1. Time limits are important and must, prima facie, be obeyed.

2. In order to justify a court acceding to an application to extend time, there must be some material on which the court can exercise its discretion.

3. Such an application should only be granted if, having regard to the important value of finality in litigation and the need for time limits to be respected, it is proper to do so.

4. There should be an explanation for the delay, as to which any action (other than to appeal) that has been taken by the applicant is relevant.

5. The court must consider any prejudice to the respondent in defending the proceeding, as caused by the delay, and any such prejudice will tell against the extension.

6. The mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the extension of time.

7. The merits of the appeal itself must be taken into account in deciding whether an extension of time should be granted.

8. The court, on considering an application for an extension of time within which to appeal, should not decide the appeal and, in an appropriate circumstance, an arguable case may be sufficient, though in the case of long delay it may be necessary to show that the applicant has a strong case.

9. Nevertheless, the application is to be determined by the court's view of the demands of justice in accordance with a broad judicial discretion and not by the mere application of a verbal formula.

10. In particular, the court will look, above all else, to determine whether there has not been and will not be, if the application is refused, a miscarriage of justice which will always be an overriding consideration.

1. The principles were most recently considered by the tribunal in Presidential Member Symons' decision of Wang v Lin & Jiang.[7] In essence, the principles require the tribunal to consider the applicant's explanation for delay, the merits of the proposed appeal and whether justice requires that the application be allowed.
2. Considering the merits of the proposed appeal in the context of an application for extension of time to appeal requires that the tribunal consider whether there is at least an arguable basis for concluding that the original tribunal has made an error of fact or of law that is material, in the sense that it is an error that might make a difference to the outcome of the case.[8]
3. I started the hearing of Mrs Wallace's application on 9 November 2016 and continued it on 25 November 2016. While the documents filed with the Tribunal show the applicant's name as Ma Lily Superal-Wallace, she said she preferred to be called Mrs Wallace, and so this is how she is referred to in these reasons.
4. Mrs Wallace represented herself on both days. Mr Silk appeared as the legal representative for the first respondent on both days. Mr Burgess participated on the first day of the hearing as the representative of the second respondent by telephone, but did not appear and made no arrangement for leave to participate by telephone, on the second day. I decided to procced on the second day in his absence - there is no obligation on the tribunal to chase parties to ensure they make arrangements to participate in hearings.
5. On the first day Mrs Wallace explained that her application was out of time because she thought that she could appeal the original tribunal's decision to the Supreme Court. She said she had some legal advice to that effect. She said that she has undertaken some legal studies and has friends who are barristers. She acknowledged that she was aware that there was a time limit for appeals. As it happens, the 28 day time limit for appeals within the tribunal is the same as the time limit for an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from a decision of an Appeal Tribunal.[9]
6. Mrs Wallace's belief about being able to appeal against the original decision to the Supreme Court was mistaken. Section 86 of the ACAT Act allows appeals to the Supreme Court in civil dispute cases but only from a decision of an appeal tribunal.
7. Mrs Wallace said that she attempted to file an appeal in the Supreme Court within 28 days of the decision, but this was rejected and she was told that she would need to return to the tribunal. It was late in the day and so she returned to the tribunal a few days later. There was no clear explanation of why she didn't return to the tribunal the next day because, although her recollection of dates was vague, it seems that had she done so, she would have been in time. I accept that she would have needed to complete a new set of documents. She did not produce any documents to support her oral evidence, such as a copy of a rejected Supreme Court application, but I accept that what she said occurred as described.
8. Both respondents' representatives opposed her application for leave. In summary, they said that time limits exist for good reason; the matter was finalised when it was dismissed by the original tribunal on 21 September, the matter had a very long history and that Mrs Wallace should not be allowed to keep pursuing it now by being given leave to appeal out of time. Both conceded that they could not point to any particular prejudice attributable to the short delay, other than prejudice related to the lack of finality of the proceedings. Mr Silk, representing the first respondent, submitted that the application should also be rejected because it did not disclose any grounds of appeal.
9. The application for appeal filed on 24 October 2016 did not refer to the decision of the original tribunal and described the questions of fact or law involved in the appeal as:

Pursuant of section 18 of Australian Consumer Law and section 29 under Australian Consumer Law which concerned with false or misleading and deceptive.

