Tait & Lennox (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC2F 1406 (9 October 2025)

(a) her Motor Vehicle 1,

(b) monies standing to her credit in all bank accounts;

(c) her superannuation; and

(d) any liabilities in her sole name.

1. The respondent shall retain, to the exclusion of the applicant:

(a) his Motor Vehicle 2,

(b) monies standing to his credit in all bank accounts;

(c) his camper trailer;

(d) his furniture and personal goods retained from the matrimonial home;

(e) his termination payment from his employer received in December 2024;

(f) his superannuation save as is provided at orders 3 to 5 herein; and

(g) any liabilities in his sole name.

1. The applicant wife shall transfer to the respondent husband her interest, if any, in the D Company and E Company shareholdings within 14 days.
2. The applicant and the respondent shall otherwise be solely entitled to all property in their respective possession as at this date including any jewellery, furniture, furnishings, and each of the applicant and the respondent shall be solely liable for and indemnify the other against any liability in their sole name and/or encumbering any item of property to which that party is entitled pursuant to these orders.
3. There be no order as to the costs of the proceedings.

1. Section 114Q of the Family Law Act 1975 provides that it is an offence punishable by imprisonment for up to one year to communicate to the public an account of family law proceedings which identifies a party to the proceedings, a witness in the proceedings, a person related to, or associated with, a party to the proceedings, or a person who is, or alleged to be, in any other way concerned in the matter to which the proceedings relate, unless specifically authorised by the court.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. This is an application for property adjustment under s.79 of the _Family Law Act 197_5 ("the Act"). The wife is the applicant and the husband is the respondent.
2. The husband is 53 years old and the wife is 50 years old. They commenced cohabitation in 2001 and married in 2006. They separated on 19 April 2022. The parties divorced in early 2024. The period of cohabitation was 22 years.
3. The parties have two children, X, who was born in 2009, and Y, who was born in 2015. At the final hearing, orders were made with the consent of the parents and the independent children's lawyer finalising the parenting application. In accordance with those orders, the children live with the wife and spend no time with the husband. However, the children may communicate with their father by telephone, email or otherwise.
4. The wife filed her initiating application on 24 January 2024. Initially, both parties were legally represented and both parties filed material. However, the husband's solicitors filed a notice of ceasing to act on 23 August 2024. He remained unrepresented until 15 September 2025, and filed no further material. On 15 September 2025, lawyers appointed under s.102NA of the Act filed a notice of address for service on behalf of the husband, three days before the final hearing. He did not attend the compliance and readiness hearing and did not attend the family report interviews.
5. In the meantime, on 2 October 2024, Judge Bingham made orders that the husband vacate the former matrimonial home and it be sold. The husband had lived in the former matrimonial home after separation, but had not paid the mortgage. The mortgagee had commenced proceedings in the County Court for possession and sale. The husband attended the hearing on 2 October 2024 without the benefit of legal assistance.
6. The matter was listed for a directions hearing on 5 September 2025, 10 days before the final hearing. The matter was listed for directions because the Department of Families, Fairness and Housing had provided a response under s.67ZBD of the Act and advice under s.67ZBG of the Act. The advice under s.67ZBG of the Act was that the release to the parties of the response under s.67ZBD of the Act may place the wife at risk of an escalation of family violence by the husband towards the wife.
7. At the directions hearing on 5 September 2025, I encouraged the husband to get legal assistance under the Commonwealth Family Violence Scheme, which he did. As mentioned above, lawyers for the husband filed a notice of address for service on 15 September 2025, three days before the final hearing.
8. On 18 September 2025, at the commencement of the final hearing at 10am, counsel announced that he had expected to appear for the husband but he and his instructors had not been able to obtain instructions. The husband was not in attendance. Consequently, counsel said he sought leave to withdraw. My associates advised that the husband had sent an email to chambers that morning, which they did not show me because it was inappropriate that I see it, but which said that he had been held up and would attend court at 11.15am.
9. In the circumstances, the parties in court agreed that the preferable course would be to wait until 11.15am. I said that I would not give the husband's lawyers leave to withdraw until at least then. The husband arrived at court at about 11.15am. The matter was stood down to allow counsel for the husband to obtain instructions. As mentioned above, the parties and the independent children's lawyer were able to reach agreement about parenting matters and parenting orders were made by consent at about 12.30pm.
10. However, the parties were not able to settle their property dispute. The hearing regarding property began with an attempt to clarify what was agreed and what was not agreed in relation to assets and liabilities. That process was completed just before 1pm, when the matter was adjourned for lunch.
11. After lunch, counsel for the husband advised that he had departed court, saying that he needed to attend a doctor. Counsel for the wife wished to press on with the hearing, relying on r.10.26 and 10.27 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 ("the Rules").
12. Those rules relevantly provide that:

(2) For the purposes of rule 10.27, a respondent is in default if the respondent fails to:

(a) give an address for service before the time for the respondent to give an address has expired; or

(b) file a response before the time for the respondent to file a response has expired; or

(c) comply with an order of the court in the proceeding; or

(d) file and serve a document required under these Rules; or

(e) produce a document as required by Division 6.2.2; or

(f) do any act required to be done by these Rules or the Family Law Regulations; or

(g) defend the proceeding with due diligence; or

(h) prosecute with due diligence any application the respondent has made in the proceeding.

(1) If a party is in default, the court may do any of the following:

(a) order that the proceeding be stayed or dismissed as to the whole or any part of the relief claimed by the party;

(b) set aside a step taken or an order made;

(c) order that a step in the proceeding be taken within the time limited in the order;

(d) order costs;

(e) prohibit the party from taking a further step in the proceeding until the occurrence of a specified event;

(f) make any order that is to take effect if the party does not take a step ordered by the court in the proceeding in the time limited in the order;

(g) proceed on the non-defaulting party's evidence together with:

(i) if considered appropriate by the court - such evidence as the defaulting party has filed; and

(ii) such evidence as tendered during cross-examination by the defaulting party; and

(iii) submissions by either party limited to the matters that are the subject of evidence;

(h) in exceptional circumstances - proceed on the non-defaulting party's evidence without hearing from the defaulting party.

(2) The court may make an order of the kind referred to in subrule (1), or any other order, or may give any directions, and specify any consequences for non-compliance with the order, that the court thinks just.

