Summons v 1414 Degrees Ltd [2025] SAET 118

1. It is necessary to set out a brief chronology of truncated facts, with the key issues and events highlighted:

December 2020 The parties enter into a Contract of Employment for Mr Summons to be the Managing Director of the respondent.

The position is fulltime and provides an annual salary of $250,000.00. A relocation assistance in the amount of up to $10,000.00, to assist Mr Summons to move from Sydney to Adelaide, is provided.

16 December 2020 The probationary period stipulated in the Contract is extended to be a period of 12 months, with notice of termination of one week, during that period.

3 December 2020 ASX announces the appointment of Mr Summons as Managing Director of the respondent.

4 January 2021 Mr Summons commences in his role with the respondent.

May 2021 The respondent receives two employee complaints alleging inappropriate conduct and or bullying behaviour by Mr Summons.

14 May 2021 Mr Summons is suspended with pay pending the investigation of the complaints.

15 May 2021 Mr Summons alleges that the chair of the respondent had not complied with the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).

21 May 2021 Respondent advised Mr Summons of its intention to terminate his employment on probationary grounds.

24 May 2021 Purported termination is revoked. Mr Summons' employment is maintained. He remained suspended with pay.

23 June 2021 Respondent terminates Mr Summons' probationary employment immediately. One week's pay in lieu of notice provided.

23 June 2021 Mr Summons makes a workers compensation claim for mental stress and anxiety pursuant to the Return to Work Act 2014 (SA).

14 July 2021 The parties enter into a Deed of Release, where the sum of $23,724.50 is to be paid to Mr Summons to resolve all his employment matters. Schedule A sets out an agreed statement with regards to Mr Summons employment and an ASX Update.

20 March 2023 Mr Summons commences these proceedings to recover a sum of $8,176.83 pursuant to the relocation clause of the contract.

5 May 2023 The respondent wholly denies liability for Mr Summons' claim.

1. With the chronology explained, the issues in this case are identified: the Contract provided for up to $10,000.00 relocation assistance; Mr Summons employment was terminated; a Deed pays him a lump sum; he later claims the relocation allowance; the respondent says that the Deed was an entire agreement for all employment matters including the relocation allowance; Mr Summons argues against that.

What do the relevant contractual documents actually say?

1. The Contract is some 15 pages long, its entirety does not need to be completely reproduced. However, a brief moment needs to be spent on the part headed 'Remuneration'. Three aspects are relevant.
2. First, is the clause which establishes Mr Summons' annual salary at, full-time equivalent, $250,000.00.[2]
3. Next, is the clause which confirms that in addition to his annual salary, the respondent will "reimburse" Mr Summons for "reasonable work-related expenditure" incurred by him on production of valid tax invoices or receipts.[3] This clause is relevant when the Deed is analysed.
4. Finally, is the clause which is the subject matter of the within proceedings, where the respondent agreed to pay 'Additional Benefits' to Mr Summons as specified at Item 9 in the Schedule of Key Terms.[4] Those Additional Benefits are described at Item 9 as Relocation Assistance and Performance Rights, only the former is relevant and is set out in full below:

Relocation Assistance: Relocation assistance for the removal of furniture and personal effects from Sydney to Adelaide - reimbursement of reasonable costs incurred upon the provision of receipts to a maximum total of $10,000. If the employment ceases before the second anniversary of the Employee's commencement date, the Employee agrees to reimburse the Employer for the Relocation Assistance payments on a pro-rata basis (e.g. 25% reimbursement after 18 months employment).[5]

