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SZBQN v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1845 | Case summary | Zoe

CTHFCA

SZBQN v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

[2005] FCA 1845

Federal Court of Australia|2005-11-29|Before: McHugh J, Jacobson J

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Court

Federal Court of Australia

Decision date

2005-11-29

Before

McHugh J, Jacobson J

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Judgment (3 paragraphs)

[1]

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 This is an application for an extension of time in which to file and serve a notice of appeal against the orders and judgment of Barnes FM dated 2 September 2005. On that date, her Honour dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal ('the RRT') handed down on 18 September 2003. The RRT affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent not to grant the applicant a protection visa. The application for an extension of time was filed on 29 September 2005, six days outside the 21 day time limit provided by Order 52, subrule 15(1) of the Federal Court Rules ('the Rules'). 2 Order 52, subrule 15(2) of the Rules provides that an extension of time may be granted for 'special reasons'. The judgment and orders of Barnes FM were final. Leave to appeal was not required. In Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187 at 195 the Full Court stated that in order to warrant an extension of time it is necessary to demonstrate grounds sufficient, in the particular circumstances, to justify a departure from the general rule which prescribes a period within which an appeal must be filed and served. The grounds must be such as to take the case out of the ordinary. I will refer later in my reasons to the explanation given by the applicant to support the application for an extension. 3 In determining whether special reasons exist to grant an extension of time, it is necessary to consider the applicant's prospects. A similar power of a Justice of the High Court to grant an extension of time was referred to in Gallo v Dawson (No 2) (1992) 109 ALR 319 where the High Court endorsed the following statement of principle enunciated by McHugh J at first instance (see Gallo v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 479 at 480): 'The discretion to extend time is given for the sole purpose of enabling the court or justice to do justice between the parties. This means that the discretion can only be exercised in favour of an applicant upon proof that strict compliance with the rules will work an injustice upon the applicant. In order to determine whether the rules will work an injustice, it is necessary to have regard to the history of the proceedings, the conduct of the parties, the nature of the litigation, and the consequences for the parties of the grant or refusal of the application for extension of time. When the application is for an extension of time in which to file an appeal, it is always necessary to consider the prospects of the applicant succeeding in the appeal.' (citations omitted) 4 The applicant is a citizen of India. He claimed to have a well-founded fear of persecution on the grounds of his religion. He is a Muslim and claimed to fear harm from the Hindu Shiv Sena organisation, particularly in his home state of Maharashtra where the Shiv Sena was in power. The applicant also made claims in relation to the treatment of the Muslim community as a whole in India, particularly in Maharashtra. The RRT found that the applicant was generally a reliable witness but it came to the view that he does not have a well-founded fear of persecution on Convention grounds. 5 The learned Federal Magistrate summarised the findings of the RRT at [5] - [14] of her reasons for judgment. I will refer to the RRT's reasons briefly. The applicant made a number of claims of persecution covering the period from the 1980s up to 2001. The claims included the death of his mother as well as mistreatment in 1993 in the aftermath of the rioting following the destruction of the Babri Mosque. There were also claims of sporadic threats and harassment directed at the applicant by the Shiv Sena between 1993 and 2001. The RRT found, as I have said, that the applicant was generally reliable but it came to the view that he tended to exaggerate the problems of Muslims in Maharashtra. 6 The RRT divided the applicant's claims of personal mistreatment into two periods, those which occurred before and those which occurred after 1996. In relation to the pre-1996 claims, the RRT found that it was not satisfied that what the Applicant had experienced constituted systematic or discriminatory conduct so as to amount to persecution. Nor was the RRT satisfied that up to 1996, the applicant's fears of persecution were for a Convention related reason. The RRT stated that it was fortified in this view by the fact that the applicant had spent time in the United Kingdom and the United States of America between 1994 and 1996 and had not made a claim for protection in either of those countries. 7 As to the claims in the period after 1996, the RRT considered that any fear of persecution was not well-founded. The RRT addressed what it called the 'main plank' of the applicant's claim, namely that the Muslim community was subject to persecution at the hands of the Hindu majority, especially in the applicant's home state. However, after discussing with the applicant independent country information, the RRT made two important findings. First, it found that contrary to the substantial amount of country information submitted by the applicant, the Indian central government had not embarked upon policies designed to systematically mistreat Muslims. It referred in particular to the situation in Gujarat Province from which it concluded that the Indian central government had shown a determination to bring violence to an end. Second, the RRT found that despite some shortcomings, the central government had demonstrated a willingness and ability to protect all citizens, irrespective of religious belief. It was not satisfied that the central or state governments had an agenda of driving Muslims out of India. 