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[2026] NSWSC 1180
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-09-29
McGrath J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: The Adoption of Edmund Luigi Andrea Wilmore and Albert Edward Fernand Wilmore [2026] NSWSC 1180
Hearing dates: On the papers
Date of orders: 29 September 2026
Decision date: 29 September 2026
Jurisdiction: Equity - Adoptions List
Before: McGrath J
Decision: Orders for adoption made, maternal and paternal adoption plans in the best interests of the child and proper in the circumstances
Catchwords: CHILD WELFARE — Adoption — where the proposed adoptive parents are the children’s current foster parents — whether adoption order is in the children’s best interests — whether paternal and maternal adoption plans are in the best interests of the child and proper in the circumstances — HELD — adoption order is clearly preferable in the children’s best interests — consent of the birth parent not required to be dispensed with — children have each signed an instrument of consent for their proposed adoption — maternal and paternal adoption plans are in the best interests of the child and proper in the circumstances
Legislation Cited: Adoption Act 2000 (NSW), ss 8, 23, 24, 28, 45F, 46, 50, 54, 55, 59, 63, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 101, 180
Adoption and Children Act 2002 (UK), ss 66(1)(d), 67, 69(4), 74
Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth), s 16(2)(a)–(b)(i)
British Nationality Act 1981 (UK), s 1
Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW), ss 82, 90
Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (29 May 1993)
Adoption Regulation 2015 (NSW), cl 80
Cases Cited: A Child Proposed for Adoption [2019] NSWSC 1653
Adoption of Jing Xue [2026] NSWSC 1049
Adoption of LJK and CRK [2017] NSWSC 7
Adoption of NG (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 680
Adoption of RCC and RZA [2015] NSWSC 813
Director General Department of Human Services; Re M [2011] NSWSC 369
Re B (A Minor) [2001] UKHL 70; [2002] 1 All ER 641
Re B (Adoption: Jurisdiction to Set Aside) [1995] Fam 239
Re the Adoption of AJH [2017] NSWSC 1751
Re the Adoption of CCS and FLS [2019] NSWSC 71
Secretary, New South Wales Department of Family and Community Services v MB [2017] NSWSC 1087
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Secretary, New South Wales Department of Communities and Justice (Plaintiff)
Valentine Beauchamp (also known as Teresa-Abigail Leonora Busoni) (Defendant)
Representation: Solicitors:
New South Wales Crown Solicitor’s Office (Plaintiff)
Neligan Law (Edmund Wilmore)
Phillips Levy Bennett Legal (Albert Wilmore)
Valentine Beauchamp (also known as Teresa-Abigail Leonora Busoni) (Self-represented)
File Number(s): 2025/00392977
Publication restriction: This judgment has been anonymised pursuant to s 180 of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW).
These proceedings concern an application made by summons filed on 9 October 2025 by the Secretary of the New South Wales Department of Communities and Justice (DCJ) seeking that Edmund Luigi Andrea Wilmore (now 18 years of age) and Albert Edward Fernand Wilmore (now 14 years of age) be adopted by the proposed adoptive parents, Renée Madeline Helen Morrel and Gerard Raoul Morrel**,** by an order of this court pursuant to s 23 of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW). Each of Edmund and Albert has consented to his own adoption and expressed his wish to be adopted by Renée and Gerard.
The Secretary further seeks:
an order pursuant to s 101(1) of the Adoption Act for the approval of the name “Wilmore” as the surname and “Edmund Luigi Andrea” as the given names of the child;
an order pursuant to s 101(1) of the Adoption Act for the approval of the name “Wilmore” as the surname and “Albert Edward Fernand” as the given names of the child;
a notation that the court is satisfied by the arrangements proposed in the maternal adoption plan signed by Albert, Edmund, Pierre Lucien Franz Wilmore, Renée and Gerard on 15 February 2026 and by Jennifer McDonald, Acting Principal Officer, Key Assets Australia on 18 February 2026, and that the court finds this maternal adoption plan to be in the best interests of Albert and proper in the circumstances;
a notation that the court is satisfied by the arrangements proposed in the paternal adoption plan signed by Albert, Edmund, Pierre, Renée and Gerard on 15 February 2026 and by Ms McDonald, Acting Principal Officer, Key Assets Australia on 18 February 2026, and that the court finds this maternal adoption plan to be in the best interests of Albert and proper in the circumstances;
a notation that no parent ages are to be recorded on the adoptive birth certificates of Edmund and that the court is satisfied that this is in the best interests of Edmund and is appropriate in the circumstances; and
a notation that no parent ages are to be recorded on the adoptive birth certificates of Albert and that the court is satisfied that this is in the best interests of Albert and is appropriate in the circumstances.
In this judgment, I will refer to each of the family members and other individuals involved by their first names for convenience and without intending any disrespect. In the published version of this judgment, all persons referred to have been assigned pseudonyms in keeping with s 180 of the Adoption Act.
The central issue I am required to decide is whether an adoption order is in the best interests of each of Edmund and Albert.
The adoption order sought in respect of each of Edmund and Albert is in favour of Renée and Gerard, the current foster carers of Edmund and Albert, with whom Edmund and Albert have been continuously living since 10 August 2020, when Edmund was 12 years old and Albert was 8 years old.
On 29 October 2024, Edmund and Albert each signed an instrument of consent to their respective adoptions by Renée and Gerard after receiving counselling and being assessed by a registered counsellor on 10 October 2024.
For the reasons set out below, I have determined to order that each of Edmund and Albert be adopted by Renée and Gerard. I have also determined to make all the other orders and notations sought by the Secretary.
Edmund was born on 3 June 2008 in Poole Hospital, Poole, United Kingdom (UK) and is presently 18 years old.
Albert was born on 28 April 2012 in Poole Hospital, Poole, UK and is presently 14 years old.
Both Edmund and Albert acquired Australian citizenship by descent on 15 October 2019 and concurrently hold UK citizenship by birth. Both Edmund and Albert have UK and Anglo-Australian heritage and are not of Aboriginal descent.
Edmund and Albert are full biological siblings. They have another full biological sibling, Pierre. Pierre was born on 30 August 2006 and is presently 20 years old. Pierre was placed in the care of Renée and Gerard, along with Edmund and Albert, on 10 August 2020. Pierre has chosen not to be adopted and is not a subject of these proceedings.
Edmund and Albert also have a maternal-half sibling, Julie Mondego, who is now known as Hermine Debray. Hermine was born on 8 September 1995 and is presently 31 years old. She resides in the UK and does not share a close relationship with Edmund and Albert, although they remain in contact via Instagram.
The maternal grandparents of Edmund and Albert, Robert Cavalcanti and Mariam Cavalcanti, reside in the UK and are supportive of the proposed adoption of Edmund and Albert by Renée and Gerard.
The paternal step-grandmother of Edmund and Albert, Louise Wilmore, resides in South-Western Sydney, New South Wales and is supportive of the proposed adoption of Edmund and Albert by Renée and Gerard. The paternal grandfather of Edmund and Albert, Luigi Wilmore, died in November 2024.
Edmund enjoys basketball and attending his Church youth groups. He is very good at fixing things and helping with cooking, laundry, chores and making naan.
Albert enjoys soccer, piano, attending his Church youth groups and helping at home with chores and cooking.
Each of Albert and Edmund have no diagnosed health or developmental conditions and continue to meet age-appropriate developmental milestones. Both appear healthy and well-functioning.
Albert and Edmund maintain a wide range of longstanding sporting, social and community commitments. Both Edmund and Albert are regarded as sociable, friendly and well-liked by peers and extended family.
Edmund has recently finished his Higher School Certificate and is currently on a gap year, with the intention of applying for the defence force or pursuing further studies in construction. Albert is currently in year 8, enjoys school and is achieving very well academically.
Edmund and Albert were raised in the UK up until August 2019, when they travelled to Australia on a holiday along with their sibling, Pierre, and birth father, Max Lucien Wilmore. During their holiday, Max tragically passed away after sustaining a fatal brain injury while participating in an acrobatic activity, witnessed by Edmund, Albert and Pierre. After Max’s death, the DCJ initiated temporary care arrangements for Edmund, Albert and Pierre as they were in Australia without a parent holding parental responsibility. More details of the child protection and placement history of Edmund and Albert are described below.
