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[2026] NSWSC 547
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-05-19
Brereton J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: The Adoption of Eliza (a pseudonym) [2026] NSWSC 547
Hearing dates: On the papers
Date of orders: 19 May 2026
Decision date: 19 May 2026
Jurisdiction: Equity - Adoptions List
Before: Brereton J
Decision: Adoption orders to be made
Catchwords: CHILD WELFARE – adoption – whether adoption order is clearly preferable in best interests of the child – whether change of name should be approved – whether consent dispensation orders should be made against the birth parents – where birth mother does not oppose adoption – where birth father cannot be identified after reasonable inquiry – where child has lived with proposed adoptive parent since birth – where it is appropriate to dispense with the requirement for the birth parents’ consent – change of name to be approved – adoption orders to be made
Legislation Cited: Adoption Act 2000 (NSW)
Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998
Cases Cited: Adoption of JLK and CRK [2017] NSWSC 7
Adoption of NG [2014] NSWSC 680
Adoption of RCC and RZA [2015] NSWSC 813
Adoption of Taylor-Clay [2019] NSWSC 27
Application of A - re D [2006] NSWSC 1056
In re W (A Child) (Adoption: Grandparents’ Competing Claim) [2016] EWCA Civ 793
Re DYK and the Adoption Act 2000 [2005] NSWSC 1045
Re K and the Adoption Act 2000 [2005] NSWSC 858
Texts Cited: N.A.
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Secretary, New South Wales Department of Communities and Justice (plaintiff)
Representation: Solicitors:
New South Wales Department of Communities and Justice (plaintiff)
File Number(s): 2025/444409
Publication restriction: This judgment has been anonymised pursuant to s 180 of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW)
These reasons concern an application for the adoption of a child who I will call ‘Eliza’, aged 11 years old, in favour of ‘Rebecca’, aged 51 years old.
By summons filed on 13 November 2025, the Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice (‘Secretary’) seeks the following orders:
that pursuant to s 67(1)(d) of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW) (‘the Adoption Act’), the Court dispense with the consent of Eliza’s birth mother, who I will call ‘Jane’;
that pursuant to s 67(1)(a) of the Adoption Act, the Court dispense with the requirement for the consent of Eliza’s birth father;
that pursuant to s 88(4) of the Adoption Act, the Court dispense with the requirement to provide notice of the adoption application to Eliza’s birth father;
that pursuant to s 23 of the Adoption Act, an order be made for the adoption of Eliza in favour of the adopting parent, Rebecca;
that pursuant to s 101(1) of the Adoption Act, an order approving the proposed names for the child;
that pursuant to s 50(1) and 50(3) of the Adoption Act, an order that the adoption plan dated 10 November 2025 be registered; and
that pursuant to s 194(2) of the Adoption Act, leave be granted to provide a copy of the Registered Adoption Plan, which the Court has found to be in Eliza’s best interest, to Jane.
For the reasons set out below, I propose to grant the relief sought by the summons.
Eliza was born in New South Wales in mid-2014. Eliza’s birth mother, as registered on her birth certificate, is Jane. No father is identified on her birth certificate. The identity of her father is unknown.
The Department received a risk of harm report in relation to unborn Eliza arising from concerns about her mother’s incarceration for possession of stolen goods and drug use. A high-risk birth alert was issued in relation to Eliza.
On the day she was born, following pre-natal casework and support, the Department assessed that Eliza was at risk of serious harm and that it was in her best interests not to be placed in her mother’s care in light of her drug use. Two of Eliza’s maternal siblings had been removed from Jane’s care in 2012 by order of the Children’s Court in light of concerns around drug use, neglect and exposure to domestic violence. The Department assumed Eliza into care. She has never been returned to Jane’s care.
The Department filed an application and report initiating care proceedings in the Children’s Court in relation to Eliza in September 2014.
In September 2014, the Children’s Court made interim orders allocating parental responsibility for Eliza to the Minister. In October 2014, the Children’s Court made a finding that Eliza was a child in need of care and protection pursuant to s 71 of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW).
Eliza was initially placed with short term carers, proposed adoptive parent Rebecca and her then-partner, ‘Alison’. At that time Eliza’s care was managed by Barnardos. Case management for Eliza has since transitioned to Challenge Community Services (‘Challenge’).
