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[2016] VCAT 483
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal
2016-03-24
Original judgment source is linked above.
For the reasons provided in writing, the Tribunal orders that the application is struck out.
For the Applicants: Mr. Matt White, Port Phillip Agents Pty Ltd
You have assigned or sublet part of all of the premises without my permission or purported to.
Residents in the building have confirmed that you are using Air B&B to rent out a room of the apartment without prior consent of the landlord. I have checked Air B&B website and have confirmed that this is the case. The landlord requires you to vacate the property on or before 2.2.2016.
A notice to vacate given under this Part is not valid unless -
(a) it is in the relevant prescribed form; and
(b) it is addressed to the tenant, resident or site tenant (as the case requires); and
(c) it is signed by the person giving the notice or by that person's agent; and
(d) except in the case of a notice under section 263, 288, 314, 317ZF or 317ZG, it specifies the reason or reasons for giving the notice; and
(e) it specifies the date by which compliance is required (the "termination date").
The requirement laid down in s.319(d) is designed to require advice to be given to the tenant as to the reason the landlord demands possession with a sufficient degree of detail to enable her to understand the facts being alleged as a basis for terminating the tenancy. It requires no technical expression, no particular formal verbal formula and no particular legal knowledge to answer the question "Why is this notice being given?" A basic facility for communication in plain English is enough.
The answer, for the notice to comply with s.319(d), requires the setting out of the facts upon which the assertion that the tenant or her visitor has endangered or is endangering the safety of relevant neighbours with a sufficient degree of particularity to enable the tenant to understand why the landlord wishes to evict her and to contest those facts if she wishes.
Mr Williams sought to distinguish this case on the ground that it dealt with breaches of tenancy agreements which might be able to be remedied, whereas conduct giving rise to a right to give a notice under s.244 of the current Act cannot be remedied. That distinction, although real, ignores the purpose of s.319 which is to lay a proper basis for the pursuit by a landlord of a very summary method of terminating a tenancy and thus extinguishing the rights of the tenant. It is incumbent upon a landlord who seeks to avail himself of such a summary remedy to comply strictly with the law so as to ensure that by resorting to such a remedy he is neither deliberately nor accidentally trampling on the rights of the person against whom the remedy is being sought.
The tenants listed the second bedroom ("spare room") in the rented premises on online accommodation platform AirBnB on 7 November 2016.
The first AirBnB guest stayed in the rented premises in the spare room on 4 December 2015, for a period of 4 days. Following this initial booking, other AirBnB guests stayed in the rented premises, from time to time.
During the tenancy to date, the tenants' relatives and friends stayed as guests in the spare room, from time to time.
The duration of AirBnB guests' stays in the rented premises never exceeded the duration of the tenants' friends and relatives stays in the rented premises: the longest stay by a friend or relative of the tenants was for a period of two weeks.
(1) A landlord may give a tenant a notice to vacate rented premises if the tenant has assigned or sub-let or purported to assign or sub-let the whole or any part of the premises without the landlord's consent.
(2) The notice must specify a termination date that is not less than 14 days after the date on which the notice is given.
This Act does not apply to a tenancy agreement that is a fixed term tenancy agreement if -
(a) immediately before the agreement was entered into, the rented premises were the landlord's principal place of residence; and
(b) the fixed term is less than 60 days; and
(c) the agreement states that -
(i) immediately before the agreement was entered into, the rented premises were the landlord's principal place of residence; and
(ii) the landlord intends to resume occupancy of the premises on termination of the tenancy agreement.
This Act does not apply to a tenancy agreement if the rented premises are ordinarily used for holiday purposes.
This Act applies to a tenancy agreement if the rented premises are used primarily for residential purposes even if a trade, profession or business is also carried on by the tenant on those premises.
The Tribunal identified the distinguishing feature of a lease to be the grant of exclusive possession, which carries with it the right to exclude all others, including the grantor. It acknowledged that while the principle was well established, a satisfactory statement of the criteria by which such a grant may be identified was elusive. Nonetheless, the Tribunal set out 'some useful directions' as to what the criteria for the grant of exclusive possession might be, including the following:
(a) a person may retain legal possession (that is, exclusive possession) even though another person has sole physical occupation of the premises;
(b) the words used by the parties are not conclusive; and
(c) an intention to create the relationship of landlord and tenant is not necessary in the formation of a lease."
None of this legal exegesis by the Tribunal is challenged.[3]
The Tribunal correctly stated that one does not look to the intention of the parties as to the legal consequence of their agreement but to the rights and duties they have in fact created. It found that 'regardless of his subjective intentions, [the applicant] in fact granted [the travellers] the right to exclusively occupy his room for up to six months to the exclusion of all others'. This is consistent with Radaich v Smith, in which Windeyer J stated that 'whether the transaction creates a lease or licence depends upon intention, only in the sense that it depends upon the nature of the right which the parties intend the person entering upon the land shall have in relation to the land'. There was no error in the Tribunal proceeding on the basis that it was unnecessary to identify the parties' intention to create the relationship of landlord and tenant. The Tribunal found that the parties intended that there be a particular arrangement between them and that this arrangement involved a grant of exclusive possession. If the arrangement between the parties amounts to a grant of exclusive possession, the grant itself creates legal relations between them.[4]
The tenants rely on the wording of the Airbnb agreement which states -
"Guests agree that a confirmed reservation is merely a licence[5] granted by the Host to the Guest to enter and use the listing for the limited duration of the confirmed reservation and in accordance with the Guest's agreement with the Host. Guests further agree to leave the Accommodation no later than the checkout time that the Host specifies in the Listing or such other time as mutually agreed upon between the Host and Guest. If a Guest stays past the agreed checkout time without the Host's consent, they no longer have a license to stay in the Listing and the Host is entitled to make the Guest leave."
The tenants submit that the wording of the Airbnb agreement is evidence of the intention of both themselves and the guests. They submit that the express use of the word "licence" supports the parties intention that the legal relationship between them was characteristic of a licence.
The tenants submit that the conduct of each Airbnb guest supports the existence of a licence. The tenants say that each stay was no longer than five days at a time and payments were made via the Airbnb online platform. The tenants maintain that on each occasion they acted as host and guests were not allowed to check-in before a certain time and were required to leave by a certain time on the exit date. The tenants say the rented premises has continued to be their principal place of residence since the commencement of the tenancy. They say at no stage have any of the guests considered the rented premises to be their principal place of residence.
The tenants submit that under the terms of the Airbnb agreement, they maintained their right to revoke the licence and eject the guests. They say the agreement provides "the Host is entitled to make the Guest leave".
I find that the Airbnb guests did not have exclusion possession of the rented premises.
[2] [2014] VSC 650 per Emerton J.
[3] Paragraphs 16 and 17 of Janusauskas' case.
Swan
Uecker