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[2021] HCA 15
mixed. The grant of special leave to appeal on the second ground revoked with costs. Appeal dismissed. Special leave to cross-appeal granted and cross-appeals allowed. Orders of the Court of Appeal set aside...
The High Court decided that when Jan Emil Talacko and his family secretly donated valuable Czech properties to his sons to stop his siblings collecting on a big court judgment, this immediately destroyed the value of the siblings' legal rights. That completed the tort of conspiracy using unlawful means. The Court said the loss was not just a 'chance' that might or might not happen later; it was a real drop in the worth of their existing court rights the moment the donation papers were signed. A slim 20 per cent chance of winning a long and expensive separate case in Czech courts against the sons did not reduce the damages, because that case was too uncertain, against different people, and not something the victims had to try before claiming their loss. The damages were increased to 75 per cent of the judgment amount. The original appeal by Judith was dismissed and the siblings' cross-appeal succeeded.
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3,016 words · generated 24/04/2026
The underlying dispute began after the 1989 Velvet Revolution when properties confiscated under communist rule were restored to Jan Emil Talacko, the only sibling then resident in Czechoslovakia and therefore eligible to claim. The Properties included prime buildings in Prague, agricultural land at Řepy and Kbely, a forest at Suchá and an apartment in Dresden. Helena and Peter, who had remained in Australia, asserted that Jan Emil held any restored properties on trust for all three siblings. This led to 1998 Supreme Court of Victoria proceedings alleging breach of fiduciary duty.
Those proceedings settled on 23 February 2001. Clause 1 required Jan Emil to transfer title to most of the Properties (excluding the Prague properties) to nominees of Helena and Peter's estate. Clause 6 provided for equitable compensation if he failed to do so, on the premise that failure would constitute an admission of the alleged breach of fiduciary duty. Jan Emil refused to execute transfer documents. The first to fifth respondents did not seek specific performance or damages in lieu. Instead they obtained reinstatement of the 1998 proceeding and, in April 2008, Osborn J held that Jan Emil had breached the settlement agreement and that clause 6 was enforceable ([4]-[7]).
Before quantum was determined, Jan Emil executed the Donation Agreement on 12 May 2009. He transferred the Prague properties, Řepy and Kbely land to his sons David and Paul. The agreements were signed the day after he received legal advice about potential criminal liability for earlier transfers and in direct contradiction of affidavits given to the Victorian court that he would not dispose of assets. Two days later registration of the transfers was applied for in Prague.
Kyrou J delivered the quantum judgment on 24 November 2009, assessing equitable compensation at two-thirds of the value of the clause 6 properties plus two-thirds of net rental income. The final order on 11 December 2009 quantified the debt at €10,073,818 together with indemnity costs. Appeals were dismissed. Jan Emil was declared bankrupt in 2011. Enforcement proceedings in the Czech Republic were ultimately rendered worthless because the bankruptcy stay prevented issue of a valid certificate under the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) (Talacko v Bennett (2017) 260 CLR 124).
The first to fifth respondents also commenced the Donation Agreement Proceedings in the Prague District Court under s 42a of the Czech Civil Code. That provision permits a creditor to claim directly against a donee if the donation was made within three years to defeat creditors and the donee knew of that purpose. Expert evidence before McDonald J established that success would not revest title but would allow a monetary claim against David and Paul personally.
In July 2009 the Victorian proceeding that reached the High Court was issued. It alleged unlawful means conspiracy, among other claims. McDonald J in 2015 found that all elements of the tort were proved except loss or damage. He characterised any loss as contingent on the failure of the Czech proceedings. The Court of Appeal in 2017 held that loss was suffered immediately upon entry into the Donation Agreement because it impaired the value of the chose in action recognised by Osborn J. On remitter McDonald J assessed prior to the Donation Agreement a 75 per cent chance of recovery through bankruptcy processes. After the Donation Agreement that prospect was reduced to 20 per cent by reason of the Czech proceedings. He therefore awarded 55 per cent of the judgment sum. He also awarded the reasonably incurred costs of the Czech proceedings as a separate head of loss, subject to minor recoverable amounts.