1. Parsing that clause, it is evident that if Mr Summons actually incurred the costs of relocation of his furniture and personal effects from Sydney to Adelaide that, upon providing a receipt(s) of the actual costs, he would be able to be reimbursed the reasonable costs up to the amount of $10,000.00. That is, if his actual costs were more than $10,000.00, he could receive no more than that amount. And unreasonable costs would not be able to be recovered, even if they were less than that amount.
2. Question: did Mr Summons actually incur relocation costs? In his application Mr Summons claimed an amount of $8,176.83.[6] However, in an affidavit, Mr Summons claimed that his relocation costs were $8,046.83.[7] Whatever the actual sum, the amount will be referred to as $8,000.00 odd. As to whom or what provided the services to Mr Summons, no details of such have been provided.
3. Question: did Mr Summons provide a receipt(s)? Nowhere in the court documents and the exhibits that have been filed in this case is there any document purporting to be a "receipt" for the relocation costs incurred by Mr Summons. If such a document(s) exists, they have not been brought to my attention. As a matter of contractual interpretation, Mr Summons would not be able to receive reimbursement for any actually incurred relocation (reasonable) costs unless and until he provided a receipt(s) to the respondent evincing such incurred costs.
4. In none of its documents does the respondent make any admissions about: whether Mr Summons incurred any relocation costs, whether such costs were or were not reasonable, whether any receipt(s) were provided to it, if so when, and for what amount. In all instances in denying Mr Summons claim the respondent relied on the Deed as an absolute defence.
5. Given the above identified issues, it is possible that notwithstanding the existence of the Deed, that Mr Summons' claim to be reimbursed his relocation costs may have encountered unsurmountable difficulties in any event. Indeed, that is before we go to the qualifying element of Item 9 of the Contract.
6. The second part of Item 9, in its second sentence, is a qualification on the first part/sentence. The second part confirms that any paid relocation assistance costs may be recovered from Mr Summons, if his employment were to come to an end inside of two years. The provision does not stipulate the type of ending, it casts the net widely by the phrase if 'the employment ceases'. That is, additional potential qualifiers such as 'due to the employee's decision' or 'due to serious and wilful misconduct' for example are absent.
7. Mr Summons' employment was ceased before the second anniversary of its commencement. Also, Mr Summons' employment was ceased during a probationary period. If 4 January 2021 is taken as the commencement date and 23 June 2021 as the termination date, then Mr Summons employment came to an end with the respondent within six months.
8. Accordingly, if Mr Summons were to be successful in these proceedings - in that he has an entitlement to a sum for his reasonable costs incurred in relocating from Sydney to Adelaide - then perhaps the issue of set-off may arise. Alternatively, if monies were to be paid to him, the respondent could perhaps commence its own money claim proceedings in this Court seeking a sum due to it from Mr Summons.[8]
9. Such consideration rests on whether Mr Summons is due any monies at all as a result of these proceedings. In that regard the Deed is to be considered.

1. As with the Contract, not every aspect of the Deed needs to be reproduced here. However, many of its clauses are directly relevant and form part of the respondent's defence to Mr Summons' proceedings. Where necessary they shall be quoted in full.
2. The Deed was dated 14 July 2021. It was signed and witnessed by Mr Summons. It was signed and witnessed by a person on behalf of the respondent. Throughout the Deed the respondent is referred to as "14D".
3. Relevant agreed background facts as stated in the Deed are that Mr Summons was employed, then suspended, then terminated by the respondent. That he made corporate governance allegations about the chair of the respondent. And that he made a workers compensation claim under the RTW Act for mental stress and anxiety. Those background facts form part of the Deed.[9]
4. Immediately after reciting those facts, the Deed sets out the following relevant paragraph:

However, to the fullest extent permitted by law, the parties have agreed to move forward and resolve all matters relating to the Employment, including its cessation, on the terms set out in this Deed. This Deed formally records the mutual exchange of promises between 14D and Mr Summons.[10]

1. A number of the components of that clause are relevant here. The phrase 'to the fullest extent permitted by law' connotes the widest scope possible subject to the law. For example, the Deed could not contract out of any workers compensation rights or liabilities.[11]
2. Next, that the parties are 'moving forward' such that they are not scrutinising the past. More importantly, that they are resolving all matters relating to Mr Summons' employment. The word 'all' is to be emphasised. In that same sentence is the additional words 'including its cessation'. That phrase makes it clear that "all matters" includes the cessation. The point there being that there are other employment matters that are not the cessation.
3. Finally, the paragraph records that the contracting parties have formally made certain promises to each other. The point there being that it is those promises that the Deed records. What can be inferred from that is only the promises to each other that was formally recorded in the Deed, and no others.
4. Still on the topic of 'promises' under the Main heading of AGREEMENT, and the subheading MR SUMMONS' CONDITIONS OF AGREEMENT, the Deed stipulates that:

3.1 he accepts the promises in this Deed in full and final satisfaction and discharge of any and all Claims against or involving 14D.

