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[2015] QDC 190
General information, not legal advice.
District Court of Queensland
2015-05-08
Original judgment source is linked above.
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondent
[1] On 16 September 2013, the applicant/appellant was sentenced in the Magistrates Court at Pine Rivers in relation to a number of offences to which she had pleaded guilty. I will refer to that as the September sentence.
[2] She was fined $1000 and had convictions recorded in relation to four summary offences committed between the 2nd and the 11th of August 2013. She was also sentenced to the following varying terms of imprisonment for a number of indictable offences: three months' imprisonment for each of four counts of stealing, two counts of which were committed on the 8th of August 2013, with the remaining two committed on the 11th of August 2013; four months' imprisonment for one count of unlawful use of a motor vehicle to commit an indictable offence, which was committed between 7 and 11 August 2013; and two years for each of two counts of entering premises and committing an indictable offence by a break, which were committed on 9 and 11 August 2013, respectively.
[3] Each of those terms of imprisonment were ordered to be served concurrently with each other, but cumulatively upon an unexpired 18 month sentence, which had been imposed in the Magistrates Court at Brisbane on 27 February 2013 and to which I will refer to as the February sentence. The combined head sentence, taking into account the February sentence, was therefore, in effect, three and a half years imprisonment from 27 February 2013.
[4] The applicant/appellant had received court ordered parole on 26 June 2013 in relation to the February sentence. She had, however, been returned to custody from 12 August 2013 upon her arrest for the August offences. Her parole was suspended the following day and automatically cancelled on the day of her September sentence. That pre sentence custody from 12 August 2013 could not be declared. However, the learned magistrate took it into account in setting the parole eligibility date of 16 February 2014, being five months after the sentence date. It is reasonable to assume that but for that, the parole eligibility date would have been set at six months.
[5] Notwithstanding the eligibility date, the applicant/appellant was not released on parole until 12 September 2014, approximately 12 months after her September sentence. Her parole was subsequently suspended for other reasons on 8 October 2014 and she has been in custody ever since. Accordingly, since being incarcerated on the 22nd of February 2013, she has spent a very considerable period of time in prison.
[6] The applicant/appellant seeks an extension of time within which to appeal the September sentence. It was contended on her behalf that, in imposing the sentence, the learned magistrate failed to adequately take into account the principle of totality and that he arrived at a sentence which was manifestly excessive in the circumstances. The parties' legal representatives addressed the court both in relation to the application for an extension of time and also the appeal.
[7] The court has power, pursuant to section 224 of the Justices Act 1886, to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal; such an extension may be given retrospectively. In this case, an extension, if granted, would be to 4 February 2015, being the date the notice of appeal was filed. The discretion to extend time must, of course, be exercised judicially.
[8] The length of the extension required in this case is very substantial, but the appellant has explained the reason for her delay in instituting the appeal. In that regard, the evidence establishes that she did not recall receiving any correspondence from her then solicitor with information about her appeal rights in relation to the September sentence when it was handed down. She had not fully understood her sentence at the time it was imposed and was shocked when it was explained to her upon her arrival in prison. At that stage, she unsuccessfully attempted to contact her lawyer to discuss the sentence. She did speak to her mother, who had, in turn, spoken to the lawyer, but no mention was made of appeal rights or any recommendation to appeal.
[9] Although she thought her overall sentence was too high, she did not know that she could appeal her sentence, nor did she know anything about the process for instituting an appeal; she thought that she was stuck with the sentence which was imposed. It was not until being returned to custody, on 8 October 2014, that she received advice from another lawyer. That lawyer obtained transcripts of the sentencing remarks and decision, advised her that she had prospects of appealing the sentence, obtained instructions to appeal and assisted her in having the necessary documents filed. Had she known her appeal rights, she would have exercised them more promptly.
[10] The appellant/applicant's evidence in relation to the advice she received from her new lawyer and her prompt giving of instructions in response, was corroborated in testimony from her solicitor.
[11] I accept the explanation for the delay in seeking to appeal against the sentence. The appeal raises relevant grounds which are not only arguable but, for the reasons which I will discuss later, soundly based. The interests of justice favour the exercise of the discretion to grant the necessary extension.
[12] It has already been observed that the terms of imprisonment imposed by reason of the September sentence were ordered to be served concurrently with each other, but cumulatively with the unexpired sentence imposed on 22nd February 2013. It is rightly common ground that, in those circumstances, the learned magistrate was obliged to consider the principle of totality.