The Court of Appeal in 2020 upheld the 20 per cent discount. Special leave was granted to Judith to appeal to the High Court on whether loss had been suffered at all and whether the 20 per cent discount was correct. The first to fifth respondents cross-appealed the discount. The High Court unanimously dismissed the appeal, allowed the cross-appeals, revoked special leave on one ground, varied the damages to reflect an undiscounted 75 per cent of the chose in action, and ordered Judith to pay the costs of the appeal and cross-appeals.
The Court began by distinguishing two categories of “loss of chance” cases. The first concerns deprivation of an opportunity to which the plaintiff was never entitled; the second concerns diminution in the value of an existing right. The present case fell into the second category. The first to fifth respondents held a chose in action arising from Osborn J’s judgment that clause 6 entitled them to equitable compensation. That chose in action was “something of value” whose worth was capable of immediate impairment ([39]-[40]).
Execution of the Donation Agreement was the very means chosen to achieve the conspirators’ object: to put the most valuable assets beyond the reach of any trustee in bankruptcy. The Court accepted McDonald J’s finding that, absent the Donation Agreement, the first to fifth respondents would have obtained a sequestration order, secured transfer orders under s 77(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), and realised the properties through the trustee. After the Donation Agreement that route was extinguished. The value of the rights against Jan Emil therefore fell to zero immediately ([4], [50]-[52]).
The Court rejected the submission that the loss remained contingent until the Czech courts ruled on the Donation Agreement Proceedings. Wardley Australia Ltd v Western Australia (1992) 175 CLR 514 was distinguished because there the plaintiff had no existing impaired right; the State merely faced a contingent liability under an indemnity. Here an existing right was impaired. It would be “unjust to compel the first to fifth respondents to commence speculative proceedings in the Czech Republic when the existence of this loss was already ascertainable” ([52]).
On quantification the 25 per cent contingency discount (reflecting the possibility that Jan Emil might lawfully have impeded recovery) was not challenged. The 20 per cent discount for the Czech proceedings was, however, impermissible. Those proceedings were against different parties (David and Paul), for a different legal wrong (breach of s 42a rather than breach of fiduciary duty), and in a different jurisdiction. Success was uncertain, could take ten years, and would require further unrecoverable costs. The cause of action under s 42a was not an “extension” of the original rights against Jan Emil; it was a new and collateral right ([57]-[58]).
The Court further held that the speculative 20 per cent prospect could not be treated as a compensating advantage to be brought into account. Even if the respondents ultimately recovered from David and Paul, that sum would be deducted, but the mere chance of such recovery did not reduce the damages payable by the conspirators. To do so would shift the risk of uncertain foreign litigation from the wrongdoers to the victims ([60]-[61]).
On the separate head of loss for expenses of the Donation Agreement Proceedings, the Court accepted that costs reasonably incurred in attempting to undo the consequences of a tort are recoverable once spent. McDonald J’s finding that the second to fifth respondents had incurred €63,217.80 (of which at most €1,800 was recoverable) and the first respondent $107,991.20 was undisturbed. A late attempt by Judith to argue that some expenses might fall outside the scope of liability for reasons of Czech law was rejected both because it had not been run below and because it was contrary to the concession that such costs are a recognised head of damage ([64]-[65]).
Prior to Talacko the law on when loss is suffered in unlawful means conspiracy, particularly where the unlawful means involve dissipation of assets, was unsettled. Wardley stood for the proposition that a mere contingent liability does not constitute damage. Cases such as Hunt & Hunt Lawyers v Mitchell Morgan Nominees Pty Ltd (2013) 247 CLR 613 had recognised that diminution in the value of security rights could be immediate damage, but the precise application to a chose in action for unliquidated equitable compensation was unclear. Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332 had established that loss of a commercial opportunity could be damage, yet the boundary between loss of a chance and loss of the value of an existing right remained blurred, as the Court itself noted at [33]-[38].
The decision clarifies that once a plaintiff possesses a chose in action of value (here the right to equitable compensation recognised by Osborn J at [7]), any act that permanently impairs that value completes the tort. The impairment need not be total and irreversible in a literal sense; it is enough that the defendant has stripped himself of assets that would otherwise have been available to satisfy the judgment and that there is no realistic prospect of him reacquiring equivalent assets. The judgment therefore moves the crystallisation point forward from the failure of enforcement proceedings to the moment the conspiracy is performed.