3.2 he will never again commence or prosecute and Claims, including complaints to a statutory authority such as the Fair Work Ombudsman, that directly or indirectly involve 14D. [12] (underling added)

1.3 Claims means all past, present and future claims, causes of action, costs, demands, entitlements and complaints, however described, including but not limited to those arising pursuant to the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), the common law, equity and/or any other Act or Regulation of State or Commonwealth Parliament, and including all claims and/or complaints relating to:

1.3.1 The Contract and the Employment (including their cessation); (underlining added)

1. At this juncture it is to be understood that these proceedings were instigated by Mr Summons as a Money Claim, pursuant to the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), and that what he has sought is a remedy with regards to his Contract and his Employment.
2. How payment was to be made to Mr Summons under the Deed is also of interest. The procedure provided that within seven days of the respondent solicitor receiving a 'valid itemised GST invoice' from Mr Summons' solicitor - the reasonableness of that invoice having been agreed - and the executed copy of the Deed, then the respondent would make 'Reimbursement to Ms Summons' solicitor.[14]
3. 'Reimbursement' is defined in the Deed as:

Reimbursement is the reimbursement to Mr Summons' solicitor, by 14D on behalf of Mr Summons, for Mr Summons' work-related expenditure (in this case legal expenses) incurred by Mr Summons in the manner contemplated by clause 6(c)(iii) of his Contract, in the amount of $23,724.50 total (inclusive of GST).

1. As is obvious from the foregoing paragraph, Mr Summons was legally represented at the time of the negotiation of the Deed and at the time it was executed.
2. With regards to the coverage of the Deed, it was agreed between the parties that it would be an 'entire agreement':

11.1 This Deed constitutes the entire agreement of the parties relating to its subject matter and sets out the conduct relied upon by each party. It supersedes all prior understandings, negotiations, offers or agreements. (underlining added)

1. Accordingly, it is evident that the Deed envisaged a settlement of all issues arising out of Mr Summons employment and termination, except his workers compensation matters. It is clear that by paying $23,724.50, that the respondent expected that it would be released from all future liability to Mr Summons. The Deed is such that absence extraordinary factors, it can be relied upon by the respondent to deny all future claims brought against it by Mr Summons regarding his employment and termination.
2. The respondent relies on the Deed as an absolute defence to Mr Summons's present money claim proceedings. Accordingly, what does Mr Summons say are the extraordinary factors that would mean his proceedings should find success?

Why does Mr Summons say his proceedings should be successful?

1. In his recently filed Further Submissions in Reply, Mr Summons said that the Deed should be set aside on the grounds of:
   1. Lack of capacity due to a diagnosed work-related psychological injury;
   2. Economic duress and coercion;
   3. Misrepresentation and unconscionability in the circumstances of execution.[15]
2. Further on in those submissions, he addressed other topics such as: the knowledge of the respondent; legal advice and consent and abuse of process.[16]
3. In his earlier written submissions, Mr Summons addressed the topics of lack of capacity / psychological injury; economic duress; coercion and invalidity of the Deed.[17]

1. The first thing to be said about Mr Summons' sought remedy, that the Deed should be set aside, is that the Deed is not an order of this Court. It is an instrument entered into by the two parties. On its face it appears to have been lawfully executed. If Mr Summons does in fact seek to set aside the Deed, query whether his present money claim pursuant to the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) is the appropriate action or whether he should have brought proceedings in another court.
2. The question in these proceedings might more correctly be put in term of estoppel. That is, whether there is an Estoppel by deed which will bar Mr Summons from achieving the remedy he seeks.
3. Estoppel by deed is a rule of evidence founded on the principle that a solemn and unambiguous statement in a deed must be taken as binding on a party that makes it.[18]
4. The principles of Anshun estoppel[19] would also be relevant if there was litigation between the parties leading up to the Deed. However, on the information before me it appears there was only the prospect of litigation, not actual proceedings.
5. The next thing to be said about the remedy of setting aside is that were that to occur it would put the parties back in the position they were in immediately prior to the entering into the Deed. In that regard, the respondent would be entitled to have the $23,724.50 it paid to Mr Summons, repaid to it. If Mr Summons did indeed wish to set aside the Deed, he could accelerate that by returning that money. There is no evidence before me that Mr Summons had repaid that money or intends to.

