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[2026] QCA 30
respondent. Leave to appeal on the amended grounds was granted, but the appeal was dismissed with costs.
The Court of Appeal accepted that the District Court used the wrong method when it heard the appeal from the Magistrates Court’s final summary judgment. But that error did not change the result. The loan documents and the applicant’s electronic acceptance form showed, on the facts the parties did not dispute, that he had accepted the loan offer. His not signing the Offer, Schedule or Terms did not undo that acceptance. The magistrate’s short reasons were sufficient. The respondent’s failure to get leave before making its second summary judgment application was a procedural irregularity, not an automatic nullity. Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed with costs.
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2,371 words · generated 08/10/2026
Brandon Nicholas Sweeney sought leave to appeal after the District Court dismissed his appeal from a Magistrates Court order giving Credit Union Australia Limited, trading as Great Southern Bank, summary judgment for $39,967.10, plus costs. The debt was said to arise under a personal loan contract ([2]–[3]).
1 cited instrument linked from this judgment.
The loan offer was dated 24 March 2021 and signed for the bank by an authorised officer. Its Schedule specified credit of $40,175: $40,000 available at funding and $175 in fees and charges. It set an annual percentage rate of 9.39 per cent and repayment instalments totalling $50,495.58 ([13]–[14]). The offer came with a credit guide and Terms of Loan Contract. The Terms said the contract was made up of the Terms and Schedule, and included repayment and default provisions ([16]–[17]).
Sweeney did not sign the Offer, Schedule or Terms. He did, however, electronically sign a personal loan acceptance form using DocuSign on 24 March 2021. The form said it was for confirming acceptance of a personal loan offer ([18]–[19]). The bank funded the loan two days later. Sweeney received $40,000 and was credited with payment of the $175 in fees and charges ([20]). He made 13 fortnightly payments of $611.50 and two further payments of $1 and $230, totalling $8,180.50, before making no further payments ([21]).
The bank filed its debt claim in the Magistrates Court on 15 February 2023. It alleged that the parties had made a loan contract under which the bank advanced $40,175 and Sweeney agreed to make monthly payments ([22]). There had already been an unsuccessful summary judgment application. On that earlier application, the magistrate struck out Sweeney’s then defence, gave him leave to file an amended defence on other grounds, and dismissed the bank’s application ([36]). The bank later made a second summary judgment application without obtaining leave under r 294(2) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) ([37]).
The Magistrates Court granted summary judgment on 26 July 2024. The District Court dismissed Sweeney’s appeal on 4 March 2025 ([2]–[3]). In the Court of Appeal, Sweeney’s central contract argument was that there was no binding agreement because he had not signed the “Loan Contract” ([25]). He also challenged the appeal method used in the District Court, the adequacy of the magistrate’s reasons, and the second summary judgment application made without leave ([6]–[11]).
The Court of Appeal granted leave on amended grounds. It agreed that the District Court had treated the appeal incorrectly, but rejected the grounds that could have affected the summary judgment. It dismissed the appeal with costs ([23]–[24], [31], [33], [41], [44]–[45]).
The appeal-method error was common ground. The Magistrates Court had granted judgment giving the bank final relief on its claim. On that premise, the order was final, not interlocutory, and the appeal in the District Court should have proceeded by way of rehearing ([23]). The Court said the respondent’s submissions in the District Court appeared to have led the primary judge into the error. It granted leave so that the error could be corrected, but explained that it still had to consider the remaining grounds to determine the outcome ([23]–[24]).
The main substantive issue was whether Sweeney’s failure to sign the Offer, Schedule or Terms prevented a loan contract from arising. The Court rejected the framing of this as a factual dispute. The parties did not dispute the relevant actions: the bank made the offer, Sweeney signed the acceptance form electronically, and the bank funded the loan. Their contest concerned the legal effect of those admitted events ([27]).
The Court also addressed whether the kind of dealing required a signed writing because it concerned land. It said the transaction did not create or dispose of an interest in land, or otherwise deal with land in a way requiring a signed writing by the person dealing with the land. The absence of Sweeney’s signature on the loan documents therefore did not provide a defence on that basis ([28]).
The Court treated the electronically signed Form as Sweeney’s confirmation that he accepted the bank’s Offer. In the Court’s view, that acceptance created a contract binding on both parties, with its content set out in the Terms and Schedule ([29]). It did not matter that he did not sign those documents. Nor did later correspondence or the parties’ descriptions of the documents change the legal effect the Court attributed to the acceptance ([30]). From that analysis, the Court concluded that Sweeney had no real prospect of successfully defending the claim and that a trial was unnecessary ([31]).