It was proposed that Eliza required a permanent placement. Her maternal grandmother and grandfather expressed interest but were concerned about their long-term ability to care for Eliza. They withdrew their application to care for Eliza.
In December 2015, the Secretary filed a report on the suitability of arrangements concerning parental responsibility for Eliza pursuant to the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act. It was noted that Eliza’s short-term carers, Rebecca and Alison, had expressed their desire to become long-term authorised carers. Rebecca and Alison had been advised by Barnardos that they had not met the criteria required to provide permanent care for Eliza due to their financial situation.
Rebecca and Alison appealed Barnardos’ decision in the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal. In October 2015, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal ordered that Barnardos’ decision was to be set aside. Eliza’s case manager noted at the time that Eliza appears to be happy and healthy while meeting developmental milestones.
Rebecca and Alison filed an application in the Children’s Court seeking joint parental responsibility for Eliza until Eliza attained 18 years, while being placed under the supervision of the Secretary for 12 months. The Children’s Court made final orders in April 2015, and again with the addition of extra reports in June 2016, allocating parental responsibility for Eliza to the Minister until she attains the age of 18 years pursuant to the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act.
Rebecca is 51 years old and an authorised carer for Eliza under out-of-home care arrangements within the meaning of s 67(1)(f) of the Adoption Act. Alison was at one stage a second proposed adoptive parent of Eliza. Rebecca and Alison ended their relationship in early 2016, and Alison stopped providing care to Eliza at that time. Alison ceased to be an authorised carer of Eliza in July 2016. Rebecca has one child from this relationship, ‘Michael’, who is the proposed adoptive sibling for Eliza. In December 2016, Rebecca commenced a relationship with ‘Louise’, who commenced providing care for Eliza jointly with Rebecca. Rebecca and Louise married. The Department invited both Rebecca and Louise to adopt Eliza pursuant to s 45D of the Adoption Act. Louise passed away in May 2021, and Rebecca is now the sole adoptive applicant for Eliza.
The formal requirements of the Adoption Act have been satisfied, namely:
Jane has been served with sufficient notice of the application for adoption orders (s 88(1)(a));
Eliza was present in New South Wales when the proceedings were commenced (s 23(2)(a));
Rebecca was resident and domiciled in New South Wales when the proceedings were commenced (s 27(1)(a));
a report regarding Eliza’s proposed adoption has been provided to the Court by an ‘independent assessor’ (s 91(1));
Rebecca is of good repute and is a fit and proper person to fulfil the responsibilities of a parent (s 27(1)(b)); and
Rebecca has been selected in accordance with the Adoption Act (s 90(1)(c)).
In making my decision, I must have regard (as far as practicable and appropriate) to the principles set out in s 8(1) of the Adoption Act, including that adoption must be regarded as a service for the child, and not as a right of the adult with whom they are placed. The paramount consideration in any decision concerning the adoption of a child is what is in the best interests of the child, during childhood as well as later in life.
An adoption order for Eliza cannot be made unless I am satisfied that her best interests will be promoted through her adoption to Rebecca, and that, as far as practicable and having regard to Eliza’s age and understanding, her wishes and feelings have been fully ascertained and proper attention has been given to them in the circumstances: s 90(1) of the Adoption Act.
In considering what is in Eliza’s best interests, I have had regard to the matters outlined in s 8(2) of the Adoption Act, relevantly:
Eliza’s wishes;
Eliza’s age, maturity, level of understanding, gender, background, family relationships and any other characteristics that I considered relevant;
Eliza’s physical, emotional and educational needs, including her sense of personal, familial and cultural identity;
any wishes expressed by Jane in relation to Eliza;
the relationship that Eliza has with Jane, her maternal siblings and significant other people in her life;
Rebecca’s attitude towards Eliza and the responsibilities that are associated with parenthood;
the nature of the relationship that Eliza has formed with Rebecca;
the suitability and capacity of Rebecca to provide for Eliza’s needs, including those of an emotional and intellectual nature; and
the need to protect Eliza from physical or psychological harm caused, or that may be caused, by being subjected or exposed to abuse, ill-treatment, violence or other behaviour, or being present while a third person is subjected or exposed to abuse, ill-treatment, violence or other behaviour; and
any alternatives to the making of an adoption order and the likely effect of such an order on Eliza.
In assessing Eliza’s best interests, a judicial evaluation must consider these varying factors in turn. For the reasons outlined below, the evaluation points strongly in favour of Eliza’s adoption.