8 The RRT also considered that the applicant's subjective fears were localised and found that, having regard to his level of education, language abilities and his history of overseas travel overseas and previous employment, it was reasonable for him to relocate. The RRT referred to Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 440-441 in coming to the view that the applicant's ability to relocate elsewhere in India negated the well-founded fear of persecution. 9 The applicant raised a large number of grounds of review on the hearing of the application before Barnes FM. These grounds included a claim of denial of procedural fairness in relation to the hearing before the RRT. The applicant also raised in that regard the grounds of bias and lack of good faith. On the first day the application was listed for hearing Barnes FM granted the applicant an adjournment to enable him to obtain a transcript of the RRT hearing but he failed to do so. Her Honour said at [17] of her reasons for judgment that in those circumstances, the factual basis for those aspects of the applicant's claims that relied on what occurred at the hearing was not established. Accordingly, her Honour rejected the claims of breach of the rules of procedural fairness as well as the claims of actual bias and lack of good faith. 10 In relation to the claim of actual bias, Barnes FM referred to the decision of the High Court in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507. Her Honour said that the RRT's account of what occurred at the hearing, the RRT's findings and reasons, and the material before the Federal Magistrates Court did not establish actual bias. Her Honour referred to a decision of von Doussa J in SCAA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 668 in which his Honour said (at [38]): '…it will be a rare and exceptional case where actual bias can be demonstrated solely from the published reasons for decision.' 11 Her Honour considered in the alternative whether the material before the Court established apprehended bias in the sense considered by the High Court in Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425 ('Ex parte H'). Her Honour came to the view that the matters which were raised by the applicant were not such as to establish that a hypothetical fair-minded lay person who was properly informed of the nature of the proceedings and the matters in issue would have had a reasonable apprehension of bias or a reasonable apprehension that the RRT might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the questions to be decided. 12 Her Honour also rejected the claim of bad faith, referring to the decision of Allsop J in NAAG of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2002) 195 ALR 207 at [24]. Barnes FM found at [32] of her reasons for judgment that in essence the applicant's complaint was about the RRT's factual findings, thus jurisdictional error was not shown. The applicant contended before Barnes FM that the RRT had not referred to every item of country information that was before it. However, her Honour noted that the observations of French, Sackville, and Hely JJ in Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184 at [46] provided an answer to that contention. 13 Her Honour also dealt with the applicant's submission that the RRT had failed to consider every integer of his claims. This contention was rejected by her Honour at [34] of her reasons for judgment. Her Honour observed that the reasons of the RRT are comprehensive and found that the RRT's finding that the 'low level harassment' of the applicant did not constitute persecution was logical and open to it on the material before it. Her Honour also found that Wednesbury unreasonableness was not established. 14 The applicant also took issue with the weight given by the RRT to particular items of country information but Barnes FM observed that this was a matter for the RRT. Her Honour also found no error in relation to the RRT's understanding of the meaning of refugee or its consideration of whether the matters complained of amounted to persecution. Her Honour observed that these were factual matters for the RRT, citing Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SZANS (2005) 141 FCR 586. Her Honour further found no error in the RRT's findings on the issue of relocation or the availability of state protection. 15 Barnes FM also considered whether the RRT had contravened s 424A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by relying on information contained in the applicant's protection visa application. Her Honour rejected, at [47] of her reasons for judgment, any claim of jurisdictional error based upon the decision of the High Court in SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2005) 215 ALR 162. 