1. Mr Summons contended that he was intentionally inflicted by extreme stress, anxiety and depression, with the intent to destroy his judgment and capacity at the time he entered into the Deed.[20]
2. Bearing in mind that the Deed was entered into on 14 July 2021, Mr Summons pointed out that he attended on his general practitioner on four occasion prior to that date: 2, 9 & 23 June 2021 and 6 July 2021. He relied on notes made by his GP on the 2 & 23 June 2021 attendances to highlight that he was on those occasions: still under extreme stress, emotional, couldn't think properly, had difficulty coping and couldn't concentrate.[21]
3. His GP's notes of 6 July 2021 record:

Advised about report request received[22]

1. The next visit was on 27 July 2021 - almost two weeks after the signing of the Deed. There, Mr Summons' GP recorded:

1: Zoloft not helping aws much . Will need increase dosage. Days when he is really anxious Advised to go to 100 mg daily gradual increase . review 3/52

2: Seeing Psychologist Gills Hummond and working well with him

4: The boss her resigned, The board has supported him been ousted

1. With regards to his medication treatment regime at that time, Mr Summons said that he had been prescribed and was taking: Diazepam (for anxiety and sleep problems); Zoloft (for major depressive disorder, panic disorder and post-traumatic stress); Valium (for anxiety); and Temazepam (for insomnia).[24]
2. Answering questions put by the workers compensation insurer, Mr Summons' GP authored a report dated 7 July 2021. In that report a history as provided by Mr Summons was set out and a diagnosis of severe depression was made. The GP expressed the opinion that Mr Summons' employment was a major cause of his psychiatric condition. Further, the GP opined that Mr Summons was not able to return to employment duties at the respondent, but that, when his condition improves, he was able to return to similar duties with another employer. The GP does not address Ms Summons legal capacity.[25] If Mr Summons had no legal capacity, it could have been expected that the GP would have commented about that.
3. Seeking treatment for his psychological condition, Mr Summons attended on a psychologist, Gilles Hammond as referred by his GP. He consulted Mr Hammond almost weekly from at least 13 July 2021 to 14 October 2022. It is to be noted that Mr Hammond's patient appointment list records Mr Summons as attending on him on 13 July 2021 - the day before the Deed was signed by him and on 20 July 2021- six days after the Deed was signed.[26]
4. In an email to Mr Hammond and others on 6 July 2023, Mr Summons said the following:

SAET has requested I provide medical proof that my capacity to sign or understand any contractual arrangement was severely impacted at the time. That I was not in a fit state of mind to be signing anything, noting that I was bullied, harassed, castigated with knowingly malicious intent in combination with:

• No support network in Adelaide
• No income with which to defend myself owing the be wrongfully dismissed because of the false and misleading allegations
• Ongoing press articles due to false 14D company ASX announcements, many post deed

All further compounding my injury and incapacitating me.

Another side point here which is very important. If I can with your help medically prove my incapacity then not only will SAET find in my favour regarding the costs I'm rightfully owed, voiding the deed means I rightfully have the potential ability to seek further compensation from 14D in regards to future employment owing to the damage they knowingly intentionally perpetrated upon me, without ever having produced any evidence what so ever as was also promised and legally should have been produced at the time.

