SZVVI & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 546

1. This application for judicial review raises two issues. The first is whether the second respondent (Tribunal) had jurisdiction to consider an application for review of a decision of a delegate made under s.109 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) to cancel the first applicant's Protection (Class XA) visa (Protection visa). The second issue, which arose after the matter had been listed for judgment, is whether the Tribunal's decision is affected by the Tribunal's not having disclosed to the applicants certificates that had been issued purportedly pursuant to s.438 of the Act. I will separately deal with each issue.

1. The first issue arises out of the following circumstances. On 11 September 2006 the first applicant (applicant), using a false name, applied for and, on 22 November 2006, was refused a protection visa (first Protection visa application). The Tribunal affirmed the refusal on 15 February 2007. On 17 September 2009, however, the applicant, using his actual name, again applied for a Protection visa (second Protection visa application). On 13 January 2010 a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) refused the application but, on review, the Tribunal found the applicant met the criteria for the granting of a Protection visa. On 22 June 2010 the Tribunal remitted the matter to the Minister and, on 10 August 2010, the Minister granted the applicant a Protection visa.
2. In late 2010 the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (as the Department of Immigration and Border Protection was then known) (Department) became aware of information that suggested the applicant had failed to provide, and had given incorrect information to the Minister in connection with the first Protection visa application, contrary to s.101 of the Act. On 2 March 2012, pursuant to s.107 of the Act, a delegate of the Minister issued to the applicant a Notice of Intention to Consider Cancellation of the applicant's visa (NOICC) in which the delegate identified the applicant had failed to comply with s.101 of the Act in a number of respects.[1]
3. The applicant responded to the NOICC through his representative's letter dated 30 May 2012.[2] The applicant's representative conceded the applicant is the same person as the person who made the first Protection visa application. The representative also conceded the applicant failed to answer questions and answered questions incorrectly. The applicant's representative, however, submitted that these matters were immaterial because they only related to the identity of the applicant, and not to the matters on which he relied in his second application for a protection visa which the Tribunal had accepted. By notice dated 30 May 2014 the delegate cancelled the applicant's visa pursuant to s.109 of the Act.[3]
4. The applicants applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision. By letter dated 8 October 2014[4] the Tribunal invited the applicants to comment on information the Tribunal said would be, subject to any comments the applicants might make, the reason or a part of the reason for affirming the decision under review. The letter identified information which included the following:

1. a person by the name of Y made the first Protection visa application; 2. the applicant made the second Protection visa application;

1. in the second Protection visa application (Form 866C) the applicant did not answer the question whether he was known by any other name, he said he entered Australia on "4/2009", and, in response to the question whether "any person named in Question 1 previously applied for refugee status or a protection visa from the Department", the applicant stated "no".
2. The Tribunal stated this information was relevant for reasons that included the following:

1. there was evidence, which the Tribunal identified, that it was highly likely that the person depicted in a facial image the Roads and Traffic Authority took of the applicant is the same person as the person depicted in a facial image of Y held by the Department; 2. the Tribunal may find that answers the applicants gave in the second Protection visa application were not correct, or had not been completed, as required by s.101 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act);

1. the likely effect of the correct information is that the applicant would not have been granted a protection visa because the applicant would have been prevented by s.48A and s.48B of the Act from making a valid application for a protection visa.
2. The applicant's representative responded by letter dated 31 October 2014.[5] The representative said the applicant "has engaged in a systematic course of conduct with respect to having deceived the Department and used a bogus document". The representative submitted, however, that the applicant's claims of being a Falun Gong practitioner were credible. The representative also said:

In addition, the applicant concedes that by reason of having previously made an application for a Protection Visa, albeit in respect of a false identity may enliven an exclusion which the Tribunal has identified as being sections 48A and 48B of the Migration Act 1958.

1. The Tribunal was satisfied that the conditions for the issuing of the NOICC were satisfied, and affirmed the delegate's decision to cancel the applicant's Protection visa.

1. This proceeding was heard together with SZVVL & Anor v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, in which counsel for the applicant in this case was also counsel for the applicant in SZVVL. Counsel for the applicant in this matter and in SZVVL, and the Minister, made one set of submissions that applied to both proceedings. In the remainder of this section of my reasons, subject to minor exceptions, I will repeat word for word what I say in my reasons for judgment in SZVVL, which I propose to publish at the time I publish these reasons.
2. The application, as initially filed, contained the following single ground of application:

The Tribunal had no jurisdiction in the matter.