[13] The effect of the totality principle is to require a judge to ensure that the aggregation of sentences imposed on an offender is a just and appropriate measure of the total criminality involved. It is relevant to the purpose of sentencing, set out in section 9(1)(a) of the Penalties and Sentences Act, namely, to punish in a way that is just in the circumstances.
[14] The principle not only applies where a judge is sentencing an offender for a series of offences but also, relevantly, applies in sentencing an offender who is serving existing sentences earlier imposed. When a custodial sentence will be cumulative upon, or will overlap with, an existing custodial sentence, the sentencing judge or magistrate must take into account that existing sentence, so that the total period of custody adequately and fairly represents the totality of the criminality involved in all of the offences to which that total period is attributable.
[15] That may require a downward adjustment to the sentence which would otherwise be imposed on a particular offence or offences so as to ensure an appropriate relativity. That adjustment may be made either by making the sentences wholly or partially concurrent, or by lowering the individual sentences not below that which would otherwise be appropriate, in order to reflect the fact that a number of sentences are being imposed. The former approach is generally preferable, but the latter is available (see R v Kendrick [2015] QCA 27).
[16] The learned magistrate did not discuss the totality principle, nor did he expressly consider whether the combination of the unexpired February sentence and the sentences which he was to impose in September were just and appropriate overall. It may be, as Henry J pointed out in R v Kendrick (supra) at para 71, that the absence of an express statement in sentencing remarks will not, of itself, always bespeak error. It may be apparent, as a matter of inference, that the principle was taken into account and appropriately applied. For the reasons which followed, however, that inference is not reasonably open in this case.
[17] It has already been observed that the periods of imprisonment imposed by the September sentence were ordered to be served concurrently with each other. That structure suggests that the learned sentencing magistrate was conscious of the principle of totality, at least insofar as it related to the totality of the criminality in the offences for which the applicant/appellant was being dealt with in September. No such inference can be drawn from the structure of the sentence in relation to the totality of the February and September sentences, because his Honour made those periods cumulative rather than concurrent.
[18] It was common ground that his Honour was not obliged to make the September sentence cumulative with the February sentence. His Honour heard no submissions in relation to whether the September sentence should be concurrent or cumulative with the February sentence. Further, he gave no reasons for making the September sentence cumulative, nor did he indicate that he had reduced the September sentence on account of the principle of totality in this application to the February and September sentences viewed collectively. He did take into account the approximately one month of non declarable pre sentence custody, but that is not a full and proper application of the principle. There is, in short, nothing from which it could be inferred that his Honour took into account, and appropriately applied, the principle of totality.
[19] Further, the circumstances were such that his Honour could not have properly considered and applied the principle. Nothing was placed before his Honour which described the details or circumstances of the offending for which the appellant/applicant was sentenced in February.
[20] It was pointed out, for the respondent, that his Honour had her criminal history before him, which disclosed the offences and the sentences imposed in February. However, contrary to the respondent's submissions, that was insufficient for him to have considered and applied the principle in a full and proper way. One cannot consider the appropriateness of the sentence for the totality of the criminality without knowledge of the particulars of that criminality.
[21] The sentencing discretion miscarried because his Honour failed to appropriately consider and apply the principles of totality. The sentence below should therefore be set aside and the sentencing discretion re exercised afresh.
[22] The applicant/appellant is young. She is now 20 years of age, having been born on 27 May 1994. She was only 18 when she committed the offences the subject of the February sentence, and 19 when she committed the offences the subject of the September sentence.
[23] The applicant/appellant was in difficult circumstances at the time of the offending. The sentencing magistrate, for the February sentence, had before him a psychiatric report which evidenced the applicant/appellant's chronic depressive disorder. She had been abusing alcohol and sniffing glue since the age of 13. She had turned to substance abuse as a way of blocking things out. She had, as at the date of the February sentence, begun treatment, including by medication. The sentencing magistrate, at the September sentence, was informed that she had not been taking her medication when she committed the offences for which she was then dealt.
[24] The applicant/appellant was not only a young lady with a troubled background and with a substance abuse problem, but she was also influenced by others, as the particulars of the offending behaviour shows. The offences were carried out by a group of which she was a part.