The reasons challenge also failed. The Court acknowledged that the magistrate’s reasons were brief. But it endorsed the primary judge’s view that the reasons were no shorter than the evidence and issues required ([33]). The reasons allowed the appeal courts to identify the basis of the decision and allowed the parties to understand the extent to which their arguments had been understood, accepted or rejected ([33]). The Court referred to the proposition, taken from the applicant’s own outline and attributed there to Sun Alliance Insurance Ltd v Massoud, that a statement of conclusion may suffice where the issue is simple or the state of the evidence permits it ([32]).
Finally, the Court rejected the argument about the second summary judgment application. Rule 294(2) says that a second or later application under the summary judgment part may be made with the court’s leave ([35]). The bank had not obtained leave ([37]). But r 371(1) says a failure to comply with the rules is an irregularity and does not render a proceeding, document, step or order a nullity ([40]). The Court reasoned that the application and the resulting judgment remained valid and effectual unless the Court ordered otherwise. Sweeney had not sought an order declaring the application ineffectual, which was a sufficient answer to the ground ([41]).
The judgment does not set out a comprehensive account of the law before this case or describe a change to the law afterwards. Its reasoning instead applies the rules and principles it identifies to the facts before it.
On appeals from the Magistrates Court, the Court states that where an order grants final relief on a claim, the District Court appeal should be a rehearing. The judgment applies that proposition to the summary judgment order because it finally determined the bank’s debt claim ([23]). The practical significance within this case is that the District Court used the wrong appeal method. The Court of Appeal nevertheless considered the other grounds and dismissed the appeal ([24], [45]).
On contract formation, the judgment’s stated conclusion is fact-specific: the signed electronic Form confirmed acceptance of the Offer, and the contract’s content was in the Terms and Schedule ([29]). The Court did not formulate a broad rule that every electronically signed acceptance form creates a contract. Its reasoning depended on the wording of the Form, the Offer and accompanying documents, and the undisputed events of funding and payment ([16]–[21], [29]–[30]).
For procedural non-compliance, the judgment applies the interaction between r 294(2) and r 371(1). The former required leave for a second or later summary judgment application; the latter characterised non-compliance as an irregularity rather than a nullity ([35], [40]). On the facts, the failure to obtain leave did not automatically invalidate the application or judgment. The Court also noted that the applicant had not asked for an order declaring the application ineffectual ([41]). The reasons do not decide every question that might arise about the exercise of the court’s power to make such an order.
The judgment therefore clarifies how those provisions operated in this particular appeal; it does not purport to replace or amend the text of the rules.
At [23], the Court said the District Court appeal “should have been conducted by way of a rehearing”. In plain English, because the Magistrates Court had finally decided the bank’s claim, the District Court should have reconsidered the matter using the rehearing method, rather than treating it as an appeal in the strict sense. The Court treated this as an error of law, but did not regard it as requiring the appeal to be allowed once the other grounds were considered ([23]–[24]).
At [27], the Court explained that the dispute concerned “the legal effect of the (admitted) actions of the parties”. This distinguishes a real factual disagreement from disagreement about what the law makes of agreed events. Here, the relevant actions, including Sweeney’s signing of the Form, were not disputed. The Court therefore rejected the contention that those matters required trial simply because they were described as factual issues.
At [29], the Court said that by accepting the Offer, Sweeney created a loan contract binding on both parties, with the contract’s content set out in the Terms and Schedule. In plain English, the Court treated the acceptance form as the act that accepted the offer, while the accompanying documents supplied the contract terms. At [30], it added that the lack of Sweeney’s signature on the Offer, Schedule and Terms did not change that result on these facts.
At [33], the Court concluded that the magistrate’s reasons were “not inadequate”. The reasons did not need to be lengthy if they enabled the appeal courts to understand the basis for the decision and the parties to see how their arguments had been addressed. The Court’s assessment was tied to the simplicity of the defence and the state of the evidence ([32]–[33]).
At [41], the Court said a second summary judgment application made without leave was an irregular step that remained “valid and effectual unless the Court orders otherwise”. In plain English, failure to follow the leave requirement did not automatically erase the application or the judgment. The applicant had not asked for an order making the application ineffectual, so the rule-based objection did not succeed ([40]–[41]).
