The complaints brought by Mr Tarpey against the first, second, third and fourth respondents are dismissed.

1. Mr Tarpey and his wife are divorced. They have a daughter Charlotte who was born on 15 December 1999. Mr Tarpey contends that in April 2004, his former wife applied to enrol Charlotte at the Albert Park Primary School without consultation with him. He believes this was in breach of Family Court orders. He says he contacted the school in August 2004 and received confirmation of the intended enrolment but was unable to speak with the principal who failed to return his call. He believes the school should have contacted him about his daughter's enrolment.
2. Charlotte commenced schooling at Albert Park Primary School on 31 January 2005 and on that day Mr Tarpey wrote to the school principal Although he stated in the opening phrases of the letter that he "not want to come into any conflict with any member of your school fraternity" the general tone of the letter was unpleasant and intemperate. From that time on, this saga of anger and conflict seems to have spun out of control giving rise to litigation in the Magistrates Court, the County Court, the Family Court and now this Tribunal.
3. In May 2008 Mr Tarpey made a series of complaints to the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission ("the Commission"). The first was a complaint brought against the State of Victoria - Department of Education and Early Childhood Development. The complaint was one of discrimination on the basis of sex and physical features in the area of goods and services as well as authorising and assisting discrimination on the basis of sex. The second complaint was brought against Mr David Hatherill, the principal of Albert Park Primary School. The complaint was one of discrimination on the basis of sex in the area of goods and services. The third complaint was against Ms Elaine Mills. She was the vice-principal of the school and this complaint was of discrimination on the basis of sex and physical features in the area of goods and services. Finally, there was a complaint against Ms Bridene Forrest, an administration officer at the school, alleging discrimination on the basis of sex in the area of goods and services.
4. On 17 July 2008 the Commission advised Mr Tarpey that it had decided to decline to entertain his complaints. Mr Tarpey advised the Commission that he wished the complaints referred to this Tribunal for hearing and this occurred on 9 October 2008. Mr Tarpey's summaries of complaint are set out below.

The School enrolled my daughter Charlotte without advising me and have refused to communicate with me with regard to her care and development; however it kept in constant contact with Charlotte's mother. David Hatherill and Elaine Mills unfairly obtained Intervention Orders against me and a number of other fathers with children at Albert Park Primary School in order to legitimise their refusal to communicate with me as a parent. The Department of Education have provided legal representation for its staff in these actions and therefore assisted them to treat me unfairly. Accordingly, I believe that the State of Victoria - Department of Education and Early Childhood Development has discriminated against me on the basis of sex and physical features in the area of goods and services and authorised and assisted discrimination against me on the basis of sex and physical features.

David Hatherill was the Principal of my daughter's school. The School enrolled my daughter Charlotte without advising me and refused to communicate with me with regard to her care and development; however it kept in constant contact with Charlotte's mother. David Hatherill unfairly obtained an Intervention Order against me and a number of other fathers with children at Albert Park Primary School in order to legitimise his refusal to communicate with me as a parent. Accordingly, I believe that David Hatherill has discriminated against me on the basis of sex in the area of goods and services.

Elaine Mills is the Vice-Principal of my daughter's school. The School enrolled my daughter Charlotte without advising me and have refused to communicate with me with regard to her care and development; however Elaine Mills kept in contact with Charlotte's mother. Elaine Mills unfairly obtained an Intervention order against me saying that she found me threatening, including a reference to my physical size. I believe she obtained an Intervention Order to enhance David Hatherill's application and that this was done to legitimise their refusal to communicate with me about Charlotte's education and welfare. I had never met, spoken or had any idea who Elaine Mills was. I believe that Elaine Mills has discriminated against me on the basis of sex and physical features in the area of goods and services.

Bridene Forrest instigated false reports to child welfare authorities and police that I had kidnapped my daughter in 2005 and then gave evidence to the Family Court in November 2007 that she believed I had done this, despite no charges having been laid against me. I believe she did this in order to legitimise the School's refusal to communicate with me about my daughter, because I am male. Accordingly, I believe that Bridene Forrest has discriminated against me on the basis of sex in the area of goods and services.

1. The respondents now seek to strike out the various claims and have filed comprehensive submissions in support of their application brought pursuant to section 75 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 "the VCAT Act"). Mr Tarpey for his part has responded to the submissions.
2. At the outset I should dispose of one part of the preliminary point put by the respondents' counsel. In the material filed and served by Mr Tarpey in response to the respondents' submissions he seems to have included, as part of his case, a claim of discrimination arising from two new attributes - that is, "parental status or status as a carer" and "marital status." Neither of those attributes was the subject of the original complaint to the Commission and for that reason I will have no regard to that portion of his submissions insofar as they articulate complaints concerning those attributes. In the case of all the respondents, Mr Tarpey's complaint was either based on sex, or on sex and physical features.
3. The major thrust of the respondents' case is that even if discrimination occurred (which is denied), it did not occur in the provision of goods and services and so does not contravene section 42 of the Equal Opportunity Act 1995 ("the Act").
4. The Victoria legislation provides that it is unlawful to discriminate against another person on the basis of an attribute covered by the Act in the provision of goods and services in certain limited ways. In particular section 42 provides that -

(1) A person must not discriminate against another person-

(a) by refusing to provide goods or services to the other person;

(b) in the terms on which goods or services are provided to the others person

(c) by subjecting the other person to any other detriment in connection with the provision of goods or services to him or her.