[25] Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the problems she had from a very young age, she had a criminal history. Her prior history was significant but not particularly lengthy. As at the date of the February sentence, she had been before the Magistrates Court on four previous occasions. She had no offending prior 2012. Her first appearance was in February 2012 when she was dealt with for public nuisance. She was next dealt with on the 8th of March 2012 for a range of property offences, including stealing, unlawful use of a motor vehicle and multiple counts of burglary. She was given three years' probation for those offences. She was then dealt with in April 2012 for assault occasioning bodily harm, for which she was fined with no conviction recorded, and again in July, when she was given probation for one count of stealing. Accordingly, she had not, prior to the February sentence, been incarcerated.
[26] The only other entries on her record are the February and September sentences and one entry from 25 October 2013, when she was dealt with for the breach of her earlier probation order and was resentenced to concurrent, wholly suspended terms of imprisonment and a fine.
[27] The February sentence was consequent upon her pleas of guilty to five counts of stealing, one of break and enter premise and committing an indictable offence, one of unlawful use of a motor vehicle, one of receiving tainted property, one of fraud and three summary matters. The offending behaviour of relevance to the February sentence was set out in the sentencing submissions that day. It included shop stealing of alcohol from a liquor outlet and clothes from a clothing store. It also included stealing a handbag from a person, as well as the theft of fuel by two service station drive offs. It also included receiving some stolen property and pawning one of those items to obtain $100. There were two other offences which the learned magistrate rightly regarded as the most serious. He described them as follows:
[28] Clearly, the most serious of your offences was that on the 1st of November 2012, stealing from the person, when you were party to a joint enterprise in which an innocent citizen was stopped, was prevented from removing her car. You distracted her whilst your co offender - female co offender flashed/waving a metal bar, forcing her to leave her car. So her car was ransacked and two and a half thousand dollars in cash contained within her purse was stolen. She struggled with you and she was then confronted by your two co offenders to force her to let her - to let you go, so I don't accept that you merely went along with that scheme, as you told Dr Lichter. It seems to me that you were an integral part of it.
[29] The offence of entering premises and stealing by means of a break, that occurred on 8th of November, so a week later. It is also in my view a serious example of that type of offending. It happened in the early hours of the morning. You were with co offenders in a stolen vehicle. You and they damaged the closed safety rollers of the business to gain entry to it. You stole a large quantity of goods, decamped in a stolen vehicle and were caught in that stolen vehicle the next day in Murgon, where you intended to sell the goods you'd stolen.
[30] Each of the other indictable offences with which you had been charged are also serious in their way, but the two that I have referred to are the most serious of the lot.
[31] Although the description of the handbag stealing referred to a struggle, the Police Prosecutor acknowledged, in the course of sentencing submissions, that "there wasn't even a slight overtone of violence on the defendant's part". It was also acknowledged by the Police Prosecutor that it could not be proven that the applicant/appellant knew that a co accused was taking an iron bar. The Police Prosecutor described her as playing a "relatively minor part", although the learned magistrate thought the role to be integral.
[32] The February sentence was high, and indeed higher than had been contended for by either the prosecution or the defence, but is not the subject of this appeal. The offending of relevance to the September sentence was committed while the applicant/appellant was on parole. The details of the offending behaviour were described in the course of the sentencing submissions.
[33] The unlawful use of a motor vehicle counts relate to the use of a stolen BMW motor vehicle in which the applicant/appellant was a passenger. The stealing counts relate to stealing fuel by service station drive offs. The two counts of entering premises and committing an indictable offence of stealing were the most serious and attracted concurrent two year head sentences. In each case, the applicant/appellant was a party to offences carried out by a larger group. The circumstances of those two offences were described as follows:
Charge 2, the complainant is the BWS at Coorparoo. The informant is Jacob Woodcock. At - sorry, 12.30 am on 9 August 2013, three stolen vehicles, being a silver BMW, a black Holden Commodore Club Sport and a silver VW Golf, have all driven and parked out the front of the BWS at Coorparoo.
Nine offenders have exited the vehicle. Some of the offenders have used a jimmy bar and a hammer to force a deadlock to the glass - to the front glass sliding door with a security grille. The defendants have been - have then opened the sliding door and entered the BWS and stolen a large amount of alcohol and cigarettes and loaded the vehicles up with stolen property. They have then returned to the stolen vehicles and headed towards Brisbane City.
The offence was captured on CCTV footage. One of the offenders was described as wearing a pink, white and black jumper and shorts, and that description matched that of the female given for the previous driver.