Eliza has consistently expressed a desire to be adopted by Rebecca and, in doing so, ‘officially’ become Michael’s sibling and Rebecca’s daughter. She has also expressly articulated her wish to have the same surname as Rebecca and Michael. While Eliza does not yet have the capacity to fully understand the legal implications of an adoption order, she is excited by the prospect of her own adoption.
I am confident that Rebecca will provide Eliza with the care, love and attention she deserves. The evidence demonstrates Rebecca’s ability to provide a high level of care to Eliza, addressing her physical, emotional and educational needs consistently and thoughtfully. She has developed a strong relationship with Rebecca over the years, referring to her as ‘Mum’. The evidence also shows that, as Eliza develops, Rebecca has clearly provided her with a safe space to have challenging conversations and to approach them gently. Eliza is aware of the challenges her birth mother has faced and there are plans for how further details about her birth family will be provided for her personal development.
I must consider any concerns around Eliza’s care, including as they relate to Rebecca’s suitability as an authorised carer applying for adoption of Eliza: Adoption Act s 45F; Adoption Regulations 2015 (NSW) cl 59. To that end, I have reviewed material provided by Challenge and the Department, including a risk assessment dated March 2017 and subsequent material which resulted in Eliza’s proposed adoption process being placed on hold pending investigation. The Department considered information concerning the alleged behaviour of individuals residing with Eliza and the consequences that might have on her development. Ultimately, the material indicates that the investigation did not substantiate concerns raised.
Challenge and the Department recommend Rebecca as Eliza’s adoptive parent. I consider the recommendation to be well-founded. It is pertinent that the earlier concerns prompted appropriate intervention and support, including a Therapeutic Intervention Plan to assist with Eliza’s care. The current material indicates improved and stable circumstances. I am satisfied that Rebecca is a suitable prospective adoptive parent for Eliza.
Separately, Rebecca’s current medical needs have been considered by caseworkers in their assessment of Eliza’s living situation. Rebecca has indicated that her mother, ‘Jill’, provides additional parental support where necessary. I do not consider Rebecca’s diagnosis to be a factor that would prevent Rebecca from providing sufficient care for Eliza.
Rebecca has demonstrated proactivity in maintaining Eliza’s overall health. Eliza has some complex health and developmental needs. Rebecca has continuously shown that she is willing and able to meet all of Eliza’s medical and developmental needs.
Rebecca is prepared for the financial costs of Eliza’s upbringing, including her medical conditions, in conjunction with NDIS support. She has stated that she is prepared for the prospect of losing agency financial support. Rebecca has consistently demonstrated a positive attitude in relation to the responsibilities associated with Eliza’s upbringing.
The evidence shows that Rebecca has, thoughtfully and consistently, arranged and facilitated family time visits between Eliza and her birth family since she was placed in her care. She placed Eliza’s needs at the forefront when arranging family time visits, basing them on her requests and preferences. Rebecca understands the crucial importance of Eliza maintaining authentic relationships with her birth family and I am confident that they will continue to do so in the event an adoption order is made.
In relation to cultural heritage which I must consider under s 32 of the Adoption Act, Eliza is Anglo-Australian and inherited a Church of England faith. Neither the maternal family nor the proposed adoptive family actively practice their Church of England religion.
The adoption is supported by an adoption report. Strong referee affidavits in support of Rebecca have also been filed.
Eliza has a positive relationship with her maternal sibling, ‘Stuart’, who resides with Jane. Stuart often participates in family time with Eliza when that occurs. Eliza’s other maternal siblings, ‘Natalie’ and ‘Grace’, also engage in family time with Eliza but reside separately to Jane.
Eliza has additional relationships with her maternal grandfather, ‘Thomas’ and ‘Helena’, her maternal aunt. Extended family events provide an opportunity for connection between Eliza and these family members. Thomas and Helena are also able to attend organised family time with Jane, Rebecca and Eliza.
In accordance with Eliza’s wishes and best interests, Rebecca has demonstrated commitment to helping Eliza continue these relationships.
In my assessment of Eliza’s best interests, I must consider the relationship that Eliza has formed with Jane and any views that Jane has regarding Eliza’s adoption, as Eliza’s birth mother.