16 The application for an extension of time includes a draft notice of appeal. The grounds of appeal are in very broad terms and are unparticularised. They are first, that there was a breach of the rules of natural justice, second, that the applicant was denied procedural fairness in connection with the making of the RRT's decision and third, that there was no other material to justify the making of the decision by Barnes FM. The applicant relies upon an affidavit sworn on 29 September 2005 in support of his application. The affidavit states that the applicant is a heart patient and that he is suffering from financial hardship. He says that he was sick and had gone to a general practitioner and a specialist who had advised him to rest. He says that due to his illness he could not file the application on time. 17 When the application for an extension of time was first called on for hearing before me on 26 October 2005 the applicant sought to offer from the bar table an explanation for his failure to put the transcript before Barnes FM. He has now provided sworn evidence as to the reasons why the transcript was not provided and seeks to rely on the transcript in support of the application for an extension of time. The Minister accepts that it is appropriate for me to receive the transcript of the RRT hearing on this application. However, the Minister does not concede that the transcript would be admissible as fresh evidence on the hearing of the appeal if time is extended for that purpose: see Cottrell v Wilcox [2002] FCAFC 53 at [19] - [21]; cf Council of the City of Greater Wollongong v Cowan (1955) 93 CLR 435. 18 I will turn then to consider the transcript of the two day RRT hearing, heard on 20 June 2003 and 7 August 2003. The cover sheet of the transcript for 7 August 2003 records the RRT Member as G. Short whereas the cover sheet of the transcript for 20 June 2003 records the RRT Member as K. Northwood. I am satisfied that the reference to G. Short on the second day of hearing was an error and that the RRT was constituted by Mr Northwood on both occasions. Page two of the transcript of 7 August 2003 records that the RRT was constituted by Mr Northwood, as does the cover sheet of the RRT's reasons for decision. At [21] of the RRT's reasons for decision it is stated that the applicant gave oral evidence before the RRT Member on 20 June 2003 and 7 August 2003. 19 It is appropriate to set out a number of salient passages from the transcript of the RRT hearing as they bear upon matters which the applicant wishes to agitate on appeal. The RRT Member commenced by explaining the RRT's procedures and what the applicant had to show in order to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution. The transcript demonstrates that although the Member had a preliminary view of the merits he put to the applicant in what appears to be a non aggressive way, the various concerns of the Member which were critical to his decision. 20 The transcript is lengthy (the second day occupying approximately 6 hours of hearing time) but it shows that the applicant was not hurried in the time given to him to deal with questions nor was he rushed in his opportunity to respond. He was given an opportunity to provide a chronological account of his claims of past persecution. He was also given the opportunity to deal with questions relating to the attitude of the Indian Government to the position of the Muslim community and the possibility of relocation in India. Those were the critical matters in the RRT's decision. 21 The issues which the RRT Member discussed with the applicant included country information and threats from the Shiv Sena. The relevant passages from the transcript of 20 June 2003, appearing at pp 6, 9, 20, 24 and 35-36 are as follows: 'THE TRIBUNAL: That's all right, just to emphasise that, when we talk about persecution having an official quality we mean in the sense that it originates from the government or is tolerated by the government or the government is powerless to do anything about it. The reason I again take some time over that is because that is, in my view, a problem for applicants from India. … THE TRIBUNAL: I'll also endeavour to discuss with you as we go along any difficulties or problems that I see with your claims. Also endeavour to raise with you independent information which does not help your claims. When I raise those matters with you it doesn't all mean that I've made up my mind about them, it simply means that there are things that I think need to be explained or clarified and I'm interested to hear what you have to say about them. … THE TRIBUNAL: Okay, so was this incident that occurred in - did this incident occur on the 12th of July 1992? Sorry, I'm not trying to trick you. I just notice that you say that mother died on the 12th of July 1992 after being in pain for five nights. So does that mean that the break in was actually the 7th of July? The mistake is that - there is a mistake, mean the incident occurred in 1991 rather than - instead of '92. This incident. Yeah, it's a printing or typing mistake. THE TRIBUNAL: So when was the attack on the house, what was the precise date of the attack on the house? THE TRIBUNAL: Yeah, before five days the incident occurred 7th of July 1991. … THE TRIBUNAL: Well I understand that but I'm just trying to get clear in my mind and the question is did mother die of the injuries she received in the attack or did she die from a pre-existing heart condition? THE INTERPRETER: I will reply soon THE TRIBUNAL: Take your time, there's no rush. THE INTERPRETER: Thank you very much. THE TRIBUNAL: Perhaps just to take your mind away from that for a moment, when - you mentioned in your statement that - or you inferred in your statement, you suggested in your statement that the house was attacked a second time. If that was so, when was the second time the house was attacked? … THE TRIBUNAL: Now look [applicant's name], there is nothing about that in your statement. Now stop, I want you to stop. I want you to stop. Now what I'm going to do is I'm going to adjourn this hearing now because clearly we're not going to finish and what I want you to do is to go away and prepare another - prepare your statement and this time I want you to get your statement in the right chronological order and I want you to make sure that you set out everything that you claim you personally have suffered by way of mistreatment. THE TRIBUNAL: And make sure that you get all the dates right so that you know where you were and what you were doing at particular times. THE INTERPRETER: Okay. THE TRIBUNAL: Because do you see that if you can't remember and you get them all confused it then looks as though they're not the truth.' 