1. On 24 October 2016 Mrs Wallace also filed an application to have her application removed or referred to the Supreme Court. Under the heading "Reasons for Removal/Referral" she wrote that the nature of her case was that the respondent had sold her a car that is not roadworthy and the respondent had agreed to fix the car but had not done so.
2. She identified the questions of law or fact involved as:

Is there a question of law or fact involved an expression of breach of section 53A (1) of the Trade Practices Act? As the respondent breach their promise that we agreed in the conference that the respondents will fix the car problem?

1. She said that the reasons why the matter should be removed or referred to the Supreme Court were that:

I would like to respect the decision of the Senior Member H Robinson and appeal to Supreme Court for justice and claim suffering and damages that me and my son was been dealing with, because of the moral turpitude; with trickery, guile, Also the Tribunal withdraw my complaint against the mechanic which is the only one could explain the situation of the car problem in court.

1. I asked Mrs Wallace if she could explain her grounds of appeal to me. She said the respondents had promised to fix her car in return for her withdrawing an application she made to the tribunal about the car in 2014. The car had not been fixed. She said that the promise made was a misrepresentation and that this formed the basis of her appeal.
2. I told her that she could not rely on what seemed be a new case as a ground of appeal from the decision of the original tribunal. Rather, her appeal had to identify questions, or errors, of law or fact arising from the decision of the original tribunal. We discussed the repeal of the Trade Practices Act. I told her that I would give her a further opportunity to identify her grounds of appeal so that the tribunal could fairly consider the merits of the proposed appeal. The respondents did not oppose this course.
3. I confirmed that the tribunal registry had sent her the full transcript of the hearing of 21 September 2016, including the reasons for decision, by email on 13 October 2016. I encouraged her to seek further legal advice and adjourned the hearing, directing her to file and serve a document setting out her draft grounds of appeal by reference to the decision and reasons of the original tribunal, by 18 November 2016.
4. On 18 November 2016, Mrs Wallace filed another 'Application for Removal or Referral to the Supreme Court' which I accept she intended to be treated as her response to the direction. This document did not refer to the original tribunal's decision save in one respect. The nature of the case was described as relating to misleading conduct as to the nature of goods and services. The questions of law or fact involved were described as:

The Question of Law under Australian Consumer Law (ACL) of section 18, and Section 29(a)(b) of Australian Consumer Law (ACL). Also ACL provisions section 54 guarantees as to acceptable quality, section 55 as to fitness for purpose, and also section 259, s260 failure to comply.

1. The reasons why a removal or referral to the Supreme Court should proceed were given as:

The dealer doesn't want to refund me the cost and my witness was been withdrawn by Tribunal which is the Rolfe Renault who is the only mechanic that looked at the car and knew the car very well before I purchased it...

1. On the second day of the hearing, Mrs Wallace referred again to an agreement said to have been made by the respondents to fix her car, which led to her discontinuing her 2014 application. The fact that the car was still not fixed she said, meant that the respondents had misled and deceived her into withdrawing that earlier application. Mrs Wallace did not explain how this issue involved a question of fact or law arising from the tribunal's decision on the 2015 application.
2. She said that she had initially included 'Rolfe Renault' as a third respondent to the 2015 application before the original tribunal, but that the tribunal had removed Rolfe Renault as a respondent. She described the business as her "witness". On further questioning she indicated that that business was relevant to the case before the original tribunal because it had undertaken work on her car and the mechanic could give evidence about that and about earlier work done on the car before she bought it. Rolfe Renault had not been named as a respondent to the 2014 application. She had not arranged for the mechanic to come to the hearing, or asked that a subpoena be issued to have the mechanic attend the hearing, to give evidence.
3. She said that she wanted the case to go to the Supreme Court because she could recover her legal costs there, but then said that she didn't mind if the tribunal dealt with it.
4. Mr Silk, for the first respondent, opposed any referral to the Supreme Court on the basis that it was not appropriate and further opposed the application for leave to appeal out of time because, notwithstanding the adjournment, no grounds of appeal are identified.