Edmund and Albert suffered severe psychological and emotional trauma after the death of Max. Edmund and Albert have been receiving therapy and counselling since March 2020 to manage their grief and loss. Since being placed under the care of Renée and Gerard, Edmund and Albert have made considerable progress.
Renée and Gerard are the proposed adoptive parents of Edmund and Albert.
Renée was born on 13 November 1993 in Blacktown Hospital, Blacktown, New South Wales, is presently 32 years old and is an Australian citizen. She identifies with the Christian faith and attends church every week. Renée is not of Aboriginal descent.
Gerard was born on 30 May 1991 in Camperdown King George V Memorial Hospital, Camperdown, New South Wales, is presently 35 years old, is an Australian citizen and has Lebanese/Syrian and Australian heritage. He identifies with the Christian faith and attends church every week. Gerard is not of Aboriginal descent.
Renée and Gerard married on 2 April 2016 and share a relationship of love and affection. Renée and Gerard have two biological children together: Mercédès Jane Morrel (born on 7 August 2022, who is currently four years old) and Eugénie Morrel (born on 9 May 2025, who is currently one year old).
Renée and Gerard live together with Edmund, Albert, Pierre, Mercédès and Eugénie in Woronora, New South Wales. They all live in a house that Renée and Gerard own together that has four bedrooms, a dining room, kitchen, two lounge rooms and a large backyard with bushes and a trampoline. Their home is a five-minute walk away from a river, around seven kilometres away from Albert’s school, four and a half kilometres away from Edmund’s basketball practice, around five kilometres away from Albert’s soccer practice, 15 kilometres away from the medical services used by Edmund and Albert and around eight kilometres away from the nearest hospital.
Renée has completed her Higher School Certificate and has a bachelor’s degree in midwifery from the University of Technology Sydney.
Gerard has completed his Higher School Certificate and has a bachelor’s degree in forensic science (applied chemistry) with honours from the University of Technology Sydney.
Renée is a registered midwife and is currently employed as a first aid and administration officer at a school. Gerard is currently employed as a police officer.
The combined monthly income of Renée and Gerard from various sources and their assets make them financially sound.
Both Renée and Gerard enjoy overall positive physical health and wellbeing and have completed the necessary medical assessments required under the Adoption Act.
Both Renée and Gerard maintain good repute and have cleared the required background checks.
The birth mother of Edmund and Albert, as noted on their birth certificates, is Teresa-Abigail Leonora Wilmore. In February 2019, Teresa-Abigail changed her name to Valentine Beauchamp and now prefers to be known by the first name “Tina”.
The birth father of Edmund and Albert is Max.
Tina was born on 14 October 1968 and is presently 57 years old. She is a citizen of the UK and resides in England. Tina is not of Aboriginal descent.
Max was born on 12 January 1966 and died on 15 August 2019. The circumstances of his death are described above. Max was an Australian citizen. Max was not of Aboriginal descent.
Max and Tina were in a relationship until 2014, after which they separated.
As stated above, Tina and Max have another biological child, Pierre, who is the full sibling of Edmund and Albert. As also stated above, Tina has another biological child from a different relationship, Hermine.
Tina has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and is currently not in full-time employment. She is studying part-time for a postgraduate degree in psychology. Tina identifies as Roman Catholic and regularly attends church.
In August 2019, Edmund and Albert travelled to Australia on a holiday along with their sibling, Pierre, and birth father, Max. As described above, Max tragically passed away during the holiday.
On 13 August 2019, the DCJ received a Risk of Significant Harm report regarding Edmund, Albert and Pierre about Max’s brain injury, that Max’s medical recovery would be unlikely and that Edmund, Albert and Pierre would be in Australia without a parent having parental responsibility.
On 14 August 2019, Edmund, Albert and Pierre were placed in the short-term care of friends of Max, Louis Faria and Heloise Faria, under a temporary care arrangement. This placement ended in August 2020.
After Max’s death on 15 August 2019, the DCJ staff corresponded with Children’s Services from Dorset Council in the UK about information regarding Edmund, Albert and Pierre and their care. The DCJ also made contact with the UK Embassy to identify potential carers in the UK and to determine the suitability of placing Edmund, Albert and Pierre in the care of Tina.
On 7 September 2019, a DCJ caseworker received an email from Tina which indicated her intention to seek a court order in the UK for the return of Edmund, Albert and Pierre to her care. Tina subsequently lodged an application in the UK courts to seek such an order.
On 14 July 2020, Renée and Gerard were approved as authorised carers for Edmund, Albert and Pierre and a transition plan was developed by Key Assets and reviewed by the counsellor for Edmund, Albert and Pierre, Samara Smith.
On 10 August 2020, Edmund, Albert and Pierre transitioned into the full-time care of Renée and Gerard.
On 20 September 2019, the Secretary filed an application initiating care proceedings regarding Edmund, Albert and Pierre in the Children**’**s Court of New South Wales.
On 24 September 2019, the Children’s Court made an interim order allocating parental responsibility for Edmund, Albert and Pierre to the New South Wales Minister for Families, Communities and Disability until further order.
On 7 November 2019, the Children’s Court made a finding that each of Edmund, Albert and Pierre were in need of care and protection.
On 26 August 2020, the Secretary filed care plans in the Children’s Court regarding Edmund, Albert and Pierre. The care plans proposed that parental responsibility for each of Edmund, Albert and Pierre be allocated to the Minister until they attain the age of 18, and that they be placed in the long-term care of Gerard and Renée.
Tina participated in the Children’s Court proceedings and was represented by Ellis Mclachlan Solicitors.
In March 2020, Tina participated in a parenting capacity assessment with an independent social worker, Sharon Kelly of Carter Brown Associates in the UK, organised by Key Assets. In her assessment report, Ms Kelly stated that Tina engaged positively in four assessment sessions before unexpectedly advising that she had withdrawn her application to care for Edmund, Albert and Pierre on 14 April 2020 and that Tina did not engage in further planned sessions. Ms Kelly advised in her report that the assessment was incomplete and no final conclusion was drawn about Tina’s capacity to care for each of Edmund, Albert and Pierre.
On 24 September 2020, the Children’s Court found that there was no realistic possibility of restoration of Edmund, Albert and Pierre to Tina and made final orders allocating parental responsibility for each of Edmund, Albert and Pierre to the Minister until they each attain the age of 18 years. These orders remain in effect for Albert but not for Edmund as he attained the age of 18 years on 3 June 2026.
In January 2021, the DCJ received a copy of orders made by the UK Family Court at Bournemouth and Poole which dismissed proceedings brought by Tina regarding the care of Edmund, Albert and Pierre. It was noted that final orders had been made by the Children’s Court and that the UK Family Court at Bournemouth and Poole did not have jurisdiction regarding Edmund, Albert and Pierre.
On 2 March 2021, the Secretary filed a report pursuant to s 82 of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW) (Care Act) in the Children’s Court. The report outlined that Edmund, Albert and Pierre had settled into their new placement well, had formed strong and secure attachments to Renée and Gerard and that each of them had expressed their happiness at the idea of living with Renée and Gerard for the long-term.
On or around 24 August 2021, the Secretary filed a further s 82 report in the Children’s Court regarding Edmund, Albert and Pierre.
On 15 October 2021, Tina filed an application for rescission of the Children’s Court orders pursuant to s 90 of the Care Act, to the effect that Albert solely be returned to her care in the UK.
The matter was heard by the Children’s Court on 10 November 2021, where an independent legal representative was appointed for Albert, and direct legal representatives were appointed for Edmund and Pierre respectively.
On 20 January 2022, Tina advised the parties that she had decided to withdraw her application and the matter was accordingly dismissed by the Children’s Court.
On 18 February 2022, Tina filed a second application pursuant to s 90 of the Care Act seeking restoration of Edmund, Albert and Pierre to her care.