22 The relevant passages from the RRT transcript of 7 August 2003, appearing at pp 14 - 15, 27, 29, 35, 41 and 45, are as follows: 'THE TRIBUNAL: Now before I leave the States, and the point was raised in the decision of the delegate, why didn't you apply for a protection visa in the United States? THE APPLICANT: That's a very normal thing, you know, like. THE TRIBUNAL: The question is why didn't you? There might be a perfectly logical answer but why didn't you apply? THE APPLICANT: No, I don't understand how come they have that thought, why didn't they ask me that you didn't apply in UK. UK is much easier than USA. THE TRIBUNAL: Yeah, but why don't you. I'll ask you now, why didn't you apply in the UK? THE APPLICANT: Yeah, you're asking me now, this is a good thing for me because first thing is that I was alone. The very essential point that I was alone, I was not bothered about myself that much which at present, at this moment when I ask in Australia I was having a wife and my kid. … THE TRIBUNAL: But just picking up on that, you mentioned Gujarat. My recollection is that the, as a result of what happened there I think the Indian government sent Gill to Gujarat to straighten things out and he - Gill from the Punjab, the police broke from police - policeman with the fearsome reputation from Punjab, they sent him there to straighten the situation out and to sort things out to help the Muslim community. So it's not - despite all the things that are said about the police and what have you in Gujarat and so forth, and let's not forget that the Gujarat trouble started because of the actions by Muslims with respect to the train as I recall. So it's not - this is not just one way. There are terrorist acts and atrocities committed by Muslims in India in the same way as there are - there is - there are terrible things done by from time by Hindus. But nevertheless the government showed their willingness to provide protection by sending Gill to Gujarat. THE APPLICANT: Gill is getting now old, he cannot straight the Punjab or what he is want to straight the Gujarat. I don't have any consult with him. … THE TRIBUNAL: Everywhere, and no but nevertheless what I'm saying is that the government of India demonstrated in relation to Gujarat a willingness to protect the Muslim community in Gujarat. That's what I'm saying. So, A, the Indian government certainly aren't powerless to deal with these things if they choose to do so and B, in the case of Gujarat and other places they have demonstrated a willingness to protect - to provide protection for the Muslim community. THE APPLICANT: After killing of more than I think several thousand of Muslims and they tortured so many things, like I have given the one example, I've asked Mr Kaurdri to send an example here. THE TRIBUNAL: In Gujarat you mean? THE APPLICANT: Yeah, in Gujarat. THE TRIBUNAL: The Muslims start - the Muslims attacked the train, now didn't they, you've got to acknowledge that the Muslims attacked the train? THE APPLICANT: You see why they attacked the train, you have further information about this that why they have attacked the train? … THE TRIBUNAL: I'm sorry, don't misunderstand me, perhaps through Mr Interpreter. Your activities in the past have been very localised and you are not a person who is known and of concern to the authorities on the national level in India such that the Hindu organisations would want to target you. … THE TRIBUNAL: Why couldn't you relocate to Andra Pradesh? … THE TRIBUNAL: All right, I don't think that I - I think if I were asking any more questions they would be on the same sort of ground again. I have looked at most of the independent information that you've made available to me and I'll look at it further. Before we finish, is there anything additional that you wish to say which you think might help your claims or do you want to refer to anything that you feel that we may not have dealt with at all or dealt with in sufficient detail. This is your opportunity. THE APPLICANT: First of all I would like to say thank you very much for this opportunity that you have given to me not only once but twice and I do appreciate your effort and whatever I have put in my papers that was - that was the true thing because I believe as a Muslim I shouldn't be lying for anything which is ...... in my religion to say something wrong and whatever the things are there I wish that should fulfil your criteria and you know basically we want to be independently help work in Australia and help the country. … THE TRIBUNAL: Which I'll do and I've got the order of your claims pretty clearly in my mind now from some of the material in the second statement, from what we've discussed so I think I understand the situation. I guess that the for me the most difficult problem with your case is and I genuinely don't have a firm view about it at the moment, the most difficult thing though is coming to a conclusion about whether A, what you've suffered in the past amounts to Convention based persecution and because what's happened in the past is not usefully set to give some sort of indication of what might be the situation in the future because the critical thing is, is there a real chance that if you go back to India you'll be subjected to Convention based persecution and I've just got to make up my mind about that and I'm not sure that that is the situation. In other words I

