Body Corporate and Community Management (Accommodation Module) Regulation 2020 (Accommodation Module)

INTERIM ORDER - whether interim orders are warranted - whether there is jurisdiction to determine the application.

1. The application for interim orders is dismissed.

• [1] This application is about unpaid contributions.
• [2] At a general meeting in October 2024 the body corporate approved a special levy to raise just over $4,000,000 for capital works. The resolution provided for contributions to fall due in February, May, August, and November 2025. As of 15 September 2025, the owners of Lot 27 owe over $61,000 in body corporate contributions, of which $38,738.02 is in arrears.
• [3] The body corporate apparently pursued a claim against the owners of Lot 27 in the Magistrates Court in March 2025 and the amount owing at the time was subsequently paid. However, further levies were not paid and in June the body corporate's solicitors advised that legal proceedings would re-commence if the arrears were not paid. The letter asserted the owners of Lot 27 had a 'significantly large history' of failing into arrears. Further correspondence on 10 September said proceedings would be pursued if the arrears were not paid by 24 September. However, the applicant asserts there are no current debt recovery proceedings.
• [4] The applicant says they are currently unable to pay their contributions. Various proposed payment plans have been put to the body corporate but refused. The applicant alleges its payment proposals have been refused without meaningful engagement or consideration of the alternatives. They say the refusal to consider or vote on reasonable motion is unreasonable.
• [5] The applicant seeks orders approving a payment plan of $3,000 a month for all current and future levies until the balance is paid. They want the body corporate not to take debt recovery proceedings while they comply with that payment plan. In the interim, the applicant wants the body corporate to be restrained from taking debt recovery action or commencing court proceedings in respect of the overdue special levies.
• [6] At this stage, there are questions of whether this application is within my jurisdiction to determine and, if so, whether interim orders are warranted.

• [7] Surf Regency community titles scheme 10938 (Surf Regency) is a 59-lot scheme in Surfers Paradise. The community management statement (CMS) shows the Accommodation Module applies. The scheme is registered as building units plan 4246.
• [8] The application seeks the following final orders:

The Body Corporate for Surf Regency approve a payment plan for my outstanding contributions, on the following terms (or such terms as the Adjudicator considers reasonable):

Repayment of the outstanding amount of $38,738.02 in instalments of $3,000 per month.

This includes all future levies as they fall due, until we are in a financial position to pay all outstanding amounts.

The Body Corporate refrain from commencing or continuing debt recovery proceedings provided I comply with the payment plan.

• [9] The applicant currently seeks the following interim orders:

The Body Corporate, its committee, and its body corporate manager (including any debt recovery agents engaged on its behalf) be restrained from taking further debt recovery action or commencing any court proceedings against the applicant in respect of the outstanding special levies the subject of this application.

• [10] The co-owner of Lot 27 applied for conciliation of a dispute about their outstanding levies in June 2025.[1] The parties reached a conciliated agreement in July. Unfortunately, that agreement has not resolved the dispute.
• [11] This application was lodged on 17 September. The Commissioner's delegate sought clarification from the applicant on some aspects of the application,[2] which was amended.[3]
• [12] As permitted under the Act, the Commissioner referred this application to me to decide whether the nature or urgency of the circumstances warrant an interim order,[4] notwithstanding that notice of the application has not yet been given to the respondent or owners.
• [13] Given the circumstances as outlined in the application, I did not consider it necessary to seek comment from the body corporate before determining the application for interim orders.

• [14] The substantive issue at this stage is whether interim orders are warranted. The purpose of an interim order is to grant temporary relief or preserve the status quo until the substantive issue in dispute can be resolved. It is not a means of expediting determination of a substantive issue.
• [15] Any order granted must be just and equitable.[5] An interim order will not be granted unless it is necessary due to the nature or urgency of the circumstances.[6] An adjudicator must be satisfied an application raises serious legal questions, establishing a prima facie case. An adjudicator must then balance the inconvenience of granting interim relief if final orders are ultimately refused against the impact of refusing relief if final orders are ultimately granted.
• [16] It is necessary to consider the substantive issues in dispute to decide if an interim order is warranted. So, I will comment on whether the applicant has established a legal issue to be determined. But I will first address a preliminary issue of my jurisdiction to decide this dispute.

