The Court's powers in respect to contempt
6 The Court's power in respect to contempt is set forth as follows in s 31 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth):
Contempt of Court
(1) Subject to any other Act, the Court has the same power to punish contempts of its power and authority as is possessed by the High Court in respect of contempts of the High Court.
(2) The jurisdiction of the Court to punish a contempt of the Court committed in the face or hearing of the Court may be exercised by the Court as constituted at the time of the contempt.
7 The manner of exercise of that power is further addressed in Part 42 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (the "Federal Court Rules").
8 Within Pt 41, which deals with "Enforcement", r 41.06 provides as follows:
Endorsement on order
If an order requires a person to do, or not to do, an act or thing, whether within a certain time or not, and the consequences of failing to comply with the order may be committal, sequestration or punishment for contempt, the order must carry an endorsement that the person to be served with the order will be liable to imprisonment, sequestration of property or punishment for contempt if:
(a) for an order that requires the person to do an act or thing - the person neglects or refuses to do the act or thing within the time specified in the order; or
(b) for an order that requires the person not to do an act or thing - the person disobeys the order.
In Titan Support Systems Inc v Nguyen (No 2) [2015] FCA 359, an application for a finding of contempt arising out of the failure to comply with orders previously made failed. The orders as served did not contain the endorsement required by r 41.06. In respect to the need for compliance, Murphy J concluded:
[27] … in my view r 41.06 indicates that enforcement by way of committal, sequestration and punishment for contempt is not available unless the order is endorsed as required and served or otherwise notified as provided by the Rules.
[28] Rule 41.06 necessitates an endorsement on orders that require the person bound to do, or not to do, an act or thing, and r 41.07(1) requires that the order (in my view carrying the required endorsement) be personally served on the person bound by it (unless the person has had other notice of the order as provided under r 41.07(2)). I consider that unless the required endorsement is included in the order served (or otherwise notified in accordance with Division 41.1) the order may not be enforced by way of committal, sequestration or punishment for contempt.
The order made by his Honour was to vary the prior orders to include an endorsement, and to stand over the interlocutory application for punishment of contempt for further hearing on a future date.
9 Within Pt 42 of the Federal Court Rules, Div 42.2 provides in relevant part as follows:
Division 42.2 - Applications for contempt
42.11 Procedure generally
(1) If a party alleges that a contempt has been committed by a person in connection with a proceeding in the Court, an application for punishment for the alleged contempt must be made by the party by interlocutory application in the proceeding.
...
42.12 Statement of charge
An application alleging that a contempt has been committed must be accompanied by:
(a) a statement of charge, in accordance with Form 137, specifying the contempt with sufficient particularity to allow the person charged to answer the charge; and
(b) the affidavits on which the person making the charge intends to rely to prove the charge.
The former O 40, r 6 of the now-repealed Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) required a "statement specifying the contempt". The former rule and the current r 42.12 is a recognition of the principle of law that "no person should be punished for contempt of Court, which is a criminal offence, unless the specific offence charged against him be distinctly stated": Australian Building Construction Employees' and Builders Labourers' Federation v Viner (1982) 63 FLR 253 at 275. Rule 1.34 of the current Federal Court Rules also provides that the Court "may dispense with compliance with any of these Rules, either before or after the occasion for compliance arises".
10 The current r 42 also relevantly provides:
42.13 Service
The person charged must be served personally with:
(a) the application (whether originating or interlocutory); and
(b) the statement of charge; and
(c) the affidavits on which the party making the charge intends to rely.
…
42.15 Procedure on the hearing
(1) The person charged may apply to the Court for an order:
(a) that the hearing of the charge proceed by way of oral evidence; or
(b) for the cross-examination of the deponents to the affidavits to be relied on by the person making the charge.
(2) The person charged may file affidavits in answer to the charge.
(3) The person charged may:
(a) give oral evidence; and
(b) call witnesses to give oral evidence without first filing any affidavit sworn by the person charged or by those witnesses.
11 The present case requires no detailed exposition of the principles to be applied when a contempt is alleged, the range of penalties open to the Court or the principles to be applied. But some brief exposition is nevertheless prudent.
12 First, in Pelechowski v Registrar, Court of Appeal (NSW) [1999] HCA 19, (1999) 198 CLR 435 at 463 McHugh J observed:
[88] … In considering the appropriateness or otherwise of a sentence imposed for a contempt of court, it must always be borne in mind that the jurisdiction to commit for contempt exists so that the authority of the courts of law can be maintained. If breaches of the orders of the courts were regarded as of little moment, respect for and observance of the law would inevitably deteriorate and, ultimately, pose a threat to social order.