THE APPLICANT: No, I'm worried about because --- THE TRIBUNAL: --- have difficulty satisfying myself that if you go back would you be subjected to Convention based persecution.' 23 I turn next to the first two grounds of appeal proposed in the draft notice of appeal, namely, breach of the rules of natural justice and procedural fairness. There was no error in the approach taken by Barnes FM who, of course, considered the question of procedural fairness, including the bias claim, without a transcript of the RRT hearing. The correctness of her Honour's finding are confirmed by an examination of the transcript. The transcript shows, as I have said, that all critical matters relating to the RRT's decision were put to the applicant. It also shows that the applicant was allowed to expand on his answers without interruption. There was no suggestion made to him that he was lying. He was given full opportunity to deal with all matters of concern to the RRT and which he wished to put in support of his claim. He was given an opportunity to clarify his claims orally and in writing. 24 Although the RRT Member indicated early on the first day of the hearing that he had doubts about the applicant's claim, it is plain that this was merely a preliminary view and that the RRT Member did not have a closed mind. There was no actual bias. Moreover, the transcript shows that the applicant was given ample opportunity to answer all of the issues and there can be no suggestion that a fair minded lay observer might have a reasonable apprehension of bias as the test is stated by the High Court in Ex parte H. Bad faith is quite out of the question, indeed in my view, the reverse is demonstrated by the transcript. 25 The third ground, namely that there was no material to justify Barnes FM's decision, could not, in my opinion, succeed. Her Honour had before her a Court Book which included a statement of reasons of the RRT. The statement of reasons indicates that the RRT gave considerable thought to the claims made by the applicant, to his evidence given at the two hearings, as well as to a vast quantity of material submitted by him in support of his application for review. The balanced and well considered nature of the RRT's reasons for decision was sufficient material to justify the conclusions of Barnes FM that the RRT was not actually biased and that there was no reasonable apprehension of bias. 26 Further, in the absence of transcripts Barnes FM was entitled to find that the RRT had not failed to raise matters with the applicant at the hearings held by it in 2003. For those reasons the third ground in the draft notice of appeal has little or no prospects of success. 27 The applicant submitted detailed written submissions in support of the application for an extension of time. The written submissions raised possible grounds of appeal not referred to in the draft notice. It is necessary to consider them. The first ground asserted that the RRT failed to consider the Convention ground of actual or imputed political opinion. The short answer to this is that the claim was not made by the applicant before the RRT, but even if it was, the RRT's findings effectively disposed of such a claim. A Full Court said in NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1 ('NABE')at [61] that: '…the tribunal is not required to consider a case that is not expressly made or does not arise clearly on the materials before it.' Here it is at least arguable that a claim of imputed political opinion arose in relation to the way in which the applicant expressed his Muslim faith by political means, for example, in the Babri Mosque riots, by his involvement in a Muslim sports centre and by the fact the he claimed to fear persecution from the Shiv Sena as a political party. Nevertheless, the RRT's finding that the applicant's claims of personal mistreatment did not amount to persecution and its findings that state protection was available and that the applicant could reasonably relocate, effectively disposed of any possible claim of political opinion. 28 I should add that, in my opinion, the claim before the RRT was made solely on the basis of religion. Accordingly, the RRT was not required to deal with any other ground: see the authorities referred to in NABE at [62]. 29 The second ground before me was that the RRT failed to exercise any independent review function. I understand this to be a complaint that the hearing on the second day was conducted by an RRT Member other than Mr Northwood. I have dealt with this above. 