The matter was heard by the Children’s Court on 3 March 2022, where Tina appeared as a self-represented litigant. Orders were made for the filing of evidence and submissions and the matter was listed for hearing on 13 May 2022.
On 13 May 2022, the second s 90 application was dismissed by the Children’s Court due to Tina’s unexplained absence. The DCJ records show that Tina was contacted by the Children’s Court and the New South Wales Crown Solicitor’s Office and was advised that the matter may be determined in her absence, prior to the matter being heard on 13 May 2022.
Pursuant to an order of the UK Family Court at Bournemouth and Poole made on 8 October 2015, Edmund and Albert, along with their sibling Pierre, lived with Max after he and Tina separated in 2014. Pursuant to this order, Edmund and Albert had scheduled contact visits with Tina under a family contact plan.
After Max’s death and Edmund and Albert being taken into the care of the Minister in New South Wales, Edmund and Albert have had no face-to-face family time with Tina as she resides in the UK. Renée and Gerard send email updates, including photos and school reports, about Edmund and Albert to Tina on a monthly basis.
On 29 October 2024, Edmund and Albert each signed an instrument of consent to their respective adoptions by Renée and Gerard, pursuant to s 55(1)(c) of the Adoption Act and cl 80 of the Adoption Regulations 2015 (NSW).
On 9 October 2025, the Secretary filed a summons seeking adoption orders for Edmund and Albert.
On 22 October 2025, Tina was served with notice of the adoption application for Edmund and Albert.
On 17 February 2026, the Secretary filed an adoption matter summary form.
On 6 March 2026, Tina filed a notice of appearance.
On 1 April 2026, a directions hearing was held before me at which I made orders joining Tina as a defendant in these proceedings, listing these proceedings for preliminary hearing on 19 June 2026 and other case management orders.
On 7 May 2026, I made orders in chambers appointing a separate legal representative for Edmund and Albert pursuant to s 122 of the Adoption Act and other case management orders.
On 19 May 2026, the separate legal representative, Cassandra Bennett of Phillips Levy Bennett Legal, filed a notice of appearance for Edmund and Albert.
On 19 May 2026, a mediation was arranged by Legal Aid NSW to discuss the issues related to the proposed adoption of Edmund and Albert. Tina did not attend this mediation, despite arrangements being made for her to appear electronically from the UK.
On 12 June 2026, I made orders in chambers discharging the order I made on 7 May 2026 that a separate legal representative be appointed for Edmund. This was because Edmund had turned 18 years of age on 3 June 2026 and an order pursuant to s 122 of the Adoption Act to appoint a separate legal representative for a child can only be made for a child under the age of 18 years. I also made orders appointing Ms Bennett of Phillips Levy Bennett Legal as a legal representative of Albert pursuant to s 122 of the Adoption Act.
On 15 June 2026, Dian Neligan of Neligan Law Pty Ltd filed a notice of appearance as legal representative for Edmund.
On 19 June 2026, a preliminary hearing was held before me at which I made timetabling orders for the filing of written submissions by the Secretary and the legal representatives of each of Edmund and Albert. I also noted that Tina has not filed any materials to contest these proceedings and that if she did not do so, these proceedings would be determined on the papers in chambers.
23 Jurisdiction
(1) Subject to this Act, the Court may make an order for the adoption of a child (an adoption order) solely in favour of one person or jointly in favour of a couple.
(2) The Court must not make an adoption order unless, when the application for the order is filed—
(a) the child is present in the State, and
(b) the applicant, or if the application is a joint application, each of the applicants, resides, or is domiciled, in the State.
…
Section 24(1) of the Adoption Act provides that an adoption order may be made in relation to a child who is less than 18 years of age as at the date of the application, or who is more than 18 years of age on that date but was cared for by the applicant(s) prior to attaining that age.
In respect of an application for adoption by a couple, s 28 of the Adoption Act states the following:
28 Adoption by couple
(1) Basic requirements Two persons who are a couple may, subject to this Act, adopt a child only if—
(a) both of them are resident or domiciled in the State, and
(b) both of them are of good repute and are fit and proper persons to fulfil the responsibilities of parents.
(2) Requirements for step parent The Court must not make an order in favour of a couple if one of them is a step parent unless section 30 is complied with.
(3) Age requirements The Court must not make an adoption order in favour of a couple if neither of them is a birth parent or relative of the child unless—
(a) each of them is 21 or more years of age and 18 or more years older than the child, or
(b) the Court considers that in the particular circumstances of the case it is desirable to make the order even though one or both of them do not fulfil the age requirements.
(4) Length of relationship requirement The Court must not make an adoption order in favour of a couple unless the couple have been living together for a continuous period of not less than 2 years immediately before the application for the adoption order.
(5) The Court may make an adoption order in favour of a couple jointly even if one of them is a birth parent, or they are the birth parents, of the child.
A “couple” is defined in the Dictionary of the Adoption Act to mean two people who are either married to each other or are de facto partners.
Section 90(1)(c) of the Adoption Act requires that proposed adoptive parents must also be selected in accordance with the Adoption Act. Section 45F of the Adoption Act requires the proposed adoptive parents to be assessed and determined to be suitable to adopt.
Section 59 of the Adoption Act requires the Secretary to ensure that a person whose consent to an adoption is needed is given the “mandatory written information” before that person consents or refuses to consent to the adoption.
Section 87 of the Adoption Act provides:
87 Application to be consented to by Secretary
(1) The Court may make an adoption order only on application made by—
(a) the prospective adoptive parent or parents with the consent of the Secretary, or
(b) the Secretary or by a principal officer on behalf of the prospective adoptive parent or parents, or
(c) (Repealed)
(d) a child who is 18 or more years of age for his or her adoption.
(2) Despite subsection (1) (a), the consent of the Secretary to an application for an adoption order is not required—
(a) if the applicant is a step parent or relative of the child, or
(b) if the application relates to an intercountry adoption.
Section 88 of the Adoption Act states that this court cannot make an adoption order unless 14 days’ notice of the adoption application has been given to any person whose consent to the adoption is required under the Adoption Act.
Section 91 of the Adoption Act requires the applicant to provide a written report prepared by the Secretary or an authorised person.
In the present case, all of the formal requirements under the Adoption Act have been satisfied, specifically:
The adoption application is made by the Secretary on behalf of the proposed adoptive parents (s 87 of the Adoption Act).
When the adoption application was filed, Edmund and Albert were present in New South Wales and less than 18 years of age (ss 23(2)(a) and 24(1)(a) of the Adoption Act).
When the adoption application was filed for Edmund and Albert, Renée and Gerard were 31 and 34 years of age respectively, had been married for nine years, were residents in New South Wales and were more than 18 years older than Albert (ss 28(1)(a), 28(3)(a), 28(4) and Dictionary of the Adoption Act). Renée and Gerard were not more than 18 years older than Edmund at the time of the filing of his adoption application. However, for the reasons set out in the next section of this judgment in relation to why an adoption order is in the best interests of each of Edmund and Albert, pursuant to s 28(3)(b) of the Adoption Act, I find it desirable to make the adoption order even though Renée and Gerard do not fulfil the age requirements in respect of Edmund.
For reasons more fully explained below, each of Renée and Gerard are of good repute and fit and proper people to fulfil the responsibilities of parents (s 28(1)(b) of the Adoption Act).
Each of Renée and Gerard have been assessed and determined to be suitable to adopt and were selected to adopt (ss 45F and 90(1)(c) of the Adoption Act).
The s 91 Report prepared by Renee Coiner in accordance with s 91 of the Adoption Act has been received and read. Ms Coiner provided the s 91 Report in her capacity as an “approved assessor” within the meaning of s 91(2A)(a) of the Adoption Act. The s 91 Report for Edmund and Albert was filed on 17 February 2026.
Tina was served with notice of the adoption application for Edmund and Albert on 25 February 2026. Therefore, Tina was provided with at least 14 days’ notice of the adoption application for Edmund and Albert (ss 54(3)(a) and 88(1) of the Adoption Act).
