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[2026] NSWSC 1117
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-09-16
Brereton J
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Succar v Dominium Homes Pty Ltd [2026] NSWSC 1117
Hearing dates: 26 August, 14 September 2026
Date of orders: 16 September 2026
Decision date: 16 September 2026
Jurisdiction: Equity - Commercial List
Before: Brereton J
Decision: (1) The answer to the separate question is “yes” for each of the plaintiffs.
(2) The proceedings are dismissed.
(3) If the parties wish to be heard about costs, they must notify my Associate by 5pm on 24 September 2026 and a date will be fixed for the hearing of oral argument about costs.
(4) If there is no notice in accordance with (3), there will be an order that the plaintiffs are to pay the second defendant’s costs of the proceedings.
Catchwords: BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION – separate question – residential building work – where builder insolvent – insurance – where plaintiffs claim on a policy of insurance issued in accordance with the Home Building Act 1989 (NSW) – whether cover excluded because plaintiffs were developers within the meaning of s 3A of the Home Building Act – whether each plaintiff “will be” an “owner” of 4 or more dwellings – where plaintiffs executed a deed of partition – where plaintiffs will be registered proprietors of land when construction of 10 dwellings will be completed – ownership of dwellings at law sufficient within the meaning of s 3A of the Home Building Act irrespective of position in equity – each plaintiff was a developer – insurance cover excluded – proceedings dismissed
Original judgment source is linked above.
Legislation Cited: Home Building Act 1989 (NSW)
Home Building Amendment Act 2011 (NSW)
Land Tax Act 1958 (Vic)
Land Tax Assessment Act 1910-1914 (Cth)
Law Reform (Law and Equity) Act 1972 (NSW)
Home Building Regulation 2014 (NSW)
Cases Cited: Ace Woollahra Pty Ltd v Owners Strata Plan 61424 (2010) 77 NSWLR 613; [2010] NSWCA 101
CN1 Pty Ltd v NSW Self Insurance Corporation [2025] NSWSC 1464
CPT Custodian Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue of the State of Victoria (2005) 224 CLR 98; [2005] HCA 53
Glenn v The Federal Commissioner of Land Tax (1915) 20 CLR 490
Karingal 2 Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [2002] VSC 431; 51 ATC 190
Makowski v NSW Self Insurance Corporation; Mircevski v NSW Self Insurance Corporation [2026] NSWCATAP 184
Owners – Strata Plan 81837 v Multiplex Hurstville Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 1488
Segal v Barel (2013) 84 NSWLR 193; [2013] NSWCA 92
Succar v Dominion Homes Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 183
TEC Desert Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (Western Australia) (2010) 241 CLR 576; [2010] HCA 49
The Commonwealth of Australia v Sterling Nicholas Duty Free Pty Limited (1972) 126 CLR 297
The Owners – Strata Plan No 68372 v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited [2014] NSWSC 1807
Texts Cited: N.A.
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Mtanios Succar (first plaintiff)
Sylvie Succar (second plaintiff)
Elie Succar (third plaintiff)
Chantelle Succar (fourth plaintiff)
Bernadette Succar (fifth plaintiff)
Dominium Homes Pty Ltd (first defendant)
NSW Self Insurance Corporation (second defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
T Lynch SC / M Klooster (plaintiffs)
P Bambagiotti (second defendant)
Solicitors:
G&S Law Group (plaintiffs)
Hicksons | Hunt & Hunt (second defendant)
File Number(s): 2022/72717
Publication restriction: N.A.
On 17 October 2025, the Court ordered that a separate question be determined as between the plaintiffs and the second defendant.
The question is whether each of the plaintiffs is a “developer” within the meaning of a contract of insurance issued by the second defendant (SICorp). If the answer is “yes”, the plaintiffs are ineligible for indemnity under the policy, and the proceedings will be dismissed. The question is to be answered by reference to a joint statement of facts.
For the following reasons, the answer to the separate question is “yes”.
The following background matters are drawn from the joint statement of facts and other uncontroversial matters.
The 5 plaintiffs are natural persons. The first and fifth plaintiffs are married. The second, third and fourth plaintiffs are siblings. Their father and the first plaintiff are members of the same extended family and are close friends.