So, all I need is a summary letter (hopefully from all of you) stating the medical facts and history of treatment so I can lodge this with SAET. Can you please confirm whether you are able to assist?[27] (underlining added)

1. In response to that request, Mr Hammond authored what he styled as a 'comprehensive psychological treating report'. In that report, dated 24 August 2023, Mr Hammond said that Mr Summons consulted with him on 24 occasions between 13 July 2021 and 1 August 2023 for treatment of work-related symptoms of depression and anxiety.[28] Recording what Mr Summons had told him about the events surrounding the Deed, Mr Hammond said:

Mr Summons stated that a final legal process involving the signing of a deed was agreed by all parties. The goals of the deed were to absolve all parties of any responsibilities and demands for the future. Mr Summons stated that he took part in the signing the deal as he felt that a signed deed would bring an ending to the public shaming he was subjected to and the urgent need to salvage his reputation so he can move on and get a suitable job somewhere else. He said that despite the fact he was in financial duress and could not afford a lawyer, he felt caught in a corner and pressured to sign as he felt that this opportunity was his only way out of the hopeless situation, he felt he was in.[29]

1. Mr Hammond commented on Mr Summons' presentation and symptomatology on 21 July 2021, saying:

Mr Summons presented with the following psychological symptoms at his initial consultation on the 21/07/2021:

Low mood, loss of confidence and negative self-evaluation, fatigue, irritable, loss of motivation, feelings of persecution, resentment, sense of loss of role/identity, confused thinking, reduced capacity to concentrate, reduced problem-solving and decision-making ability, reduced enjoyment of activities and sense of hopelessness and shame.

Rumination, inability to relax and worries about what the future may hold for him, difficulties with making decisions, social anxious and avoidant and fear of being shamed.[30]

1. Despite Mr Summons' requests, Mr Hammond does not address his legal capacity, as at the time of him entering into the Deed, in his report of 24 August 2023. If Mr Summons had no legal capacity at that time, it would have been expected - particularly with the request to do so - that Mr Hammond would have commented about that.
2. Turning now to Mr Summons specific arguments regarding his alleged lack of legal capacity/psychological injury, he submitted that adjustment disorder with anxiety, depression and panic attacks is a recognised mental disorder, which was recognised by his treating medical practitioners and the workers compensation insurer.[31] Whilst that contention may be true, it is not axiomatic that having a recognised mental disorder means that a person has no legal capacity. Mr Summons is wrong to conflate the two concepts.
3. With regards to any contemporaneous medical reporting of his alleged lack of legal capacity, Mr Summons said that such a requirement was 'not determinative' as 'contemporaneous medical records, observable behaviour, and corroborative evidence demonstrated impaired judgment and function.'[32] Mr Summons is misguided in that approach.
4. Contemporaneous medical reporting of any lack of legal capacity is highly relevant to the issues at hand and would in many instances be determinative or close thereto. For example, if his GP or Mr Hammond had reported at the time that he lacked legal capacity then that information would weigh heavily in any reasoning on the issue. The GP and Mr Hammond do not make any such reports. Given the seriousness of a diagnosis of no legal capacity, it is to be assumed that if such a diagnosis was evident, that professional medical practitioners would have made a record or report about that. In that regard, the absence of any such recording or reporting tells significantly against Mr Summons' contentions.
5. Where Mr Summons has misguided himself is that he concluded that because he had a recognised psychological disorder at the time of entering into the Deed that ergo, he lacked legal capacity in its entirety. Perhaps he also has confused the concepts of "work injury incapacity" with "legal incapacity". An inability to perform some or all of your pre-injury work duties, does not by the fact of that, mean a person lacks the capacity to make decisions about their life in general.
6. In these proceedings, it is evident that Mr Summons has not comprehended the well-established legal maxim that a person of full age is presumed to be capable of managing their own affairs, including their litigation, unless proof to the contrary is provided and accepted by a court. A person's incapacity to manage their own affairs is usually evident by that person's inability to understand the nature of an event or transaction when it is explained to them. Whilst there is no universal test, a person's "inability", is to be understood as being manifest; not just that 'I am anxious about this deal', but 'I don't know what this deal is, I don't know why I have been offered it', for example. The person who asserts the incapacity bears the onus of persuading the court. A mere assertion is not enough, actual persuasive evidence is required. The bar will be high: a court should be cautious and careful in determining that a person is not capable of managing their own affairs - depriving them of their free-will and decision-making capacity - and which would necessitate the appointment of a guardian or attorney.[33]
7. The evidence presented by Mr Summons is wholly insufficient to support the submissions he has made. There is no evidence that as at the time of entering into the Deed that Mr Summons lacked legal capacity. It is to be assumed therefore that the opposite is the case: he had legal capacity. Mr Summons' submissions as to his alleged lack of legal capacity therefore fail.