On quantification the Court reinforces that difficulties in estimation do not prevent an award (Sellars at 349, cited at [49]). It also confirms that hypothetical unlawful conduct by the defendant is ignored in assessing the “but for” position, consistent with Lewis v Australian Capital Territory (2020) 94 ALJR 740, while lawful contingencies may be taken into account. The refusal to discount for the collateral Czech proceedings narrows the circumstances in which a defendant can point to a plaintiff’s separate remedial actions as reducing loss. Only benefits that are sufficiently connected and not merely speculative will be brought into account. The recognition that reasonably incurred costs of “undoing” a transaction are themselves a head of loss aligns with Gray v Sirtex Medical Ltd (2011) 193 FCR 1 but places the principle on a firmer compensatory footing.
After Talacko, practitioners assessing conspiracy claims involving asset protection structures must focus on the existence and value of the plaintiff’s rights at the date of the unlawful act. Foreign proceedings that are contingent, protracted and directed at third parties will not automatically reduce the Victorian award. The decision therefore strengthens the deterrent effect of the tort in cross-border judgment enforcement cases.
Paragraph [4]: “For the reasons below, the Court of Appeal was correct to conclude that the first to fifth respondents suffered loss or damage such that the unlawful means conspiracy was actionable. … their damage is better described as the loss of the value of their rights or chose in action, rather than a loss of a chance or loss of opportunity.”
Plain English: The siblings won because the donation deal instantly made their court rights worth less. This is not about losing a “chance”; it is about the court rights themselves becoming less valuable the moment the properties were given away.
Paragraph [39]: “In the second category, the existence of a loss is sufficiently shown by proving that the tort caused a permanent impairment of the value of the plaintiff’s existing right. It is enough that the right is ‘something of value’ and that its value is diminished or lost.”
Plain English: If you already have a legal right that is worth money and the defendant’s wrongdoing makes that right worth less, you have suffered loss straight away. You do not have to wait and see what eventually happens.
Paragraph [44]: “The same rules apply to a diminution in the value of a plaintiff’s rights to intangible property. … the common law does not permit difficulties of estimating the loss in money to defeat an award of damages.”
Plain English: The law treats rights such as a court judgment for money the same as it treats damage to a car or a house. Hard-to-measure losses are still compensated.
Paragraph [52]: “By contrast, the first to fifth respondents suffered an immediate loss in the value of their rights against Jan Emil when the Donation Agreement was executed. The chose in action against Jan Emil for equitable compensation then became worthless. … It would be unjust to compel the first to fifth respondents to commence speculative proceedings in the Czech Republic when the existence of this loss was already ascertainable.”
Plain English: Once Jan Emil signed the donation papers his Australian court debt became uncollectible from him. The siblings do not have to spend years in a foreign court before they can say they have lost money.
Paragraph [57]: “the Donation Agreement Proceedings involved a speculative prospect of recovery in different proceedings, for a different breach (concerning s 42a, not breach of fiduciary duty), against different persons (David and Paul), in relation to a different subject matter.”
Plain English: The Czech case is not a continuation of the original Victorian judgment; it is a new lawsuit against the sons on different legal grounds. Therefore it cannot be treated as simply “reducing” the loss caused by the conspiracy against Jan Emil.
Paragraph [64]: “costs of litigation that are reasonably incurred in an attempt to reduce losses caused by wrongdoing are a head of loss.”
Plain English: If you have to spend money trying to fix the damage the conspirators caused, that spending is itself part of the damage you can claim.
The decision is engaged whenever (1) a plaintiff possesses an existing chose in action of ascertainable value, (2) the defendant, together with others, agrees to perform an unlawful act whose known purpose is to impair that value, and (3) the act is carried out. Typical triggers include execution of a deed of gift, transfer to a discretionary trust, or granting of security over assets in favour of a related party immediately before or after liability is established, where the transfer leaves the defendant without assets reasonably available to satisfy the judgment.
The precedent applies with particular force in cross-border cases where the assets are located in jurisdictions that recognise foreign judgments but where enforcement is complicated by bankruptcy stays or registration requirements. It is not limited to family disputes; any judgment creditor who can prove a concerted scheme to put assets beyond reach can rely on it. The unlawful means may be equitable fraud, deceit, or breach of court orders. The loss crystallises at the moment the impugned transaction is completed; subsequent foreign proceedings aimed at third parties do not prevent the cause of action from being complete.