1. It was decided to press on with the hearing. The husband has not communicated with chambers since he departed the hearing at lunchtime on 18 September 2025.
2. The husband was served with the wife's initiating documents on 15 February 2024. Six days later, on 21 February 2024, the husband filed a notice of address for service. That was within the time permitted under the Rules. On 8 March 2024, the husband filed a response, a financial statement, a notice of risk, an affidavit and a genuine steps statement. That was within the 28 days of service provided by r.2.18(2) of the Rules. The husband attended a child impact report interview on 9 May 2024 by video. The husband also filed an interim case outline on 4 June 2024 and filed a request to inspect subpoenaed documents on 17 June 2024.
3. Orders were made on 5 June 2024 for the sale of the former matrimonial home. The husband failed to comply with:

(a) order 14, regarding signing documents for the appointment of a selling agent;

(b) order 17(b), regarding payment of outgoings, including mortgage payments;

(c) order 17(c), regarding further encumbering the property;

(d) order 18(a), regarding keeping the property free of rubbish and presentable for the sale;

(e) order 18(b), regarding facilitating opens for inspection; and

(f) order 18(c), regarding signing documents for the appointment of the conveyancer.

1. These were all defaults (six) under r.10.27(2)(c) of the Rules.
2. The husband's solicitors filed a notice of ceasing to act on 23 August 2024. Since then, the husband had not filed any documents, until he filed a notice of address for service on 15 September 2025.
3. The husband attended the directions hearing on 10 September 2024 in person. At that hearing, the husband was directed:

(a) to file and serve a notice of address for service by 4pm on 18 September 2024; and

(b) to file and serve an affidavit and a case outline for the interim hearing before Judge Bingham on 2 October 2024.

1. The husband did not comply with those orders. The non-compliance mentioned in sub- paragraph (a) of the preceding paragraph was a default under r.10.26(2)(a) of the Rules. The non-compliance mentioned in sub-paragraph (b) of the preceding paragraph were two defaults under r.10.26(2)(c) of the Rules.
2. By orders made in chambers on 13 September 2024, the husband was required to file certain documents for the interim hearing on 2 October 2024. He did not do so. These orders do not appear to have been made by consent, and were made in chambers. Arguably, they are not valid orders, and should be regarded as an instruction from chambers rather than as orders. I will not treat the husband's non-compliance with these arguably invalid orders as a default.
3. At the interim hearing on 2 October 2024, the husband was ordered to give vacant possession to the wife, so she could effect the sale. He did not do so, and the wife was obliged to get a warrant for possession. The husband's failure to vacate the property was another default under r.10.26(2)(c) of the Rules. Also on 2 October 2024, the husband was ordered to pay the wife's costs of $14,059. He has not done so. That is another default under r.10.26(2)(c) of the Rules.
4. By orders made on 15 October 2024, the husband was required to file and serve certain documents for a family dispute resolution conference by 4pm on 21 November 2024. He did not do so. That was another default under r.10.26(2)(c) of the Rules. Also, by the orders made on 15 October 2024, the husband was required to attend the family dispute resolution conference at 3.45pm on 28 November 2024. He did not do so. This is another default under r.10.26(2)(c) of the Rules.
5. Orders were made on 2 December 2024 requiring the husband to attend the compliance and readiness hearing scheduled for 2 April 2024 at 11am and do the other things usually specified to prepare for the compliance and readiness hearing. He did not do so. That is another default under r.10.26(2)(c) of the Rules.
6. By orders made on 18 February 2025, the husband was required to file and serve a notice of address for service by 4pm on 26 February 2025. He did not do so. That is another default under r.10.26(2)(c) of the Rules.
7. At the compliance and readiness hearing on 2 April 2025, the husband was ordered to file and serve an updated, single consolidated trial affidavit and an updated financial statement. The husband did not do either of those things. That is a further two defaults under r.10.26(2)(c) of the Rules.
8. Also on 2 April 2025, the husband was ordered to make additions to a draft balance sheet provided by the wife. He did not do so. That is another default under r.10.26(2)(c) of the Rules. The husband was also ordered on 2 April 2025 to file an outline of case. He did not do so. That is another default under r.10.26(2)(c) of the Rules.
9. On 2 April 2025, the husband was also ordered to attend family report interviews. He did not do so. That is another default under r.10.26(2)(c) of the Rules.
10. In addition, the husband has not defended the proceeding with due diligence. That is a default under r.10.26(2)(g) of the Rules.
11. In these circumstances, the wife sought to proceed under r.10.27(1)(g) or (h) of the Rules, which are:

(1) If a party is in default, the court may do any of the following:

...

(g) proceed on the non-defaulting party's evidence together with:

(i) if considered appropriate by the court - such evidence as the defaulting party has filed; and

(ii) such evidence as tendered during cross-examination by the defaulting party; and

(iii) submissions by either party limited to the matters that are the subject of evidence;

(h) in exceptional circumstances - proceed on the non-defaulting party's evidence without hearing from the defaulting party.

1. Counsel for the husband remained in attendance throughout the hearing. However, he was in no position to cross-examine the wife, as he had no instructions. Similarly, he had little to say by way of submissions.
2. In all the circumstances of this case, I consider that it is appropriate to proceed on the wife's evidence under r.10.27(1)(g) of the Rules. I do not consider that it is appropriate to consider such evidence as the husband has filed, except in so far as it constitutes admissions. That is because the husband absented himself from the hearing, he did not made make himself available for cross-examination, and his evidence has not been recently updated.
3. In broad terms, I will accept the wife's unchallenged evidence, except where it is contradicted by apparently genuine documents or it is inherently implausible.

1. The wife provided a chronology to the court. It was largely as follows:

Parties commence cohabitation in rental property in Suburb F.

Parties purchase matrimonial home at B Street, Suburb C for $501,000.

Child Y, born. Applicant mother uses her long service leave (12 weeks) and annual leave to pay into family finances during maternity leave.

Respondent's behaviour toward Applicant deteriorates and applicant experiences escalating family violence.

Applicant wife leaves matrimonial home and parties separate.

Mortgage loan owing against matrimonial home is $298,787.

Applicant wife discovers respondent husband has withdrawn monies from offset account in November 2022 in amount of $8,600 without her consent.

Applicant deposits total of $44,460 of her wages to the parties joint account, used by the respondent.

Respondent withdraws further sums totalling $46,000 from offset account and $10,478 from children's accounts and $12,500 from home loan redraw.

Applicant reports respondent's behaviour to police. Police apply for a family violence intervention order against the respondent.

Interim family violence intervention order granted protecting applicant wife.

Son Y comes back from time with Respondent upset and scared for applicant mother. Mother reports this to police.

Police apply to court for amendment to interim family violence IVO to include children as protected persons.

Respondent successfully negotiates for children to be removed from family violence IVO, which is made a final family violence intervention order for 1 year.