On the 16th of August 2013, whilst speaking with her at the detention centre, the defendant has made full admissions to this offence and admitted to being the person wearing the clothing that I've just described to the court. She was cooperative and remorseful, and again saying she didn't know why she committed offences like she does...
Now, that victim is Ascot Cellars trading as Cellarbrations Ascot, which is located at Alexandra Road, Ascot. The informant is Christopher Condon - he is the complainant. At approximately 3.40 am on the 11th of August 2013, the offenders have attended the victim's store at Ascot in the silver BMW, parked the vehicle out the front. At this point, four offenders have exited the vehicle and have used bricks and a hammer to smash the front glass door, allowing them entry into the shop. Once inside, the offenders have removed a large amount of bottles and spirits and have placed the bottles in the BMW, before getting back into the vehicle and decamping.
On the 11th of August, she was located with the alcohol that I've already outlined. She's taken back to the police station. She said she was picked up in the stolen vehicle. They went cruising in the vehicle. They went to the Cellarbrations store at Ascot. Someone else in the vehicle had smashed a front glass door, but she didn't know how he did it, but she - but then she and the others have entered the store and removed a quantity of spirits and loaded them into a car, and the alcohol located was - and the alcohol located was the alcohol stolen.
[35] For some of it, she knew it was an offence to steal spirits from stores that she'd broken into. She gave the same excuse as to why she committed this offence. The amount of the loss was not quantified.
[36] The amount of loss was not quantified. The applicant/appellant was remorseful in relation to the offences for which she was dealt with in both February and September. She had, in each case, been cooperative and made admissions to police and proceeded by timely pleas of guilty.
[37] The offences were, of course, serious and all the more so, given the applicant/appellant's history and the fact that she was on parole when they were committed. That, however, must be balanced with other considerations, including the offender's youth, circumstances, contrition, cooperation and timely pleas of guilty.
[38] I was referred to a number of decisions to consider in determining the appropriate sentence. They were R v Mason [1998] QCA 177, R v Karbanowicz [2003] QCA 543, R v Cummins [2004] QCA 350, R v Dance [2009] QCA 371, R v Paton [2011] QCA 34 and R v Walsh [2014] QCA 209. The case of R v Walsh discusses a number cases.
[39] A review of those cases demonstrates that a head sentence of even more than the effective head sentence of three and a half years imposed in this case may be appropriate for multiple robbery offences committed by a recidivist with a lengthy criminal history. The offences for which the applicant/appellant was sentenced in both February and September, however, did not include burglary. And each of the cases which indicate a head sentence at or above the effective head sentence given in this case were, in my view, more serious.
[40] In my view, the September sentence would have been appropriate only if it had been ordered to be served concurrently with the unexpired portion of the February sentence. That would have resulted in the full time release date of 16 September 2015.
[41] The resentencing discretion in this case needs to take account of the substantial time lapse in the intervening period from 2013, when the applicant/appellant was previously sentenced. There is now no unexpired term of imprisonment which the applicant/appellant is serving.
[42] This sentence, therefore, cannot be made concurrent with any other sentence, since the February sentence has now expired.
[43] Further, the appellant has now spent a significant time in custody, including custody relating solely to these matters, and indeed, in my view, has served a sufficient time of actual custody. In the circumstances, it is appropriate to construct a sentence so that the sentence does not extend beyond the 16th of September of this year and which gives the applicant/appellant the benefit of a release as soon as possible.
[44] I appreciate that that may involve setting a head sentence which would have been inadequate if given in September of 2013, particularly if it had been imposed concurrently. However, structuring a sentence in the way I have indicated is necessary to achieve a just sentence in the particular circumstances. I will give the parties an opportunity to be heard as to how a sentence may now appropriately be structured to achieve that result.
[45] HIS HONOUR: Earlier this morning, I gave reasons for extending the time for instituting the appeal, for setting aside the sentence imposed on the 16th of September 2013 and for proceeding to resentence. I should add that the appeal did not seek to disturb the sentence of the 16th of September 2013 insofar as it related to the summary matters and I do not propose to upset or to vary that part of the sentence. The remaining offences, that is, the indictable offences, will be subject to a resentencing.