Jane has not formally consented to Eliza’s adoption for these proceedings under ss 52 and 61 of the Adoption Act. She has stated she is supportive of Eliza’s adoption, noting that while she wished she could care for Eliza, Eliza has a strong relationship with her proposed adoptive parent, and adoption would bring Eliza added stability. Jane signed Eliza’s adoption plan in September 2025.
Eliza has a generally positive relationship with Jane. Eliza spends time with Jane and occasionally other members of her birth family at a frequency arranged with Rebecca. Jane is of the view that, provided she maintains her ability to see Eliza, adoption with Rebecca is positive as the individual who has cared for her since she was born.
As stated above, the identity of Eliza’s birth father remains unknown.
I cannot make an order for adoption unless I am satisfied that the making of that order is clearly preferable, in Eliza’s best interests, to any other action which could be taken by law in relation to her care: s 90(3) of the Adoption Act. This involves identifying the likely impacts of an adoption order and examining the positive and negative factors associated with each cause of action: Adoption of NG [2014] NSWSC 680 at [74]. I must achieve the degree of conviction in favour of this adoption commensurate with the gravity of the decision that is being made: Application of A - re D [2006] NSWSC 1056; 36 Fam LR 142 at [53]. Additionally, I must be satisfied that there is more than a “slight preponderance” of considerations in favour of Eliza’s adoption over the other available alternatives: Adoption of RCC and RZA [2015] NSWSC 813 at [14].
The Secretary identified the following alternatives to making an adoption order:
(a) no order and maintain the status quo, which is that Eliza remains under the parental responsibility of the Minister until she is 18 years of age; (b) an order allocating parental responsibility to Rebecca pursuant to s 92 of the Adoption Act; or (c) an order allocating parental responsibility to one of the birth parents pursuant to s 92 of the Adoption Act, noting that paternity is not currently confirmed for Eliza.
An order for adoption is clearly preferable and in the best interests of Eliza. If I were to make no order, Eliza would continue as a ward of the state until she reaches the age of 18. This would also mean that Rebecca would not be able to make any significant decisions regarding Eliza without the approval of the Minister. It would also mean that Eliza would not be recognised as part of Rebecca’s family in the eyes of the law.
An order maintaining parental responsibility for Eliza with Rebecca would address some of the disadvantages associated with taking no steps at all, but this would be a temporary order that would expire when Eliza reaches the age of 18. In the meantime, the Minister and relevant caseworkers would continue their involvement in the decision-making process for Eliza. Eliza would still lose her legal connection to her psychological family when she reaches 18 years of age.
Making no order would lack the certainty and permanency of an adoption order. This would also potentially expose Eliza to being stigmatised from the fact that she would continue to be a ‘foster child’, rather than living in a family that is legally recognised as her own.
Eliza has never been in the care of her mother, and her paternity has not been confirmed. Entrusting her in the care of a biological parent would not be in her best interests.
In this case, an adoption order would deliver clear benefits over the alternative options, including the provision of a secure, stable and reliable lifetime placement for Eliza with Rebecca: In re W (A Child) (Adoption: Grandparents’ Competing Claim) [2017] 1 WLR 889; [2016] EWCA Civ 793 at [64]. An order for adoption would also serve Eliza’s identity needs, in circumstances where she is emotionally, psychologically and residentially already a beloved member of her proposed adoptive family, with Rebecca and Michael, bringing her legal status into conformity with reality and perfecting her sense of permanent belonging in the family which she identifies with as her own, not only during childhood but for life: Adoption of Taylor-Clay [2019] NSWSC 27 at [58].
The evidence clearly indicates that Eliza is eager to become a permanent and legally recognised member of Rebecca’s family. Eliza has lived with Rebecca for the substantive entirety of her life, and it is in her best interests to continue to have a stable home environment. An adoption order would provide Eliza with a sense of permanency and belonging that would not be provided by rehoming Eliza or locating alternative adoptive parents.
While the adoption order is likely to strengthen Eliza’s connection and relationship with Michael, I am satisfied that an adoption order is unlikely to have a negative impact on Eliza’s future relationships with her biological siblings. In the context of open adoption, the sibling bond can be fostered in the absence of a legal relationship, and the adoption plan plays a crucial role in maximising the opportunities for these relationships to remain intact: Adoption of JLK and CRK [2017] NSWSC 7 at [92]. The adoption plan contemplates consistent contact arrangements between Eliza and her maternal siblings.
I am satisfied that, when compared to the available alternatives, an adoption order is firmly in Eliza’s best interests and is the clearly preferable option.
