Taylor v Vukovic [2000] VSC 29

Supreme Court of Victoria|2000-02-09|Before: Eames J

A victim of crime must apply for compensation within six months of the offender being convicted, not within six months of sentencing. Here, the offender pleaded guilty in April 1999 but wasn't sentenced until May 1999. The victim applied in November 1999—within six months of sentencing but more than six months after the guilty plea. The Supreme Court held the application was out of time and dismissed it, though no costs were awarded against the victim because the delay between plea and sentencing was unusually long and likely caused the confusion.

The application for compensation in this case was dated and filed with the court on 18 November 1999 and accordingly was beyond six months from the day on which the plea of guilty was entered, although it was within ten days of six months running from the date of sentence. The terms of s.86(5)(a) make it clear, in my opinion, however, that the time period of six months in this case must run from the day on which the plea of guilty was entered, by which plea Mr Vukovic was convicted. In those circumstances the application which is brought here is out of time and accordingly the court has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. That conclusion is one which counsel before me do not seek to challenge and, indeed, accept that it is the correct interpretation of the legislation as it relates to the circumstances of this case.

I add that Dr Taylor retains his civil rights to claim damages at common law. That entitlement to take proceedings, apart from the application for compensation under the Sentencing Act, is retained for him by the terms of s.86(10). Accordingly, he may if he chooses bring such proceedings as he deems appropriate for damages at common law. That, however, is a matter separate and distinct from the application before me, which application, as I have said, must be dismissed by virtue of the failure to bring proceedings within the time prescribed.

Application has been made for costs by counsel for Mr Vukovic, but in all the circumstances it seems to me appropriate that no order as to costs should be made and that all parties should bear their own costs. In making that order I have regard to the fact that the Act itself by s.86(9D) provides that in such proceedings each party must bear their own costs of the proceeding unless the court otherwise determines. Whilst the court has a discretion, therefore, to make an order for costs, and whilst it might be that in many circumstances an application brought out of time would lead to a costs consequence for the person who brought the application, it seems to me in all the circumstances that the justice of the situation is that an order for costs should not be made. The fact that the proceedings were brought out of time, as I indicated in the course of discussion with counsel, most probably was an unfortunate consequence of the fact that the sentencing in this case was delayed for a period beyond that which would normally be the situation. Whatever the circumstances may have been which led to that, in my view a costs consequence should not flow against the applicant, and accordingly my orders will be:

The application will be dismissed and there will be no order as to costs.

I direct that a copy of these reasons be placed on the court file.

Outcomedefendant

Disposition:

Application dismissed; no order as to costs

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