On 13 October 2015, the plaintiffs became the registered proprietors, as tenants in common, of some land located at Rosehill, in Sydney (the Land).
On 30 March 2016, the plaintiffs obtained conditional consent from Parramatta City Council for the construction on the Land of 10 dwellings with basement parking for 23 vehicles, with a proposal for strata subdivision thereafter.
On 11 April 2016, the plaintiffs entered into a “deed of partition”. The deed reflected an agreement between the plaintiffs concerning their rights and obligations in respect of the Land.
On 15 September 2017, the plaintiffs entered into a contract with the first defendant (the Builder) to undertake the construction work. Construction commenced on 25 September 2017. It was agreed that the construction work was “residential building work” within the meaning of the Home Building Act 1989 (NSW).
On 10 January 2018, the Builder procured the issue of 10 certificates of insurance, which evidenced “the inception of the Policy”. The “Policy” was agreed to be a policy issued by SICorp in accordance with and for the purposes of Part 6 of the Home Building Act.
There was a dispute between the plaintiffs and the Builder about the adequacy of the Builder’s performance. The plaintiffs terminated the building contract on 9 March 2022. They commenced these proceedings against the Builder on 14 March 2022.
On 19 June 2023, the Builder’s licence was suspended.
On 7 August 2024, the plaintiffs, as registered proprietors of the Land, notified a claim on the Policy.
On 9 August 2024, SICorp declined the claim on the basis that each of the plaintiffs was a “developer” within the meaning of the policy wording. The Policy does not cover claims made by a developer.
The plaintiffs joined SICorp to these proceedings on 25 November 2024.
On 11 March 2025, the plaintiffs obtained judgment against the Builder in the sum of $3,757,814.98: see Succar v Dominion Homes Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 183. Just over 2 weeks later, on 27 March 2025, a liquidator was appointed to the Builder.
The development remains incomplete and without an occupation certificate.
The certificates of insurance record that a contract of insurance complying with s 92 and s 96 of the Home Building Act has been issued by Insurance and Care NSW for the insurer, SICorp. Each certificate provides (subject to qualifications) that “cover will be provided to a beneficiary described in the contract and successor in title to the beneficiary”. There was no contract in evidence that specifically described any “beneficiary”.
The parties agreed that insurance was issued in accordance with the standard wording for policies of this kind. That wording provided cover to “you”, which was defined to mean “the person on whose behalf the work is done or is to be done including any owner of the land at the time the contract is entered into, on which residential building work is done, and any successor in title to that person”.
Notwithstanding that the joint statement of facts appears to proceed on the basis that there is a single policy, the plaintiffs submitted that there are 10 policies, each with common wording. SICorp did not take a position about whether there is just 1 policy or 10 policies. There is some indication that there was a single policy of a composite nature that provided cover for each of the proposed dwellings. Each certificate refers to a policy numbered HBCF18000809. While each of the 10 certificates refer respectively to 10 separate units, each of the 10 certificates describe the work as “construction of 10 townhouses with 1 level basement parking”. In each certificate, the “homeowner” is identified as each of the plaintiffs. Each certificate refers to a contract amount of $2,360,000 and a premium paid of $53,536.79. It is apparent that the contract amount reflects the cost of the whole of the development and the premium paid was a single payment of $53,536.79 in respect of the entire development.
It ultimately does not matter for present purposes whether there is 1 policy or 10. Whether there is 1 or 10, at the time of entry into the building contract, each of the plaintiffs was a registered proprietor of the whole of the Land and each plaintiff entered into the contract with the Builder for the construction of the whole of the residential building work. Even if there are 10 policies, each plaintiff is a “you” in respect of each policy. For convenience, I will proceed in the fashion of the joint statement of facts and continue to refer simply to the “Policy”.
Broadly speaking, the Policy provided cover for loss or damage in respect of the “work” covered by the Policy where there has been: (a) non-completion of the work because of insolvency, death or disappearance of the builder; or (b) a breach of the statutory warranty by the builder (which cannot be recovered from the builder). It is essentially back up cover where recovery cannot be secured from the Builder.
Clause 3.4(a) of the Policy provides that the “policy does not cover a claim by any person who is, in relation to the work…a developer”. The word “work” is defined to mean “the residential building work which is done or is to be done by the builder to the dwelling under the contract”. The word “developer” is a defined term. Clause 7 defines “Developer” as having the same meaning as it does under the Home Building Act.