Respondent continues to harass applicant via phone/text/emails.

Wife's (then) solicitors send initial letter to respondent re property and parenting matters, requesting disclosure, requesting respondent cease contacting the applicant, requesting the matrimonial home be listed for sale without delay having regard to the [mortgagee's] default notice.

Respondent husband writes to applicant wife's solicitors to advise he "has no money".

Respondent husband continues to be employed by H Company on salary of $110,000 plus bonus plus car allowance plus superannuation.

Respondent has withdrawn cash from accounts totalling more than $70,000 in previous 12 months.

Respondent husband sends abusive messages to applicant wife.

Applicant reports respondent's behaviour to Victoria Police as potential IVO breaches.

Default Notice issued to parties by mortgagee bank.

Wife files proceedings in FCFCOA for parenting and property orders.

Mortgagee bank issue final demand for full repayment of mortgage loan.

Parties are divorced. Ms Lennox is now known as Ms Tait.

Mortgagee bank files County Court proceedings (writ and statement of claim) re matrimonial home default.

Wife is served with mortgagee's County Court documents.

Interim defended hearing before SJR Conlan. Parties settle interim orders by consent - includes property orders to have house on market within 30 days and husband to make house presentable for sale, free from rubbish, at his sole cost, and husband to meet all costs during his sole occupation, and settlement to be no more than 60 days.

Parties to sign selling agent's authority by this date. Applicant wife signs authority. Respondent refuses.

Respondent's criminal charge is listed for hearing in Magistrates Court.

Applicant wife writes to respondent husband's solicitors regarding husband's breach of orders.

Applicant wife files application in a proceeding for urgent orders relating to husband's refusal to list property for sale pursuant to orders of 5 June 2024.

Respondent husband's solicitors file Notice of Ceasing to Act.

Mention hearing of wife's application before JR McGowan.

Interim defended hearing before Judge Bingham. Order for husband to vacate by 16/10/2024 and wife to have sole use/control of sale of matrimonial home. Respondent husband present in court. Respondent husband advises Court he will not be vacating by due date. Orders made for eviction by Sheriff if husband fails to vacate.

Costs order made in favour of wife of fixed amount $14,059.

Chambers order made for Part 1 of FDRC to be adjourned to 28/11/2024 and Part 2, to 5/12/2024.

Orders made by Judge O'Shannessy for warrant of possession to issue to wife/eviction of the respondent.

Chambers order made for Part 1 of FDRC to be varied to 27/11/2024 and Part 2, to 2/12/2024.

Part 1 FDRC - husband fails to respond/attend FDRC.

Chambers Order JR McGowan - all applications adjourned for mention on 18/2/2025; listed for Compliance and Readiness Hearing on 2 April 2025.

Chambers Order JR Mooney - Part 2 of FDRC, vacated.

Respondent husband evicted from home by Sheriff. Applicant takes sole possession.

During attendances at the home by the applicant, the applicant discovers drug paraphernalia at the home including bongs, ice pipes, drug baggies with residue, dozens of unused drug baggies, machete, baseball bat, discarded young women's clothing, handbag and shoes in the main bathroom.

Respondent husband attends the matrimonial home in breach of the FCFCOA orders of 2 October 2024, commits family violence against applicant wife and children. '000' police are called to attend.

Wife attends Suburb C police station to make a statement to police.

Respondent husband attends matrimonial home in breach of FCFCOA orders, argues with third party there disposing of rubbish.

Respondent husband drives off to intercept applicant wife at primary school dropping child Y off and boxes her in to try to prevent her from leaving. Road rages applicant as she escapes. Is intercepted by police at front of J School. This incidence of family violence occurs with older child X in the car.

Police apply for a second FV IVO against Respondent.

Interim FV IVO is granted by the Magistrates Court against respondent protecting applicant and children.

Last time this year the children have spent time with respondent.

Mention - Order JR McGowan orders respondent file NOAS by 26/02/2025.

Respondent texts abusive texts to applicant wife in breach of FV IVO.

CJ Alstergren orders Respondent file NOAS forthwith and applicant solicitor serve respondent with copy of orders of the day, orders sought by applicant and letter explaining if respondent fails to appear matter may be determined in respondent's absence; ICL appointed; matter listed for trial 18 & 19 September 2025.

Younger son Y falls off scooter and breaks his ankle. Applicant wife advises respondent via 'AppClose' app.

Respondent husband attends primary school of younger child Y, against FV IVO and, applicant submits, against FCFCOA orders.

Wife receives messages from friends alerting her to posts on a public, local Facebook Suburb C Community Page wherein a poster is alleging the respondent is a predator and paedophile and feeds young girls the drug 'GHB' to sleep with them and makes them pay for the drugs with sex. These posts are seen by the oldest child (though NOT through the applicant wife/mother who is extremely concerned about the children being told/shown these posts by friends/school acquaintances). The posts also publish the husband's actual rental address.

Applicant wife receives text message from respondent husband's brother, advising the wife that the husband has been intercepted by police for drug driving and driving more than 25km/hour over the speed limit and has had his car impounded and will lose his licence.

Respondent attends primary school of younger child again, causes incident with principal and teachers. School call police and make reports. Police advise applicant that respondent is being interviewed.

Mention hearing re FV IVO - respondent husband refuses to consent to order with children on order. Applicant wife's solicitors attend hearing with applicant, in support of police application.

Applicant receives phone call from Child Protection. Child protection visit applicant and children at home.

Applicant receives text messages from friends and from respondent husband's brother, alerting her to a death at the respondent's rental property.

Person unknown to applicant but living with respondent husband at respondent husband's rental property at K Street, Suburb C, dies at the home. Initial reports are that person died of a drug (GHB) overdose. Subsequently confirmed by Victoria Police that the death is being investigated by the Coroner.

Child Protection phone applicant wife. Confirm respondent husband had been detected drug driving (methamphetamine) in June 2025. Advise applicant they are preparing a report regarding the children.

Applicant receives Child Support Assessment confirming husband's taxable income for financial year ending 30 June 2025 was $139,311.

Applicant receives child support lump sum payment of $3,775.59.

Child Protection phone applicant advising her that the respondent has spoken to them and is angry and aggressive and advise the applicant to 'enact her safety plan' after the respondent hung up on Child Protection, telling them he going to go straight to the applicant's house.

Applicant files trial documents and serves on respondent.

Chambers Order - Judge Blake. Applicant granted leave to issue subpoena to Victoria Police.

Directions hearing - Judge Riley. Respondent appears. No documents filed by respondent.

