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[2026] NSWSC 711
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-08-05
Peden J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Tarazi v Paras; Paras v Tarazi (No 2) [2026] NSWSC 711
Hearing dates: 20 July 2026; further submissions received 24 July and 29 July 2026
Date of orders: 05 August 2026
Decision date: 05 August 2026
Jurisdiction: Equity – Probate and Family Provision List – Probate
Before: Peden J
Decision: Final orders made for the appointment of an independent administrator, account of rent received, directions for account, liberty to apply, and for defendants to pay plaintiff's costs, inter alia: at [24]
Catchwords: PROCEDURE — Final orders — Where parties ordered to confer on appropriate orders to give effect to reasons in primary judgment — Where parties could not reach agreement on all orders — Final orders made
Legislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 100
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) rr 20.26, 42.14
Cases Cited: Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 All ER 333
Della Franca v Lorenzato (No 2) [2022] NSWCA 53
El Assaad v Al Haje (No 2) [2025] NSWCA 17
Juul v Northey [2010] NSWCA 211
Northey v Juul [2008] NSWSC 275
Tarazi v Paras; Paras v Tarazi [2026] NSWSC 369
Category: Consequential orders
Parties: Yvonne Tarazi (Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant)
Sophia Paras (First Defendant/First Cross-Claimant)
Anastasia Ualesi (Second Defendant/Second Cross-Claimant)
Representation: Counsel:
S O’Brien (Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant)
K E Burke (Defendants/Cross-Claimants) (hearing on 20 July 2026)
M Evans (Defendants/Cross-Claimants) (written submissions)
Solicitors:
Serenity Legal (Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant)
ELG Legal (Defendants/Cross-Claimants)
File Number(s): 2024/00413859
Publication restriction: Nil
On 15 June 2026, I delivered reasons in this matter, to the effect that the will of the late Ahileas Parastatidis ought to be administered in accordance with its terms, namely, that his residual estate be divided between his three daughters in equal shares as tenants in common: see Tarazi v Paras; Paras v Tarazi [2026] NSWSC 369 (Judgment). I did not accept that Ahileas was bound by any agreement or representation to exclude Yvonne from the will, with the practical of favouring Sophia and Anastasia.
I directed the parties to confer about appropriate orders giving effect to my reasons. They failed to agree on all matters, but did agree on most.
The issues that remain in dispute are:
Whether the independent administrator for the estate, being an experienced lawyer, ought to be paid his usual hourly rate;
Whether all parties ought to be granted liberty to apply in the context of the administration, rather than just the administrator; and
Costs. Yvonne seeks her costs on the ordinary basis up to 1 April 2026, on which date an offer of compromise was served on Sophia and Anastasia, and on an indemnity basis from 2 April 2026 onwards, without recourse to the estate of Ahileas. Sophia and Anastasia seek for costs to be payable on the ordinary basis only.
Each matter is considered below.
At all times during the hearing, Yvonne sought the appointment of an independent administrator who would also carry out an account to the estate. As noted in Judgment at [97], I considered it appropriate to appoint an independent and experienced lawyer as administrator because of the antagonism between the parties.
Sophia and Anastasia were aware that Mr Gerard John Basha was proposed as independent administrator, and were aware from his affidavit of his qualifications, current professional role and hourly rate.
Mr Basha was not cross-examined at the hearing. No submission was made that he was not a fit and proper person to carry out the role of independent administrator. No other alternative independent administrator was proposed at the hearing.
In written submissions on their proposed final orders, Sophia and Anastasia submitted the estate should be administered by the NSW Trustee and Guardian, which charges a one-off executor fee, or Mr Phillip Davis, a solicitor who charges an hourly rate of $600 plus GST.
I consider the time to have proposed an alternative independent administrator was at the hearing, not after judgment was delivered. I further note Mr Basha will engage the assistance of a senior associate, lawyers and paralegals at lower hourly rates of charge.
I consider Mr Basha is a highly appropriate person to be appointed to the role of administrator and, in light of the work to be undertaken, do not consider his fees excessive. I will appoint him and allow him to charge his usual hourly rate of $750 plus GST carrying out the role as administrator and trustee.
I already indicated to the parties that I am not prepared to allow Mr Basha to be paid from the estate in respect of “non-professional” services rendered by him, in circumstances where Mr Basha will act as a professional administrator and trustee.
Sophia and Anastasia also took issue with orders 7 and 9 proposed by Yvonne, which provided for Sophia and Anastasia to account for rent received on a wilful default basis; those orders did not provide for outgoing expenses. I note the time for parties to contest proposed orders has long passed. In any event, as I found in Judgment at [72], there was no clear delineation between their personal living expenses, including, for example, electricity, and expenses relevant to the rented part of the building, meaning any outgoings are difficult, if not impossible, to account for accurately.
However, as accepted by Yvonne, Sophia and Anastasia are entitled to a claim for “just allowance” in respect of expenses properly incurred in improving the Ashbury property: Northey v Juul [2008] NSWSC 275 at [66]-[73] (Macready AsJ) (and citations there) (finding not disturbed on appeal: see Juul v Northey [2010] NSWCA 211).