The question is whether each of the plaintiffs is a developer within the meaning of the Home Building Act.
The Builder was prohibited from undertaking the residential building work in this case without a contact of insurance that complied with the Home Building Act: see s 92. The contract must insure the person on whose behalf the work is done and successors in title: see s 92C and s 99 and also reg 37 of the Home Building Regulation 2014 (NSW).
The Home Building Act and the Home Building Regulation include provisions that concern a person who is a “developer”. They were summarised by Kirk J in CN1 Pty Ltd v NSW Self Insurance Corporation [2025] NSWSC 1464 at [31]. Relevantly for this case, a builder is not required to obtain a policy of insurance in favour of a developer: see s 99(2) and reg 37(2)(a) of the Home Building Regulation. That is the statutory context for the exclusion in the Policy of a claim by a “developer”.
Clause 1 of sch 1 to the Home Building Act provides that the meaning of “developer” is found in s 3A. Section 3A relevantly provides as follows:
3A Application of provisions to developers
(1) For the purposes of this Act, an individual, a partnership or a corporation on whose behalf residential building work is done in the circumstances set out in subsection (2) is a developer in relation to that residential building work.
(1A) Residential building work done on land in the circumstances set out in subsection (2) is, for the purpose of determining who is a developer in relation to the work, deemed to have been done on behalf of the owner of the land (in addition to any person on whose behalf the work was actually done).
(2) The circumstances are—
(a) the residential building work is done in connection with an existing or proposed dwelling in a building or residential development where 4 or more of the existing or proposed dwellings are or will be owned by the individual, partnership or corporation, or…
The plaintiffs contend that they are not relevantly “developers” because of the effect of the deed of partition.
Clause A of the deed of partition provides that the “parties agree and declare that each party is liable for and entitled to their interest in the lots in the Draft Strata Plan” (which is attached to the deed) as follows:
(a) the first and fifth plaintiffs will be the registered proprietors of unit 1 as joint tenants; (b) the first plaintiff will be the registered proprietor of units 2 and 4; (c) the fifth plaintiff will be the registered proprietor of units 3 and 5; (d) the second plaintiff will be the registered proprietor of units 6 and 9; (e) the third plaintiff will be the registered proprietor of unit 7; (f) the fourth plaintiff will be the registered proprietor of unit 8; and (g) the second, third and fourth plaintiffs will be the registered proprietors of unit 10 as tenants in common.
The deed of partition contemplates that once construction is completed, there will be a formal subdivision of the Land at law, by the registration of the strata plan, and that the partition will then be completed, at law, by the registration of transfers of identified units in that registered strata plan, with the result that no plaintiff will have any interest in more than 3 dwellings.
The deed of partition also provides that the plaintiffs would be proportionately responsible for construction costs “of their allocated lot associated with this agreement”.
For the reasons set out below, I do not accept that the effect of the deed of partition is that none of the plaintiffs is relevantly a “developer”.
The claim on the Policy concerns loss or damage in respect of work that was done or to be done by the Builder. The exclusion in cl 3.4(a) of the Policy applies if each of the plaintiffs was a developer in relation to that work. The joint statement of facts in this case does not reveal much about the work that is the subject of the claim. It is sufficient in this case to consider whether each plaintiff was a developer in respect of the building work done (or not done) pursuant to the building contract up until the termination of the contract on 9 March 2022.
It was agreed that the construction work under the building contract to construct 10 dwellings and basement parking was “residential building work” within the meaning of s 3A of the Home Building Act. It is necessary to consider whether each plaintiff is a developer in relation to that residential building work. That requires consideration of whether that residential building work “is done in the circumstances set out in subsection (2)”: see s 3A(1).
“the residential building work is done in connection with [a] … proposed dwelling in a … residential development where 4 or more of the … proposed dwellings … will be owned by the individual…”
The language “will be owned” is future-looking. That raises obvious questions about how one is to go about ascertaining whether something “will be owned”. Is it an objective or subjective inquiry? What degree of certainty is required? And most relevantly for present purposes, what point of time in the future is the relevant time (or is the point of time at large)?
