The primary judge erred in concluding that the statement of reasons of the Medical Panel did not comply with its statutory obligation pursuant to s 313(2) of the Workplace Injury Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2013 (Vic).[20]

1. Section 313(2) of the Act requires that a 'Medical Panel to whom a medical question is so referred must give a certificate as to its opinion and a written statement of reasons for that opinion'.
2. The Applicants' written case on the application for leave to appeal and the appeal states:

Further, the Panel provided detailed reasons that set out its path of reasoning in sufficient detail to show how the Panel reached its conclusion and that it did not fail to take into account mandatory considerations. It was not a necessary step in the Panel's reasons that it explain why the worker's constitutional spondylosis was constitutional. Nor was the Panel obliged to give reasons for why it did not determine that the worker had suffered a different injury to the one it had found he had sustained. Lastly, the Panel's conclusion that the exacerbation was temporary followed from its conclusion that the exacerbation caused by the worker's employment duties was an exacerbation of the symptoms emanating from his underlying constitutional condition, which would not have continued to persist after he ceased his employment as a plasterer and was no longer undertaking his pre-injury employment duties which were of a physical nature. The Panel expressly found that the worker's duties had not caused any worsening of the underlying degenerative condition itself or a hastening of its natural progression. Again, these were conclusions formed by the Panel in the application of its professional medical experience and expertise which clearly explained why it formed the opinion it formed. It was not to the point that different doctors may have reached different conclusions. The task of answering the referred medical questions was entrusted to the Panel, and no error was shown in the way that the Panel went about that task.

Further, at [58] the primary judge considered that the Panel's reasons did not explain how it reached the conclusion that the exacerbation of the worker's cervical spondylosis and lumbar spondylosis between May 2012 and February 2013 was only temporary or had resolved. It is submitted there is no error in the primary judge's approach to the Panel's reasons.

It is submitted the primary judge's approach to the Panel's Reasons was consistent with the Court of Appeal's statement of the principles relating to Medical Panel Reasons in Sidiqi v Kotsios [2021] VSCA 187 at [99] and in A&L Windows Pty Ltd v Yildirim [2022] VSCA 46 at [29]-[31].

1. We have already referred to this Court's decision in A & L Windows at [82]. We also adopt her Honour's statement of principle set out at [55]-[56] of the Reasons which reads as follows:

Section 313(2) of the WIRC Act requires a Medical Panel to provide a written statement of reasons for its opinion. Those reasons must explain the Medical Panel's 'actual path of reasoning in sufficient detail to enable a court to see whether the opinion does or does not involve any error of law'. A statement of reasons is not adequate if there is a 'real doubt' whether the Medical Panel correctly performed its statutory functions. A real doubt may exist where a Medical Panel's conclusions are open to more than one interpretation, and in that case the reviewing court should not speculate about a Medical Panel's path of reasoning in order to resolve ambiguity or fill gaps.

At the same time, a Medical Panel's reasons, read fairly, as a whole and in context, need only be sufficient to enable a reviewing court to understand that it has performed its function - to form and give its opinion on the medical questions referred to it - lawfully. A Medical Panel's reasons may be able to be understood by combining what is expressly stated with inferences necessarily arising, although any such inferences must have a 'proper evidential foundation disclosed in the reasons'.[21]