The judgment is most directly relevant where a Magistrates Court has granted summary judgment that finally determines a claim, and a party appeals to the District Court. The key distinction is whether the order provides final relief, as the Court found here, or is instead interlocutory. The judgment’s conclusion about a rehearing rests on the parties’ common premise that the Magistrates Court order finally determined the bank’s claim ([23]).
It may also be relevant where a borrower says no contract arose because they did not sign every document containing the proposed contract terms, but they did sign a separate form confirming acceptance of an offer. The Court’s analysis looked at the form’s stated function, the accompanying Terms and Schedule, and the undisputed conduct of funding and repayment ([16]–[21], [29]–[30]). The judgment does not establish that a signature is unnecessary in every contract or that every electronic signing process has the same effect. The particular documents and transaction matter.
A further relevant fact pattern is a challenge to summary judgment based on alleged factual disputes that are actually disagreements about the legal effect of admitted conduct. The Court found no relevant factual dispute where the parties accepted what had occurred but disagreed about the consequence of Sweeney signing the Form ([27]–[31]).
The procedural part is relevant where a party makes a second or later summary judgment application without leave under r 294(2), and the opposing party contends that the application or judgment is automatically invalid. The Court’s answer depends on r 371(1) and on whether an order declaring the step ineffectual has been sought or made ([35], [37], [40]–[41]). The circumstances surrounding any such application, including what relief is sought, may matter.
The judgment does not identify any later judicial treatment of this decision. It was delivered on 27 February 2026, and the material supplied contains no later cases discussing, applying or distinguishing it. Accordingly, no claim can be made from this source about whether later courts have followed, limited or departed from its reasoning.
The judgment does cite two earlier authorities. Perez v Transfield (Qld) Pty Ltd [1979] Qd R 444 is cited at [41] for the historical explanation that the distinction between nullity and irregularity had been abolished under a former rule of court. The Court uses that reference in discussing the effect of r 371(1). Sun Alliance Insurance Ltd v Massoud [1989] VR 8; [1989] VicRp 2 is mentioned at [32] because the applicant cited a passage about when a concise statement of conclusion may be sufficient. The Court’s own conclusion on the adequacy of the magistrate’s reasons appears at [33].
Those citations are not evidence of how later courts have treated Sweeney. They are the authorities referred to in the judgment itself.
The judgment’s conclusions are tied to the record and grounds before the Court. It does not determine how a different acceptance form, a different set of loan documents, or disputed evidence about electronic execution would be treated. Its analysis depends on the Form’s stated purpose, the Offer and accompanying documents, and the parties’ admitted actions ([16]–[21], [27], [29]–[30]).
Nor does the judgment decide all circumstances in which a court might order that an irregular procedural step be treated as ineffectual. It says the second application and resulting judgment were valid and effectual because r 371(1) prevented automatic nullity and the applicant had not sought an order declaring the application ineffectual ([40]–[41]). It then describes how the rules’ objectives would be relevant if the appeal were treated as such an application, and concludes that requiring the bank to seek leave would not advance those objectives in the circumstances ([42]–[43]). The decision does not provide a general checklist for deciding every application under r 371(2)(c).
The judgment also does not give a detailed account of how a rehearing in the District Court should be conducted in other cases. It resolves the classification question on the agreed basis that the Magistrates Court order granted final relief ([23]). Questions about a different kind of order, or a different procedural history, are not addressed.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on this, relying on it, or using any draft, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Sweeney v Credit Union Australia Limited [2026] QCA 30
PARTIES: BRANDON NICHOLAS SWEENEY / (applicant) / v / CREDIT UNION AUSTRALIA LIMITED (TRADING AS GREAT SOUTHERN BANK) / ACN 087 650 959 / (respondent)
FILE NO/S: Appeal No 1295 of 2025 / DC No 2267 of 2024
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Civil)
ORIGINATING COURT: District Court at Brisbane – [2025] QDC 19 (Farr SC DCJ)
DELIVERED ON: 27 February 2026
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 16 July 2025
JUDGES: Mullins P, Bradley JA, Morrison AJA
ORDERS: Leave to the applicant to appeal on the amended grounds of appeal. Appeal dismissed with costs.