(a) her trial affidavit filed 11 August 2025;

(b) her amended application for final orders filed 7 August 2025;

(c) her financial statement filed 7 August 2025;

(d) her balance sheet filed 1 September 2025;

(e) her case outline filed 9 September 2025;

(f) her cost notice filed on 10 and 30 September 2024, and 17 February, 1 April and 17 September 2025;

(g) exhibit 1: the husband's superannuation statement as at 22 Jul 2025;

(h) exhibit 2: the print out of D Company holdings shares;

(i) exhibit 3: the print out of E Company shares;

(j) exhibit 4: the balance sheet with handwritten amendments;

(k) exhibit 5: the exhibits to the wife's trial affidavit;

(l) exhibit 6: the settlement statement;

(m) exhibit 7: the superannuation procedural fairness letters;

(n) exhibit 8: the proposed orders.

1. As discussed above, the husband did not rely on any documents.

1. The wife's proposed orders (as per exhibit 8) are as follows:
   1. That this matter proceeds on an undefended basis in relation to the respondent husband/father.
   2. All previous orders are dismissed save for Order 13 of the Order of Judge Bingham of 2 October 2024 which remains in force.
   3. Within 30 days of the date of these Orders, the proceeds held in trust following the sale of the former matrimonial home at [B Street, Suburb C] Victoria and on term deposit with Westpac Banking Corporation namely $448,492.36 (plus any accrued interest) shall be paid to applicant [Ms Tait] via her solicitors.
   4. Orders 14 to 16 of these orders are binding on [Super Fund 1] ABN: [...] ("the Trustee"), being the Trustee of the [Super Fund 2] ABN: [...] ("the Fund").
   5. Pursuant to section 90XT(1)(a) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), whenever a splittable payment becomes payable in respect of the interest of [MR LENNOX] in the Fund (account number [...88]), [MS TAIT] is entitled to be paid an amount calculated in accordance with Part 7 of the Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2025 (Cth), using a base amount of $28,829.00 (provided that such base amount shall not exceed the value of the member's superannuation interest) and there be a corresponding reduction in the entitlement of [MR LENNOX].
   6. This order has effect from the operative time, and the operative time is four (4) business days after the date of service of a certified copy of the sealed orders upon the Trustee.
   7. The applicant shall retain, to the exclusion of the respondent:
      1. her [Motor Vehicle 1],
      2. monies standing to her credit in all bank accounts;
      3. her superannuation;
      4. any liabilities in her sole name.
   8. The respondent shall retain, to the exclusion of the applicant:
      1. his [Motor Vehicle 2],
      2. monies standing to his credit in all bank accounts;
      3. his camper trailer;
      4. his furniture and personal goods retained from the matrimonial home;
      5. his termination payment from his employer received in December 2024;
      6. his superannuation save as is provided at Orders 13-15 herein;
      7. any liabilities in his sole name.
   9. The applicant wife shall transfer to the respondent husband her interest, if any, in the [D Company] shareholdings [...] and the [E Company] Private shareholdings [...] within 14 days.
   10. The applicant and the respondent shall otherwise be solely entitled to all property in their respective possession as at this date including any jewellery, furniture, furnishings, and each of the applicant and the respondent shall be solely liable for and indemnify the other against any liability in their sole name and/or encumbering any item of property to which that party is entitled pursuant to this order.
   11. That the respondent husband pay the applicant wife's costs of these proceedings fixed at $90,000.00.
   12. Any other orders as this Honourable Court sees fit.

1. The husband did not provide any proposed orders to the court. In his response filed on 8 March 2024, he said that he wished to particularise his proposed orders after the sale of the former matrimonial home ("the property") and after discovery. He never particularised his proposed orders.

1. Subsection 79(1) of the Act, subject to s.79(6) of the Act, gives the court power to alter the interests of the parties to a marriage in the property of the parties to that marriage. Subsection 79(2) of the Act provides that:

The court must not make an order under this section unless it is satisfied that, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable to make the order.

1. Subsection 79(3) of the Act sets out the matters the court must take into account when considering what orders, if any, should be made for the alteration of the interests of the parties in property. Those matters are:

In considering what order (if any) should be made under this section in property settlement proceedings, the court:

(a) is to identify:

(i) the existing legal and equitable rights and interests in any property of the parties to the marriage or either of them; and

(ii) the existing liabilities of the parties to the marriage or either of them; and

(b) is to take into account (except for the purpose of making an order with respect to the ownership of property that is a companion animal):

(i) the considerations set out in subsection (4) (considerations relating to contributions); and

(ii) the considerations set out in subsection (5) (considerations relating to current and future circumstances).

1. Subsection 79(4) of the Act sets out the following considerations regarding contributions that the court is to take into account so far as they are relevant:

(a) the financial contribution made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to the marriage or a child of the marriage to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them, or otherwise in relation to any of that last-mentioned property, whether or not that last-mentioned property has, since the making of the contribution, ceased to be the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them;

(b) the contribution (other than a financial contribution) made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to the marriage or a child of the marriage to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them, or otherwise in relation to any of that last-mentioned property, whether or not that last-mentioned property has, since the making of the contribution, ceased to be the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them;

(c) the contribution made by a party to the marriage to the welfare of the family constituted by the parties to the marriage and any children of the marriage, including any contribution made in the capacity of homemaker or parent;

(ca) the effect of any family violence, to which one party to the marriage has subjected or exposed the other party, on the ability of a party to the marriage to make the kind of contributions referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c);

(d) the effect of any proposed order upon the earning capacity of either party to the marriage;

(f) any other order made under this Act affecting a party to the marriage or a child of the marriage;

(g) any child support under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 that a party to the marriage has provided for a child of the marriage.