Edmund and Albert were each provided with a copy of the mandatory written information on 13 March 2023 (s 59 of the Adoption Act). Edmund and Albert met with a registered counsellor on 10 October 2024, who certified that both the children understand the effect of signing an instrument of consent to their proposed adoption (ss 55(1)(a)–(b) and 63 of the Adoption Act). Edmund and Albert each signed an instrument of consent to their respective adoptions by Renée and Gerard on 29 October 2024 (s 55(1)(c) of the Adoption Act and cl 80 of the Adoption Regulations 2015 (NSW)). At the time of the signing of the instrument of consent, each of Edmund and Albert were above the age of 12 years (s 54(2) of the Adoption Act). Therefore, in the circumstances of the present case, there is no need to consider and/or dispense with Tina’s consent to the proposed adoption of each of Edmund and Albert.
I am satisfied that all the formal requirements of an adoption application have been met.
90 Court to be satisfied as to certain matters
(1) The Court must not make an adoption order in relation to a child unless the Court is satisfied—
(a) that the best interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption, and
(b) that, as far as practicable and having regard to the age and understanding of the child, the wishes and feelings of the child have been ascertained and due consideration given to them, and
(c) if the prospective adoptive parent or parents are persons other than a step parent or relative of the child-that the prospective adoptive parent or parents have been selected in accordance with this Act, and
(d) that consent to the adoption of the child has been given by every person whose consent is required under this Act or that consent has been, or should be, dispensed with, and
…
(h) in the case of a child (other than an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander child)—that the culture, any disability, language and religion of the child and, as far as possible, that the child’s given names, identity, language and cultural and religious ties have been taken into account in the making of any adoption plan in relation to the adoption.
The Court may not make an adoption order if the parties to the adoption have agreed to an adoption plan unless it is satisfied that the arrangements proposed in the plan are in the child’s best interests and are proper in the circumstances.
The Court may not make an adoption order unless it considers that the making of the order would be clearly preferable in the best interests of the child than any other action that could be taken by law in relation to the care of the child.
Determining adoption applications is an important part of the court’s work: Secretary*,* New South Wales Department of Family and Community Services v MB [2017] NSWSC 1087, Sackar J at [9].
An order for adoption is one of great magnitude, particularly because the legal and social consequences that flow from an adoption are far-reaching (for the child themselves as well as for the persons connected to the child) and involve a particular degree of finality: Re the Adoption of CCS and FLS [2019] NSWSC 71, Hallen J at [157], citing Re B (Adoption: Jurisdiction to Set Aside) [1995] Fam 239, Sir Thomas Bingham at 251G-H.
As observed by Hallen J in Re the Adoption of CCS and FLS at [150]:
An adoption order is status changing. It severs, in law, but not in fact, the existing relationship of blood, and creates an adoptive relationship in place of the natural relationship, which in fact, although not in law, continues, unchanged. New family ties are created which approximate blood ties. The child becomes part of his, or her, adoptive parents’ family, solely through operation of law, and there is no necessity for any actual blood relationship to exist between them. He, or she, thereafter, is regarded, in law, as the child of the adoptive parents, and the adoptive parents are regarded in law as the parents of the adopted child: s 95(2)(c) of the Act. The adopted child also ceases to be regarded, in law, as the child of the birth parents and the birth parents cease to be regarded in law as the parents of the adopted child: s 95(2)(d) of the Act. The effect of an adoption order is to extinguish any parental responsibility of the birth parents. They no longer qualify as parents for the purpose of taking part in any future proceedings about the child. Thus, the adoption order directly affects three parties, namely the child, the birth parents and the adoptive parents.
Because of the seriousness and significance of the decision, and in line with ss 90(1)(a) and 90(1)(b) of the Adoption Act, I must not make an adoption order for each of Edmund and Albert unless I am satisfied that their best interests will be promoted by the adoption, and that, as far as practicable and having regard to their age and understanding, the wishes and feelings of Edmund and Albert have been ascertained and duly considered.
I must have regard to the best interests of each of Edmund and Albert, both in youth and later life — this being the paramount consideration as stated in s 8(1)(a) of the Adoption Act. I must also have regard to the principles that adoption is to be regarded as a service for the child (s 8(1)(b) of the Adoption Act) and that no adult is entitled as of right to adopt the child (s 8(1)(c) of the Adoption Act).
The paramount consideration of the best interests of the child has been described in Adoption of LJK and CRK [2017] NSWSC 7 by Brereton J at [12] as follows:
The “paramountcy principle” contained in par (a) means that the inquiry is child and future focussed: as the best interests of the children, both in childhood and in later life, must be the paramount consideration, so it is necessary to evaluate the competing proposals (and any viable alternatives) so as to ascertain which will best serve the interests of these children now and in the future, given what has already happened, rather than revisiting the actual or perceived rights and wrongs of the past (save insofar as they may be indicative of the future). In speaking of adoption being a “service to the child”, the Act requires decisions in connection with adoption to be made on the basis that the prime consideration is benefit to the child, as distinct from providing a service to people who wish to adopt a child. However, that does not mean that no service is provided to a child by adoption just because his or her needs are already being adequately met.
In determining the best interests of the child, the decision maker is to have regard to the following—
(a) any wishes expressed by the child,
(b) the child’s age, maturity, level of understanding, gender, background and family relationships and any other characteristics of the child that the decision maker thinks are relevant,
(c) the child’s physical, emotional and educational needs, including the child’s sense of personal, family and cultural identity,
(d) any disability that the child has,
(e) any wishes expressed by either or both of the parents of the child,
(f) the relationship that the child has with his or her parents and siblings (if any) and any significant other people (including relatives) in relation to whom the decision maker considers the question to be relevant,
(g) the attitude of each proposed adoptive parent to the child and to the responsibilities of parenthood,
(h) the nature of the relationship of the child with each proposed adoptive parent,
(i) the suitability and capacity of each proposed adoptive parent, or any other person, to provide for the needs of the child, including the emotional and intellectual needs of the child,
(j) the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm caused, or that may be caused, by being subjected or exposed to abuse, ill-treatment, violence or other behaviour, or being present while a third person is subjected or exposed to abuse, ill-treatment, violence or other behaviour,
(k) the alternatives to the making of an adoption order and the likely effect on the child in both the short and longer term of changes in the child’s circumstances caused by an adoption, so that adoption is determined among all alternative forms of care to best meet the needs of the child.
[297] It is often referred to in the literature that a child placed with foster carers has an abiding need for a sense of security and identity and that she, or he, will feel most secure when she, or he, is assured that no one can take her, or him, away from the family of which she, or he, is a legal member. It is recognised that the sooner a child can feel this sense of security, the better for her, or his, development in the future: see Re Peter [2009] NSWSC 697, per Palmer J, at [35].
[298] As was written in Re W (A Child) (Adoption: Grandparents’ Competing Claim) [2017] 1 WLR 889; [2016] EWCA Civ 793, by McFarlane LJ, with agreement of the other two members of the Court of Appeal (Jackson and Lindblom LJJ), at [64]:
“One of the principal benefits of adoption is to achieve a secure, stable, reliable, permanent, lifetime placement for the child in the adoptive family as the adoptive son or daughter of the adopters.”
[299] Also, if the carers who have developed a strong bond of family relationship with the child feels that they are under threat of an application to the Children’s Court, at any time, for vacation of a care order and the consequent removal of the child from them, then they could be subjected to a level of stress and anxiety that must affect the parental relationship with the child who is in their care: Re Peter at [36].
The requirement in s 90(3) of the Adoption Act that the making of the adoption order must be clearly preferable in the best interests of the child rather than any other action that could be taken by law in relation to the care of the child “requires something more than a slight preponderance of considerations in favour of adoption over the alternatives” and “the requirement that the Court consider that an adoption order be ‘“clearly preferable’” is one that adoption be obviously, plainly or manifestly preferable to any other action that could be taken by law”: Adoption of RCC and RZA [2015] NSWSC 813, Brereton J at [14].