CATCHWORDS: MAGISTRATES – APPEAL AND REVIEW – QUEENSLAND – APPEAL – NATURE OF APPEAL – where the applicant appealed an order of the Magistrates Court granting summary judgment to the respondent in respect of a debt – where the learned District Court judge treated the Magistrates Court order as an interlocutory decision and as a consequence treated the appeal as an appeal in the strict sense – whether the learned District Court judge erred in failing to conduct the appeal by way of a rehearing / CONTRACTS – GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES – ACCEPTANCE – GENERALLY – where the respondent provided the applicant with a personal loan offer containing a schedule and accompanied by a document setting out the terms of the personal loan offer – where the applicant signed a personal loan acceptance form using the application “DocuSign” – where the respondent subsequently obtained summary judgment against the applicant for a debt arising from the personal loan agreement – where the applicant contends that a binding contract did not arise in the circumstances – whether the applicant has any real prospect of successfully defending the respondent’s claim on this basis / MAGISTRATES – POWERS AND DUTIES – REASONS – where the learned Magistrate provided brief reasons for granting summary judgment to the respondent in respect of a claim for a debt – whether the learned Magistrate’s reasons were inadequate in the circumstances / PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COURT SUPERVISION – IRREGULARITIES AND NON-COMPLIANCE WITH RULES – where the respondent had applied for summary judgment against the applicant – where the whole of the applicant’s defence was struck out and the applicant was granted leave to file an amended defence – where the respondent subsequently filed a second application for summary judgment – where the respondent did not obtain leave of the Magistrates Court to make the second application pursuant to r 294(2) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) – whether the failure to obtain leave rendered the second application for summary judgment invalid or ineffectual / Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 294(2), r 371(1) / Perez v Transfield (Qld) Pty Ltd [1979] Qd R 444, cited / Sun Alliance Insurance Ltd v Massoud [1989] VR 8; [1989] VicRp 2, cited
COUNSEL: The applicant appeared on his own behalf / J J T Dudley for the respondent
SOLICITORS: The applicant appeared on his own behalf / HWL Ebsworth Lawyers for the respondent
MULLINS P: I agree with Bradley JA.
BRADLEY JA: The applicant asks for leave to appeal against an order made in the District Court at Brisbane, which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against an order made in the Magistrates Court at Brisbane. The Magistrates Court order gave the respondent summary judgment against the applicant for $39,967.10 as a debt due and owing under a loan contract. In each court, the relevant order also provided that the applicant was to pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding.
The District Court order was made on 4 March 2025, and the learned primary judge published reasons for the decision that day. The Magistrates Court order had been made on 26 July 2024, and the learned magistrate had given ex tempore reasons for making the order, which were set out in a transcript.1
Grounds of appeal
The applicant proposed various grounds of appeal. He filed a version on 9 June 2025 with seven grounds. Shortly before the hearing of the appeal, the applicant clarified that he primarily relied on grounds 1 and 7; he no longer pressed grounds 2 and 3; and he relied on grounds 4, 5 and 6 only in the alternative to ground 7.
The applicant sought leave to amend his grounds of appeal in this way. The respondent did not oppose leave. The Court granted leave at the hearing.
By ground 1, the applicant contended that the primary judge erred in treating the appeal before him as an appeal in the strict sense. The respondent concedes this error. It is unnecessary to make any further comment.
The applicant did not press grounds 2 and 3, which alleged other errors of law by the primary judge. The applicant did rely on the written submissions he made in support of those grounds insofar as they are relevant to the issues raised in ground 5.
By ground 4, the applicant contended that the primary judge erred in law by “failing to consider or address” certain evidence, being the documents exchanged by the parties about the admission of facts, a letter from the respondent’s solicitors dated 25 May 2023, and a term in the loan contract.
By ground 5, the applicant contended that the primary judge erred in law “by upholding summary judgment” when there were “clear factual disputes” about the “formation, enforceability and acceptance” of the loan contract.
By ground 6, the applicant contended that the primary judge erred in law “by upholding” the magistrate’s “reasons for granting summary judgment” because the reasons “were plainly inadequate”.
By ground 7, the applicant contended that the primary judge erred “in failing to identify and correct” an alleged error of the magistrate, namely hearing and determining the respondent’s application for summary judgment without the respondent obtaining leave pursuant to r 294(2) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (the rules).
The relevant facts
While the parties were in dispute about some legal issues, including the effect or consequence of certain facts, there was no dispute about the following relevant facts.