(2) Subsection (1) applies whether or not the goods or services are provided for payment.

In the case of Mr Tarpey, presumably he relies on paragraph (c).

1. The term "goods" is not defined in the legislation but given its ordinary meaning it is clear that the complainant cannot contend he is provided with goods by any of the respondents.
2. The term "services" is defined in the Act. Section 4 provides that -

"services" includes, without limiting the generality of the word-

(a) access to and use of any place that members of the public are permitted to enter;

(b) banking services, the provision of loans or finance, financial accommodation, credit guarantees and insurance;

(c) provision of entertainment, recreation or refreshment;

(d) services connected with transportation or travel;

(e) services of any profession, trade or business, including those of an employment agent;

(f) services provided by a government department, public authority, State owned enterprise or municipal council-

but does not include education or training in an educational institution; (my emphasis)

1. To my mind there is no justification for giving the word "education" or "training" appearing in the definition anything other than its ordinary meaning. As the respondents have submitted, the meaning of "education" in sub-section (f) of the definition of "services" should be construed as the area of activity relating to education, named and regulated by Division 3 of Part 3 of the Act. The matters complained of in this proceeding relate to the education of the complainant's daughter and thus fall within the area of activity regulated by Division 3 of Part 3 (discrimination in education) of the Act. As the scope of discrimination prohibited by the division is restricted to students and persons seeking to be admitted as students, the conduct the complainant alleges cannot be said to be prohibited.
2. Earlier cases such as Sinnappan v State of Victoria [1995] VicRp 27; [1995] 1 VR 421 wherein the Court of Appeal held that the public education service system constituted a "service" with the meaning of the former section 29(1) were overtaken by amendments to then Act which repealed section 29 and thus left no resulting ambiguity arising from the definition of "services".
3. The grounds upon which the respondents based their claim under section 75 of the VCAT Act is that Mr Tarpey's complaint is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived, lacking in substance or is an abuse of process.
4. The principles to be applied in determining applications such as this were discussed by the Victorian Court of Appeal in Rabel v State Electricity Commission [1998] 1 VR 102 and have consistently been followed by VCAT in many cases including, for example, Norman v Australian Red Cross Society (1998) 14 VAR 243.
5. Relevantly those principles are that the Tribunal should be extremely cautious in summarily dismissing a complaint before evidence can been heard and tested and as a result depriving a litigant of the chance to have his or her case heard in the ordinary course. It follows that it should only strike a matter out where it is satisfied that the case in absolutely hopeless, manifestly untenable in fact or law or otherwise doomed to fail.
6. The crux of Mr Tarpey's complaint is set out in his various responses wherein he iterates his concern that although he has endeavoured on many occasions to liaise with the department he has been either "lied to, misled, not replied to, ridiculed, abused, unfairly accused of aggressive behaviour, had unnecessary interaction with police, accused of kidnapping his own daughter, accused of upsetting his daughter and unfairly discriminated against for more than 4.5 years." He further asserts that the department took out intervention orders, joined in as third party in his Family Court proceedings, refused to answer correspondence, perjured themselves, misled VCAT and Equal Opportunity Commission, misled the Family Court and misled the Magistrates Court.
7. His experience with the school and the other defendants has left him with a feeling of grievous injustice. But of course that is not what invokes the jurisdiction of this Tribunal.
8. There is no doubt that Mr Tarpey possesses relevant attributes (as that term in explained in section 6 of the Act) but the real question for the Tribunal is whether the school provides any "services" to him (clearly it does not provides him with "goods") or whether the case is so manifestly hopeless that it should be struck out or dismissed. Education or training in an educational institution is specifically excluded from the definition and in any event educational services are not provided to Mr Tarpey, only to his daughter.
9. Insofar as the complainant asserts the school should have contacted him concerning Family Court orders, should have contacted him when his daughter broke her arm, humiliated him by serving him with a trespass notice in the presence of others, and the numerous other incidents he catalogues, none of these relates to a service provided to him by the respondents.
10. The respondents have even turned their mind to whether Mr Tarpey might be able to avail himself of the provision in paragraph (a) of the definition of "services" in section 4 of the Act, that is by asserting that he is discriminated against pursuant to section 42 by being denied "access to or use of any place that members of the public are permitted to enter". This contention so strains the intention of the legislation as to be barely credible but the Tribunal is grateful to the respondents' legal counsel for the time they have taken to explore what possibilities might be available to the complainant. Mr Tarpey has not advanced any argument or indicated there would be any evidence forthcoming in relation to what I might call the "access" argument and accordingly it is not necessary for me to consider it further.
11. Notwithstanding Mr Tarpey's frustration at the inability of the legal system to accord him what he sees as justice, I am not persuaded that his case has even a scintilla of a chance of success before this Tribunal operating as it must within the statutory framework provided by the Equal Opportunity Act. He has not advanced any argument (or indicated any evidence would be forthcoming) to support his contention that he has been the recipient of goods and services provided by any of the respondents.
12. For the same reason as set out herein, his claim against the department alleging that it authorised and assisted discrimination on the basis of sex, is doomed to fail.
13. There may be other avenues available to Mr Tarpey but his application to this Tribunal is entirely misconceived, lacking in substance and is manifestly untenable both as to fact and law. His complaints are dismissed.