Consideration of whether adoption would promote the child’s best interests, and whether it is clearly preferable to any other order that could be made, involves identification of the likely effects of adoption, and of the various available alternatives, and examining their respective benefits and detriments from the perspective of the best interests of the child, so as to conclude whether adoption is, or is not, clearly preferable to all the others: Adoption of NG (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 680, Brereton J at [74].
The question of what is in a child’s best interests involves the making of a judicial evaluation and the balancing of many factors from which an overall conclusion must be reached. It will, inevitably, be impressionistic and inexact: Re B (A Minor) [2001] UKHL 70; [2002] 1 All ER 641, Lord Nicholls (with whom Lord Mackay, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Millett and Lord Rodger agreed) at [16], cited with approval in Director General Department of Human Services; Re M [2011] NSWSC 369, Hallen AsJ at [90].
As noted previously, Edmund and Albert have each signed an instrument of consent for their proposed adoption by Renée and Gerard. Edmund is presently 18 years of age and Albert is 14 years of age. Both the children have expressed on numerous occasions, with sufficient clarity, their desire to remain in Australia and be adopted by Renée and Gerard.
In the s 91 report, Ms Coiner has described Edmund and Albert’s wishes and views about their proposed adoption in the following manner:
Edmund
Edmund’s views and wishes about adoption have been explored with him numerous times over the years, and he has articulated that he perceives open adoption as a way to feel connected to Renée and Gerard (whom he also calls ‘mum’ and ‘dad’) and a legal way to define his family. Edmund has communicated that he has some worries that his mother may file a further application before the Court for restoration, and he considers that open adoption will provide him with peace of mind and stability.
Key Assets file notes show that Edmund received the Mandatory Written Information Booklet on 13 March 2023 and again on 4 October 2023.
On 10 October 2024, Edmund participated in Registered Adoption Counselling with Registered (Adoption) Counsellor Ms Emma Healy, Senior Manager of Adoption and Permanency at Family Spirit. Edmund told Ms Healy that adoption would make life simpler and it would be good for him. Ms Healy noted that “Edmund presented as having a good understanding of the contents of the MWI [Mandatory Written Information]. Edmund seemed to have a clear understanding of the effects of an adoption order and was very clear that he wanted the adoption order”.
Ms Healy concluded, “after meeting with Edmund, it is my professional opinion that he has the capacity to make an informed decision about the proposed adoption and has sufficient capacity, understanding and maturity to give consent to his own adoption.”
On 29 October 2024, Edmund met with Ms Carmen Cercea, Open Adoption Caseworker with DCJ. In this meeting, Edmund consented to his own adoption.
In November 2025 the Author again spoke about open adoption with Edmund who again was able to articulate the social, legal and practical implications of an adoption order being made. Further, Edmund reported his communication with Tina is occurring in accordance with his wishes and he indicated he does not want that communication to change in any significant way.
Albert
Albert informed the Adoption Assessor that he wanted to be adopted by Renée and Gerard. He is recorded as stating, “I know mum [Tina] can’t take care of us. I want to be adopted. In case something bad happens, I am going to stay with Gerard and Renée. If I’m not adopted, they might take us away if they think it’s for the best”. He later added, “plus it’s a lot easier to go on holidays [if you’re not a child in out-of-home care]”.
Albert also remarked, “I think I would feel happier and more belonging because if mum [Tina] wants to take us back, I would prefer to stay with Gerard and Renée. I would prefer not having that risk”.
Key Assets case notes show that Albert received the Mandatory Written Information on 13 March 2023 and again on 4 October 2023.
On 10 October 2024, Albert participated in Registered Adoption Counselling with Registered (Adoption) Counsellor Ms Emma Healy, Senior Manager of Adoption and Permanency at Family Spirit.
Ms Healy noted in her report that Albert told her that adoption meant he would be secure in the family he is in and not “just fostered” and that adoption would make him feel “really happy”. Ms Healy determined that Albert presented as having a good understanding of the contents of the MWI and the effect of an adoption order. She stated that after meeting with Albert, it was her professional opinion that he has the capacity to make an informed decision about the proposed adoption and has sufficient capacity, understanding and maturity to give consent to his own adoption.
On 29 October 2024, Albert met with Ms Carmen Cercea, Open Adoption Caseworker with DCJ. In this meeting, Albert consented to his own adoption. In proving consent, Albert stated, “I want to be adopted by Renée and Gerard… because of the situation with my mum, and I really like Renée and Gerard”.
In November 20205 [sic] the Author again spoke about open adoption with Albert who again was able to articulate the social, legal and practical implications of an adoption order being made. Further, Albert reported his communication with Tina is occurring in accordance with his wishes and he indicated he does not want that communication to change in any significant way, stating he knew he could increase this communication if he wanted to (and if Tina wanted to).
It is clear to me that each of Edmund and Albert has expressed their views — their “voice” — with sufficient clarity. In Adoption of Jing Xue [2026] NSWSC 1049 at [50]–[73], I made observations about the importance of the “voice of the child” in adoption proceedings which are applicable but unnecessary to repeat in full here.
In light of the above, I place due weight on the wishes and feelings of Edmund and Albert. It is only each of them who know what they have experienced and what they want to experience in their lives. Edmund and Albert have their own hopes, dreams, fears, ambitions, aspirations and wishes. They both understand the relationship that they have with the central people in their lives, including with Tina, with each other, with Pierre and with Renée and Gerard. Edmund and Albert have expressed that their safety lies in the care of Renée and Gerard.
Edmund and Albert have been continuously living with Renée and Gerard since 10 August 2020, when Edmund was 12 years old and Albert was 8 years old, which is a period of more than six years. Edmund and Albert refer to Renée and Gerard as “Mum” and “Dad”.
Edmund and Albert have not met face-to-face with Tina since they have been living in Australia. Their elder sibling, Pierre, also lives with them under the care of Renée and Gerard and together they all share a loving relationship. Edmund and Albert also live with their proposed adoptive siblings, Mercédès and Eugénie, and share a caring and affectionate relationship with them.
Edmund and Albert do not have regular family time with Tina. Renée and Gerard share information about Edmund and Albert with Tina via email on approximately a monthly basis and they encourage them to participate in contacting Tina independently via email and their telephones. Renée and Gerard are willing to facilitate video calls or other additional communication with Tina if Edmund and Albert wish.
Edmund and Albert have regular visits with their paternal step-grandmother and extended family in Australia and share a positive relationship with them.
Renée and Gerard have made sincere efforts to meet the emotional needs of Edmund and Albert and assist them in recovering from their past trauma and rebuild their identity and sense of self.
In the s 91 report, Ms Coiner made the following remarks about how Renée and Gerard have met the emotional needs and wellbeing of Edmund and Albert:
Albert and Edmund are healthy, developmentally on track, and thriving in the stable and nurturing care of Renée and Gerard. Medical records confirm good physical health and proactive management of all health needs, with future orthodontic treatment for Albert appropriately planned and funded. Despite a significant trauma history following their father’s illness and death in 2018, both boys have made substantial emotional and developmental progress. Psychological reports confirm that earlier grief-related difficulties resolved over time within a secure placement, and by late 2023 Albert no longer required therapeutic intervention. The boys’ placement is consistently described as safe, supportive, and protective, with strong routines, positive school and community engagement, and appropriate family contact. While court proceedings and uncertainty around permanency have been identified as emotional stressors, there are no current concerns regarding the boys’ wellbeing, stability, or development.
Renée and Gerard also assist Edmund and Albert in developing their identity and sense of self by maintaining several albums containing numerous photographs from their childhood, a Google Drive folder containing more than 4,000 photographs and videos of them and their extended birth family and displaying photos of their biological family on the walls of their home.
Renée and Gerard have satisfactorily arranged for the educational and extracurricular needs of Edmund and Albert to be met. They have also ensured that the health needs of Edmund and Albert are adequately met by regularly taking them to their medical and therapy appointments.
Renée and Gerard maintain sufficient financial circumstances, maintain a good character and health and have provided Edmund and Albert with a comfortable place in which to live.