Consideration of Application for Removal or Referral to the Supreme Court

1. It is not clear whether Mrs Wallace seeks that the tribunal refer her application for leave to appeal out of time to the Court or, if leave is granted, the subsequent appeal, or to just refer her matter generally to the Court.
2. If it is the first, I accept Mr Silk's submission that a removal or referral is not appropriate. There is no question of law that arises in considering this application for leave to appeal out of time and so, no basis for the tribunal to act under sub-section 84(1) of the ACAT Act.
3. Nor, having regard to the nature of the application, the absence of any matter of public importance, or of legal or factual complexity; is it appropriate to remove the application for leave to appeal out of time to the Supreme Court under section 83(2) of the ACAT Act.
4. If it is the appeal itself that Mrs Wallace wishes to have sent to the Supreme Court, her application for removal or referral is dismissed because her application for leave to appeal out of time is dismissed for the reasons set out below and there is no appeal to be removed or referred.
5. The Tribunal has no power to generally refer matters to the Supreme Court, only an application or appeal can be removed or be the subject of a referral.

The Merits of the Proposed Appeal and the Justice of the Case

1. Mr Silk is correct to say that no grounds of appeal have been identified. Mrs Wallace has not said what errors or questions or fact or law there are in the original decision in a way that one would normally expect. She makes no reference to any part of the decision or reasons of the original tribunal, nor, apart from her reference to the removal of Rolfe Renault as a respondent, does she raise any concern about procedural matters or procedural fairness before the original tribunal. But English is not her first language and she is not represented. Even though she has apparently received some legal advice, the nature and content of the documents filed suggests she does not understand what she is required to do.
2. It is clear that she disagrees with the original decision. I have therefore reviewed the file for both the 2014 and 2015 applications and the transcript of 21 September 2016 which includes the oral reasons for decision for anything that might indicate an arguable case for appeal and so that I can consider whether any miscarriage of justice is apparent. The transcript shows that the original tribunal had the 2014 application file at the hearing on 21 September 2016.

1. This application was filed in the name 'Lily Superal' on 12 September 2014. The respondents were named as Indypendent Pty Ltd and National Warranty Company Pty Ltd. The application sought orders that the respondents pay to have the car the applicant purchased from the first respondent fixed, so that it was roadworthy and also sought payment of $2,833 for various expenses and for suffering related to aggravation of pre-existing conditions.
2. The grounds of the application recited that the car had been purchased from the first respondent with an extended warranty given by the second respondent. It was said to have low mileage and the first respondent was said to have promised that it would be reliable. The application said that the car was leaking oil heavily. The applicant drove the car "back to the car yard...to get the car fix." When returned, the leak was not fixed and the blinker, horn and steering wheel were broken. The car was returned again and this time, only the steering wheel was fixed. The applicant took the car to Rolfe Renault and was told that the car had been leaking oil before it was sold to the applicant. The application said that the first respondent had "promised me that he is going to raise the money...to fix the transmission oil and the other problem" but now did not want to pay any more. The application made no reference to a problem with lights on the dashboard or the car stopping suddenly or going into "limp mode". No reports or statements were attached.
3. The application was served on the respondents by ordinary pre-paid post on 18 September 2014. Significantly, no response was filed and no conference was held. On 4 November 2014 the applicant filed a notice discontinuing the application. An order was made in chambers dismissing the application on it being withdrawn. If there was a conference between the parties in which the first respondent promised to fix the car in return for Mrs Wallace discontinuing her application, it did not involve the tribunal as Mrs Wallace seemed to recollect. There may of course have been private conversations between the parties.