Conversely, the decision does not assist where the plaintiff has no existing right at the date of the conspiracy (Wardley) or where the plaintiff’s own conduct breaks the chain of causation. It also leaves open the possibility that a very high probability of successful recovery from the transferee on identical terms might be treated as preventing any diminution in value, although the Court emphasised that the Czech proceedings here were too remote to have that effect.
Because the judgment is recent, the source text itself records how the High Court treated the authorities it considered. Wardley was distinguished on the ground that no existing right was impaired; the contingent liability there was not analogous to the immediate reduction in value of a judgment debt ([50]-[51]). Sellars was applied for the proposition that difficulties of estimation do not bar recovery and for the distinction between loss of a chance and diminution in value of a right ([33], [42]). Hunt & Hunt was applied to confirm that intangible rights, including a lender’s right to recover money, can be the subject of immediate economic loss ([46]). Tabet v Gett and Malec were cited to underline that once loss is established the quantification exercise may involve assessment of future contingencies without converting the claim into a pure loss-of-chance case ([27], [35]).
The Court approved the Court of Appeal’s characterisation of the loss as immediate rather than contingent and endorsed McDonald J’s 75 per cent baseline assessment while correcting his treatment of the collateral Czech proceedings. The reasoning in Bennett v Estate of Talacko (Decd) (An undischarged bankrupt) [2020] VSCA 99 that the Donation Agreement “extinguished any possibility of recovering the judgment debt against the properties through Jan Emil’s trustee in bankruptcy” was expressly approved at [58]. The High Court’s treatment therefore narrows the circumstances in which later courts may discount damages by reference to separate foreign actions and widens the availability of the tort in asset-protection cases.
The judgment leaves several matters for future decision. First, the precise date for valuation of the lost chose in action was not contested; Kyrou J’s 24 September 2009 valuation date was accepted, but the Court noted that the correct date might have been the date of the Donation Agreement itself ([43]). Whether courts should always value at the date of the tort or the date of judgment remains open.
Second, the interaction between the 25 per cent contingency discount for hypothetical lawful conduct and the prohibition on taking account of hypothetical unlawful conduct (Lewis) may require further elaboration in a case where the two overlap more closely.
Third, the Court assumed that any actual recovery from David and Paul would be brought into account but did not decide whether the principle of mitigation or the compensating advantage rule strictly applied. The limits of that assumption were left for another day ([60]).
Fourth, the recoverability of costs of foreign proceedings as a head of loss is confirmed only where they are “reasonably incurred”. The boundary between reasonable and unreasonable expenditure, especially where proceedings continue for a decade, is not delineated.
Fifth, the decision is silent on whether a partial success in the foreign proceedings that exactly mirrors the original judgment debt would prevent any finding of loss at all. The Court’s emphasis on the different parties and different cause of action suggests that even identical monetary recovery might not negate the original loss, but that proposition was not tested.
Finally, the Court did not address the alternative ground of equitable compensation for equitable fraud pressed by the second to fifth respondents. Whether the same result could have been reached through equitable rather than tortious analysis therefore remains unresolved. These open questions will require careful pleading and expert foreign-law evidence in subsequent cases.
(b) order 2 of the orders of the Supreme Court of Victoria made on 20 December 2018 be varied to replace the sum of $5,900,227.92 with the sum of $8,045,765.34 and the sum of $3,101,822.56 with the sum of $4,229,758.04;
(c) order 4 of the orders of the Supreme Court of Victoria made on 20 December 2018 be varied to replace the sum of $5,892,069.06 with the sum of $8,034,639.62 and the sum of $3,084,619.22 with the sum of $4,223,909.11; and
(d) the fourth respondent pay the appellants' costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal, to be taxed in default of agreement on the standard basis.