Renée and Gerard also actively support Edmund and Albert in maintaining and celebrating their dual Anglo-Australian and UK cultural heritage. In the s 91 Report, Ms Coiner noted the following:
Renée and Gerard actively support the boys in maintaining a connection with their UK heritage by continuing various cultural traditions. These include enjoying English foods such as chocolate, sweets, and Brussel sprouts at Christmas; watching British television shows such as Doctor Who; and reading English literature based on individual preference. The family also maintains traditions such as having a real Christmas tree, using chocolate Advent calendars, and placing an orange at the bottom of Christmas stockings.
The overall attitudes of Renée and Gerard towards Edmund and Albert are characterised by love, commitment, warmth and a dedicated approach to their care. I am satisfied that Renée and Gerard are devoted to their responsibilities of parenthood and providing each of Edmund and Albert with a nurturing, stable and loving home environment.
In the s 91 Report, Ms Coiner observed the following about the attitudes of Renée and Gerard towards adoption and their relationship with Edmund and Albert:
Key Asset’s Pre-Adoption summary notes that Gerard and Renée have established boundaries and expectations to support appropriate behaviour in their home. The children’s social worker notes that she has observed a loving, mutually respectful relationship between Gerard and Renée, and among all three children. There have never been any concerns about Renée and Gerard’s care for the children.
Edmund and Albert’s social worker noted “on numerous occasions, (she) has had conversations with Gerard and Renée when one of the children has been struggling with a personal difficulty. Gerard and Renée have always been able to articulate exactly how they have provided support to each child, including spending more time with them one-on-one, checking in with them more regularly and consulting with them around their wishes for their own happiness.”
Gerard describes his greatest reward in parenting Albert and Edmund as “when we are all doing something as a family.” He values being part of a large family of six and enjoys “having the excuse to do childish things.” He identifies his biggest challenge as the limited understanding of the boys’ early life experiences, stating, “Sometimes, because they are not our birth children, I don’t have all the background information, so it’s hard to understand their responses to things. They’ve not reacted in a way I’d expect sometimes.”
Renée describes her greatest reward in parenting Albert and Edmund as simply that “they’re really lovely kids.” She reflected that, following the initial six-month adjustment period, she observed a positive shift in the boys’ ability to reflect on parental boundaries, noting: “They may disagree with a parental decision, but they’ll think about why. I was surprised by it, as I wasn’t willing to understand my parents.” Renée described her personal joys in parenting Albert and Edmund, sharing, “With Albert, it’s the cuddles; he’ll say ‘I love you’; he wants to talk; he says really sweet things. With Edmund, it’s the hugs; he notices if I’m having a hard day; he has high levels of emotional intelligence; he’s very emotionally mature; he shows love and care too.”
Renée and Gerard have undertaken trauma-informed care training, which they report has reshaped their overall parenting philosophy. They expressed that this approach has been beneficial not only for Albert and Edmund but will also guide their parenting of their younger children, Mercédès and Eugénie.
When consequences are required for inappropriate behaviour, Renée and Gerard typically use the removal of electronic device time, which has proven effective. Renée and Gerard maintain open, age-appropriate communication about relationships and sexuality. They have already had these discussions with Edmund and Pierre and intend to have similar conversations with Albert as he matures. As a qualified midwife, Renée explained, “I’m quite honest about bodies, periods, and babies, and I don’t think they’d ever feel uncomfortable asking any questions.”
Professionals describe Gerard and Renée as creating a loving, respectful, and well-structured home, with clear boundaries, a strong emotional connection, and a trauma-informed parenting approach that consistently meets each child’s individual needs. They communicate openly and age-appropriately about behaviour, relationships, and wellbeing, demonstrating reflective, nurturing parenting that prioritises the children’s safety, development, and happiness.
[Renée]
I first decided that I wished to adopt the children because I wished to provide them with a sense of security and permanence. Edmund and Albert are thoughtful, kind, considerate, friendly and intelligent children. I feel privileged to have been able to care for them and parent them. They have brought tremendous joy to my life, and I am so glad they are a part of our family. I dearly love them and cannot imagine my life without them.
I decided to pursue adoption as it was something that Edmund and Albert both requested. I was supportive of this decision as I felt it would further cement us as family and ensure the boys felt more secure in our family unit.
I believe that adoption is in the children’s best interests and is the preferred order above any other because it reflects the children’s wishes. The finality of adoption will provide them with a greater sense of security.
[Gerard]
I first decided that I wished to adopt the children to provide them with a sense of security and permanence. However, the decision to adopt Edmund and Albert came from them both personally asking to be adopted. I was and still am excited at the prospect of adopting them both.
I also felt that adoption would help them to feel more secure and safe in our family unit. After moving in with us they regularly talked about their fear of having to leave us or go somewhere else. My wife and I regularly remind them that we love them and would never choose to remove them from our care, so we feel that adoption would help to provide them with the assurance they will always live with us and not be removed from our care.
I feel privileged to be their parent and feel that the legal tie would help them both feel assured that this is their forever home.
Referees for Renée and Gerard describe them as thoughtful, loving, caring, loyal, patient, genuine, compassionate, consistent, kind, gentle, generous, empathetic, hardworking and considerate with a stable and happy marriage, and always ready to support Edmund and Albert.
In these circumstances, I consider that Renée and Gerard demonstrate a deep sense of responsibility and commitment to the wellbeing and development of Edmund and Albert. They prioritise the needs of Edmund and Albert, aim to be supportive and loving parents and ensure that Edmund and Albert are raised in an environment grounded in stability, empathy and love.
Tina is formally contesting these proceedings.
Tina states, among other things, the following about the proposed adoption of Edmund and Albert:
…
I do not agree to the adoption. I do not consider that adoption is in the children’s best interests.
I love the children intensely, and think about them constantly.
I do not have a strong relationship with the proposed adoptive parents.
I am and continue to be open and transparent with the proposed adoptive parents, but I do not consider that this has been reciprocated.
…
Tina states that she is unhappy with the low frequency of contact between herself and Edmund and Albert, as facilitated by Renée and Gerard.
Tina further states the following:
…
I would love for the children to be restored to me; however, I recognise that they are now settled in Australia with the proposed adoptive parents.
I was not given the opportunity to care for the children following the tragic passing of their father. This was a very traumatic experience for the children and myself, and it continues to impact my life today.
I would like for the current orders for Parental Responsibility to the Minister until the children attain the age of 18 years to continue.
My reasoning for this is because I think the ongoing oversight and casework provided by the Plaintiff and the designated agency, KeyAssets, is best for the children.
I am worried that if an adoption order is made that all communication and contact between myself and the children will cease forever. I am worried that I will not be a part of the children’s lives anymore and will never see them again.
….
In the s 91 Report, Ms Coiner has recorded that Tina has expressed that she does not want Edmund and Albert to feel that she has given up on them and that her concern is that if an adoption order is made, she would not continue to receive information about their progress.
I have taken into account the views and wishes expressed by Tina in relation to the proposed adoption of Edmund and Albert. After considering the evidence before me, I find that “voice” of Edmund and Albert outweighs the wishes expressed by Tina. Both the children have expressed with sufficient clarity and maturity that they wish to be adopted by Renée and Gerard. While Tina’s intentions may be kind, she unfortunately is not in a position to provide high quality and nourishing care to Edmund and Albert.
While there are no child protection concerns for Edmund and Albert, the evidence before me indicates that Edmund and Albert have expressed the view that they will not be appropriately cared for by Tina.
I find that Tina is currently not in a place to provide a suitable and nourishing environment in which each of Edmund and Albert can grow and thrive.
It is clear from the evidence before me that Renée and Gerard are able to provide a safe, stable and nurturing environment that supports the physical, emotional and psychological wellbeing of Edmund and Albert. The two children have been physically, mentally and emotionally well in the care of Renée and Gerard, and no concerns about the welfare of Edmund and Albert have been raised by any caseworker, medical practitioner or other relevant professional.
I may not make an adoption order unless I am satisfied that such an order is “clearly preferable” in the best interests of Edmund and Albert, compared with any other legal measure that could be taken in relation to their care: s 90(3) of the Adoption Act.