In this case, it was accepted that the deed of partition can be taken as evincing an intention that once the building work was complete, a strata plan would be registered and the plaintiffs would execute transfers which would result in the plaintiffs becoming the registered proprietors of 1, 2 or 3 of the 10 subdivided units in the strata plan. Until those transfers were registered, all of the plaintiffs would be the registered proprietors of all of the dwellings as tenants in common. That is, at all relevant times, the intention was that all 5 plaintiffs would be the registered proprietors of the Land until the completion of the building work and that they would remain as the registered proprietors as tenants in common until transfers of the subdivided lots in the registered strata plan were registered.
It cannot be right that a person is not a developer if he or she is undertaking residential building work, comprising 4 or more dwellings, with a view of disposing all of the dwellings once the development is complete. If that were the case, the consumer protection scheme reflected in the Home Building Act, including by s 3A, would be seriously undermined. An important aspect of the Home Building Act is to give certain persons the benefit of statutory warranties against a “developer”: see s 18C and CN1 at [31]. Those protections would not go far if the warranty obligations were only owed by persons who intended, or were expected, to hold on to 4 or more dwellings indefinitely. That would be a perverse outcome.
In my view, a person will relevantly be a developer in respect of work if the residential building work is done in connection with a proposed development where that person will own 4 or more of the proposed dwellings at the time the building work is completed. That is, the “will be owned” question arising under s 3A(2)(a) is not answered by reference to any time in the future at large. It directs attention to the time when it is anticipated that the proposed dwellings will be constructed (and become actual rather than merely proposed). This is consistent with the conclusion of Ball J in The Owners – Strat**a Plan No 68372 v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited [2014] NSWSC 1807 at [22]-[23].
The future-looking question should be answered objectively. Ordinarily, that will involve the following analysis. It is first necessary to identify the point in time at which the person’s status as a developer (or not) is to be determined. It is then, at least usually, appropriate to consider the legal arrangements that are then in place that will, unless altered, determine who is to own the dwellings at the time construction is completed. This analysis can be framed by reference to the notion of “intention”, but it does not have to be. It seems to me that the correct analysis requires consideration of the legal arrangements that were in place at the time of the relevant work in respect of the ownership of the dwellings at the time the construction was to be completed.
In this case, the relevant issue is whether the plaintiffs were developers in respect of the work that is the subject of claim on the Policy. At the time the work was being done, the plaintiffs were party to the deed of partition that would have legal consequences as between the parties at the time the construction of the dwellings was expected to be completed. The legal position when the relevant work was being performed was that the plaintiffs would be the registered proprietors of the Land, and would be the joint owners of all the dwellings at law, at the time the construction was to be completed. The fact that each of the plaintiffs would be the registered proprietors of no more than 3 lots at some time after the dwellings were constructed, once a strata plan was registered and transfers were executed and registered, does not mean that they are not developers.
The plaintiffs’ principal contention is that the deed of partition had a much more important effect than providing for the future transfers of units or lots. They submitted that the effect of the deed of partition was to bring about an immediate partition as between the plaintiffs, with the result that from the date of the deed the plaintiffs relevantly ceased to be co-owners of the subdivided parts of the Land in equity. They recognised that the plaintiffs would remain the registered proprietors of the Land, but asserted that beneficially they owned the lots as partitioned. They submitted that the partition of the Land in this way meant that when the construction was complete, no plaintiff would own 4 or more dwellings, because those dwellings would be located on Land that had already been partitioned in accordance with the deed.
This argument raises questions about what is meant by a dwelling being “owned” within the meaning of s 3A(2) of the Home Building Act.
Section 3A(2) speaks of “dwellings” being “owned”. The term “dwelling” is defined in cl 3 of sch 1 to the Home Building Act and relevantly it means a building or portion of a building designed, constructed or adapted for use as a residence. Elsewhere in s 3A, there is reference to “the owner of the land”.
Clause 1 of sch 1 to the Home Building Act defines “owner” in the following way:
owner of land means the only person who, or each person who jointly or severally, at law or in equity—
(a) is entitled to the land for an estate of freehold in possession, or
(b) is entitled to receive, or receives, or if the land were let to a tenant would be entitled to receive, the rents and profits of the land, whether as beneficial owner, trustee, mortgagee in possession or otherwise.