Unless the Court dispenses with the requirement, the consent of Eliza’s birth mother and father to the adoption is required: s 52 of the Adoption Act. The plaintiff seeks orders dispensing with the requirement for consent by Eliza’s birth parents. The circumstances which give the Court power to dispense with consent are addressed in s 67 of the Adoption Act.
In relation to Eliza’s birth father, I must be satisfied that, after reasonable inquiry, Eliza’s birth father cannot be found or identified: s 67(1)(a). I must also be satisfied that dispensing with Eliza’s birth father’s consent is in her best interests: s 67(2). In Re K and the Adoption Act 2000 [2005] NSWSC 858, White J stated at [22] that “reasonable inquiry” in relation to s 67(1)(a) of the Adoption Act must be evaluated from the perspective of the applicant and also the person whose consent would otherwise be required. In Re DYK and the Adoption Act 2000 [2005] NSWSC 1045, Brereton J made orders that dispensed with the consent of the child’s birth parents due to the limited capacity of the applicant to make any further inquiries regarding the child’s birth parents.
In May 2014, Jane told the Department that ‘Robert’ was Eliza’s biological father but indicated there were three potential fathers. Robert confirmed with the Department in October 2014 that he believed he was the father and confirmed he would undertake DNA testing. He has since refused to undertake DNA testing multiple times, and has made it clear to the Department that he is not able to undertake carer responsibilities for Eliza. In any event, Police records indicate Robert has a history with possession of dangerous weapons, aggressive behaviour and drug use which would impact any organised engagement with Eliza. He has been recorded as an individual no longer to be contacted by the Department. Despite lengthy efforts by the Department and Challenge between 2014 and 2024, Eliza’s paternity has been unable to be determined.
I am satisfied that all reasonable inquiries to identify Eliza’s birth father have been undertaken. Without any further information, Challenge is restricted in its capacity to conduct any further testing. In my view, there is nothing further that can reasonably be done at present to identify Eliza’s birth father.
I am satisfied that:
it is not necessary for notice of the consent dispense order to be given to the birth father (see s 72(1) and s 72(2)(a) of the Adoption Act);
it is appropriate to dispense with the requirement to give the birth father notice of the application: s 88(4) of the Adoption Act; and
the Court can and should dispense with the need for consent of Eliza’s birth father to the adoption.
Jane was provided with information on adoption and related materials in May 2020, and again in June 2023. She was provided with notice of the application for the adoption order and related materials on 27 November 2025, and has thus been given 14 days’ notice of the application pursuant to s 88(1) of the Adoption Act. Jane signed Eliza’s adoption plan in September 2025.
I cannot make a consent dispense order under s 67(1)(d) of the Adoption Act unless I am satisfied that Eliza has established a stable relationship with Rebecca, and that the adoption by Rebecca will promote Eliza’s welfare. I must also be satisfied that to dispense with Jane’s consent would be in Eliza’s best interests: Adoption Act s 67(2).
It is by no means a straightforward decision for the Court to dispense with the consent of the birth parents to the adoption of their child by the proposed adoptive parents where the adoption is opposed. This is a serious step and it is not to be taken lightly: see for example, Adoption of RCC and RZA at [17]. Nevertheless, I am satisfied that I should dispense with the requirement for Jane’s consent in relation to Eliza’s adoption.
Eliza has clearly formed a strong and stable relationship with Rebecca and her adoption by them will clearly promote her welfare in both the short and long term. I am also satisfied that the making of consent dispense orders is in Eliza’s best interests. Jane has had notice of the application for adoption and the application to dispense with her consent. Jane has expressed a belief that adoption is the best course of action for Eliza. I am satisfied that residing with Jane or her putative father are not prospects that are in Eliza’s interests. Her interests are overwhelmingly supported by the proposed adoption.
The Secretary has prepared an adoption plan pursuant to s 46 of the Adoption Act which includes provisions for the means and nature of contact between Eliza and her birth and psychological family. The contact arrangements concern Eliza, Jane, Eliza’s maternal siblings and extended maternal family. The adoption plan allows Eliza to have direct input with respect to her contact arrangements with her birth family as she ages.
The question that I must address is whether the proposed adoption plan is in Eliza’s best interests and is proper in the circumstances: Adoption Act s 90(2). The Secretary seeks an order that this adoption plan be registered.