I must therefore be satisfied that the balance weighs more than slightly in favour of the proposed adoption over other alternatives. The making of an adoption order must be obviously, plainly or manifestly preferable to any other action that could be taken by law. I must reach the degree of conviction in favour of the adoption commensurate with the gravity of the decision: Adoption of RCC and RZA, Brereton J at [14]; Adoption of NG (No 2), Brereton J at [74].
Edmund turned 18 years of age on 3 June 2026. As stated above, he signed an instrument of consent to his adoption by Renée and Gerard on 29 October 2024, pursuant to s 55(1)(c) of the Adoption Act and cl 80 of the Adoption Regulations 2015 (NSW). Edmund has not revoked this instrument of consent. Edmund is therefore no longer under the parental responsibility of the Minister, and an order allocating the parental responsibility of Edmund to Renée and Gerard or Tina is no longer applicable.
The alternatives to making an adoption order for Albert is:
an order allocating parental responsibility of Albert to Tina pursuant to s 92 of the Adoption Act (also commonly known as restoration);
make no order and maintain the status quo, which is that Albert remains under the parental responsibility of the Minister until he reaches the age of 18; or
an order allocating parental responsibility of Albert to Renée and Gerard, pursuant to s 92 of the Adoption Act (also known as a guardianship order).
I consider that each of the above three alternatives to adoption are not in the best interests of Albert.
In the s 91 Report, Ms Coiner noted the following about why adoption is clearly preferable in the best interests of each of Edmund and Albert and why maintaining the status quo or making a guardianship order are not in the best interests of Edmund and Albert:
Status Quo
In my professional opinion, there is limited benefit in Albert and Edmund remaining in Out-of-Home Care. Retaining Edmund and Albert in out-of-home care does not provide legal or psychological permanence and has been identified as a source of ongoing uncertainty for the boys. The evidence indicates that continued involvement of statutory services, together with the prospect of further legal applications, has been destabilising and anxiety-provoking for both children. The author notes Tina’s worries that leaving care may lead to a cessation of communication. In the author’s professional opinion, there is no evidence to support this, as the applicants initiate communication and not the Agency.
In the author’s opinion, maintaining the children in care will not improve communication between Tina and her children. The status quo does not reflect the boys’ long-term placement stability, their established attachments, or their clearly articulated wishes to achieve permanency within their current family environment. Importantly, Albert and Edmund have consistently expressed their wish to remain living in Australia and to be adopted by Renée and Gerard. It is also noted that extended family members have expressed support for the proposed adoption.
Parental Responsibility Orders or Guardianship Order
A Parental Responsibility Order, or a Guardianship Order, would provide greater autonomy to the family than remaining in Out-of-Home Care; however, it would not offer the level of certainty and belonging that Edmund and Albert seek. This permanency option would retain an element of impermanence and continued legal oversight, which the boys have identified as distressing and inconsistent with their sense of family identity and would not be aligned with the expressed views of Edmund and Albert who have clearly stated a preference for adoption to Renée and Gerard.
Adoption Order
I consider open adoption the most preferable permanency option for Edmund and Albert. Open adoption is the permanency pathway most closely aligned with the boys’ best interests. It provides full legal, emotional, and psychological permanence while maintaining relationships with their birth family through structured and flexible adoption plans. The evidence demonstrates that Edmund and Albert have lived with Renée and Gerard for a significant period, have formed strong, secure attachments, and are thriving across all domains of development. Adoption reflects the existing family relationships and provides long-term certainty, stability, and security, while supporting identity, sibling relationships, and ongoing family connections.
…
It is my professional opinion that an open adoption order is the most appropriate permanency outcome for Edmund and Albert. Both boys have provided informed and voluntary consent following registered adoption counselling and have demonstrated a clear understanding of the legal and social implications of adoption. Their wishes in relation to adoption and birth family relationships have been consistently expressed over time and appear genuine and autonomously held. Their views on adoption are motivated by a desire for stability, permanency, and relief from ongoing uncertainty.
The evidence establishes that Renée and Gerard provide a high standard of care, consistently described as stable, nurturing, trauma-informed, and developmentally responsive. Edmund and Albert are healthy, emotionally settled, socially connected, and progressing well educationally within their care. There are no identified concerns regarding their safety, wellbeing, or development.
Only an adoption order will formalise the secure parent-child relationships already in place, provide legal certainty now and into adulthood, and support the boys’ long-term emotional wellbeing and identity development. Accordingly, I recommend that the Court make an Order of Adoption in favour of Renée and Gerard Morrel, as this outcome is clearly in the best interests of Edmund and Albert, both now and in the future.
It is clear from the evidence before me that Tina is unable to provide care for Edmund and Albert. Restoration of Albert to the care of Tina is neither realistically possible nor in the best interests of him.
One detrimental impact of an adoption order in favour of each of Edmund and Albert will be that Pierre will no longer be recognised as a brother to Edmund and Albert under law. In other words, an adoption order in favour each of Edmund and Albert will sever a legal connection between Pierre on the one hand and each of Edmund and Albert on the other hand. I am satisfied, however, that Pierre, Edmund and Albert have indicated that this will not impact upon their relationships. By considering the evidence before me, I am satisfied that Pierre, Edmund and Albert share a close relationship of love and affection with each other and they all reside together in the same household under the care of Renée and Gerard. In all the circumstances, I am satisfied that it is likely that Pierre, Edmund and Albert will always remain a family.
I have also given consideration to whether an adoption order by this court in favour each of Edmund and Albert would impact on their UK and Australian citizenships. I consider that such an adoption order will not impact the respective citizenships of Edmund and Albert. Pursuant to ss 66(1)(d), 67 and 74 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (UK), children who are subject to adoption proceedings outside the UK are treated as if they are the children of their adoptive parents, except in relation to any provisions of the British Nationality Act 1981 (UK) or other UK laws that determine UK citizenship. Pursuant to s 1 of the British Nationality Act, children who are born in the UK to a mother or father who is a UK citizen are deemed UK citizens by birth. In the present case, Edmund and Albert are UK citizens by birth as they were born in the UK to Tina who is a UK citizen. Therefore, an adoption order by this court in favour of each of Edmund and Albert will not sever or affect each of their UK citizenships.
The same can be said about the Australian citizenships of each of Edmund and Albert. Pursuant to s 16(2)(a)–(b)(i) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth), each of Edmund and Albert acquired their respective Australian citizenships by descent on 15 October 2019 as each of them was born outside Australia but to a parent who was an Australian citizen — being Max, the birth father of Edmund and Albert. Edmund and Albert are now habitual residents in Australia and did not move to Australia from the UK for the sole purpose of their adoption. This means that Edmund and Albert’s proposed adoption will not be characterised as an intercountry adoption for the purposes of the Adoption Act and subdiv AA of the Australian Citizenship Act. In addition, both the UK and Australia are contracting states to the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (29 May 1993). Taking all of the above matters into account, I find that an adoption order by this court in favour of each of Edmund and Albert will not affect each of their Australian citizenships.
I have given additional consideration to the issue of whether an adoption order made by this court might sever any interests that each of Edmund and Albert might have in the estate of Max who has now died. As stated above, s 67(3) of the Adoption and Children Act stipulates that after an adoption order is made, the adopted person is to be regarded solely as the child of the adopted parents and the adopted person’s ties (at least in a legal sense) to their birth parents are severed. However, s 69(4) of the Adoption and Children Act makes it clear that s 67(3) does not prejudice any qualifying interest (defined as an interest vested in possession in the adopted person before the adoption), any interest expectant (whether immediately or not) upon a qualifying interest or any contingent interest (other than a contingent interest in remainder) which the adopted person has immediately before the adoption in the estate of a deceased parent, whether testate or intestate. I am therefore satisfied that an adoption order by this court in favour of each of Edmund and Albert will not affect any interests they might have in Max’s estate or any benefits given to them under Max’s will.