B W Walker SC with J B Masters for the appellant (instructed by Strongman & Crouch Solicitors)
W A Harris QC with K A Loxley for the first respondent (instructed by Patrick & Associates)
D B O'Sullivan QC and B R Kremer with O M Ciolek for the second to fifth respondents (instructed by Brand Partners)
Submitting appearances for the ninth and tenth respondents
No appearance for the sixth, seventh, eighth and eleventh respondents
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
Tort - Unlawful means conspiracy - Loss or damage - Loss of chance - Loss of value of rights or chose in action - Damages - Where conspiracy by unlawful means undertaken to deprive first to fifth respondents ("Respondents") of value of chose in action arising from judgment in their favour - Where conspiracy involved agreements by which valuable properties in Czech Republic were transferred to impede recovery by Respondents of anticipated judgment debt ("Donation Agreement") - Where Respondents commenced proceedings in Czech Republic against two conspirators to set aside Donation Agreement ("Donation Agreement Proceedings") - Where Respondents had 20% prospect of successfully recovering through Donation Agreement Proceedings - Whether loss or damage proved such that unlawful means conspiracy was actionable - Whether damages for unlawful means conspiracy should be discounted to reflect 20% prospect of separate recovery through Donation Agreement Proceedings.
Words and phrases - "actionable", "chance of recovery", "chose in action", "contingent", "damages", "diminution in value", "judgment debt", "loss of chance", "loss of opportunity", "loss or damage", "prospect of recovery", "quantification of damages", "unlawful means conspiracy", "value of a plaintiff's rights".
KIEFEL CJ, GAGELER, KEANE, GORDON, EDELMAN, STEWARD AND GLEESON JJ.
The first category of alleged damage: loss of the value of rights
"If a claimant suffers damage to property, such as a vehicle or a ship, as a result of the tortious actions of a defendant, it can claim as damages the diminution in value of the damaged property, usually measured by the cost of repairing the property, and consequential loss".
The Donation Agreement Proceedings should not reduce the loss
The second category of alleged damage: expenses incurred
(b) order 2 of the orders of the Supreme Court of Victoria made on 20 December 2018 be varied to replace the sum of $5,900,227.92 with the sum of $8,045,765.34 and the sum of $3,101,822.56 with the sum of $4,229,758.04;
(c) order 4 of the orders of the Supreme Court of Victoria made on 20 December 2018 be varied to replace the sum of $5,892,069.06 with the sum of $8,034,639.62 and the sum of $3,084,619.22 with the sum of $4,223,909.11; and
(d) the fourth respondent pay the appellants' costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal, to be taxed in default of agreement on the standard basis.
Talacko v Bennett (2017) 260 CLR 124 at 147 [73]. ↑
See Talacko v Talacko [2018] VSC 751 at [64], [86]. See also Bennett v Estate of Talacko (Decd) (An undischarged bankrupt) [2020] VSCA 99 at [31]. ↑
Talacko v Talacko [2018] VSC 751 at [60], [65]. ↑
(1959) 103 CLR 30 at 122. See also Fullagar J at 78: "a combination to do unlawful acts necessarily involving injury". ↑
See also Thompson v Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 574 at 580-581. ↑
Vickery v Taylor (1910) 11 SR (NSW) 119 at 130. See also McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd (1999) 165 ALR 409 at 435 [137]. ↑
Dresna Pty Ltd v Misu Nominees Pty Ltd (2004) ATPR ¶42-013 at 48,885 [9]‑[11]; Fatimi Pty Ltd v Bryant (2004) 59 NSWLR 678 at 681 [13]. See also Lonrho Plc v Fayed [1992] 1 AC 448 at 467 and Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd [1981] Com LR 74 at 75. ↑