13 Second, the necessary elements to make good a charge of civil contempt have been identified as follows by Gillard J in Advan Investments Pty Ltd v Dean Gleeson Motor Sales Pty Ltd [2003] VSC 201:
[31] In order to prove a civil contempt of court involving a breach of an order of the court, the plaintiff has to prove the following:
(i) that an order was made by the court;
(ii) that the terms of the order are clear, unambiguous and capable of compliance;
(iii) that the order was served on the alleged contemnor or excused in the circumstances, or service dispensed with pursuant to the Rules of Court;
(iv) that the alleged contemnor has knowledge of the terms of the order;
(v) that the alleged contemnor has breached the terms of the order.
[32] It is necessary for the plaintiff to prove each element beyond reasonable doubt. In accordance with the principles of the criminal law, in proving element (v) it must be proven that the act or omission which constituted the breach of the order was deliberate and voluntary.
Although reference is there made to the need for an order to be expressed in terms which are "clear, unambiguous and capable of compliance", it has nevertheless also been concluded that an order may be "clear and unambiguous" even though questions may arise as to the construction of the terms of an order: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v ACN 117 372 915 Pty Ltd (in liq) (formerly Advanced Medical Institute Pty Limited) [2015] FCA 1441 at [52] per Moshinsky J. A "direct intention to disobey an order is not a necessary element in a finding of wilful disobedience or a deliberate commission or omission in relation to an order": Hurd v Zomojo Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 148 at [91] per Besanko and Gilmour JJ.
14 Third, the Court has a wide range of penalties open to it: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v INFO4PC.Com Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 949, (2002) 121 FCR 24 at 54. R D Nicholson J there observed:
[138] The Federal Court has a wide range of penalties open to it … and includes the power to:
(a) commit a contemnor to prison for an indefinite period of time ...
(b) to impose a fine for a wilful breach of an order or undertaking ...
(c) to impose a daily fine ...
(d) to order the sequestration of the assets of a contemnor …
(e) to suspend on condition any sentence of imprisonment that it might impose in respect to contempt ...
Cited with approval: Hughes v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission [2004] FCAFC 319 at [55] per French, Emmett and Dowsett JJ; Titan Support Systems Inc v Nguyen (No 2) [2015] FCA 359 at [12] per Murphy J. Besanko J, it may be noted by way of example, has imposed a fine and also a daily fine for any continuing contempt in Bob Jane Corporation Pty Ltd v ACN 149 801 141 Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 637 at [85].
15 Fourth, in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v World Netsafe Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 1501, (2003) 133 FCR 279 at 283 Spender J observed:
[16] Considerations which are relevant in deciding what is the appropriate penalty include:
(a) The relative seriousness of the contempt, which is determined by the extent to which the contemnor appreciated that a contempt was being committed ...
(b) Whether the contemnor subjectively intended to disobey the order ...
(c) The importance of bringing home to the contemnor the seriousness of the contempt ...
(d) Whether the contemnor has offered any explanation or apology for his conduct ...
(e) An acknowledgment by the contemnor that a contempt was committed may be a mitigating factor ...
This list of considerations is, obviously enough, not exhaustive. Palmer J in Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Michalik [2004] NSWSC 1259, (2004) 52 ACSR 115 at 123 has expressed the considerations of relevance, albeit again in a non-exhaustive fashion, as follows:
[29] For present purposes the relevant factors to be considered may be summarised thus:
(i) the seriousness of the contempt proved;
(ii) whether the contemnor was aware of the consequences to himself of what he proposed to do;
(iii) the actual or potential consequences of the contempt on the proceedings in which the contempt was committed;
(iv) whether the contempt was committed in the context of a proceeding alleging crime or conduct seriously prejudicial to the public interest …
(v) the reason or motive for the contempt;
(vi) whether the contemnor has received, or sought to receive, a benefit or gain from the contempt;
(vii) whether there has been any expression of genuine contrition by the contemnor;
(viii) the character and antecedents of the contemnor;
(ix) what punishment is required to deter the contemnor and others of like mind from similar disobedience to the orders of the court;
(x) what punishment is required to express the court's denunciation of the contempt.
Apprv'd: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Levi (No 3) [2008] FCA 1586 [19] per McKerracher J. A further centrally relevant consideration is the effect of the contempt on the administration of justice. See: Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 83 at [83] per Merkel J; Metcash Trading Limited v Bunn (No 6) [2009] FCA 266 at [7] to [8] per Finn J; Alfred v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) [2011] FCA 557 at [14] per Tracey J.