1. Mr Summons submitted that at the time of entering into the Deed he was under economic duress in the form of 'mounting legal bills'. He said that he was compelled to engage legal counsel to defend himself against the respondent's fabrications. Further, inferred from his submissions, is that he was suffering financial hardship due to his employment with the respondent being terminated and not having a salary to rely on. In that regard, Mr Summons also stressed that he was suffering reputational damage preventing him from obtaining alternative work. He said he had no reasonable alternative but to sign the Deed.[34]
2. Other than his evidence and submissions, no other evidence was tendered by Mr Summons to establish economic duress and coercion, for example verifiable evidence of the respondent's illegitimate intent and pressure.
3. What Mr Summons submitted may well be accurate to a point. But to evaluate such factors - which are common features in termination of employment cases - to the point of him having 'no reasonable alternative' but to enter into the Deed is misguided. The principles of economic duress and coercion in Contract Law are much more stringent than Mr Summons submits. The details of such concepts do not need to be repeated here; there is little point; the evidence in this case does not get remotely close to the relevant level of satisfaction.
4. Further, the High Court authorities cited by him are of no assistance given the facts of this case.[35]
5. At this juncture, I will comment on the fact that Mr Summons was legally represented in the negotiation for, and the entering into of the Deed. This is a factor of some note. It is to be assumed that he received legal advice about his prospects of success with regards to his dispute with his employer, the respondent. Putting the workers compensation issues to one side, Mr Summons' complaints were of an unfair termination of his employment, fabricated allegations against him and of reputation damage. Whilst he may have considered proceedings in defamation, the starting point would have been potential legal action with regards to the termination.
6. Considering such, it is to be understood that Mr Summons would not have been able prosecute unfair dismissal proceedings under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) in the Fair Work Commission. He would have been statute barred as his salary was in excess of the remuneration cap. Further, he was serving a period of probation; admittedly that period was lengthy, but if that period were considered not to be reasonable, the fact remains that Mr Summons' employment came to an end within six months of its commencement.
7. Other options open to Ms Summons at that time could have been contractual damages proceedings at common law in an appropriate court regarding the termination.[36] The significant risks of such a civil action are that costs would follow the event. That is, the winning party could expect that its legal costs would be paid by the losing party. It can be assumed that in engaging legal representation that Mr Summons received advice about commencing any such proceedings in a common law court. I have not been informed that any such proceedings were commenced. It is to be assumed that Mr Summons therefore decided against such a course.
8. The specific submissions advanced by Mr Summons regarding 'Legal Advice and Consent' centre around his alleged psychological distress and financial distress, which have already been discussed and dismissed.[37]
9. Accordingly, Mr Summons finds no success in his arguments regarding economic duress and coercion.

1. Relying on his evidence in an affidavit, Mr Summons contended that the Deed was 'invalid' as the respondent had 'misrepresented' the nature or scope of the dispute owing to fabricated evidence. Further, he contended that the respondent misrepresented the nature and scope of the alleged misconduct he had engaged in and never provided particulars or evidence. Further, that the Deed was one-sided, which was designed to absolve the respondent of liability and leave him with lasting reputational harm.[38]
2. In similar vein Mr Summons, submitted that the Deed is rendered 'unconscionable' due to the relevant sequence of historical events prior to the Deed being entered into - suspension, fabricated allegations, unilateral termination attempts, and misleading ASX disclosures.[39]
3. The emotive submissions advanced by Mr Summons regarding misrepresentation and unconscionability do not assist in resolving the present proceedings; they are his opinions which are not supported by verifiable facts in evidence in these proceedings. As such they are dismissed.