Considerations regarding current and future circumstances

1. Subsection 79(5) of the Act sets out the following considerations regarding current and future circumstances that the court is to take into account, so far as they are relevant:

(a) the effect of any family violence, to which one party to the marriage has subjected or exposed the other party, on the current and future circumstances of the other party, including on any of the matters mentioned elsewhere in this subsection;

(b) the age and state of health of each of the parties to the marriage;

(c) the income, property and financial resources of each of the parties to the marriage and the physical and mental capacity of each of them for appropriate gainful employment;

(d) the effect of any material wastage, caused intentionally or recklessly by a party to the marriage, of property or financial resources of either of the parties to the marriage or both of them;

(e) any liabilities incurred by either of the parties to the marriage or both of them, including the nature of the liabilities and the circumstances relating to them;

(f) the extent to which either party to the marriage has the care of a child of the marriage who has not attained the age of 18 years, including the need of either party to provide appropriate housing for such a child;

(g) commitments of each of the parties to the marriage that are necessary to enable the party to support themselves and any child or other person that the party has a duty to maintain;

(h) the responsibilities of either party to the marriage to support any other person;

(i) the eligibility of either party to the marriage for a pension, allowance or benefit under:

(i) any law of the Commonwealth, of a State or Territory or of another country; or

(ii) any superannuation fund or scheme, whether the fund or scheme was established, or operates, within or outside Australia;

(j) if either party to the marriage is eligible for a pension, allowance or benefit as mentioned in paragraph (i) - the rate at which it is being paid to the party;

(k) if the parties to the marriage have separated or divorced, a standard of living that in all the circumstances is reasonable;

(l) the extent to which an alteration of the interests of the parties to the marriage in any property would enable a party to undertake education or establish a business or otherwise obtain an adequate income;

(m) the effect of any proposed order on the ability of a creditor of a party to the marriage to recover the creditor's debt, so far as that effect is relevant;

(n) the extent to which each party to the marriage has contributed to the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of the other party;

(o) the duration of the marriage and the extent to which it has affected the earning capacity of each party to the marriage;

(p) the need to protect a party to the marriage who wishes to continue that party's role as a parent;

(q) if either party to the marriage is cohabiting with another person - the financial circumstances relating to the cohabitation;

(r) the terms of any order or declaration made, or proposed to be made, under Part VIIIAB in relation to:

(i) a party to the marriage; or

(ii) a person who is a party to a de facto relationship with a party to the marriage; or

(iii) the property of a person covered by subparagraph (i) and of a person covered by subparagraph (ii), or of either of them; or

(iv) vested bankruptcy property in relation to a person covered by subparagraph (i) or (ii);

(s) any child support under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 that a party to the marriage is to provide, or might be liable to provide in the future, for a child of the marriage;

(t) the terms of any financial agreement that is binding on the parties to the marriage;

(u) the terms of any Part VIIIAB financial agreement that is binding on a party to the marriage;

(v) any other fact or circumstance which, in the opinion of the court, the justice of the case requires to be taken into account.

1. Under s.4AB of the Act, family violence is defined as:

(1) For the purposes of this Act, family violence means violent, threatening or other behaviour by a person that coerces or controls a member of the person's family (the family member), or causes the family member to be fearful.

(2) Examples of behaviour that may constitute family violence include (but are not limited to):

(a) an assault; or

(b) a sexual assault or other sexually abusive behaviour; or

(c) stalking; or

(d) repeated derogatory taunts; or

(e) intentionally damaging or destroying property; or

(f) intentionally causing death or injury to an animal; or

(g) economic or financial abuse; or

(i) preventing the family member from making or keeping connections with his or her family, friends or culture; or

(j) unlawfully depriving the family member, or any member of the family member's family, of his or her liberty.

(2A) For the purposes of paragraph (2)(g), examples of behaviour that might constitute economic or financial abuse of a family member include (but are not limited to) the following:

(a) unreasonably denying the family member the financial autonomy that the family member would otherwise have had, such as by:

(i) forcibly controlling the family member's money or assets, including superannuation; or

(ii) sabotaging the family member's employment or income or potential employment or income; or

(iii) forcing the family member to take on a financial or legal liability, or status; or

(iv) forcibly or without the family member's knowledge, accumulating debt in the family member's name;

(b) unreasonably withholding financial support needed to meet the reasonable living expenses of the family member, or the family member's child (including at a time when the family member is entirely or predominantly dependent on the person for financial support);

(c) coercing a family member (including by use of threats, physical abuse or emotional or psychological abuse):

(i) to give or seek money, assets or other items as dowry; or

(ii) to do or agree to things in connection with a practice of dowry;

(d) hiding or falsely denying things done or agreed to by the family member, including hiding or falsely denying the receipt of money, assets or other items, in connection with a practice of dowry.

(3) For the purposes of this Act, a child is exposed to family violence if the child sees or hears family violence or otherwise experiences the effects of family violence.

(4) Examples of situations that may constitute a child being exposed to family violence include (but are not limited to) the child:

(a) overhearing threats of death or personal injury by a member of the child's family towards another member of the child's family; or

(b) seeing or hearing an assault of a member of the child's family by another member of the child's family; or

(c) comforting or providing assistance to a member of the child's family who has been assaulted by another member of the child's family; or

(d) cleaning up a site after a member of the child's family has intentionally damaged property of another member of the child's family; or

(e) being present when police or ambulance officers attend an incident involving the assault of a member of the child's family by another member of the child's family.

THE APPROACH TO APPLICATIONS UNDER S.79

1. In Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108; (2012) 293 ALR 70; (2012) 87 ALJR 74; (2012) 47 Fam LR 481; (2012) FLC 93-518; [2012] HCA 52, the High Court explained the proper approach to an application under s.79 of the Act as follows:
   1. First, it is necessary to begin consideration of whether it is just and equitable to make a property settlement order by identifying, according to ordinary common law and equitable principles, the existing legal and equitable interests of the parties in the property. ... The question posed by s 79(2) is thus whether, having regard to those existing interests, the court is satisfied that it is just and equitable to make a property settlement order.
   2. Second, although s 79 confers a broad power on a court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to make a property settlement order, it is not a power that is to be exercised according to an unguided judicial discretion. In Wirth v Wirth, Dixon CJ observed that a power to make such order with respect to property and costs "as [the judge] thinks fit", in any question between husband and wife as to the title to or possession of property, is a power which "rests upon the law and not upon judicial discretion"...(footnotes omitted)
   3. Because the power to make a property settlement order is not to be exercised in an unprincipled fashion, whether it is "just and equitable" to make the order is not to be answered by assuming that the parties' rights to or interests in marital property are or should be different from those that then exist. All the more is that so when it is recognised that s 79 of the Act must be applied keeping in mind that "[c]ommunity of ownership arising from marriage has no place in the common law". Questions between husband and wife about the ownership of property that may be then, or may have been in the past, enjoyed in common are to be "decided according to the same scheme of legal titles and equitable principles as govern the rights of any two persons who are not spouses". The question presented by s 79 is whether those rights and interests should be altered. (footnotes omitted)
   4. Thirdly, whether making a property settlement order is "just and equitable" is not to be answered by beginning from the assumption that one or other party has the right to have the property of the parties divided between them or has the right to an interest in marital property which is fixed by reference to the various matters (including financial and other contributions) set out in s 79(4). The power to make a property settlement order must be exercised "in accordance with legal principles, including the principles which the Act itself lays down". To conclude that making an order is "just and equitable" only because of and by reference to various matters in s 79(4), without a separate consideration of s 79(2), would be to conflate the statutory requirements and ignore the principles laid down by the Act. (footnote omitted)

...