• [17] An adjudicator may make an order that is just and equitable in the circumstances to resolve a dispute about a claimed or anticipated contravention of the Act or the CMS, or the exercise of rights or powers or performance of duties under the Act or the CMS.[7]
• [18] But the Act specifies that an adjudicator does not have jurisdiction in a debt dispute.[8] A 'debt dispute' is defined as a dispute between a body corporate and an owner about the recovery, by the body corporate from the owner, of a debt under this Act.[9] That has been accepted to include an application brought by an owner against a body corporate.[10] For there to be a debt dispute, there needs to be an amount owing under the Act.[11]
• [19] There is no question that the dispute in this application is between the body corporate and an owner and is about the recovery, by the body corporate from an owner, of a debt. The applicant does not dispute that a debt is owing under the Act. The dispute only relates to how the debt should be paid. Prima facie, that a debt dispute.
• [20] The applicant asserts the application is within my jurisdiction. They say they are not seeking to extinguish the debt, but to require the body corporate to properly consider and vote on a reasonable payment plan.
• [21] A dispute about the validity of the decision of a body corporate or its committee, or its failure to make a decision, could potentially be within the jurisdiction of an adjudicator even if the issue decided (or not decided) was about a body corporate debt.[12]
• [22] But that is not the case here. The applicant has not sought orders to invalidate a specific committee decision or require the committee to consider or reconsider a motion for a particular payment plan. Rather, the applicant wants final orders requiring the approval of a specific payment plan. Moreover, the applicant has not evidenced that the payment plan they want approved has actually been put to the body corporate in the terms proposed.
• [23] With the particular orders sought, it seems to me the applicant is seeking a determination on the payment of the debt, rather than the validity of the body corporate's decision-making. My preliminary view is that this is a debt dispute which I do not have jurisdiction to determine.

• [24] Notwithstanding that preliminary view, I will comment on whether the applicant has identified a genuine legal question to be determined if jurisdiction existed. The applicant asserts the body corporate did not act reasonably in considering their proposed payment plans.

• [25] A body corporate must act reasonably in regard to its functions, including in making or not making a decision.[13] Similarly, a committee must act reasonably in making a decision.[14]
• [26] There is considerable case law about the body corporate's responsibility to act reasonably. Reasonable decision-making "...involves an evaluation of the known facts, circumstances and considerations that tend to have a rational bearing on the issue..." and "...requires that all relevant matters are taken into consideration and irrelevant ones are left out".[15] I note the view that a "...legally reasonable decision is not a uniquely right one. It involves matters of degree about which contrary - even opposite - conclusions can be reasonably reached on the same body of evidence by different lines of reasoning or by reference to other determinants without either being demonstrably right or manifestly wrong."[16]
• [27] If a body corporate or its committee acts unreasonably, an adjudicator may intervene to make an order that is just and equitable to resolve the dispute. But it is not for an adjudicator to supplant the body corporate's decision-making role or impose their own views on the body corporate. A decision will only overturned if an adjudicator is satisfied the decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable body corporate could have come to it, or it is 'conflicted, arbitrary, patently absurd or plainly unjust'.[17]
• [28] An applicant bears the onus of establishing that a decision or action was unreasonable.

• [29] The regulations provide for a body corporate to levy contributions on owners.[18] It can fix, by ordinary resolution, a discount for owners for contributions paid by the due date,[19] and for penalty interest to be charged on contributions that are in arrears.[20]
• [30] All owners are liable for contributions, and the consequences if they fail to pay their levies.
• [31] If a contribution is not paid by the due date, the body corporate can recover the contributions, any penalty, and any recovery costs reasonably incurred, as a debt.[21] Notably, if a contribution has been outstanding for 2 years the body corporate must start debt recovery proceedings.[22]
• [32] The legislation specifies that if the body corporate is satisfied that there are special reasons for allowing a discount of a contribution, or waiving a penalty or liability for recovery costs, the body corporate may do so in whole or part.[23] But there is no legislative authority for a body corporate to waive or defer the obligation to pay the substantive levies. The Supreme Court has considered the meaning of the phrase 'special reason' in a different context.[24] It indicated that special reasons are something that would be out of the ordinary, and not a normal or inevitable result of routine circumstances. As such, there must be some particular or compelling circumstance warranting the exercise of the body corporate's discretion.