Particulars

On 17 September 2009, the Applicant lodged an application for a Protection (Class XA) visa which was invalid by reason of the operation of Sections 48A and 48B of the Migration Act 1958. The subsequent refusal of that application, the appeal to the Refugee Review Tribunal and the decision of the Tribunal to the effect that the first instance refusal be set aside and the grant of a Protection (Class XA) visa on 10 August 2010 were all invalid exercises of power. The decision of the Department of Immigration and Border protection to cancel the visa was infected by the same error.

1. At the hearing before me, I asked counsel for the applicant what utility the applicant attached to challenging the Tribunal's decision. Counsel said it would enable the applicant to make a further application for protection on the basis of s.36(2)(aa) of the Act. In the course of her submissions, counsel indicated the applicant was seeking a declaration that the Tribunal's decision to affirm the delegate's decision as well as the delegate's decision to grant the applicant a Protection visa, were invalid, but the invalidity of the visa would operate from the day on which the declaration is made.
2. Ms Buchanan, who appeared for the Minister, submitted the applicant appeared to be raising a different case to the one that appeared in the application. Counsel for the applicant sought, and I granted, leave on terms that the applicant file and serve an amended application.
3. Pursuant to the leave I granted, the applicant filed an amended application, together with written submissions. The amended application does not amend the ground contained in the original application; but it did amend the relief the applicant seeks, which is as follows:

An order in the nature of certiorari or alternatively, a declaration setting aside or declaring invalid the decisions of the delegate of the first respondent, dated 30 May 2014, to cancel the first applicant's Subclass 866 (Protection) visa under section 109(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") ("delegate's decision") and the decision of the former Refugee Review Tribunal, now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal"), the second respondent, dated 24 November 2014 ("the decision"), as the delegate and Tribunal had no jurisdiction to determine the matter by reason that the first applicant's visa application made on 17 September 2009 for a Protection (Class XA) visa ("visa application") was invalid by operation of sections 48A and 48B of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act").

Parties' submissions

1. The applicant makes three submissions. First, he submits the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to entertain the application for review because the Protection visa the delegate had cancelled had been granted on the basis of an invalid application.[6] Second, the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error because it purported to entertain an application for review of the delegate's decision to cancel the applicant's Protection visa, even though the Tribunal failed to have genuine regard to s.48A of the Act.[7] Third, there would be utility in quashing the Tribunal's decision or declaring that the Tribunal's decision and the delegate's decision to grant the Protection visa was invalid because the "effect of such a declaration or order would render the decisions of both the delegate and the Tribunal invalid and they would have no legal effect from then onwards".[8]
2. The Minister, on the other hand, makes the following submissions. First, the Court does not have jurisdiction to declare invalid the delegate's decision to grant the applicant a Protection visa because that decision is a "primary decision" within the meaning of s.476 of the Act.[9] Second, despite the second Protection visa application being an invalid application, the applicant was granted a visa, and was thus the "holder of a visa" for the purposes of s.107 of the Act; and there is nothing in the Act which prevented the Tribunal from treating the applicant as being the holder of a visa, even where the visa was granted in response to an invalid application.[10] Third, the Tribunal had jurisdiction over the delegate's decision, even though the delegate himself may have made a jurisdictional error.[11] Fourth, even if the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error, relief should be withheld on discretionary grounds because the applicant acquiesced in the invalidity of the decision.[12]

Did the Tribunal have jurisdiction?

1. Whether or not the Tribunal had jurisdiction to review the delegate's decision depends, at least in the first instance, on the proper construction of the statutory provisions which confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal and which regulate its exercise. The starting point is s.414(1) of the Act which, at the relevant time,[13] provided that, subject to s.414(2) (which is not relevant here), "if a valid application is made under section 412 for review of an RRT-reviewable decision, the Tribunal must review the decision". The expression "RRT-reviewable decision" was defined in s.411(1) of the Act to include, among other things, "a decision to cancel a protection visa, other than a decision that was made because of ... (iii) paragraph 36(2C)(a) or (b)"; and, at the time the applicant made the second Protection visa application,[14] section 46(1) of the Act provided that, subject to s.46(1A), s.46(2), and s.46(2A) (which are not relevant to this proceeding), an application for a visa is valid if, and only if, among other things, it is "not prevented by section . . . 48A (protection visa)". Also relevant is s.415(1) of the Act which provided:

The Tribunal may, for the purposes of the review of an RRT-reviewable decision, exercise all the powers and discretions that are conferred by this Act on the person who made the decision.