[46] This morning, I gave reasons why, in my view, the sentence should be fashioned in such a way as to ensure that the applicant/appellant is released as soon as possible and that the end date of her sentence is no later than 16th of September this year. As I recorded at the time, this will require imposing a sentence which, on the surface of it, will seem to be unduly lenient. However, it is necessary in order to do justice in this case because of the matters referred to earlier, including the effect of the passage of time between the date when she was sentenced in 2013 and today. In short, the sentence is to be fashioned in such a way as to be akin to a sentence of two years' imprisonment, to be served concurrently had such a sentence been imposed on the 16th of September 2013.
[47] There are some different options available to achieve that result, or something similar to it. One option, which would achieve an appropriate end date, would be to sentence the applicant/appellant to something of the order of 10 months' imprisonment and then to declare the time which she has spent in custody for these matters and for no others being, I was told, approximately seven months to be time already served. The difficulty with such an approach is that it may not allow the setting of a parole release date. That difficulty arises because of section 160B of the Penalties and Sentences Act as construed by the Court of Appeal in R v Smith [2013] QCA 397.
[48] The difficulty in relation to setting a parole release date would arise because the offending for which I would be sentencing would include offending which occurred during the parole period for the offences for which the applicant/appellant was dealt with in the February sentence. The effect of section 209 of the Corrective Services Act would be to automatically cancel the parole order from the February sentence. As was pointed out in R v Smith, that would be so even though this sentence would be occurring after the end of the parole order.
[49] Further, by declaring the time that the applicant/appellant has spent in custody before the end of the parole order from the February sentence, I would effectively be backdating the effect of the sentence imposed today such that there would be one unbroken duration of imprisonment. Accordingly, not only would the court ordered parole order from the February sentence be cancelled but importantly, for the purposes of section 160B, it would be cancelled "during the offender's period of imprisonment".
[50] Because, in my view, given the circumstances of this case, the applicant/appellant has already spent sufficient time in custody, she should be given the benefit of immediate release. Accordingly, I will not be taking the option which I have just discussed.
[51] Another option would be to take into consideration the time that she has spent in custody, but not to declare any time as time served pursuant to the sentence imposed today and, instead, to shorten the period of imprisonment to four months to start from today. That, it would seem, would obviate the difficulty under section 160B because the earlier sentences, having long since been completely fulfilled, there would not be an unbroken duration of imprisonment and, accordingly, any cancellation would not be "during the offender's period of imprisonment" for the purposes of section 160B.
[52] The solicitor for the appellant embraces that as an option, but the solicitor who appeared for the Crown, whilst not submitting that that was erroneous, said that she was struggling with the analysis. I will not further pursue that option because, in my view, there is a better option in the circumstances which both rightly agree is also open.
[53] The application of section 160B(2) depends, relevantly in this case, on section 209 of the Corrective Services Act 2006 being enlivened. Section 209(1) provides that subsection (1) does not apply in a number of scenarios. Those scenarios include if the other period of imprisonment to which the offender is sentenced is required to be served under an intensive correction order.
[54] Given that the applicant/appellant is currently in custody only for the indictable offences from the 16th of September 2013 and for no other reason, there is no other impediment, once those sentences are set aside, to me proceeding to order that the new term of imprisonment be served by way of intensive correction order. That is, in my view, a preferable option in this case, given the youth of the applicant/appellant, the desirability of her having assistance in re entering the community in a way which does not leave her vulnerable to further offending and given the level of supervision and assistance she could be provided with under an intensive correction order. That, however, is not a sentence which I can impose unless it's explained to the offender and unless she agrees to me imposing it and unless she agrees to carry out its terms.
[55] The effect of an order is that the offender is to serve the sentence of imprisonment by way of intensive correction in the community and not in a prison. There are a number of general requirements of an intensive correction order. They are that you must not commit another offence during the period of the order; you must report to an authorised corrective services officer at the place, and within the time, stated in the order. In this case whereabouts would she report?
[56] MS HORNE: Sorry. I'll just confirm that. It's Beenleigh.
[57] HIS HONOUR: At Beenleigh within 24 hours - sorry, within one business day of her actual release from custody, which - well, it should be today. And you must report to, and receive visits from, an authorised corrective services officer at least twice in each week that the order is in force; you must take part in counselling and satisfactorily attend other programs as directed by the court or an authorised corrective services officer during the period of the order; you must perform in a satisfactory way community service that an authorised corrective services officer directs during the period of the order; you must, during the period of the order, if an authorised corrective services officer directs, reside at community residential facilities for periods (not longer than seven days at a time) that the officer directs; you must notify an authorised corrective services officer of every change of your place of residence or employment within two business days after the change happens; you must not leave or stay out of Queensland without the permission of an authorised corrective services officer; and you must comply with every reasonable direction of an authorised corrective services officer.
