Sutherland Shire Council v Shenouda and Ors [2025] NSWLEC 126 | Case summary | Zoe

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Sutherland Shire Council v Shenouda and Ors [2025] NSWLEC 126 | Case summary | Zoe

The Land is located within the Sutherland Shire Local Government Area and is zoned C4 Environmental Living within the Sutherland Shire Local Environmental Plan 2015. The Land is a waterfront property accessed via a right of way from Woolooware Road. The Land was the subject of a contract for sale dated 21 March 2025 under which the purchaser, Maria Kamaritis, entered a licence agreement dated 26 May 2025 which permitted her to occupy the residence on the Land and to undertake certain works at the Land. The Land was more recently sold on 30 September 2025 to Sheffield Estate Holdings Pty Ltd (the third respondent).
As a result of complaints received by Council in July 2025, Council officers inspected the Land where they met with Mr Shenouda (the first respondent) and observed that the 2-3-storey brick building on the Land had significant internal structural features removed including the kitchen, bathrooms, a concrete slab, interior walls, and there were acrow props supporting the remaining roof structure. They also observed extensive excavation and earthworks being undertaken.
On 8 August 2025, following further inspections of the Land, Council issued a Development Control Order (‘DCO’) to “cease ALL works” under s 9.34 of the EPA Act to Mr Shenouda (who was identified as the “builder”) and to other parties who were the owners of the Land at the time. Mr Shenouda subsequently provided Council with engineering reports dated 7 July 2025 and 7 August 2025 produced by Asco Engineering, which identified certain engineering and structural concerns in relation to the building on the Land which had been constructed in the 1970s and noted “long-term consequences of minimal structural provisions”.
Mr Shenouda also provided Council’s solicitors with responses to an Emergency Order dated 11 August 2025 (issued to him on 12 August 2025 under ss 124 and 129 of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW)) including a further engineering report of 14 August 2025.
On 18 August 2025, Council officers attended the Land in response to further complaints and observed a contractor undertaking works who identified himself as “Joseph Bechara” (the second respondent).
The Emergency Order was revoked on 29 August 2025 and further email exchanges took place between Council and one or more of the respondents. New DCOs dated 26 August 2025 were served on Mr Shenouda and to the other parties who were the owners of the Land at the time on 29 August 2025. On 2 October 2025, Council officers attended the Land (again in response to a complaint received by Council that works were being undertaken) and found that the Land was inaccessible due to locked safety fencing. Council thereafter sought access to the Land to inspect the works being undertaken.
On 8 October 2025, Council received further reports from neighbours that the works were continuing at the Land, and Council’s evidence is that Mr Bechara refused to permit Council officers to undertake an inspection (apparently without the separate consent of Mr Shenouda). Conversely, Mr Shenouda, on 10 October 2025, indicated to Council officers that any inspection would require the consent of Mr Bechara as the “princip[al] contractor” who “had control” of the Land.
Despite issuing notices of entry on 10 October 2025, Council was informed on 12 October 2025 that access to the Land was refused. “Stop Works” orders were subsequently issued to the second and third respondents on 13 October 2025, and Council’s solicitors wrote to each of the respondents in relation to Council’s concerns regarding the continuing works at the Land and Council’s intention to commence proceedings. Mr Shenouda and Mr Bechara were on the Land at various times in October 2025.
Council records reveal that apart from a 1970 building permit for a swimming pool; a 1978 building approval for a landing; pontoon and ramp; a 1969 building permit for a dwelling; and a 2000 development consent for a swimming pool, there are no other approvals for works at the Land.
Council’s evidence, supported by photography, is that the works undertaken at the Land are significant and include, first, the internal walls of the kitchen, utility room, dining room, pantry and the walls of a surrounding internal courtyard have been removed; second, the ground floor concrete slab has been removed; third, substantial earthworks have taken place by removing the floors, substrate and the ground has been excavated in some areas to a depth of approximately 3m; and fourth, internal ceilings have been removed. Given the above works, the only remaining structures appear to be external walls of the dwelling and the roof.