1. The decision the Tribunal reviewed in the case before me was the exercise by a delegate of the Minister of the power conferred by s.109(1) of the Act to cancel a visa. The Tribunal's task when reviewing under s.414 of the Act the decision the delegate made under s.109 of the Act, therefore, was to determine whether it was satisfied the preconditions for the exercise of the discretion of the power conferred by s.109 were present and, if so, whether, having regard to, among other things, circumstances declared by the regulations to be circumstances in which a visa must be cancelled, the applicant's Protection visa should be cancelled. The relevant preconditions in relation to the applicant were as follows:

1. the Minister considered that the applicant was the "holder of a visa" who has been immigration cleared (whether or not because of that visa) and who did not comply with s.101 of the Act (which requires a non-citizen to complete his or her application form for a visa in such a way that all questions on it are answered and no incorrect answers are given or provided);[15] 2. the Minister gave the applicant a notice containing the particulars of the possible non-compliance specified in s.107(1) of the Act;[16] and

1. the Minister considered any response given by the applicant in the way required by s.107(1)(b), and decided there was non-compliance by the applicant in the way described in the notice.[17]
2. The expression "visa holder" is defined in s.5 of the Act to mean "the holder of a visa and, in relation to a visa, means the holder of the visa"; and s.5 of the Act provides that "visa" has the meaning given by s.29 of the Act. Subsection (1) of section 29 of the Act provides as follows:

Subject to this Act, the Minister may grant a non-citizen permission, to be known as a visa, to do either or both of the following:

(a) travel to and enter Australia;

(b) remain in Australia.

1. The Minister's power to grant a visa is to be found in s.65(1) of the Act, which relevantly provided that "[a]fter considering a valid application for a visa", the Minister, if satisfied, among other things, that "the other criteria for it prescribed by this Act or the regulations have been satisfied" is to grant the visa. As I have already noted, s.46(1) of the Act provided that an application for a visa is valid if, and only if, among other things, the application is "not prevented by section . . . 48A (protection visa)". Whether or not the Minister is to grant or not grant a visa depends on the Minister's being satisfied of a number of matters. The Minister can lawfully reach such satisfaction only by considering a "valid application for a visa". That is reinforced by s.47(3) of the Act which provides that the Minister "is not to consider an application that is not a valid application".
2. If one were to consider only these statutory provisions, there would be strong grounds for construing "visa holder" and "holder of a visa", where those expressions appear in s.107 and s.108 of the Act, to mean the person to whom the Minister had granted a visa in response to "a valid application for a visa". On that construction, given that the second Protection visa application was not a valid application for a visa, s.101, s.107, and s.108 of the Act would not have been engaged because there would have been no "visa holder"; and there would have been no "visa holder" because there would have been no valid visa. That, in turn, would have meant that the Tribunal would not itself have been able to review the delegate's decision to cancel the Protection visa.
3. Subsection 69(1) of the Act, however, must be considered. It provides:

Non-compliance by the Minister with Subdivision AA or AB or section 494D in relation to a visa application does not mean that a decision to grant or refuse to grant the visa is not a valid decision but only means that the decision might have been the wrong one and might be set aside if reviewed.

1. The Full Federal Court considered s.69(1) of the Act in Yilmaz v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.[18] In that case the applicant failed to make a valid application for a Protection visa, yet the Tribunal, on an application for review made by the applicant, considered the merits of the applicant's claims for protection and affirmed the delegate's decision not to grant the applicant a Protection visa. The applicant submitted the Tribunal's decision was a nullity because the application for a visa was not a "valid application for a visa". A majority of the Full Court (Gyles J, with Spender J agreeing) held that s.69(1) of the Act prevented from being treated as invalid a decision to grant a visa that was made in response to an invalid application for a visa. Gyles J said:[19]

Section 69(1) relates to non-compliance by the Minister with, inter alia, subdivision AA not rendering the decision invalid. When that subdivision is analysed, the only section which imposes a mandatory obligation upon the Minister is s 47, which is set out above. All of the other provisions are permissive, and non-compliance could not lead to invalidity. It is thus clear that s 69 relieves against invalidity based upon a breach of s 47.