1. The applicant filed an application on 29 October 2015 in the name 'Lily Superal'. The application could not be processed as it was and a further application was filed on 6 November 2015. The two applications were different but not in any material way.
2. The 2015 application is different from the 2014 application in a number of respects. In addition to the first and second respondents, the 2015 application named Richard Rolfe Motors No 1 Pty Ltd as a third respondent. This is the company referred to as 'Rolfe Renault'.
3. The reasons for the claim, in summary, say that from the day after it was purchased, the car leaked oil from the gear box. Apart from this, the description of the problem with the car is different from the description in the 2014 application. The application says that the problem with the car is that "the light comes on and the car goes in the limp mode and will not accelerate or not do the speed limit, sometimes it will stop automatically, sometimes I could manage to drive it back home and sometimes we tow it back home".
4. The 2014 application is referred to, as is the withdrawal of that application based on an agreement that the first and second respondent would pay the third respondent to get the car repaired to a safe and road worthy condition. The application says that the car is still not fixed and the light continues to come on so that the applicant can only drive the car around Canberra. The car is said to have been faulty and unroadworthy when sold to the applicant.
5. It claims payment of $5,500 plus fees and expenses totalling $325.22. While the application does not refer to a refund, $5,500 was the amount the applicant paid for the car - in effect, her claim was for a refund of the full cost of the car and for all three respondents to pay for the costs of the application and legal costs rather than a claim for compensation for loss and expenses.
6. The application itself did not refer specifically to the Australian Consumer Law as the basis for the claims made in it. It did not identify what claim was made against the second respondent with whom the applicant had a 12 month contract for a limited extended warranty. It contained no allegation of fault on the part of the third respondent, although it did say that the car had still not been fixed properly and that the third respondent's representative had said that they "don't know what to do about it anymore."
7. The application was served on each respondent by ordinary pre-paid post on 13 November 2015.
8. The first respondent's response said that the vehicle had been repaired at no cost to the applicant on two occasions, even after the warranty had expired, and that the first respondent believed it had fulfilled its obligations to the applicant.
9. The second respondent said that the warranty contract it had with the applicant had expired and that also, her claim was for things not covered by that contract.
10. The third respondent's response was simply that it had no contract with the applicant and therefore no liability to her.
11. A preliminary conference was held on 22 January 2016. It was adjourned to 22 February 2016. At this conference, orders were made removing the third respondent, as a respondent and providing that the other parties would liaise to allow an inspection of the vehicle. The parties were ordered to advise the tribunal if the matter resolved.
12. The conference on 22 February was adjourned to 11 March 2016. At that conference, the application was listed for hearing and directions were made for each party to file and serve the evidence each relied upon by specific dates. Again, the parties were ordered to advise the tribunal if the matter settled.
13. No documents were filed. No one attended the scheduled hearing on 6 July 2016. No party contacted the tribunal to explain their absence or seek an adjournment. The application was dismissed on an assumption that it had been settled. On 2 August 2016 it was restored to the hearing list on the applicant's application. She provided evidence that she was unwell on the hearing day and could not attend. Another hearing date was set and fresh directions made for evidence to be filed. The record of proceedings for that day records that the Registrar explained to the applicant that she needed to file and serve any evidence or material she relied on to prove her claim for a refund in accordance with the directions made.
14. Before the hearing the applicant filed and served witness statements made by herself, her husband Gordon Wallace and her father-in-law Graham Wallace.
15. In her witness statement the applicant described what happened with the car during 2014, efforts she had made to have various problems with the car fixed and conversations she had with Mr Cummins and a mechanic, Daniel. She said that her son was "driving (the car) permanently now as I am too scared to drive (the car) since I had been abused by the truck driver when the car stops in front of his big truck" and that her son was using the car to drive to university and to his workplace. The statement refers to the 2014 application and says that she withdrew that application after an agreement made in a conference that the car would be fixed as a roadworthy vehicle. As noted above, the tribunal did not hold any conference in relation to the 2014 application which was withdrawn before a response was filed, but did hold a few conferences in 2016 in relation to the 2015 application.
16. The statement said that the car had not been fixed as agreed and that Mrs Wallace had complained about it since the second day that she bought it. The provisions of the ACL providing for refunds for and replacement of goods that are not fit for purpose or that breach various consumer guarantees were referred to.
17. Gordon Wallace's statement contained corroborating information that the car was leaking fluid the day after it was purchased and described an incident in which the horn was blaring, blinkers would not automatically turn off and the steering wheel was off centre after having some work done. It referred to a report about the car provided by a mechanic (which was not attached or filed) and stated that the car was recognised by the Rolfe Renault mechanic as one they had been seem many times before with the same problems of going into "limp mode" and other related problems. The statement did not provide dates or a time line for these events but it could be inferred that the events described occurred within a reasonably short period of time after the purchase of the car.
18. In his statement Graham Wallace described a service manager of Rolfe Renault telling him that the car had been fixed by being overfilled with oil. He said that he had been assured that the car was fixed but that it continued to exhibit faults and continues to shut down without warning.
19. The first respondent filed and served an amended response, a chronology and a witness statement of Wayne Cummins, a Director of the first respondent, attaching invoices and other documents relied on. Mr Cummins was the person who sold the car to the applicant.
20. In summary the response asserted that the original matters complained of by Mrs Wallace had been fixed within a reasonable period of time, that the most recent "defect" had only been brought to his attention in February 2016 and that the first respondent had arranged and paid to have that defect fixed. The invoices attached to the witness statement were for work including repairs and inspections undertaken in October 2014, January 2015, February 2016 and March 2016.
21. The second respondent filed no material before the hearing. The applicant filed and served another document replying to the first respondent's chronology and a CD containing photographs of the car.

