filed an Affidavit Annexing Court Report in these proceedings, pursuant to s 91 of the Act, noting, amongst other topics, that the Proposed Adoptive Parents are of good health, have a strong commitment to prioritising familiar bonds and relationships, and share the same cultural values. I am satisfied that the Proposed Adoptive Parents are of good repute and are capable of fulfilling the responsibilities of parents, as both already exercise this role with Henry.

Henry's consent

As Henry is now 12, he is capable of giving his consent to his proposed adoption. He has done so.
Henry has been counselled by Registered Adoption Counsellor Ms Christine Wynd pursuant to s 63 of the Act. Ms Wynd has certified that Henry understands the effect of signing the instrument of consent, [18] stating: From the information discussed, I formed the view that Henry is capable of understanding the legal and emotional effect of signing the instrument of consent. Henry was clear in his desire to be adopted by [the Proposed Adoptive Parents]. I have no concerns about Henry's capacity to consent to his own adoption.
In these circumstances, Henry has provided his formal consent to his own adoption in favour of the Proposed Adoptive Parents under s 55 of the Act.
I am satisfied that the requirements of ss 28 and 30 of the Act have been made out so as to allow me to consider making an order for adoption in accordance with the "best interests" principles under the Act. [19]

The "best interests" principles under the Act

As I have set out above, I must not make an adoption order unless satisfied that the best interests of Henry will be promoted by the adoption and that, as far as practicable and having regard to his age and understanding, his wishes and feelings have been ascertained and due consideration given to them. [20]
When considering making a decision about the adoption of a child, I must have regard to the best interests of the child, both in childhood and later life (this being the paramount consideration). [21] I must also have regard to the principles stated in the Act that adoption is to be regarded as a service for the child, [22] and that no adult has a right to adopt the child. [23]
In determining the best interests of a child, I must have regard to the matters set forth in s 8(2) of the Act including, relevantly:

any wishes expressed by the child;
the child's age, maturity, and level of understanding;
the child's physical, emotional, and educational needs;
the wishes expressed by the parents;
the nature of the relationship that the child has with his or her parents and any siblings or significant other people;
the attitude of the proposed adoptive parents to the responsibilities of parenthood; and
the nature of the relationship of the child with the proposed adoptive parents.

Henry has expressed his wishes to be adopted and understands the legal effect of these proceedings. The Proposed Adoptive Parents both wish for Henry to be their adoptive child so as to recognise the existing parent-child relationships and maintain the strong established bond they share as a family. Henry maintains a strong and healthy relationship with the Proposed Adoptive Parents, unsurprisingly as Sally is his birth mother, as well as with the Maternal Grandparents, and I am satisfied Henry will continue to do so after the orders are made.
I may not make an order for adoption unless satisfied that the making of such an order is "clearly preferable" in the best interests of Henry than any other action that could be taken by law in relation to the care of Henry. [24]
I must therefore be satisfied that there is more than a slight preponderance of considerations in favour of adoption over other alternatives. The making of an adoption order must be obviously, plainly or manifestly preferable to any other action that could be taken by law. [25] I must achieve the degree of conviction in favour of adoption commensurate with the gravity of the decision. [26]
If I were to make no order, Henry would remain as an adopted child of his Maternal Grandparents, despite living with the Proposed Adoptive Parents. This would mean that the Proposed Adoptive Parents would be unable to make significant decisions concerning Henry, which decisions would require the approval of the Maternal Grandparents.
An order allocating parental responsibility for Henry to the Proposed Adoptive Parents would alleviate some of the disadvantages of taking no step, but would remain a temporary order that would expire when Henry attains 18 years of age and would fail to recognise the strength of the family bond.
Thus, making no order, or making an order for parental responsibility, would lack the certainty and permanency of an adoption order, and would fail to recognise the parent-child relationships that currently exist.
Additionally, Ms Collett recommended adoption in her report, stating: An Order of Adoption is considered the most appropriate permanent order for [Henry]. [Liam] has been actively involved in [Henry's] life since [Henry] was five years old with [Henry] strongly identifying him as his father. Although [Henry] was adopted by his maternal grandparents, he has always understood that [Sally] is his mother. Following adoption, [Sally] has remained consistently connected to Henry, with she and [Liam] assuming his full-time care in early 2018. … The writer recommends that an Order of Adoption be granted for [Henry] in respect of his birth mother, [Sally] and his stepfather, [Liam]. An Order of Adoption is considered to be in [Henry's] best interests, as it will formally recognise the parent-child relationships that are already in existence between [Henry] and his birth mother and stepfather.
In this case, I think it obvious that Henry's best interests require that he remain in the care of the Proposed Adoptive Parents and that the making of an adoption order is clearly preferable to any other action that could be taken by law.

