Technology Leasing Limited v TMAC Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 239 | Case summary

FACTS 3 By statement of claim filed on 9 June 2010, Technology Leasing alleges that on or about 9 April 2008 it entered into a Rental lease agreement ('the lease agreement') with the first respondent ('TMAC'), the fourth respondent ('McGrath') and the fifth respondent ('Bowes'). Such agreement was signed on or about 27 February 2008 by McGrath and Bowes as guarantors of the obligations of TMAC. Pursuant to such agreement, Technology Leasing agreed to acquire and lease to TMAC a NEC digital telephone system. McGrath and Bowes agreed to guarantee the punctual payment of monthly rental instalments and other monies which TMAC agreed to pay. 4 The statement of claim alleges breaches by TMAC and McGrath and Bowes of their obligations under the lease agreement. Paragraphs 24 and 25 of the statement of claim contains the following allegations of breach of contract by McGrath and Bowes: 24. By letter dated 14 July 2009, the Applicant demanded that the Fourth and Fifth Respondents pay the sum of $60,174.67 to the Applicant. 25. In breach of their obligations under the Guarantee provision of the First Agreement, the Fourth and Fifth Respondents have not paid the sums of $60,174.67 and $6,017.47 totalling $66,192.14, nor interest, to the Applicant. 5 In consequence of the alleged breaches of the lease agreement by McGrath and Bowes as guarantors, Technology Leasing claims liquidated damages from those parties. 6 On 29 June 2010 a defence was filed in which McGrath and Bowes did not admit to the breaches alleged against them. Further, on the same day both McGrath and Bowes filed a statement of cross-claim claiming damages against Technology Leasing and other parties arising out of, inter alia, breaches of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). 7 On 30 July 2010 Technology Leasing filed its defence to the cross-claim. 8 On 15 October 2010 an amended statement of cross-claim was filed in the proceedings against Technology Leasing and other parties. In such cross-claim McGrath became the third claimant. Bowes did not participate in this cross-claim. 9 On 2 November 2010 Technology Leasing filed its defence to the amended cross-claim. 10 On 16 November 2010 a notice of withdrawal of solicitor for TMAC, McGrath and Bowes was filed. Also on 16 November 2010, TMAC, McGrath and Bowes purported to discontinue the cross-claims against Technology Leasing. It was not clear whether the notice of discontinuance was intended to discontinue both the amended cross claim as well as the original cross claim. However, on 17 March 2011 a notice of discontinuance of the amended cross-claim was filed on behalf of McGrath. Accordingly, neither McGrath nor Bowes now have any current cross-claims against Technology Leasing.

CONSIDERATION 11 Accordingly, the current position is that McGrath and Bowes have withdrawn any defence to the allegations made against them in Technology Leasing's statement of claim filed on 9 June 2010. 12 The affidavit attaches a copy of the lease agreement. Such document includes the signatures of McGrath and Bowes as guarantors of TMAC's obligations under the lease. 13 The affidavit also calculates interest on the liquidated amount claimed. The total amount owing to Technology Leasing is the debt owing under the lease agreement ($60,174.67) plus interest ($9,026.19) totalling $69,200.86. Judgment is claimed for this amount against McGrath and Bowes pursuant to their guarantees contained in the lease agreement. 14 Order 35A of the Federal Court Rules ('the Rules') makes provision for the making of default judgments. Order 35A r 3(2) provides: (2) If a respondent is in default, the Court may: (a) … (b) if the claim against the respondent is for a debt or liquidated damages - grant leave to the applicant to enter judgment against the respondent for the debt or liquidated damages and, if appropriate: (i) costs: (A) in a sum fixed by the Court; or (B) to be taxed; and (ii) interest; or Subparagraph (c) continues: (c) if the proceeding was commenced by an application supported by a Statement of Claim or the Court has ordered that the proceeding continue on pleadings -- give judgment against the respondent for the relief that: (i) the applicant appears entitled to on the Statement of Claim; and (ii) the Court is satisfied it has power to grant; or (d) … 15 In this instance a statement of claim was filed and as a consequence of the withdrawal of the defence, there is no defence to the action on behalf of TMAC, McGrath and Bowes. 16 To be entitled to a default judgment pursuant to O 35A r 3(2) it is not necessary that the Court have proof of an applicant's claim, provided there is a claim for relief which the Court has jurisdiction to grant upon the face of the statement of claim: see Arthur v Vaupotic Investments Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 433; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v 1Cellnet LLC [2005] FCA 856; Luna Park Sydney Pty Limited (ACN 102 907 184) v Bose [2006] FCA 94. That is, default judgment may be entered in such instances with minimal formality. 17 Both McGrath and Bowes, by the withdrawal of their defences, prima facie acknowledge liability to Technology Leasing. Based upon the above authorities and O 35A r 3(2), the Court is satisfied that the content of the statement of claim, the affidavit showing the debt and interest outstanding and the annexed lease agreement to the affidavit, entitles Technology Leasing to default judgment against McGrath and Bowes. 18 As to costs, the Court has power to award costs in the exercise of its discretion: see s 43(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). Indemnity costs may be awarded where a party has engaged in misconduct or inappropriate conduct in the course of litigation. As was observed by Rogers CJ Comm D in AWA Ltd v George Richard Daniels T/A Deloitte Haskins and Sells (unreported, No 50271 of 1991, NSWSC Comm D, 8 October 1992, BC9201567), misconduct or inappropriate conduct by a party in the course of litigation may warrant an order for indemnity costs. His Honour said: This could include deliberately delaying the proceedings by putting a knowingly false defence, or bringing proceedings for an ulterior motive… 19 When leave was granted by the Court on 10 November 2010 to allow TMAC, McGrath and Bowes to withdraw their defence, an order for costs was made. However, the costs order did not provide for any costs order against McGrath. 20 The Court will order McGrath to pay Technology Leasing's costs incurred in relation to McGrath's defence on an indemnity basis. 21 There has been no explanation provided why the defence was put before the Court by McGrath and Bowes or why it was withdrawn. Accordingly, the Court will order both McGrath and Bowes to pay the costs of Technology Leasing of this motion on an indemnity basis. I certify that the preceding twenty-one (21) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Cowdroy.

Technology Leasing Limited v TMAC Pty Ltd

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