1. After observing that it was reasonable that s.69 of the Act should relieve against invalidity based on a breach of s.47 of the Act, Gyles J set out s.65(1) of the Act, including the words "[a]fter considering a valid application for a visa", and considered whether it was significant that s.65 did not form part of subdivision AA or AB of Division 3 of Part 2 of the Act. His Honour said:[20]

It seems to me that the words "after considering a valid application for a visa" in that section do not form part of the conditions of exercise of the power, but are, rather, the assumption upon which the section proceeds. This is not surprising, since it would be assumed that the Minister would obey s 47, which is directed to the very point. As non-compliance with s 47 is plainly covered by s 69, I do not find any inconsistency between it and s 65, which is directed to those elements (apart from the existence of the application) which must be met before a visa can be granted.

1. Yilmaz, therefore, is authority for the principle that the Minister's deciding to grant a visa in response to an application for a visa that is not a "valid application for a visa", contrary to s.47(3) of the Act, does not render the decision to grant the visa invalid. It follows, therefore, that until the decision granting a visa in these circumstances is set aside or reviewed, a person who holds the visa is a "holder of a visa" for the purposes of s.107 and s.108 of the Act.
2. Given the reasoning in Yilmaz, the applicant before me cannot succeed on his primary submission that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to review the delegate's decision to cancel the applicant's Protection visa. A delegate of the Minister granted the Protection visa to the applicant in response to the second Protection visa application that, because of s.48A of the Act, was not "a valid application for a visa". The delegate, therefore, granted the visa in breach of s.47(3) of the Act. Because of s.69(1) of the Act, however, the delegate's decision to grant the applicant the Protection visa does not mean the decision was not a valid decision. At most, the delegate's decision to grant the Protection visa was a wrong decision that may be, or may have been, liable to be set aside or reviewed. The applicant, therefore, was a "visa holder" for the purposes of s.107 and s.108 of the Act, and the Tribunal had jurisdiction to conduct a review of the delegate's decision to cancel the applicant's Protection visa on the basis that the applicant was a "visa holder".

1. The applicant seeks a declaration that the delegate's decision to cancel the Protection visa was invalid. Under s.476(2)(a) of the Act, this Court does not have jurisdiction in relation to a decision that is "a primary decision". At the time the Tribunal made its decision, that expression was defined in s.476(4) to mean:

a privative clause decision or purported privative clause decision:

(a) that is reviewable under Part 5 or 7 or section 500 (whether or not it has been reviewed); or

(b) that would have been so reviewable if an application for such review had been made within a specified period.

1. The delegate's decision to cancel the applicant's Protection visa is a "primary decision" within the meaning of s.476(4) of the Act. The Court, therefore, has no jurisdiction in relation to that decision.

1. The second issue arose out of the following circumstances. On 22 March 2017, after the parties were informed that I proposed to deliver judgment on the first issue, the solicitor for the Minister sent an email to my chambers in which it was said that, because of the Full Federal Court's decision in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh,[21] the parties had agreed to request the Court make orders to allow the parties to make submissions about the relevance of Singh. By consent, on 22 March 2017 I made orders granting the parties leave to reopen the case and to file submissions.
2. Pursuant to those orders, the applicant filed submissions together with an affidavit made on 6 April 2017 by Ms Anang the solicitor for the applicant. I will take that affidavit to have been formally read. In her affidavit Ms Anang deposes that, by an email she received on 21 March 2017, the Minister's lawyer informed Ms Anang there were a number of certificates that had been issued under s.438(1)(b) of the Act. Ms Anang was provided with a copy of three certificates that had purportedly been issued pursuant to s.438(1)(b) of the Act.
3. On 7 June 2017 I granted the applicant leave to file a proposed document to be titled "Further Amended Application", and made directions for the filing of further evidence and submissions. I also directed that the parties communicate to my chambers whether they wished to have a further hearing in relation to the application for leave to file the further amended application and, if leave is granted, the proposed additional ground in the further amended application, or whether they would instead be content for me to consider those questions without further hearing.
4. Pursuant to the directions, the applicant filed a "Further Amended Application" together with submissions, and the Minister filed an affidavit of Mr Vijaykumar made on 4 July 2017 which exhibited the documents covered by the three certificates together with submissions. I will take the affidavit of Mr Vijaykumar also to have been formally read, and the documents exhibited to that affidavit as having been admitted into evidence. On 18 July 2017 my chambers received an email from Ms Buchanan, the solicitor for the Minister, in which Ms Buchanan said that the parties do not wish to have a further hearing.
5. In the remainder of these reasons, therefore, I will consider the applicant's application for leave to file a further amended application and, if leave is granted, consider the additional ground stated in the further amended application. The additional ground sought to be raised in the further amended application is the same as the additional ground contained in the further amended application that has been filed in SZVVL; and the submissions the parties have made in this case are almost identical to the submissions the parties made in SZVVL. In the remainder of this section of my reasons, subject to minor exceptions, I will repeat word for word what I say in my reasons for judgment in SZVVL which I propose to publish at the time I publish these reasons.