Although Jane has not provided her formal consent to Eliza’s proposed adoption to Rebecca, she has signed the proposed adoption plan. The Secretary provided Jane with the opportunity to participate in the development of, and agree to, the adoption plan pursuant to s 46(2A) of the Adoption Act.
There is no evidence before me to indicate that Jane, or any other person, is challenging the proposed contact arrangements in the adoption plan.
The adoption plan proposes 3 face-to-face visits annually for a minimum duration of two hours between Jane and Eliza. Eliza’s maternal siblings, grandfather and aunt are permitted to attend these visits.
Family time visits between Eliza, her maternal siblings Grace, Natalie and Stuart, and her maternal grandfather Thomas, are provided for separately. Family time between Eliza and each individual is proposed as 3 face-to-face visits annually for a minimum duration of two hours. These visits can occur in conjunction with Eliza’s family time with Jane.
Family time visits between Eliza, her maternal aunt Helena, Helena’s partner and their children are also provided for in the adoption plan. It is proposed that 3 face-to-face visits per year, for a minimum duration of two hours, will occur.
Telephone, video or text message communications are also provided for in the adoption plan for each of Eliza’s birth family members. These occur as requested by Eliza or the family member, and the frequency and duration will be as agreed. Under the adoption plan, Rebecca agrees to continue to communicate with Jane to update her on Eliza’s progress on at least two formal occasions per year and provide photographs, school reports, health reports as well as general updates on Eliza’s progress.
The adoption plan also makes provision for contact with Eliza’s birth father, should paternity be confirmed at a future date. It is a requirement that the putative father undergoes DNA testing, which has been unsuccessful to date, prior to any contact occurring. There is provision made for Rebecca to first meet the putative father prior to arranging any contact with Eliza, should she wish for such contact to occur.
In considering Eliza’s relationship with her birth and psychological family (Adoption Act s 8(2)(f)), alongside her emotional needs and sense of personal, familial and cultural identity (Adoption Act s 8(2)(c)), I am satisfied that the proposed adoption plan is in her best interests and proper in the circumstances. The adoption plan places Eliza’s needs at the forefront and provides for continued contact between Eliza and her birth and psychological family.
I am confident that Rebecca will continue to encourage and arrange contact between Eliza and her birth and psychological family members. They have demonstrated a deep understanding of the important role that these relationships play in Eliza’s sense of self and wellbeing as she develops. Cooperation will be required from all parties to the adoption plan to ensure family time visits are a positive experience for Eliza.
Jane has indicated that she would like Eliza’s adoption plan to be registered for reassurance that she will continue to spend time with Eliza. In light of contact time between Eliza and her birth family proceeding well so far, Rebecca has indicated she does not consider Eliza’s adoption plan in need of registration. She is nevertheless content with registering the adoption plan to provide Jane with the security of future contact with Eliza.
If the adoption plan is registered, this will have the effect, on the making of an adoption order, as if the adoption plan was part of the order: s 50(4) Adoption Act. Therefore, a party to an adoption plan, once registered, can seek to enforce it as an order of the Court.
The Court can review the adoption plan on the application of one or more parties to the plan and make such changes, if any, to the provisions of the adoption plan as it considers appropriate: ss 51(1) and 51(3) Adoption Act.
The Secretary seeks an order, pursuant to s 101 of the Adoption Act, that the Court approves the proposed names of the child.
Before altering Eliza’s name, I must consider any wishes expressed by her and any factors relevant to the weight that should be given to those wishes: Adoption Act s 101(2).
In relation to the altered surname, I am satisfied that this change is in Eliza’s best interests: Adoption Act s 101(5). This proposed change will reflect Eliza’s legal membership to Rebecca’s family, solidifying her sense of belonging and security. This change will also allow Eliza to share a surname with her proposed adoptive sibling, Michael. The evidence shows that Eliza will be comfortable with using this surname, and it is her preference.
There is no evidence that indicates Eliza wishes to alter her given names. She has identified as "Eliza" from birth, and it is important that she retains this name as it is a crucial part of her identity, honouring and preserving her ongoing connection to her birth family.
The adoption orders sought by the Secretary in the summons are in Eliza’s best interests. I will grant the relief in the summons.
I understand that Eliza and Rebecca would like an adoption ceremony. A ceremony will provide an opportunity for Eliza and her family to recognise the significance of the occasion and to celebrate it.
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