Making no order and maintaining the status quo of Albert, which is that Albert would remain under the parental responsibility of the Minister until he reaches 18 years of age, would be highly detrimental to him. It would cause ongoing stress of instability, insecurity and uncertainty regarding the life and care of Albert with Renée and Gerard. Additionally, maintaining the status quo would also mean that Albert would remain a ward of the state until he attains the age of 18 years and that Renée and Gerard would be unable to make significant decisions in regard to Albert without the approval of the Minister’s delegate.
If I were to maintain the status quo and make no order, this would mean that Renée and Gerard would not be legally recognised as parents to Edmund and Albert, despite Renée and Gerard diligently fulfilling their duties as parents and each of Edmund and Albert expressing their strong desire to be adopted by them. It would also place additional pressures on the placement of Albert, owing to the need for Renée and Gerard to seek consents and approvals regarding decisions about Albert on an ongoing basis. An adoption order has the advantages of certainty and permanency. Making no order risks that Edmund and Albert may experience insecurity, uncertainty and ongoing trauma, or at least internal disquiet, arising, for instance, from the fact that Edmund and Albert would continue to be the foster-children of Renée and Gerard rather than their children, at least so far as the law is concerned. Edmund and Albert are deserving of a more certain outcome.
The same can be said for an order allocating long-term parental responsibility of Albert to Renée and Gerard under a guardianship order. While achieving some of the functional aims served by an adoption order, a guardianship order lacks the symbolic and expressive value of a formal adoption order. Not only would such an order expire when Albert attains 18 years of age, it also lacks the permanence and sense of ongoing belonging afforded by an adoption order. Such shortcomings were remarked upon in A Child Proposed for Adoption [2019] NSWSC 1653 by Slattery J at [165] as follows:
An order allocating parental responsibility to the proposed adoptive parents would address some deficiencies arising with the alternative of maintaining the status quo. An order allocating parental responsibility to the proposed adoptive parents would allow them to make significant decisions about the child. But it still lacks the permanency of an adoption order: Adoption of NG (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 680, (at [75]-[82]). And a major disadvantage of this alternative is that when the child reaches 18 years of age [they] would lose [their] legal connection to the proposed adoptive parents and their children, despite the reality that the proposed adoptive parents have been acting in the role of [their] parents almost since [their] birth.
I am therefore of the view that a guardianship order will not be a suitable alternative for Albert and his care.
In light of all of the above, together with my consideration of each of the matters contained in s 8(2) of the Adoption Act, I am persuaded that the interests of each of Edmund and Albert are best served by an adoption order in favour of Renée and Gerard. This course is clearly preferable to the alternatives to adoption, and it is what Edmund and Albert clearly wish. I place strong emphasis on each of their “voices”.
46 What is an adoption plan?
(1) An adoption plan is a plan agreed to by two or more of the parties to the adoption of a child that includes provisions relating to—
(a) the making of arrangements for the exchange of information between the parties in relation to any one or more of the following—
(i) the child’s medical background or condition,
(ii) the child’s development and important events in the child’s life,
(iii) the means and nature of contact between the parties and the child, and
(b) any other matter relating to the adoption of the child.
(2) Without limiting the matters for which an adoption plan may make provision—
(a) it may set out the ways in which the child is to be assisted to develop a healthy and positive cultural identity and for links with that heritage to be fostered, and
(b) it may provide for the giving of certain financial and other assistance as referred to in section 201.
(2A) A birth parent who has not consented to the adoption of a child (a non-consenting birth parent) is, as far as possible, to be given the opportunity to participate in the development of, and agree to, an adoption plan in relation to the child.
…
The Adoption Regulation 2015 (NSW) does not contain any requirements in respect of an application for registration of an adoption plan.
There is a maternal adoption plan and a paternal adoption plan prepared in these proceedings for Albert in accordance with the requirements in s 46 of the Adoption Act. Edmund does not require a maternal adoption plan or a paternal adoption plan as he has attained the age of 18 years.
A maternal adoption plan for Albert was signed by Albert, Edmund, Pierre, Renée and Gerard on 15 February 2026 and by Jennifer McDonald, Acting Principal Officer, Key Assets Australia on 18 February 2026. The maternal adoption plan was not signed by Tina.
In summary, the maternal adoption plan provides for:
telephone and electronic communication (in the form of email exchanges and video calls) between Albert and Tina, Hermine, Robert and Mariam, including exchanges of photographs and gifts, as mutually desired and in accordance with the wishes of Albert;
face-to-face family contact visits between Albert and Tina, Hermine, Robert and Mariam to occur in the event that Albert visits the UK or Tina, Hermine, Robert or Mariam visit Australia;
ensuring that Renée and Gerard facilitate and foster the British and Australian dual cultural heritage of Albert and supporting him with his Catholic upbringing; and
financial assistance by the DCJ for a one-off trip to the UK, where the maternal birth family members of Albert reside.
A paternal adoption plan for Albert was signed by Albert, Edmund, Pierre, Renée and Gerard on 15 February 2026 and by Jennifer McDonald, Acting Principal Officer, Key Assets Australia on 18 February 2026.
In summary, the paternal adoption plan provides for:
face-to-face family contact visits with Louise at a minimum of seven times per year, for at least one hour, at a mutually agreeable time and location;
face-to-face family contact visits with the paternal uncle, aunt and cousins of Albert at a minimum of three times per year, for at least three hours, at a mutually agreeable time and location;
telephone and electronic communication (in the form of email exchanges and video calls) between Albert and Louise, the paternal uncle, aunt and cousins, including exchanges of photographs and gifts, as mutually desired and in accordance with the wishes of Albert;
ensuring that Renée and Gerard facilitate and foster the British and Australian dual cultural heritage of Albert and supporting him with his Catholic upbringing; and
financial assistance by the DCJ for a one-off trip to Melbourne, where the paternal birth family members of Albert reside.
In accordance with s 90(2) of the Adoption Act, I consider that the arrangements proposed in the maternal adoption plan and the paternal adoption plan are in the best interests of Albert and are proper in the circumstances.
For the reasons given above, I make the following orders and notations:
Order pursuant to s 23 of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW) that Edmund Luigi Andrea Wilmore be adopted by adopting parents Renée Madeline Helen Morrel and Gerard Raoul Morrel.
Order pursuant to s 23 of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW) that Albert Edward Fernand Wilmore be adopted by adopting parents Renée Madeline Helen Morrel and Gerard Raoul Morrel.
Order pursuant to s 101(1) of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW) for the approval of the name “Wilmore” as the surname and “Edmund Luigi Andrea” as the given names of the child.
Order pursuant to s 101(1) of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW) for the approval of the name “Wilmore” as the surname and “Albert Edward Fernand” as the given names of the child.
It is noted that the court is satisfied by the arrangements proposed in the maternal adoption plan signed by Albert Edward Fernand Wilmore, Edmund Luigi Andrea Wilmore, Pierre Lucien Franz Wilmore, Renée Madeline Helen Morrel and Gerard Raoul Morrel on 15 February 2026 and by Jennifer McDonald, Acting Principal Officer, Key Assets Australia on 18 February 2026, a copy of which will be annexed to these orders and marked “A”, and finds this maternal adoption plan to be in the best interests of Albert Edward Fernand Wilmore and proper in the circumstances.
It is noted that the court is satisfied by the arrangements proposed in the paternal adoption plan signed by Albert Edward Fernand Wilmore, Edmund Luigi Andrea Wilmore, Pierre Lucien Franz Wilmore, Renée Madeline Helen Morrel and Gerard Raoul Morrel on 15 February 2026 and by Jennifer McDonald, Acting Principal Officer, Key Assets Australia on 18 February 2026, a copy of which will be annexed to these orders and marked “B”, and finds this paternal adoption plan to be in the best interests of Albert Edward Fernand Wilmore and proper in the circumstances.
It is noted that no parent ages are to be recorded on the adoptive birth certificates of Edmund Luigi Andrea Wilmore and that the court is satisfied that this is in the best interests of Edmund Luigi Andrea Wilmore and is appropriate in the circumstances.
It is noted that no parent ages are to be recorded on the adoptive birth certificates of Albert Edward Fernand Wilmore and that the court is satisfied that this is in the best interests of Albert Edward Fernand Wilmore and is appropriate in the circumstances.
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