1. Because she was the applicant, Mrs Wallace had to provide the tribunal with probative evidence to prove her case on the balance of probabilities, including to prove that she was entitled to the remedy that she seeks - that is, that the requirements that the law sets for when a consumer is entitled to reject goods and obtain a refund apply in her case.
2. Mrs Wallace and Gordon Wallace gave oral evidence and were questioned. Their oral evidence was consistent with their written statements. Graham Wallace did not attend the hearing but his witness statement was marked as an exhibit. Little weight could have been given to it because he was not available to answer questions. The tribunal member viewed the photographs on the applicant's CD and discussed them in detail.
3. While giving evidence Mrs Wallace acknowledged that her son had been, and was still, using the car. She did not disagree that the car had been driven for around 50,000 kilometres over the three year period since its purchase in September 2013, notwithstanding that her case was that the vehicle was unroadworthy.
4. The applicant produced a copy of the warranty contract she had with the second respondent at the hearing. It was a 12 month contract providing for amounts up to a stated limit to be paid for specific items or issues arising in that 12 month period rather than a general warranty.
5. Wayne Cummins gave oral evidence for the first respondent and was questioned. His evidence was consistent with his statement and the attachments to it. The second respondent's representative did not produce any evidence.
6. Each party made submissions about their position. When the hearing finished the member reserved for about an hour and then resumed to provide her decision and reasons.

1. The member noted that Mrs Wallace's claim was brought under the Australian Consumer Law "both in relation to misleading and deceptive conduct, although that was not formerly agitated, and breach of a guarantee." It is clear from a reading of the application and the transcript that this characterisation of the applicant's claim was accurate.
2. Findings were made that the car was purchased from the first respondent on 30 September 2013 for $5,500. At that time it was ten years old and had been driven 97,099 kilometres. The member was satisfied that Mr Cummins made representations about the suitability of the car for the purpose that the applicant had made known, namely, to drive with family members to Sydney. These findings were not controversial
3. The member was satisfied on the basis of the evidence of Mr Cummins and the applicant's own evidence, that the applicant first raised a concern with Mr Cummins about the transmission light and the car going into "limp mode" sometime in mid-2014 and not on an earlier date. The applicant asserted that she had raised her concerns earlier than this but on a review of the evidence shows that the evidence supported the member's finding - I note in particular that the 2014 application made no mention of these problems. In any event, the question of when the applicant first complained about these two things is of no relevance to the outcome of the matter.
4. The member found that the applicant had a very frightening experience when the car went into limp mode when she was driving it and that she had not driven the car to a significant degree since then, although her son had. Mrs Wallace agreed that her son used the car.
5. Based on the invoices, the member found that significant work had been done on the car in September/October 2014 at the cost of the first and second respondents. She found that further work had been undertaken in January 2015 and that the car had been inspected and further work undertaken at the cost of the first respondent in February 2016, after the 2015 application commenced. This included work undertaken by an auto electrician. The documents before the tribunal included invoices that support these findings - the applicant did not challenge the invoices or disagree that work had been done.
6. Mrs Wallace asserted that the problem of the car going into limp mode and lights coming on still existed and had not been fixed. There was no expert evidence about the problem and the invoices relating to the work undertaken in February 2016 indicated that the mechanic at Rolfe Renault could not identify a transmission "concern" and the auto electrician fixed a problem identified with lights. An invoice from Rolfe Renault dated 8 February 2016 showing an odometer reading of 134,824 kilometres as at that date said:

Customer has reported there is still a transmission error...Checked vehicle, found instrument panel flashing (See video) All testing would indicate that current issue is not related in any way to transmission or mechanical failure. It is our opinion that this instrument panel problem is its own separate electrical concern, possibly caused by a loose connection/cracked wire...Have road tested vehicle several times but was unable to reproduce any transmission concern, recommend vehicle booked for inspection by auto electrician.