1. The proposed further amended application seeks to raise the following additional ground:

In the alternative, the Tribunal's failure to disclose the existence of or provide copies of the s438(1)(b) certificates to the applicants prior to its decision of 24 November 2014 constitutes a breach of procedural fairness.

Particulars

2.1 A number of certificates regarding the non-disclosure of certain information under s 438 of the Migration Act 1958 formed part of the Department file before the Tribunal in relation to this matter. Those certificates were issued pursuant to s 438(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958.

2.2 In accordance with the judgment in Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 183 (M12/2017), the applicants contend that the Tribunal was obliged to disclose the existence of the certificates to the applicants in this matter and their failure to do so constitutes a breach of procedural fairness.

Parties' submissions

1. In written submissions filed on behalf of the applicant, it is submitted that at least one of the three certificates is invalid, and that the circumstances of this case are not materially distinguishable from Singh and MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.[22] It is further submitted that the material covered by the three certificates was "relevant to and formed part of the Tribunal's reasoning process".[23] The applicant relies[24] on Beach J's observation in MZAFZ: "If not, the s 438(1)(a) certificate would not have been necessary and the documents would not have been before the Tribunal".[25] The applicant further submits that the documents covered by the certificates were relevant because they related to the "applicants identities and Australian migration history which formed a significant basis for the Tribunal's decision to affirm" the delegate's decision to cancel the applicant's visa.[26]
2. The Minister, on the other hand, submits that leave should not be granted to the applicant to amend because the proposed ground is inconsistent with the existing ground on which the applicant relies, namely, that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to review the delegate's decision.[27] The Minister further submits that the circumstances of this case are distinguishable from Singh and MZAFZ because there is no basis to infer from the Tribunal's reasons for decision or otherwise that it acted on the certificates, and it is not apparent that the documents covered by the certificates "were relevant to, or of any more than passing contextual relevance to the review, . . . or formed part of the Tribunal's reasoning process save to the extent that the certificates covered material that was in fact already disclosed to the first applicant in the visa application and review processes and was otherwise conceded, and was therefore not in issue on the review".[28] Although the Minister did not concede the certificates were invalid, he did not submit the certificates were not invalid. I will assume, without deciding, that the three certificates are invalid because they do not disclose a proper ground for claiming public interest privilege.

Is there an arguable case the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error?