30 The third ground was an assertion of Wednesbury unreasonableness. There is no substance in this ground. It cannot be said that the decision of the RRT was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could possibly have reached the same conclusion: see the discussion of the authorities by Gummow J in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 at [132] - [136]. 31 The fourth ground was a submission of bias based upon a decision of McInnes FM in SZFRZ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FMCA 1353. However, there was nothing in the transcript of the present matter to suggest that the RRT was guilty of aggressive, sarcastic or partisan investigation of the type to which McInnes FM referred at [37] - [39]: see also VFAB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003)131FCR 102. 32 The fifth ground asserted that the RRT had failed to carry out 'the real chance' test as set out by the High Court in Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379. The applicant submitted that the RRT had applied a balance of probabilities test. I do not consider that this submission has any substance. The RRT's reasons are to be found substantially in [105] - [106], [112], [118] and [125] - [126] of its reasons for decision. I do not propose to repeat those paragraphs. There is no indication in those paragraphs or, indeed, elsewhere in the RRT's reasons for decision that the RRT applied a balance of probabilities test. 33 It is true that the RRT did not consider whether the applicant had a subjective fear of persecution after 1996, but its finding that he did not have a well-founded, that is to say, objective fear after that time made it unnecessary for the RRT to consider whether he had a subjective fear in the period from 1996 to 2001: see Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 572, 576-577. 34 The sixth ground was a submission that the RRT determined the question of persecution without considering the motives of the putative persecutor, Shiv Sena. It may be accepted that it is the motive of the persecutor which is to be considered. People are persecuted for something perceived about them, or attributed to them by their persecutors: see, for example, RAM v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1995) 57 FCR 565 at 568. Here the focus of the RRT's consideration was upon the attitude of the central and state governments to the Muslim population and upon the willingness and ability of the government to protect the individual. In my view, that approach was correct. In any event, the RRT's findings in relation to pre-1996 and post-1996 mistreatment by the Shiv Sena effectively dispose of this possible ground. 35 The seventh ground was a claim that the RRT should have asked itself the question: "What if I am wrong?" (See Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220 at [60] - [64], per Sackville J). However, there was nothing in the RRT's reasons to suggest that it did not have sufficient confidence in its findings such that the application of this principle would be enlivened. 36 The eighth ground submitted was that the RRT embarked upon only a very general inquiry about the applicant's ability to relocate. It is true that the RRT's reasons on this issue are brief, but brevity should not be criticised, so long as the reasons are not superficial. I am satisfied that they are not. In my view the RRT gave adequate consideration to this issue. The RRT referred to the applicant's education, to the fact that he had lived elsewhere and that he appeared to be readily employable. The RRT also considered country information which indicated that there were areas of India with large Muslim communities to which the applicant could safely relocate. 37 The applicant appeared in person at the hearing. The matters he put to me orally went to the merits of the RRT's findings. Nothing that was put, albeit with apparent sincerity and conviction, suggested any possible ground of jurisdictional error. Finally, therefore, I am satisfied that the applicant has no real prospects of success on an appeal. His explanation for the delay in filing his application is somewhat general. If I were satisfied that he had prospects of success on appeal, I would have been prepared to extend time because he is unrepresented and the application was only six days out of time. However, since I am satisfied that the appeal has no prospects of success I have come to the view that there are no special reasons for extending time. Accordingly, the orders I will make are that the application be dismissed with costs. I certify that the preceding thirty-seven (37) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Jacobson