1. The transcript records that the member incorrectly referred to the relevant remedies for the claim as being contained in section 269 of the ACL.[10] This is an error about the law, but not one of any significance. Section 269 relates to the termination of a contract for the supply of services and the remedies available to the consumer on termination.
2. It is clear from the member's later references to section 260 of the ACL and her description of the law she was applying that she was referring in fact, to section 259 of the ACL. That section identifies the remedies available to a consumer who is supplied goods where a guarantee, other than a guarantee about repairs and spare parts or express warranties, is not complied with. The member assessed Mrs Wallace's claim for a refund of the purchase price of the vehicle against the requirements of section 259, 260 and 262 of the ACL. These are the correct provisions.
3. The decision can be analysed as set out below.
   • (a) There was no evidence of what the problem was with the car, what was causing the problem or whether it could be fixed.
   • (b) Even if there had been evidence that established what the problem was, and established that the problem was a 'major failure' for the purposes of the ACL, the evidence did not establish that Mrs Wallace notified the first respondent that she rejected the car other than by commencing the 2015 application,[11] as a consumer is required to do by s 259(3) of the ACL.
   • (c) Even if the 2015 application was accepted to be notification that Mrs Wallace rejected the car, her rejection was outside the rejection period as set out in section 262(2) of the ACL.
   • (d) Mrs Wallace's son had driven and apparently was continuing to drive the car, and that is not consistent with a rejection of the car.
   • (e) Mrs Wallace had not provided any evidence to support any claim for compensation for reduction in the value of the car as an alternative to a refund, so that it was impossible for the tribunal to assess any amount of compensation for her and in any event, compensation was not requested.
4. Having reviewed the documents, oral evidence and submissions, I am satisfied that these conclusions and the findings of fact on which they were based are correct. Most of the findings were not contested. The relevant law is correctly described, correctly interpreted and applied. No question of fact or of law is evident.
5. Mrs Wallace did not provide evidence to the tribunal that established breaches of consumer guarantees but importantly, even if she had done so, the remedy she was seeking under the ACL is not available to her because she did not reject the car in time and indeed, the car has been used extensively. No evidence was provided that would allow the tribunal to assess any amount of compensation for a reduction in the value of the car as an alternative to a refund.

Was there an error arising from the removal of the third respondent as a party?

1. The documents filed for the appeal refer to the tribunal having removed the applicant's "witness". I clarified with the applicant that she was referring to the decision made at the conference held on 22 February 2016 to remove Richard Rolfe Motors No 1 Pty Ltd as the named third respondent to the 2015 application. I understood her to submit that she disagreed with this decision because it meant that the mechanic from the business who worked on the car was not present at the hearing to give evidence about his knowledge of the service history of the car before she purchased it, or about the work he had undertaken on the car since purchase. She told me that she did not speak to the mechanic about giving evidence, did not ask him for a witness statement and did not consider subpoenaing him to give evidence.
2. I am satisfied that the decision to remove the third respondent as a party to the application was correct. The 2015 application made no allegation of fault or liability against the third respondent. The application did not assert negligence or other tortious act or omission on the part of the third respondent, or any employee of the third respondent. There was no allegation of a contractual relationship with the third respondent that had been breached. Mrs Wallace could not sustain a claim against the third respondent and had not apparently intended to do so.
3. The applicant's primary interest in the third respondent was to have the mechanic, employed by the third respondent, who worked on the car, attend as a witness. That should have been achieved by arranging for the mechanic to give evidence, if necessary by requesting that a subpoena be issued for that purpose.
4. There was no basis for Mrs Wallace to assume that the mechanic would have come to the hearing and given evidence just because she had named his employer as a party.
5. No question of fact or law arises as a result of the tribunal's decision to remove the third respondent as a party to the application. It was appropriate and correct.

1. No arguable case for an appeal is evident from the material filed in support of the application to extend time to appeal, the applicant's oral presentation, or on review of the decision of the original tribunal.
2. I acknowledge that Mrs Wallace is distressed and aggrieved by her experiences with the car and that she feels strongly that she has been dealt with unfairly by, in particular, the first respondent. But it is also the case that the car has been driven extensively since she purchased it in a way that is not consistent with her concerns about whether it is roadworthy or consistent with her rights as a consumer to reject it. An appeal in these circumstances is not likely to lead to a different result and this is not a case in which I can be satisfied that justice demands that an appeal be permitted or that there would be a miscarriage of justice if an appeal did not proceed.
3. The application for leave to appeal out of time is therefore dismissed.

[4] [2016] ACTSC 203

[5] [2016] ACTSC 122 at [38]

[6] [2015] ACTCA 56 at [20] - [21]

[7] [2016] ACAT 84

[8] See the consideration of the approach that the ACAT should take on appeal in Giusida Pty Limited v Commissioner for Revenue [2016] ACTSC 275

[10] Transcript of Proceedings 21 September 2016 page 69, lines 26 and 29

[11] Transcript of Proceedings page 70, lines 18 - 23