(a) legal costs reasonably incurred by the persons entitled to compensation in connection with the compulsory acquisition of the land,
(b) valuation fees reasonably incurred by those persons in connection with the compulsory acquisition of the land,
…
61 Special provision relating to market value assessed on potential of land
If the market value of land is assessed on the basis that the land had potential to be used for a purpose other than that for which it is currently used, compensation is not payable in respect of:
(a) any financial advantage that would necessarily have been forgone in realising that potential, and
(b) any financial loss that would necessarily have been incurred in realising that potential."
8 The Just Terms Act includes the following relevant principles. First, it is a code in relation to the matters to which regard must be had in determining the amount of compensation: s 55 (with its reference to "only"). Secondly, the amount of compensation has to be just: ss 3(1)(b), 54(1). Thirdly, there is a guarantee that the amount of compensation will be not less than the market value of the land at the acquisition date: ss 3(1)(a), 10(1)(a). Fourthly, market value has the classic meaning of a price agreed between a hypothetical willing but not anxious seller and buyer. Fifthly, market value has to disregard any increase or decrease in the value of the land caused by the carrying out of, or the proposal to carry out, the public purpose for which the land was acquired: s 56(1)(a). Sixthly, market value has to take into account not only the land's actual use but its potential use at the acquisition date: ss 56(1), 61(a). The value of the potential depends upon how good was the chance, at the acquisition date, of the potential being realised. The chance may be virtually certain at one end of the spectrum or a mere speculative hope at the other. In Liverpool City Council v Commonwealth (1993) 46 FCR 67 at 83, 81 LGERA 405:
"In a case where the task of assessing compensation comes down to the evaluation of a chance, it will rarely be possible to demonstrate that any particular figure is correct. I certainly cannot do so in this case. I can only consider all the relevant factors and make a judgment about them; a 'best guess' perhaps."
9 The statutory provisions are illuminated by the authorities I reviewed in Walker Corporation Pty Ltd v Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority [2009] NSWLEC 219, 173 LGERA 155 and McDonald v Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW [2009] NSWLEC 105, 169 LGERA 352. In Walker Corporation Pty Ltd v Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority [2008] HCA 5, 233 CLR 259 at [51] the High Court said:
"The opening words of the definition in s 56(1) ('means the amount that would have been paid for the land if it had been sold at that time by a willing but not anxious seller to a willing but not anxious buyer') reflect what for a century has been taken from Spencer v The Commonwealth . That case arose under the tersely expressed provisions of the first federal legislation in the field, the Property for Public Purposes Acquisition Act 1901 (Cth). Section 19(1) thereof spoke merely of 'the value of the land taken'. The result of the judicial exegesis in Spencer was summed up by McHugh J in Kenny & Good Pty Ltd v MGICA (1992) Ltd as follows:
'Value is determined by forming an opinion as to what a willing purchaser will pay and a not unwilling vendor will receive for the property. In determining that value, there must be attributed to the parties a knowledge of all matters that affect its value. Those matters will include the predicted impact of future events as well as the experience of the past and the rates of return on other investments. As Isaacs J pointed out in Spencer v The Commonwealth : 'We must further suppose both to be perfectly acquainted with the land, and cognisant of all circumstances which might affect its value, either advantageously or prejudicially, including its situation, character, quality, proximity to conveniences or inconveniences, its surrounding features, the then present demand for land, and the likelihood, as then appearing to persons best capable of forming an opinion, of a rise or fall for what reason soever in the amount which one would otherwise be willing to fix as the value of the property. (Emphasis added.)'
The market for the property is, therefore, assumed to be an efficient market in which buyers and sellers have access to all currently available information that affects the property"
10 English authorities were reviewed by the House of Lords in Transport for London (London Underground Ltd) v Spirerose Ltd [2009] UKHL 44, 1 WLR 1797, 4 All ER 810 but in New South Wales they must be approached with caution for it is the provisions of the Just Terms Act that are determinative: Walker HCA at [47].
11 "In the field of judicial valuations, the task is ultimately evaluative. Within limits, courts do not require every step to be separately justified": Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Hurstville City Council [2001] NSWCA 11, 112 LGERA 223 at [50]. As Isaacs J said in Spencer v The Commonwealth (1907) 5 CLR 418 at 442 quoting the Privy Council in Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs v Charlesworth, Pilling & Co [1901] AC 373 at 391:
"It is quite true that in all valuations, judicial or other, there must be room for inferences and inclinations of opinion which, being more or less conjectural, are difficult to reduce to exact reasoning or to explain to others. Everyone who has gone through the process is aware of this lack of demonstrative proof in his own mind, and knows that every expert witness called before him has had his own set of conjectures, of more or less weight according to his experience and personal sagacity. In such an inquiry as the present, relating to subjects abounding with uncertainties and on which there is little experience, there is more than ordinary room for such guesswork; and it would be very unfair to require an exact exposition of reasons for the conclusions arrived at."