1. In our opinion, the Panel's Reasons explain why the condition of Mr El-Najjar's cervical and lumbar spine and the consequential symptoms were not causally related (as prescribed by the provisions of the Act) to the performance of his work duties. In addition, they clearly explain the basis for the Panel's conclusion as to the cause of persisting and deteriorating symptoms after he ceased his employment.
2. It must be remembered that the Panel's Reasons are those of an expert medical panel (and not a court) and caution is to be exercised in avoiding an overzealous examination of its reasoning in seeking to discern inadequacy. The Panel's Reasons should not be construed 'minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to error'.[22]
3. We disagree with her Honour's criticism of the adequacy of the Panel's path of reasoning as set out at [38] above.
4. First, the Panel was not required to explain the nature of the underlying conditions of cervical and lumbar spondylosis. It was more than sufficient for the Panel to identify as it did (see [33] and [34] above) that these were constitutional degenerative conditions that became symptomatic over time consistent with their natural progression.
5. Second, the Panel explained that the work duties of Mr El-Najjar only produced a temporary aggravation. It was not required to use terms of art such as 'gradual process'.[23] Its description of those duties set out at [35] above demonstrates that it understood the work tasks he performed and, as set out at [33] and [34] above regarded those as only producing a temporary aggravation.
6. Third, it is clear from the Panel's Reasons that it regarded the cause of Mr El-Najjar's symptoms as being the underlying degenerative condition of the cervical and lumbar spines. The Panel at [33] and [34] above made it clear that it did not accept that the performance of Mr El-Najjar's work tasks effected the overall progression of the underlying degenerative condition of his cervical and lumbar spines. Nor did it effect the bony structures of either spine. The Panel's Reasons for rejecting the opinions of the doctors with whom it disagreed (as set out above at [36]) supply, inferentially but nonetheless clearly, its answer as to why gradual process alone could not account for the recurrence, aggravation, acceleration, exacerbation or deterioration of the congenital condition affecting the bony structures which, as the Panel found, was the relevant 'medical condition' of the Applicant's cervical and lumbar spine. This explained why the work duties only produced a temporary exacerbation of symptoms.
7. Her Honour's final criticism is that of the lack of detail in the Panel's Reasons which it is said precludes a determination as to whether the Panel performed its statutory function. Its function was, using its expertise, to answer the questions posed by the County Court Judge and to provide a sufficient explanation in its reasons of the basis of reaching those conclusions.
8. In our opinion, the Panel's path of reasoning is clear:

(a) Mr El-Najjar had established degenerative changes in both his cervical and lumbar spine as disclosed by medical imaging in 2012 and 2013. > > (b) The continuous work tasks performed for the Applicants by Mr El-Najjar (which were set out in his handwritten statements and confirmed by him), produced a temporary exacerbation of the underlying degenerative conditions of his cervical and lumbar spine. > > (c) Mr El-Najjar's work for the Applicants did not alter the progress of the underlying degenerative conditions of his cervical and lumbar spine and did not produce any ongoing symptoms which persist to the present time. > > (d) The current symptomatology of both Mr El-Najjar's cervical and lumbar spine was due to the underlying degenerative condition and not to his employment with the Applicants. > > (e) That its opinion differed to that of a number of the other medical opinions considered by it.

9. We are satisfied that the Panel performed its statutory function in answering the questions and particularly those related to the role of Mr El-Najjar's work for the Applicants and its relationship to his cervical and lumbar conditions and any consequential symptoms. No 'real doubt' as to the Panel's reasoning and conclusion has been demonstrated.
10. Proposed ground 2 is made out.

1. Leave to appeal should be granted and the appeal allowed.
2. Subject to any application by the parties the following orders should be made:
   • (1) Leave to appeal is granted.
   • (2) The appeal is allowed.
   • (3) The orders of Richards J dated 20 December 2021 are set aside and in their place it is ordered as follows:

(a) The proceeding be dismissed. > > (b) The plaintiff pay the first and second defendant's costs of the proceeding, including reserved costs, on the standard basis, to be taxed in default of agreement.

• (4) The first respondent pay the appellants' costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal on the standard basis, to be taxed in default of agreement.

[1] The second to sixth respondents are identified, along with their respective specialities, at [20].

[2] El-Najjar v Swidryk Investments Pty Ltd [2021] VSC 814 ('Reasons').

[4] Schedule of attachments signed by the lawyers for the parties and dated 19 May 2020 as being present and correct for the Medical Panel referral.

[9] The Act, s 3, definition of 'injury'.

[10] Sidiqi v Kotsios [2021] VSCA 187, [61] ('Sidiqi').

[11] Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak (2013) 252 CLR 480; [2013] HCA 43 ('Wingfoot'); Sidiqi [2021] VSCA 187.

[12] Wingfoot [2013] HCA 43; (2013) 252 CLR 480, [47].

[13] Sidiqi [2021] VSCA 187, [34], [36]-[37].

[15] Chang v Neill [2019] VSCA 151; 62 VR 174, [92]-[93]. See also: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24, 39-42; [1986] HCA 40; Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 187 CLR 510, 579-580 [196]; [1999] HCA 14; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323, 348 [74]; [2001] HCA 30.

[16] [2022] VSCA 46, [29]-[30] ('A & L Windows').

[17] Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 77 ALJR 1165, [14]; [2003] HCA 30.

[21] A & L Windows [2022] VSCA 46, [55]-[56].

[22] Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Sian Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, 272; [1996] HCA 6.