1. The applicant appears to contend that Singh is authority for the proposition that the Tribunal necessarily comes under an obligation to disclose the existence of a certificate that has been issued under s.375A of the Act, and that this principle should apply to certificates issued under s.438 of the Act. For reasons I have given elsewhere, that is not what the Full Federal Court in Singh held or should be taken to have held.[29] For reasons I have also given elsewhere, however, even if the Full Federal Court in Singh is to be taken as having held the Tribunal must in every case where a certificate under s.375A of the Act has been issued disclose that fact to an applicant, the differences between s.438 and 375A of the Act prevent the Full Federal Court's reasoning in Singh from applying to s.438 of the Act.[30] The principal distinction is that s.375A of the Act requires the Tribunal not to disclose the information that is covered by the certificate whereas s.438 does not so require. If, therefore, a certificate is issued under s.438 of the Act, that will not necessarily mean that the information covered by it will not be disclosed to the applicant. That, in turn, means that "an applicant's participation in the review" will not necessarily be "circumscribed by the existence of the certificate". Whether or not an applicant's participation in the review will be circumscribed because a certificate has been issued under s.438 of the Act will depend on the circumstances of the particular case.
2. The question then is whether the Tribunal in the case before me made a jurisdictional error of the sort Beach J found the Tribunal made in MZAFZ. As I have noted elsewhere,[31] his Honour found the Tribunal in the circumstances of that case made two jurisdictional errors: the Tribunal proceeded or acted on an invalid certificate and, therefore, did not follow a "process according to law"; and the Tribunal failed to accord the applicant procedural fairness by not disclosing the certificate. Before I consider whether the Tribunal in the case before me made such errors, it will be necessary to refer to the documents covered by the three certificates. That is so because the apparent relevance of those documents to the issues that were before the Tribunal is relevant to determining whether the Tribunal acted on the certificates and whether the Tribunal was required to disclose the certificates to the applicant.
3. The documents are identified in the affidavit of Mr Vijaykumar. The delegate had already given some of the documents covered by the certificates to the applicant, and these documents are exhibit C to Mr Vijaykumar's affidavit. All other documents other than the certificates have been exhibited to Mr Vijaykumar's affidavit in three sealed envelopes in the manner suggested by the Full Federal Court in Singh.[32] I have examined the documents first, for the purpose of satisfying myself that their contents match the descriptions given to them by the certificates, and, second, to determine their apparent relevance to the issues before the Tribunal.
4. I first turn to the certificate dated 20 June 2014.[33] The certificate describes five documents that match the documents that have been exhibited to Mr Vijaykumar's affidavit.[34] The certificate states that the documents relate to the Department's enquiries with Korean authorities about the possibility of obtaining an image of a named individual (being the name under which the applicant applied for his first Protection visa) from their records for comparison and whether the named individual had any immigration status in Korea. The documents consist of the following:

1. A copy of an email apparently sent from the Department to the Australian embassy in Seoul referring to the possibility of cancelling the applicant's visa, and asking a number of questions. The email also sets out the applicant's migration history.[35] 2. A note recording the commencement of NOICC.[36]

1. A communication apparently from the Australian embassy in Seoul dated 17 November 2011 responding to an earlier request for information.[37]

1. A note recording an email had been sent to Seoul about the immigration status of the person purportedly identified in the first Protection visa application,[38] and a note to the effect there is no record of the named person having an immigration status in Korea.[39] 2. Notes recording attempts to serve the NOICC on the applicant.[40]
2. Next, there is a certificate also dated 20 June 2014 which describes two documents.[41] The first is folio 47 which the certificate states contains information about visa applications made by five named persons, other than the applicants, that was given by those persons in confidence in relation to their own dealings with the Department. The second is folio 48 which the certificate states contains information about three of the five persons named in folio 47. The copies of folios 47 and 48 that have been exhibited to Mr Vijaykumar's affidavit are redacted. Mr Vijaykumar deposes the redaction has occurred to remove material relating to third parties. The folios, however, refer to the applicant and one of the third parties, but only in connection with the need to alter the Department's records about their immigration status in Australia.
3. Finally, there is the certificate dated 24 June 2014.[42] The certificate does not describe the documents except by folio number. All documents bearing the folio numbers stated in the certificate, except folios 3, 4, 6, and 8-37, had been previously produced to the applicant, and are exhibit "C" to Mr Vijaykumar's affidavit. The documents consist of facial comparison reports and documents relevant to those reports. Folios 3, 4, 6, and 8-37 are exhibit "D", and are a copy of the second Protection visa application, a copy of which is in the Court Book.[43]
4. The Tribunal does not refer to the certificates in its reasons for decision. That, however, does not mean the Tribunal was unaware of the certificates, or that the Tribunal did not act on the certificates in any way. In my opinion, the more probable inference is that the Tribunal was aware of the certificates, but it decided that the certificates did not prevent it from doing that which it otherwise would have done with the documents. In particular, the Tribunal did not consider that the certificates prevented it from disclosing to the applicant the substance of matters recorded in the documents covered by the certificates that were relevant to the issues the Tribunal considered it was necessary for it to decide. The basis of that inference is that, by its letter dated 8 October 2014,[44] the Tribunal disclosed to the applicant the substance of the information contained in most of the documents covered by the certificates, namely, that the applicant had made the first Protection visa application using a false name and, by so doing, may have failed to comply with s.101 of the Act. Assuming the certificates were invalid, therefore, their invalidity did not infect "the process or procedure adopted by the Tribunal in relation to [the] documents"[45] covered by the certificates. Thus, to the extent the Tribunal relied on the certificates, it made no jurisdictional error.
5. The next question is whether the Tribunal failed to accord procedural fairness to the applicant by failing to disclose to the applicant the certificates and, therefore, the documents covered by the certificates. That question must be answered in the negative. First, the Tribunal, by its letter dated 8 October 2014,[46] disclosed to the applicant the substance of most of the matters revealed by the documents covered by the certificates, namely, that the applicant had made the first Protection visa application using a false name and, by so doing, may have failed to comply with s.101 of the Act. Second, the applicant accepted before the delegate and the Tribunal that he did make the first Protection visa application using a false name. There was, therefore, no occasion for the Tribunal to disclose to the applicant anything more than it did of the matters contained in the documents covered by the certificates. Thus, the Tribunal made no jurisdictional error by not disclosing, more than it did in its letter dated 8 October 2014, the contents of the documents covered by the certificates and the certificates themselves.
6. For these reasons, I am of the opinion that it would be futile to permit the applicant to rely on the proposed ground 2 stated in the further amended application. I propose, therefore, to refuse the applicant leave to rely on the further amended application. Even if I were to permit the applicant to rely on the proposed ground 2, I would conclude that the ground is not made out.