On 24 March 2021, the chief customer officer, as an authorised officer on behalf of the respondent, signed a personal loan offer addressed to the applicant (the Offer). The Offer was dated 24 March 2021. It included a schedule (the Schedule).
The Schedule identified an “Application ID”, which was “11E44F5DA4”. The Schedule specified the amount of credit, namely $40,175, comprised of $40,000 “available at funding” and $175 in “credit fees and charges deducted at funding”. The Schedule also specified that the annual percentage rate of interest on the loan was then 9.39 per cent. The Schedule also specified that the loan was repayable by 59 monthly payments each of $841.59 and a final payment of $841.77, so that the total amount of the repayments was $50,495.58.
The applicant did not sign the Offer or the Schedule it included.
The Offer was accompanied by two documents: a credit guide, which contained important information about the respondent and its obligations as a credit provider; and a Terms of Loan Contract document (the Terms), which explained that the applicant’s loan contract was made up of the Terms and the Schedule.
The Terms included:The applicant “must repay [the respondent] the outstanding balance of the loan by making repayments on the date each repayment is due, as specified in the Schedule or as adjusted;”The applicant would be “in default” under the loan contract if he did not “make a repayment in full by the date it is due;”If the applicant was “in default”, the respondent could send him a “default notice” telling him “what the default is”, and what he had to do “to remedy the default;” andIf the applicant did not “comply with the default notice”, he would “become liable to pay [the respondent] the total outstanding balance immediately”.
The applicant did not sign the Terms.
On 24 March 2021, the applicant signed a personal loan acceptance form (the Form). The Form explained it was to be used to confirm acceptance of a personal loan offer. The applicant signed the Form electronically, using a process or application called “DocuSign”.
The respondent funded the loan on 26 March 2021. The applicant received $40,000 advanced by the respondent and was credited with having paid the $175 in fees and charges to the respondent.
Between 27 March and 8 October 2021, the applicant made 13 fortnightly payments each of $611.50 and two other payments (of $1 and $230) to the respondent in respect of the money advanced; a total of $8,180.50. The applicant made no further payment to the respondent.
Ground 1 – nature of the appeal in the District Court
It is common ground that the primary judge in the District Court made an error of law in treating the appeal before him as an appeal in the strict sense and in treating the Magistrates Court order as an interlocutory decision. The parties agree that the Magistrates Court order granting summary judgment gave the respondent final relief in the form of judgment on its claim. On this common premise, it was a final decision. So, in the District Court, the applicant’s appeal should have been conducted by way of a rehearing. It appears the respondent’s submissions in the District Court led the primary judge into this error.
The applicant should have leave to appeal, so that this error may be corrected. However, it is necessary to consider the remaining grounds to determine the outcome of the appeal.
Grounds 4 and 5 – failure to consider evidence and factual issues
At the hearing of the appeal, the applicant’s defence to the respondent’s claim was that no binding agreement existed between him and the respondent because he did not sign the “Loan Contract”. Other defences raised before the magistrate or the primary judge were not pursued.
The applicant contended this defence arose from certain admissions (or deemed admissions) and involved factual issues that ought to be determined after a trial.
The applicant’s characterisation of his defence as involving factual issues must be rejected. There is no relevant factual dispute between the parties. The contest is about the legal effect of the (admitted) actions of the parties, in particular the actions of the applicant in signing the Form.
The dealing between the applicant and the respondent did not create or dispose of an interest in land or otherwise deal in land in a way that the law requires to be in writing signed by the person creating, disposing, or otherwise dealing with the land. The absence of a signature is not a defence to the respondent’s claim.
The evidence before the primary judge, and before this Court, is that the applicant electronically signed the Form. In doing so, the applicant confirmed his acceptance of the respondent’s Offer. By his acceptance, the applicant created a loan contract binding on him and on the respondent. The content of the contract was set out in the Terms and the Schedule.
The fact that the applicant did not sign the Offer, or the Schedule, or the Terms is of no consequence. Similarly, the later correspondence between the parties and the various expressions they used to describe the documents setting out the terms of their contract did not alter the legal effect of the applicant’s acceptance of the respondent’s offer.
The applicant has no real prospect of successfully defending the respondent’s claim. There is no need for a trial.