Effect of adoption order under the Act on the Fijian Adoption Order

Section 96(1) provides that on the making of an adoption order: "… the previous adoption of the child "whether effected under the law of New South Wales or otherwise) ceases to have effect". [27]
Thus, although an adoption order will not be discharged in the absence of fraud, duress, impropriety or exceptional circumstances, [28] and although adoption orders are usually intended to bring about a permanent change to the legal status of those involved, the plain reading of s 96 shows that: 1. a subsequent adoption order can be made notwithstanding the fact that the child is already the subject of an adoption order, including one made outside New South Wales; 2. the effect of a subsequent adoption order is of the former order ceases to have effect; and 3. a discharge of the former order is not a precondition to the making of a subsequent adoption order.
In this case, all that is necessary for the Court to do is to make an order for the adoption of Henry by the Proposed Adoptive Parents. It will follow from the making of that order that the Fijian Adoption Order will cease to have effect.
Thus, upon the making of this adoption order, the sole parental responsibility and legal rights of Henry will pass to the Proposed Adoptive Parents, and the Fijian Adoption Order in favour of the Maternal Grandparents will cease to have effect.

Proposed name change

It is proposed that, on the making of an adoption order, Henry is to have the surname of his step father, to reflect Liam as Henry's father figure.
I am satisfied that this is in the best interests of Henry as it will recognise and strengthen the connection Henry has with Liam as his adoptive and step father, while retaining his connection to his birth family and identity.

Conclusion

For those reasons, on 9 August 2023, I made the orders sought by the plaintiffs.

Endnotes

Section 116(1)(b) of the Act.
Section 116(2)(a) of the Act.
Section 116(2)(b) of the Act.
Section 116(2)(c) of the Act.
[2014] NSWSC 1950 at [17]; and see footnote 28 of Practice Note SC Eq 13.
Section 28(5) of the Act.
Sections 29(a) and 53(b) of the Act.
Section 29(b) of the Act.
Section 29(c) of the Act.
Section 30(1)(a) of the Act.
Section 30(1)(b) of the Act.
Section 30(1)(c) of the Act.
Section 28(2) of the Act.
And thus satisfied the requirements of s 23(2) that Henry be present in New South Wales and that the Proposed Adoptive Parents reside in or be domiciled in New South Wales on that date.
[2019] NSWSC 71 at [55].
Section 28(3)(a) and (4) of the Act.
Section 28(1)(b) of the Act.
Section 61 of the Act.
Sections 8 and 90 of the Act.
Section 90(1)(a) and (b) of the Act.
Section 8(1)(a) of the Act.
Section 8(1)(b) of the Act.
Section 8(1)(c) of the Act.
Section 90(3) of the Act.
Adoption of RCC and RZA [2015] NSWSC 813 at [14] (Brereton J, as his Honour then was).
Application of A - re D [2006] NSWSC 1056 at [53] (Palmer J); Adoption of BL [2018] NSWSC 391 at [13] (Sackar J).
Section 96(1)(b) of the Act.
Section 93(4) of the Act.

Amendments 17 August 2023 - Insertion of parenthesis in [2] DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 17 August 2023

(Fiji) Adoption Regulation 2015(NSW)

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (10 paragraphs)

Legislation Cited (3)

Cases Cited (6)

Cited By (1)