• [33] The applicant says the special levies are comparatively large, and were not '...accompanied by an accessible, equitable option for spreading the cost.' But it is not evident that the applicant has challenged the validity of the October 2024 resolutions to undertake the capital works or to raise a special levy to fund those works. Unless the time limit was waived for good reason, any application to challenge those resolutions needed to be lodged within 3 months of the relevant meeting.[25] In the absence of any sustained challenge, the owners of Lot 27, along with all other owners, are liable for the special levy along with their annual contributions.
• [34] It appears various proposal have been made over the course of 2025 about how contributions for Lot 27 could be paid, although it is not entirely clear exactly what the owners have proposed and when. The applicant suggests the committee has not considered or voted on the proposals. But it seems from the submitted material that at least some proposals have been considered. For example, the correspondence includes an extract of a meeting minute referring to the refusal one proposal.
• [35] The applicant says the committee's refusal of the proposed payment plans was unreasonable. They say the committee's pursuit of debt recovery without first 'engaging' with a proposed payment plan is unreasonable. They do not explain what engagement was required.
• [36] The fact that the committee did not approve the proposed payment plans does not of itself mean it did not properly consider them. The applicant has not explained the basis on which they assert the requests have not been genuinely considered. The applicant has not explained why the reasons for refusal, to the extent that reasons have been sought or given, are not justifiable. Fundamentally, had having regard to the statutory provisions about contributions, the applicant has not established why a reasonable committee is required to agree to a payment plan at all, or to the specific payment options the owners have proposed.
• [37] The fact that the owners do not have the funds to pay their contributions is prima facie a matter for the owners and not the body corporate. Paying contributions is an inherent part of owning a lot in the body corporate. The applicant has not identified or substantiated any particular extenuating circumstances that are preventing them from paying their levies.
• [38] To the extent that it can validly consider a payment plan, arguably a reasonable committee must consider the consequences for all owners if one owner is permitted to remain persistently in debt, and not just the circumstances of the defaulting owner. Significant arrears can impede the capacity of the body corporate to meet its financial obligations, such as undertaking necessary maintenance, and can necessitate a higher financial burden on other owners to meet the shortfall.
• [39] Furthermore, I note that at the proposed rate of $3,000 a month, the current debt for Lot 27 would take over 18 months to pay. Adding the fourth instalment of the special levy and the usual annual contributions, it is probable the applicant's proposal would leave them indebted for over 2 years. The body corporate is required by law to take legal proceedings if amounts are owing for over 2 years. Accordingly, arguably the body corporate could not lawfully agree to the payment plan that the applicant seeks orders to approve.

• [40] The applicant says an interim order is necessary to preserve the status quo and prevent unfair prejudice while the application is determined. They say that without an interim order, the body corporate could take enforcement action about the disputed levy. They say that could cause significant financial hardship and potentially irreparable consequences, such as adverse credit report and additional costs.
• [41] Undoubtedly the owners of Lot 27 will be adversely impacted if the body corporate pursues debt recovery action against them. However, the applicant does not provide evidence to substantiate their current circumstances or any likely significant or irreparable harm. Moreover, the applicant has known, or should have known, about the special levies since October 2024 and so has had considerable time to make arrangements to fund the levies. As such, it is not clear what urgent circumstances now exist that would warrant interim relief.
• [42] The applicant says neither party would be disadvantaged by the interim order. But preventing the body corporate from pursuing the recovery of a significant debt that the applicant acknowledges is owed is likely to have adverse consequences for other owners. Until the debt is paid, other owners must either shoulder the burden of the financial shortfall in its budgeted income (for example, with increased levies) or bear the consequences of the body corporate being unable afford the expenditure that it has planned, including potentially being unable to undertaken maintenance and repairs that it has a statutory responsibility for.
• [43] In any event, where the applicant has not established a prima facie case, even if there is jurisdiction to determine this application, there is no basis to grant interim relief.

• [44] I acknowledge the owners of Lot 27 may be experiencing difficulties in paying the contributions levied on them by the body corporate. However, my preliminary view is that this application is a debt dispute which I do not have jurisdiction to determine. But even if I did have jurisdiction, the applicant has not substantiated a prima facie case that the body corporate has failed to act reasonably. It follows that I have dismissed the application for interim orders.
• [45] The application for final orders remains. I will refer the application back to the Commissioner to consider under the dispute resolution provisions.[26] The applicant may wish to review the application having regard to the matters outlined above.

[1] Conciliation application reference 0502-2025

[10] Body Corporate for Jargarra Villas CTS 19298 v Odalshire Pty Ltd [2013] QCATA 168

[11] The Body Corporate for The Grove CTS9356 v Comerford [2019] QCATA 172

[12] For example, items 8, 9 and 24 of schedule 5 of the Act, noting that under section 276(3) of the Act the capacity to make orders is not limited to the orders in schedule 5.

[15] Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at 43, citing McKinnon v Department of Treasury [2006] HCA 45; (2006) 228 CLR 423

[16] Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at 47

[17] Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at 34, 74 and 98

[18] Section 152 of the Accommodation Module

[19] Section 154 of the Accommodation Module

[20] Section 155 of the Accommodation Module

[21] Section 156(1) of the Accommodation Module

[22] Section 156(2) of the Accommodation Module

[23] Section 156(6) of the Accommodation Module

[24] R v Prisk and Harris [2009] QSC 315, para 9