1. In many cases where an application is made for a property settlement order, the just and equitable requirement is readily satisfied by observing that, as the result of a choice made by one or both of the parties, the husband and wife are no longer living in a marital relationship. It will be just and equitable to make a property settlement order in such a case because there is not and will not thereafter be the common use of property by the husband and wife. No less importantly, the express and implicit assumptions that underpinned the existing property arrangements have been brought to an end by the voluntary severance of the mutuality of the marital relationship. That is, any express or implicit assumption that the parties may have made to the effect that existing arrangements of marital property interests were sufficient or appropriate during the continuance of their marital relationship is brought to an end with the ending of the marital relationship. And the assumption that any adjustment to those interests could be effected consensually as needed or desired is also brought to an end. Hence it will be just and equitable that the court make a property settlement order. What order, if any, should then be made is determined by applying s 79(4).

1. Stanford requires the following matters to be determined in applications brought under s.79 of the Act:

(a) whether the parties have separated;

(b) the assets and liabilities of each party;

(c) the contributions of each party;

(d) the future needs of each party;

(e) bearing in mind all of the foregoing matters, whether it is just and equitable to make any orders altering the interests of the parties in their property; and

(f) what orders, if any, are just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case.

1. In In the Marriage of Hickey (2003) 30 Fam LR 355; (2003) FLC 93-143; [2003] FamCA 395 at paragraph 39, the Full Court of the Family Court described the preferred four step approach in property matters as follows:

The case law reveals that there is a preferred approach to the determination of an application brought pursuant to the provisions of s.79. That approach involves four inter-related steps. Firstly, the court should make findings as to the identity and value of the property, liabilities and financial resources of the parties at the date of the hearing. Secondly, the court should identify and assess the contributions of the parties within the meaning of s 79(4)(a), (b) and (c) and determine the contribution based entitlements of the parties expressed as a percentage of the net value of the property of the parties. Third, the court should identify and assess the relevant matters referred to in s 79(4)(d), (e), (f) and (g), (the other factors) including, because of s 79(4)(e), the matters referred to in s 75(2) so far as they are relevant and determine the adjustment (if any) that should be made to the contribution based entitlements of the parties established at step two. Fourth, the court should consider the effect of those findings and determination and resolve what order is just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case...

1. In the light of the High Court's decision in Stanford, it seems that the basic steps stated in Hickey remain correct. That is, the court is required to:

(a) identify the assets owned by the parties, jointly or separately, and the liabilities to which the parties are subject, jointly or separately;

(b) take into account the contributions made by each party;

(c) take into account the current and future circumstances of the parties; and then

(d) determine what order, if any, is just and equitable.

1. There is no doubt that the parties have separated. The parties divorced in early 2024.

1. The wife provided a balance sheet in her case outline. With my amendments, it became exhibit 4. Before he absented himself from the court at lunchtime on the day of the final hearing, the husband agreed to some items in the wife's balance sheet and disputed others.
2. In relation to joint assets, the husband and wife agreed that the proceeds of sale of the former matrimonial home were $448,492.36 and the interest on that sum was $5,896.00, making total joint assets worth $454,388.36.
3. The wife said the parties had no joint liabilities. The husband alleged that there were joint liabilities on a credit card, but the wife did not accept that claim and the husband did not prove it. I am therefore not able to be satisfied that there are any joint liabilities. On that basis, I determine that the joint liabilities are worth zero. The joint assets less joint liabilities are therefore worth $454,388.36.
4. In relation to the wife's individual assets, she claimed, and the husband agreed, that she had a car worth $17,000 and funds in two bank accounts worth $1,622 and $2,611, making the wife's total individual assets worth $21,233. The parties agreed that the wife had no individual liabilities. Therefore, the wife's individual assets less liabilities are worth $21,233.
5. In relation to the husband's individual assets, the wife said he had Motor Vehicle 2 worth $21,000. The husband said it was worth $5,000. The wife sought to rely on the husband's financial statement filed on 8 March 2024 in which he said the car was worth $30,000. However, the husband said that the car's motor had blown up and it was no longer worth that amount. The wife did not produce evidence from an appropriately qualified expert. Consequently, I am unable to find that the car is worth any more than the $5,000 that the husband conceded. I asked the wife if she wanted to buy it from the husband for $5,000, but she indicated that she did not. That is understandable, given that the husband did not comply with orders to vacate the former matrimonial home. Even if the sheriff were to seize the car, there would have to be real doubts about whether the car would be worth even $5,000 by the time it reached the wife. Consequently, I will treat the husband's car as worth $5,000.
6. The wife alleged that the husband had 1,000 shares in D Company and 856 shares in E Company. The husband conceded that, but said that he held them on trust for the children. The husband did not prove that claim, so I will treat the shares as being the husband's property. The wife provided printouts of the value of the shares as at the day of trial (exhibits 2 and 3). The printouts show the D Company shares were worth $3.21 each on the day of trial, or $3,210 for the 1,000 shares. The printouts showed that the E Company shares were worth $4.84 each on the day of trial, or $4,143.04 for the 856 shares. I accept that evidence.
7. The husband claimed that he owned the shares jointly with the wife. The wife disputed that, but agreed to an order that she sign over her interest in the shares to the husband. The husband indicated that he would be content with that. Therefore, I will make that order, and treat the shares as being the husband's sole asset. The shares are worth, in total, $7,353.04.
8. The wife also claimed that the husband had a camper trailer worth $7,000. He said it had been stolen. While the husband did not provide any evidence of that, the wife did not provide any expert evidence from an appropriately qualified person that the camper trailer, assuming it is still in the husband's possession, is worth $7,000. Therefore, I am unable to attribute any value to it.
9. The parties agreed that the husband had no funds in the bank.
10. The wife claimed that the husband had house contents worth $20,000. The husband said that he had no house contents. The wife pointed out that the husband said in his financial statement filed on 8 March 2024 that he had house contents worth $30,000. However, since then he has been evicted from the former matrimonial home. It would not be surprising if he now had no household contents, or household contents of minimal value. In any event, the wife had no evidence from an appropriately qualified expert as to the value of the household contents. Therefore, I cannot attribute any particular value to the husband's household contents, if any.
11. The wife also claimed that the husband had a termination payment of $61,389. The husband agreed that he had received that amount but said that it had all been spent. I think this issue is better dealt with in connection with the parties' contributions. Similarly, the wife made various claims for addbacks. I consider that these items are better dealt with in connection with contributions.
12. All in all, the husband has individual assets consisting of:

(a) a car worth $5,000; and

(b) shares worth $7,353.04.