Ground 6 - adequacy of reasons
The defect in the applicant’s defence was obvious. As the applicant noted in his amended outline, “a mere statement of conclusion may sufficiently indicate the basis of the decision” where the “issue” and “the simplicity of the case at hand” or “the state of the evidence” permits.2
The magistrate’s reasons were brief. I agree with the primary judge that “they were not less than that which the evidence and the issues required”. I also agree that the reasons were sufficient to allow the primary judge (and this Court) to “ascertain the reasoning upon which the decision was based”. They also allowed the parties to see the extent to which their arguments had been understood, accepted, or rejected. In short, the magistrate’s reasons were not inadequate.
Ground 7 – absence of leave for a second summary judgment application
In the appeal, the applicant raised for the first time whether the decision of the primary judge should be set aside because the respondent’s application for summary judgment was its second such application. The applicant had not raised this topic with the magistrate or before the primary judge.
The applicant relies on r 294(2), within chapter 9, part 2 of the rules, which deals with summary judgment. It is convenient to extract the whole of r 294:
“294 Claims not disposed of
The making of orders under this part that does not dispose of all claims in issue in a proceeding does not prevent the continuation of any part of the proceeding not disposed of by the orders.
A second or later application under this part may be made with the court’s leave.”
On 27 October 2023, the respondent had applied for summary judgment under r 292. The magistrate who heard the application struck out the whole of the applicant’s then defence, gave the applicant leave to file an amended defence (on grounds other than those in the struck-out defence), and dismissed the respondent’s application for summary judgment.
When the respondent filed the application for summary judgment that is the basis of the present appeal, it was the respondent’s second such application. The respondent did not obtain the leave of the Magistrates Court to make the second application.
The applicant contended that the respondent’s second application was a “clear breach” of r 294(2). The applicant submitted leave was “a statutory precondition to the Court’s jurisdiction to entertain such an application” and that the magistrate’s failure to “enforce” r 294(2) and the primary judge’s failure “to identify and correct that error” had the consequence that the appeal should be allowed and the summary judgment set aside.
The applicant’s submission must be rejected.
Rule 371(1) provides:
“371 Effect of failure to comply with rules
A failure to comply with these rules is an irregularity and does not render a proceeding, a document, step taken or order made in a proceeding, a nullity.”
An irregular step, such as a second application for summary judgment without leave, is valid and effectual unless the Court orders otherwise.3 The applicant did not seek an order declaring the application ineffectual.4 So, the summary judgment application, and the order and judgment made because of it are valid. This is a sufficient answer to the applicant’s ground 7.
If this appeal were to be treated as an application by the applicant to declare the application, the order, and the judgment to be ineffectual, then the Court would apply the rules “with the objective of avoiding undue delay, expense and technicality” and facilitating “the just and expeditious resolution of the real issues in civil proceedings at a minimum of expense.”5
In the circumstances noted above, it would not be appropriate for the Court to facilitate the continuation of the applicant’s defence and require the respondent to seek leave for its summary judgment application. That would not advance the objective of the rules or facilitate their express purpose.
Leave to appeal
Final disposition
Leave to the applicant to appeal on the amended grounds of appeal.
Appeal dismissed with costs.
In these reasons, it is convenient to refer to the learned District Court judge as the primary judge, and to refer to the learned magistrate as the magistrate. ↩
The applicant cited Gray J in Sun Alliance Insurance Ltd v Massoud [1989] VR 8 at 19. ↩
The distinction between a nullity and an irregularity was abolished by O 93 r 17(1) of the former Rules of the Supreme Court, which provided that any failure to comply with the requirement of the then rules was to be treated as an irregularity and would not nullify any step taken in the proceedings, or any judgment or order: Perez v Transfield (Qld) Pty Ltd [1979] Qd R 444 at 447 (Lucas J) and 451 (Hoare J, Kelly J agreeing). ↩
The power to make such orders is conferred by r 371(2)(c). ↩
Rules, r 5(1) and (2). ↩
Sweeny
Credit Union Australia Limited [2026] QCA 30
Leave to appeal on the amended grounds was granted, but the appeal was dismissed with costs.
On 15 February 2023, the respondent filed a claim and statement of claim in the Magistrates Court at Brisbane. The claim was for a debt of $41,831.78, interest on the debt at $1.08 per day, and costs. The statement of claim alleged that by a loan contract made on or about 24 March 2021, the respondent agreed to advance to the applicant $40,175 and the applicant agreed to make monthly payments to the respondent of principal and interest on the principal. The respondent provided particulars of this allegation, which identified the loan contact as comprising the Schedule and the Terms.