1. Finally, the application before me includes as second and third applicants persons who were not included in the second Protection visa application. The Tribunal found it had no jurisdiction to determine any claims they might have had.
2. The Minister submits the second and third applicants should not have been included as applicants in the proceeding before me, and that I should make an order removing the second and third applicants as parties. The second or third respondents have not submitted the Tribunal ought to have found it had jurisdiction in relation to them. They should, therefore, be removed as parties from this proceeding.

1. the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be substituted for the Tribunal as the second respondent; 2. the applicants' application for leave to rely on the further amended application filed on 8 June 2017 be dismissed;

1. the second and third applicants be removed as parties; and

I certify that the preceding forty-seven (47) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Manousaridis

[1] This was the second notice that was sent to the applicant. A notice dated 21 November 2011 was sent to the applicant but it was returned as unclaimed. CB375, [11]

[6] First Applicant's Outline of Submissions, [15]

[7] First Applicant's Outline of Submissions, [18]

[8] First Applicant's Supplementary Submissions, [6]

[9] First Respondent's Supplementary Submissions, [5]

[10] First Respondent's Submissions, [13]

[11] First Respondent's Submissions, [14]

[12] First Respondent's Submissions, [16]

[13] 24 November 2014, being the date the Tribunal made its decision.

[15] Act, s.107(1)

[16] Act, s.107(1)

[17] Act, s.108

[18] [2000] FCA 906

[19] [2000] FCA 906 at [81]

[20] [2000] FCA 906 at [83]

[21] [2016] FCAFC 183

[22] [2016] FCA 1081

[23] Applicant's Further Supplementary Submissions, [7]

[24] Applicant's Further Supplementary Submissions, [7]

[25] [2016] FCA 1081 at [55]

[26] Applicant's Further Supplementary Submissions, [16]

[27] First Respondent's Further Submissions, [3]

[28] First Respondent's Supplementary Submissions, [8]

[29] CKG15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 938 at [99]- [106]

[30] CKG15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 938 at [106]

[31] BIE15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 2978 at [48]

[32] [2016] FCAFC 183 at [67]. The documents are described as Exhibits A, B, and D

[33] Exhibit HV-1 to the affidavit of Mr Vijaykumar.

[41] Exhibit HV-2 to the affidavit of Mr Vijaykumar.

[42] Exhibit HV-3 to the affidavit of Mr Vijaykumar.

[43] Exhibit D, folios 19-33 (CB74-88), exhibit D, folios 3-18 (CB56-71) and exhibit D, folios 34-37 (CB95-98)

[45] MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1081 at [40]