1. Responding to the respondent's written submissions, Mr Summons contended that his present proceedings were not brought for 'an improper purpose' or were not otherwise an abuse of process. He submitted that broader principles of justice and accountability support his action. And, that his claim 'is and always has been grounded in established principles of duress, unconscionability, and lack of capacity.'[40]
2. As above, Mr Summons has been wholly unsuccessful in his present proceedings. Accordingly, it is not necessary for there to be an analysis as to whether his claim was an abuse of process. These submissions are dismissed.
3. Also responding to the respondent's written submissions, Mr Summons argued that his claim for relocation costs is not barred by the Deed. He contended that the respondent expressly acknowledged such costs, and that equity required their reimbursement 'once the deed is vitiated'. I have already explained why the Deed can be relied upon and here is not the place to recount what equity may require. These submissions are of no substance and are dismissed.
4. Finally, as tilted at generally, but specifically in an affidavit, Mr Summons said he was seeking two primary remedies in the within proceedings: first, the as discussed $8,000.00 odd relocation assistance. Second, a public apology for reputational damage and a retraction of previous ASX announcements made by the respondent. The latter two are not remedies that this court can order in the within proceedings.

1. For all the reasons as explained above, the Deed is not set aside. The respondent is not estopped from relying on the Deed. The Deed prohibits Mr Summons from receiving any further money other than as provided for by the terms of the Deed.
2. These money claim proceedings are to be dismissed as the Deed prohibits Mr Summons from receiving the relocations costs as claimed.

1. The respondent has submitted that in the event that Mr Summons were to be unsuccessful, which he is, that he should pay its costs of these proceedings. Whilst usually in money claim proceedings each side will bear their own costs, exceptions to that rule can be found at s 570(2) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). Accordingly, before making a final order to dismiss these proceedings, I will hear from the parties through written submissions as to the issue of costs. Thereafter a further judgment will be delivered.

1. By 13 November 2025, the respondent is to have filed and served its written submissions seeking costs.
2. By 27 November 2025, Mr Summons is to have filed and served his written submissions on the issue of costs.

1. Application - Money Claim ET-23-01295 21/03/23
2. Answer / Response 05/05/23
3. Respondent - Outline of Submissions 22/09/23
4. Applicant - Outline of Submissions 14/11/23
5. Respondent - Further Submissions 01/12/23
6. Applicant - Further Submissions in Reply 25/09/25
7. Respondent - Reply Submissions 17/10/25

[1] The exhibits received and the documents considered are set out at Schedule A of this judgment.

[2] Exhibit A1, Contract of Employment, 04/01/21, cl 6(a) p 4.

[5] Ibid, Schedule of Key Terms, Item 9, p 1.

[6] Application - Money Claim ET-23-01295, 20/03/23, p 2.

[7] Exhibit A5, Jamie Summons Affidavit 28/08/23 p 2.

[8] Fair Work Act 1994 (SA) s 9(1)(b)(ii).

[9] A3, Deed of Release, 14/07/21, [J.] p 2.

[11] Return to Work Act 2014 (SA) s 191.

[15] Applicant's Further Submissions in Reply, 25/09/25. [3], [3.1]-[3.3], p 1.

[17] Applicant - Outline of Submissions, 13/11/23, pp 1-4.

[18] Butterworths Australian Legal Dictionary, p 432: Greer v Kettle [1938] AC 156; [1937] 4 All ER 396.

[19] An estoppel that prevents a party from making a claim in a second proceeding which should have been pursued by that party in an earlier proceeding. Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd [1981] HCA 45; (1981) 147 CLR 589.

[20] Applicant - Outline of Submissions 13/11/23 [5.1].

[22] Exhibit A7 Subpoenaed Medical Records (123 pages), 06/11/23 p 6.

[26] Exhibit A4 Patient Appointments list 17/10/23.

[31] Applicant's Further Submissions in Reply [5.1].

[33] See for example Slaveski v State of Victoria and Ors [2009] VSC 596; Manning v Russell & Anor [2015] SASC 91; Draoui v Return to Work SA [2019] SAET 94 & Price v Department for Education [2020] SAET 43.

[34] Applicant's Further Submissions in Reply [10]-[11.3].

[36] For example, in this court see Fair Work Act 1994 (SA) s 10.

[37] Applicant's Further Submissions in Reply [12]-[14].

[38] Applicant - Outline of Submissions [5.4] & Applicant's Further Submissions in Reply [17]-[18.2].

[39] Applicant's Further Submissions in Reply [18.3].