1. That means the husband's individual assets are worth a total of $12,353.04.
2. The wife claimed that the husband had no individual liabilities. The husband said he had individual liabilities consisting of credit card debts and loans. He provided no evidence of that. Therefore, I am unable to accept that the husband has any individual liabilities.
3. It follows that the husband's individual assets less his individual liabilities amount to $12,353.04.
4. The parties agreed that the wife has superannuation of $307,320.94. The wife claimed that the husband has superannuation of $363,932.04. The husband denied that. He did not produce any evidence in support of his denial. The wife produced the husband's superannuation statement: exhibit 1. It shows that, as at 22 July 2025, the husband had $363,932.04 in superannuation.

I accept that figure. 5. Consequently, the parties have superannuation as follows:

(a) wife: $307,320.94; and

(b) husband: $363,932.04.

1. In total therefore, the pool is $1,159,227.30, consisting of:

(a) the joint assets less joint liabilities: $454,388.36;

(b) the wife's individual assets less individual liabilities: $21,233;

(c) the husband's individual assets less individual liabilities: $12,353.04;

(d) wife's superannuation: $307,320.94; and

(e) husband's superannuation: $363,932.04.

1. The parties agreed that they had no additional financial resources.

CONTRIBUTIONS: S.79(4)

1. The husband absented himself from court before we commenced the discussion of contributions. Therefore, he did not dispute the wife's claims in this regard. The following is based on the wife's materials, which I accept.

1. The parties commenced cohabitation in 2001. The wife was 25 years old and the husband was 28 years old. At the commencement of the relationship in 2001, neither party had any assets of significant value, but both had their own cars, and some superannuation and savings.
2. The parties' initial contributions were equal and modest.

1. During the relationship, both parties worked, except the wife took 12 months maternity leave after the birth of each child and returned to work part-time. During maternity leave, the wife contributed financially by using her annual leave and long service leave. She worked 30 hours per week, to facilitate school drop offs and pick ups. Immediately before separation, the wife was earning $110,000 per year and the husband was earning $140,000 per year. She said that she did most of the homemaking activities but the husband assisted when he was not working. The wife claimed that the parties' contributions during the relationship were equal. I accept that.

1. Separation occurred on 19 April 2022, when the wife left the property with the children. The husband remained in the property.
2. Following separation, the husband made no mortgage repayments from about August 2023 and that the parties were served with a default notice by the mortgagee. The mortgagee served the wife with County Court proceedings for a warrant of possession on 28 April 2024. The mortgagee was unable to effect service on the husband. The costs of the attempts were added to the amount outstanding on the mortgage.
3. The wife attempted to agree with the husband that the property be sold, because neither party was in a position to buy out the other. The husband refused, and the matter was dealt with at an interim defended hearing on 5 June 2024. The parties consented to orders on 5 June 2024 for the property to be sold, the husband to pay the mortgage and so on pending sale, and the parties to sign the necessary documents and so on. As discussed above in relation to the husband's defaults, the husband did not comply with those orders, even though he consented to them.
4. The wife was obliged to make another interlocutory application to the court, which was heard on 2 October 2024 by Judge Bingham. The husband was ordered to pay the wife's costs, fixed in the sum of $14,059. He has not yet paid them. The husband was also ordered to vacate the property, to enable the wife to sell it. He did not do so. The wife had to obtain a warrant of possession, which was granted by Judge O'Shannessy on 18 October 2024 but the warrant was not executed until February 2025.
5. The husband's delay in relation to the sale of the property, and his failure to pay the mortgage, even though he was living in the property, added substantially to the parties' joint liability for the mortgage.
6. Following separation, between April 2022 and May 2023, the wife paid $44,460 into the parties' joint NAB account. Of that, the wife used about $5,000 for the expenses of the children and the husband used $39,000 to pay his credit card bill, mortgage repayments and utilities for the property he was living in.
7. Following separation, the wife also paid $2,436 for home and contents insurance on the property, which the husband was living in, and $1,041 for income protection insurance for the husband. The wife also paid $5,176 for educational, health and extracurricular expenses for the children. I accept those claims, but note that, regarding the children's expenses, the wife would probably be expected to pay half of them anyway.
8. The husband has paid no child support following separation, although about $3,000 was taken from his tax return and paid to the wife.
9. Following separation, the husband diminished the asset pool by:

(a) withdrawing $12,500 from the redraw facility on the home loan;

(b) withdrawing $58,826 from the offset savings account;

(c) withdrawing $1,515 from the joint bank account, being the whole balance;

(d) withdrawing $10,487 from bank accounts in the names of the children;

(e) made no home loan repayments, even though he was living in the property;

(f) paid no water or council rates on the property, even though he was living in it;

(g) used $30,857 from joint funds to pay his credit card bills (mentioned above);

(h) caused $6,666 in legal costs to be charged by the mortgagee; and

(i) caused $16,955[1] to need to be spent on the property to prepare it for sale (repairs, maintenance, cleaning, rubbish removal).

1. Between separation and when the sale of the property was settled, the home loan increased by about $34,400. From 30 May 2023 to 13 July 2023, the husband drew down $12,500 from the home loan account without the wife's consent. From 20 October 2023 until he was evicted in February 2025, during which time the husband was in sole occupation, the husband made no mortgage repayments. For the year ending 30 June 2023, the husband earned about $109,000.
2. Bank statements obtained under subpoena show that the husband was spending thousands of dollars on gambling.
3. In December 2024, the husband received a net termination payment of $61,389. However, he made no contribution from that sum to the mortgage arrears, outstanding rates or children's expenses.
4. Upon the settlement of the sale of the property, the husband's former solicitors required the payment of their legal costs of $62,728.66 before they would remove their caveat. That amount came from the net proceeds of sale on the husband's behalf.
5. In summary, the wife claimed that, post separation, the husband had:

(a) caused $62,728 to be taken from the pool for the husband's legal costs (when legal costs would not normally be taken into account in determining the pool);

(b) caused $16,955 to be required for clean-up prior to the sale of the property;

(c) taken $71,326 from the joint home loan and joint offset accounts; and

(d) caused the mortgage to increase by $33,690.