The principles governing the grant of interlocutory relief are well-known. The applicant for relief must demonstrate that there is a serious question to be tried such that there is a sufficient likelihood of success to justify the granting of an interlocutory injunction, and that the balance of convenience favours granting the interlocutory injunction.
Simply stated, in relation to the serious question to be tried, the applicant must show a sufficient likelihood of success to justify the preservation of the status quo pending the trial: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; [2006] HCA 46 at [65].
The factors that should be taken into account in determining where the balance of convenience lies are the prima facie strength of the applicant’s case, whether the potential damage that the applicant is likely to suffer if an order is not made outweighs the potential damage that a respondent is likely to suffer if an order is made, and whether the applicant provides an undertaking as to damages.
Despite this matter proceeding ex parte with some urgency, I have closely read Council’s evidence, in particular, the extensive documentation (including photographs) exhibited to the affidavit of Michael Carpenter, Council’s Compliance Officer, and I have considered various emergency orders and DCOs that have been issued as well as the detailed correspondence between Council’s solicitors and Mr Shenouda. Despite Council’s evidence, I note Mr Shenouda states in his email of 25 August 2025 that he has not denied Council’s access to the property and gives various reasons for his inability to facilitate such access.
The evidence in relation to the serious question to be tried is that there is no extant approval and/or development consent (or any other authorisation) providing for the extensive works that have been (and continue) to be done at the Land.
I am appropriately satisfied that notices of entry pursuant to ss 9.16 and 9.17 of the EPA Act have been issued to Mr Shenouda and Mr Bechara. I again note my view that various protestations and utterances from Mr Shenouda (in his correspondence of 25 August 2025) purporting to put Council on notice in relation to allegations such as “unlawful entry” by Council officers and the like, appear to be without any substance. Based upon my consideration of Council’s sworn evidence, I do not accept that Mr Shenouda’s protestations reflect the reality, and his criticisms of Council’s conduct are (at least) unhelpful.
I remain conscious that Mr Shenouda and Mr Bechara have not attended the hearing of the motion despite my finding that they have been appropriately made aware of the proceedings. I also note that on a number of occasions Council officers have attended the Land with either or both Mr Shenouda (at least on 6 August 2025) and Mr Bechara (on 18 August 2025) and have observed their presence on the Land.
Moreover, I am satisfied that on the evidence presently before the Court, there are works including substantial earthworks which are being undertaken at the Land in circumstances where, as noted above, there is no record of any development consent (or appropriate approval) being granted and that the building works and earthworks are clearly not exempt development pursuant to the provisions of the State Environmental Planning Policy (Exempt and Complying Development Codes) 2008.
Although there has been no appearance on behalf of Mr Bechara or Mr Shenouda, I am comfortably satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried, that there is a sufficient likelihood of success to justify granting the interlocutory relief sought in the notice of motion, and that the balance of convenience favours the grant of an interlocutory injunction as well as an order for access to all parts of the Land.
I note that Council has not proffered an undertaking as to damages and while I take this into account, I am of the view that, given Council’s obligations and duties in relation to compliance with statutory codes and the like, the failure to proffer an undertaking as to damages is not a matter to be given determinative weight in my consideration of Council’s application.
In the present circumstances, I have also taken into account the various affidavits in relation to service (and attempted service) upon each of Mr Shenouda and Mr Bechara and the orders in relation to service made by Pritchard J on 24 October 2025. In the light of this evidence, I consider it is appropriate to make an order that sufficient service of the orders I intend to make will be effected if Council provides a copy of the orders I make to Mr Shenouda by way of the email address that has been used in correspondence over a period of time, and that Council affixes a copy of the orders to the metal gate at the entrance to xxxx xxxx Parade, xxxx and obtains a photograph of the documents in situ as affixed.
Similarly, I consider it appropriate to make a corresponding order that sufficient service on Mr Bechara will be effected if a copy of the orders I make are provided to Mr Bechara by way of the email address with which he has communicated with Council and Council delivers a copy of the orders to the premises at xx xxxx Street, xxxx and obtains a photograph of the documents in situ as delivered.