It is usual to grant an independent administrator/trustee liberty to apply to the Court if an issue arises during their role, in relation to which they require guidance or orders to be made. I grant Mr Basha as administrator liberty to apply to the Court for further or other orders as may be required, including for the taking of accounts of the estate and in respect of Sophia and Anastasia’s liability to account on a wilful default basis.
It is not usual to grant all parties liberty to apply. The dispute between the parties has been determined. It is not expected that any party will have another attempt at litigating that which was or could have been litigated before the Court during the hearing. Only if it was appropriate would the parties be heard in relation to an issue raised by the administrator. Sophia and Anastasia agreed that liberty to apply should be limited to the administrator.
I will not grant the parties liberty to apply. That does not prevent them from exercising any right they otherwise have to access the Court for legitimate purposes.
Yvonne seeks her costs partly on an indemnity basis, by reason of her unaccepted offer.
On 1 April 2026, Yvonne made an offer of compromise to Sophia and Anastasia pursuant to r 20.26 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR), and in the alternative, pursuant to the principles in Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 All ER 333 (Calderbank). The offer was open for acceptance until 30 April 2026, and provided the following relevant terms:
Sophia and Anastasia pay Yvonne the sum of $768,000 within 14 days of the orders being entered (representing a one-third share of the Ashbury property, based on a provided valuation report dated 19 February 2025 which valued the Ashbury property at $2,100,000);
The proceedings and cross-claim be dismissed; and
No order as to costs with the intent that the parties would bear their own costs of the proceedings.
Sophia and Anastasia did not accept Yvonne’s offer.
Offers made under r 20.26 UCPR carry a presumptive entitlement to indemnity costs where the plaintiff obtains a judgment no less favourable to the plaintiff than the terms of its offer to the defendant: r 42.14 UCPR.
Yvonne’s offer forewent any entitlement she had to the total rental income from the property since Ahileas’ death. In Judgment at [98], I found Sophia and Anastasia are liable to account to the estate for the use of the Ashbury property. The judgment Yvonne obtained is therefore “no less favourable” to Yvonne.
In the alternative that Yvonne’s offer was a Calderbank offer, I am satisfied that an indemnity costs order is justified given: see generally Della Franca v Lorenzato (No 2) [2022] NSWCA 53 at [47] (Brereton J), in circumstances where:
The final judgment is no more favourable to Sophia and Anastasia;
I consider their rejection of the offer was unreasonable in circumstances where Yvonne’s position resisting Sophia and Anastasia’s claim of entitlement to the Ashbury property as set out in the covering letter to her offer remained unchanged at the hearing, the time allowed to consider the offer was reasonable (the offer was open for 28 days and provided for payment within 14 days of orders, ie Sophia and Anastasia had a period of up to six weeks to make payment), the extent of the compromise was reasonable, and the terms of the offer were clearly set out: see El Assaad v Al Haje (No 2) [2025] NSWCA 17 at [45] (Ward P, Ball JA and Price AJA); and
The offer sufficiently foreshadowed its use on the question of costs.
As the offer was made before the first day of the trial, indemnity costs are payable from the beginning of the day following the day on which the offer was made, being 2 April 2026: r 42.14(2)(b)(i) UCPR.
Orders for appointment of independent administrator
(a) To be paid from the estate all usual and proper charges at the usual hourly rates as are charged by the legal practice in which he is engaged, currently $750 per hour plus GST, and on the usual terms as to payment of that practice:
(i) For his work as administrator or trustee, or both; (ii) For the professional services rendered by him or that legal practice in the administration of the estate of the deceased or the trusts of the will, or both; and
(b) To engage the services of any other legal practitioner, accountant or other professional adviser in relation to the administration of the estate where he considers it necessary to do so and to pay from the estate the costs incurred in having those services provided.
Orders to account for rent received
Directions for account
(a) The nature and value of the estate, by way of inventory of property; (b) All moneys (capital and income), received, including but not limited to rent received from the Ashbury property; (c) Any assets that have been re-invested; (d) Any monies disbursed by her, or by any other person on her behalf; (e) The dealings and transactions, including, but not limited to, the transfer of unrealised assets; (f) Any assets transferred, including any in specie distributions; (g) Any assets that remain undistributed and unrealised; (h) If any asset loss has occurred, the nature and value of that loss; (i) Any amounts expended on professional assistance such as a solicitor, accountant, valuer, or real estate agent, and any authority to pay the amounts so expended; (j) Any amounts deducted by the first defendant for commission, or otherwise, which he has obtained out of the estate; and (k) A reconciliation of the funds held as at the date of the serving of the accounts.
(a) In respect of each payment, or receipt, the date and the amount thereof; (b) To whom the payment was made, or from whom the payment was received; and (c) The purpose or account for, or to which, the amount was paid, or received, as the case may be.
Liberty to apply
Costs