1. These amounts total $184,699. I accept the wife's claims in this regard. That is, I accept that, post-separation, the husband has wasted or used for his own benefit $184,699 that should have been part of the pool. It may be that the husband used some of that money for ordinary living expenses after he was terminated from his employment. However, he has provided no evidence to the court about any attempts he has made to find another job, or indeed, whether he has another job. Therefore, I am unable to find that the husband used any of the $184,699 for reasonable and understandable purposes.
2. The husband perpetrated family violence against the wife both during the relationship and after separation. This caused her to leave the former matrimonial home, and gave the husband the opportunity to diminish the asset pool. However, the wife did not press family violence as a significant issue impeding her contributions.
3. Following separation, while the husband was living in the former matrimonial home, the wife and children moved to the wife's mother's house, where they continue to reside.
4. It was not suggested that the wife's proposed orders will have any effect on either party's earning capacity.
5. In view of these matters, the wife said her contributions amounted to 60%.

CURRENT AND FUTURE CIRCUMSTANCES: S.79(5)

1. In the final years of the relationship, the husband became angry and abusive. He punched doors, yelled, threatened to smash the children's devices, swept items from the bench to the floor, smashed the wife's mobile phone, and other items, called the wife names and smashed her work computer keyboard. The children witnessed this behaviour.
2. Following separation, the husband sent the wife hundreds of unwanted messages, most of a threatening or degrading nature. With the assistance of the police, the wife obtained an interim intervention order in mid-2023, and the children were listed as protected in mid-2023. The children were removed from the intervention order in mid-2023, after which the intervention order was final. The husband continued to send the wife abusive messages. He was charged with a breach of the intervention order, but that matter has not yet been resolved.
3. The intervention order expired in mid-2024. After the hearing before Judge Bingham on 2 October 2024, the husband was waiting for the wife at the train station near her home. He yelled at the wife and followed her. The wife was worried that if she applied for another intervention order, the husband would become angrier.
4. After the husband was evicted in February 2025, he attended the former matrimonial home, contrary to court orders, and was abusive and threatening towards the wife and her mother, who were there to clean the house out. Y ran out of the house and jumped the back fence for safety.
5. In February 2025, the husband used his car to block the wife in while she was dropping the children at school. The husband yelled at the wife through his car window. The police arrived and told the husband to get on the ground. He refused. They told him he would be tasered if he did not get on the ground. He lay down on the ground. He was arrested by the police and taken away in their van.
6. Another interim intervention order was made in February 2025. In February 2025, the husband sent the wife more abusive messages.
7. In June 2025, the husband attended Y's school, and had an altercation with a male teacher. Y was placed in a secure room and the school reported the matter to the police.
8. It seems unlikely that the husband will stop his abusive and threatening behaviour towards the wife, at least in the near future.
9. The wife is 50 years old and the husband is 53 years old. The wife is well and able to work. The husband possibly has mental health issues and drug related issues. However, he did not provide any evidence about this and the wife's evidence on these topics is not sufficient for me to make any findings. I proceed on the basis that the husband could work, and earn about $140,000 per year, if he chose to. The wife earns about $110,000 per year. The property of the parties is being determined in this proceeding. The parties have no additional financial resources.
10. The husband's wastage has been discussed above. It has significantly diminished the property pool. The husband has added to the liabilities of the parties by not paying the mortgage on the property.
11. Post-separation, the children lived with the wife. Initially, they spent some time with the husband. However, they have not seen him since January 2025. It is highly likely that the wife will continue to be solely responsible for the care of the children. At present, the wife and the children are living with the wife's mother. The wife, in the future, will need to find independent housing for herself and the children.
12. The parties both have a commitment to support their children. However, the husband does not pay child support. The wife recently received about $3,000 taken from the husband's tax return. It was not suggested that either party has any responsibility to support any other person.
13. It was not suggested that either party is eligible for a pension, allowance or benefit, although it seems possible that the husband may be eligible for job seeker payments.
14. The standard of living that would be reasonable for these parties is a moderate standard.
15. It was not suggested that either party wishes to pursue further education or establish a business.
16. The parties do not have any creditors.
17. The parties' contributions are discussed above.
18. The marriage lasted about 22 years. The wife's childcare responsibilities have reduced her earning capacity. The marriage has not reduced the husband's earning capacity.
19. The wife wishes to continue part-time work, to continue her role as a parent.
20. Neither party is cohabiting with another partner.
21. There is no relevant financial agreement between the parties.
22. There are no other relevant facts or circumstances.
23. In relation to the current and future factors, the wife sought an additional 20%, making her share of the pool 80%.

WHETHER IT IS JUST AND EQUITABLE TO ALTER THE PARTIES' PROPERTY INTERESTS

1. I consider that it would be just and equitable to alter the parties' property interests in this case.

1. The pool, as assessed above, is worth $1,159,227.30. The wife in her case outline sought 80% of that, which would be $927,381.84. However, in oral submissions, the wife sought 70% of the pool, which is $811,771.30. To reach that figure, the wife seeks to retain all of the proceeds of the property, being $454,388.36, plus her individual assets, being $21,233, plus her superannuation, being $307,320.94, plus $28,829.00 of the husband's superannuation. Those figures total $811,771.30.
2. In my view, in all the circumstances discussed above, that is a just and equitable outcome in this matter. That is so particularly in view of the husband's wastage and the wife's ongoing care of the children.
3. I am satisfied, by exhibit 7, that the trustee of the husband's superannuation fund has been given procedural fairness.
4. There will be orders in terms of the proposed orders 2 to 10 in the wife's minute of proposed orders. I note that proposed order 2 continues in force the costs order made by Judge Bingham on 2 October 2025.
5. The wife formally sought an additional $90,000 in costs. However, the wife's counsel did not press the costs issue with any vigour, apparently because of the obvious difficulty in trying to get any money from the husband.
6. In terms of s.114UB of the Act, I note that:

(a) the husband is not working and has no assets; the wife will get funds pursuant to these orders but needs to house herself and the children;

(b) the husband was privately funded initially, but subsequently received assistance under the Commonwealth Family Violence Scheme; the wife has been privately funded throughout;

(c) the husband's conduct of the proceeding has been very poor, and added to the cost and difficulty of the proceeding by not attending and not complying with court orders; the wife has conducted the proceeding as well as she could in the circumstances;

(d) the proceedings overall were not necessitated by a party failing to comply with previous orders of the court, although the component concerning the husband's failure to facilitate the sale of the property was;

(e) the husband has been largely unsuccessful in the proceeding;

(f) there was no evidence on any offers to settle; and

(g) there are no other relevant matters.

1. In my view, it would not be just to require the husband to pay the wife's costs in this matter, over and above the existing costs order because the husband has no money to pay the wife's additional costs.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and twenty (120) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Riley.

[1] The wife's balance sheet said this figure was $19,955, but she accepted during the hearing that the correct figure was $16,955.