Talacko v Talacko [2015] VSC 287 at [69]-[75]. ↑
(1873) LR 6 HL 377 at 390. See also at 392-393. ↑
Bennett v Estate of Talacko (Decd) (An undischarged bankrupt) [2020] VSCA 99 at [107]. ↑
Bennett v Estate of Talacko (Decd) [2017] VSCA 163 at [99]. ↑
Talacko v Talacko [2015] VSC 287 at [171]-[173]. ↑
Bennett v Estate of Talacko (Decd) [2017] VSCA 163 at [102]‑[104], [112]. ↑
Talacko v Talacko [2018] VSC 751 at [100]-[103]. ↑
Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332 at 355, 364. ↑
HTW Valuers (Central Qld) Pty Ltd v Astonland Pty Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 640 at 656 [32]. ↑
(1992) 175 CLR 514 at 528-529, explaining Forster v Outred & Co [1982] 1 WLR 86 at 98; [1982] 2 All ER 753 at 764. ↑
Hunt & Hunt Lawyers v Mitchell Morgan Nominees Pty Ltd (2013) 247 CLR 613 at 631 [32], citing Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539 at 601, Wardley Australia Ltd v Western Australia (1992) 175 CLR 514 at 533, and Kenny & Good Pty Ltd v MGICA (1992) Ltd (1999) 199 CLR 413 at 425 [16]. ↑
Hunt & Hunt Lawyers v Mitchell Morgan Nominees Pty Ltd (2013) 247 CLR 613 at 630 [27], explaining Kenny & Good Pty Ltd v MGICA (1992) Ltd (1999) 199 CLR 413 at 425 [16]. ↑
Hunt & Hunt Lawyers v Mitchell Morgan Nominees Pty Ltd (2013) 247 CLR 613 at 631 [32]. See also Wardley Australia Ltd v Western Australia (1992) 175 CLR 514 at 527. ↑
Talacko v Talacko [2018] VSC 751 at [49]-[50]. See Lewis v Australian Capital Territory (2020) 94 ALJR 740 at 775 [151]; 381 ALR 375 at 413-414. ↑
Bennett v Estate of Talacko (Decd) (An undischarged bankrupt) [2020] VSCA 99 at [59]. ↑
Talacko v Talacko [2018] VSC 751 at [65]-[66]. ↑
Thai Airways International Public Co Ltd v KI Holdings Co Ltd [2016] 1 All ER (Comm) 675 at 684-685 [32]. See also Ruthol Pty Ltd v Tricon (Australia) Pty Ltd (2005) 12 BPR 23,923 at 23,930 [40]; Clark v Macourt (2013) 253 CLR 1 at 9 [17]. ↑
Ruthol Pty Ltd v Tricon (Australia) Pty Ltd (2005) 12 BPR 23,923 at 23,932-23,934 [44]-[51]; Harold R Finger & Co Pty Ltd v Karellas Investments Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 123 at [228]‑[229]. See also Burrows, Remedies for Torts, Breach of Contract, and Equitable Wrongs, 4th ed (2019) at 147. ↑
cf Fulton Shipping Inc of Panama v Globalia Business Travel SAU of Spain [2017] 1 WLR 2581; [2018] 1 All ER 45. ↑
See Dhaliwal v Pade [2003] NSWCA 16 at [36], citing Pilkington v Wood [1953] Ch 770. ↑
Gray v Sirtex Medical Ltd (2011) 193 FCR 1 at 11 [24], [26], quoting Berry v British Transport Commission [1962] 1 QB 306 at 321. ↑
Talacko v Talacko [2018] VSC 751 at [100]-[101]. ↑
Water Board v Moustakas (1988) 180 CLR 491 at 497. See also Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd (1950) 81 CLR 418 at 438. ↑
Talacko
Talacko
[2015] VSC 287
[2009] VSC 533
[2008] VSC 128
[2011] HCATrans 301
[2018] VSC 751
[2020] VSCA 99
[2017] VSCA 163
[2009] VSC 579
(2011) 31 VR 340
(2015) 305 FLR 353
(2016) 312 FLR 159
(2017) 260 CLR 124
(1959) 103 CLR 30
(1996) 186 CLR 574
(1999) 165 ALR 409
(2004) 59 NSWLR 678
(1990) 169 CLR 638
(1994) 179 CLR 332
(2004) 217 CLR 640
(2010) 240 CLR 537
(1997) 191 CLR 471
(2019) 266 CLR 593
(2012) 43 VR 220
(2013) 247 CLR 613
(2007) 229 CLR 519
(1988) 164 CLR 539
(1992) 175 CLR 514
(1999) 199 CLR 413
(2020) 94 ALJR 740
(2013) 253 CLR 1
(2011) 193 FCR 1
(1988) 180 CLR 491
(1950) 81 CLR 418
The grant of special leave to appeal on the second ground revoked with costs. Appeal dismissed. Special leave to cross-appeal granted and cross-appeals allowed. Orders of the Court of Appeal set aside and in lieu the appeal to that Court allowed with variations to damages awards increasing them to reflect 75 per cent of the value of the chose in action without the 20 per cent discount; appellant to pay costs of the appeal and cross-appeals.