[58] If you do not comply with the terms of this order, then you can be brought back to be dealt with for that and that you can see you being resentenced and serving the actual time in custody. Such orders can be terminated or varied on application by you, Corrective Services or DPP. Do you understand the nature of an intensive correction order?
[59] DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honour.
[60] HIS HONOUR: Do you agree to me making one?
[61] DEFENDANT: Yep.
[62] HIS HONOUR: And do you agree to carry out its terms?
[63] DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honour.
[64]
[65] HIS HONOUR: Accordingly, in relation to each of the indictable offences for which the applicant/appellant was sentenced on the 16th of September 2013, I set aside those sentences and in lieu sentence you in each case to four months', to be served by way of intensive correction order with the conditions that I have nominated. Those intensive correction orders are, of course, to be served concurrently.
[66] And I will record that it is common ground that, with the setting aside of those previous terms of imprisonment and their replacement with the intensive correction orders, that you have reached your full time release with respect to the other matters.
[67] It will be clear from this sentencing structure that, whilst I had regard to the period of imprisonment that the applicant/appellant has in fact served and the period of her incarceration in total, as well as her period of incarceration that she has served for these offences in particular, no declaration of that previous time being time served is to be made.
[68] I am conscious that the applicant/appellant's incarceration included time that she was held in custody in relation to proceedings for these offences and for no other reason. Accordingly, section 159A seems to be engaged. As I have already stated, that time is not to be taken to be imprisonment already served under the sentence and I should specify what that time is. Yes; can you assist?
[69] MS FARNSWORTH: Your Honour, if I can tender the pre sentence custody certificate.
[70] HIS HONOUR: Yes.
[71] MS FARNSWORTH: It does have
[72] HIS HONOUR: This is a new certificate, is it, I haven't seen yet?
[73] MS FARNSWORTH: You've not seen this one; no.
[74] HIS HONOUR: Okay. Well, what exhibit number are we up to? What exhibit number are we up to? Does anyone know?
[75] ASSOCIATE: I think it's five.
[76] HIS HONOUR: I'll mark this as the next exhibit number, whatever it happens to be. Yes.
[77] MS FARNSWORTH: Your Honour will note in the section it says "other matters to be considered". It states that she's been held in custody in relation to these offences for 251 days, from the 31st of August two thousand and
[78] HIS HONOUR: Hang on, hang on. Two hundred fifty one days; yes.
[79] MS FARNSWORTH: From the 31st of August 2014 and - to and including
[80] HIS HONOUR: To and including the 8th of
[81] MS FARNSWORTH: Yes.
[82] HIS HONOUR: Yes, yes.
[83] MS FARNSWORTH: But if your Honour turns over the page, the second page, you'll note that she was released on the 12th of September to the 8th of October of two thousand
[84] HIS HONOUR: Hang on. Hang on. Where's that?
[85] MS FARNSWORTH: In the second
[86] HIS HONOUR: So from - she was released when, sorry?
[87] MS FARNSWORTH: From the 12th of September of 2014.
[88] HIS HONOUR: Yes. Yes, I can see that.
[89] MS FARNSWORTH: To the 8th of October, so that brings the total date
[90] HIS HONOUR: Yes.
[91] MS FARNSWORTH: down to 224 days.
[92] HIS HONOUR: So can you give me the periods, then? Can you break the periods up, then?
[93] MS FARNSWORTH: Yes; from the 31st of August 2014.
[94] HIS HONOUR: Yes.
[95] MS FARNSWORTH: To the 12th of September 2014, to the 8th of - sorry. And then
[96] HIS HONOUR: The 8th of
[97] MS FARNSWORTH: The 8th of October 2014 to the 8th of May 2015.
[98] HIS HONOUR: Yes. So that the periods for which the applicant/offender was held in custody in relation to proceedings for these offences and for no other was the period between the 31st of August 2014 and the 12th of September 2014, and then again from the 8th of October 2014 to the 8th - to today, being the 8th of May 2014, a total of 224 days.
[99] MS FARNSWORTH: Yes.
[100] HIS HONOUR: And I declare that none of that time is taken to be imprisonment already served under the sentences. Is that all I have to do now to finish this off?
[101] MS HORNE: Yes, your Honour. Thank you.
Szucs
Queensland Police Service [2015] QDC 190