The definition concerns the owner of land, not the owner of a dwelling.
The owner of a dwelling will not necessarily be the owner of the land on which the dwelling is located. A dwelling may be a chattel and thus not part of the realty: see TEC Desert Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (Western Australia) (2010) 241 CLR 576; [2010] HCA 49 at [23]. For instance, a dwelling can be a “transportable house” (see cl 3 of sch 1 to the Home Building Act). In this case, however, the proposed dwellings were undoubtedly proposed to be permanently annexed to the Land, and would become part of the Land. The owner of the Land on which the particular dwelling was to be constructed would be the owner of the dwelling. The plaintiffs did not rely on any distinction in this case between the ownership of dwellings on the one hand and the ownership of the Land on the other.
SICorp submitted that whatever the position in equity following the execution of the deed of partition, the plaintiffs remained the owners of the Land at law, as registered proprietors, and that they would all own all 10 dwellings at law at the time the construction work was complete. They submitted that this was sufficient to engage s 3A. They cited Makowski v NSW Self Insurance Corporation; Mircevski v NSW Self Insurance Corp**oration [2026] NSWCATAP 184 in support of this conclusion. In that decision, Balla ADCJ, Principal Member and P H Molony, Senior Member observed (at [52]):
In the present case, there was an acknowledged intention that the investors would each ultimately own two lots with a total of two or three dwelling per couple. That, however, did not change the fact that they were all owners at law of all the dwellings up to and after the final subdivision, and that, as such, they each owned 4 or more dwellings during that time as a matter of law. The position in equity, said to be that they were the beneficial owners of only two or three dwellings, does not alter that fact. The definition of owner in cl 1 of Sch 1 of the HBA requires that the owners’ estates be “at law or in equity”: not both. Here the appellants had residential building work done in connection with eight proposed dwellings on land that they owned as tenants in common, which work was completed and then subdivided into saleable lots, while it remained in their joint ownership. As a consequence, they are developers for the purpose of s 3A(1) and the Tribunal was correct to find them to be so. It was not necessary that the Tribunal determine the position in equity because they were owners at law. In any case, the Tribunal decided that the parties’ intentions did not create a beneficial interest “to which their legal interests yielded”; at [79]. This is correct.
The plaintiffs submitted that this analysis is wrong. For reasons I will develop, I do not accept that submission.
every person who jointly or severally, whether in law or in equity – (a) is entitled to the land for any estate of freehold in possession; or (b) is entitled to receive, or in receipt of, or if the land were let to a tenant would be entitled to receive, the rents and profits thereof, whether as beneficial owner, trustee, mortgagee in possession, or otherwise.
The issue in that case was whether persons who had the benefit of trusts for accumulation were taxable as joint owners of the land. Griffiths CJ concluded at 498-499, that the persons had no present estate in possession because they had no present right of beneficial enjoyment of the land. Isaacs J came to the same conclusion (at 500-501, 506), on the basis that the persons did not, in the eye of a Court of equity, have a present right to the present enjoyment of the land. Rich J dissented.
I take the law on the subject to be as stated by the High Court in Glen[n] v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, namely, that in order to say of the holder of an equitable estate or interest in land that he or she is to be treated as an owner pursuant to s 51, nothing less than the ability to obtain from a court of equity an order for actual possession of the land, or receipt of the rents and profits, will suffice.
This reasoning was endorsed when the matter came before the High Court: see CPT Custodian Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue of the State of Victoria (2005) 224 CLR 98; [2005] HCA 53 at [28].
These (and other) authorities were considered in the context of s 3A of the Home Building Act by Stevenson J in Owners – Strata Plan 81837 v Multiplex Hurstville Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 1488 at [88]ff.
The authorities reveal that a person who has an equitable interest in land will not necessarily be an “owner” of the land in equity within the meaning of the statutory definition of “owner” that is relevant in the particular case. It is necessary to consider the precise character of that equitable interest in order to determine whether the holder of that interest is an owner.
A question could arise in this case about whether the deed of partition gave the plaintiffs a present ability to obtain from a court of equity an order for actual possession of the separate “lots in the Draft Strata Plan” (as referenced in the deed), or receipt of the rents and profits from the separate lots. If the deed had that consequence, in equity the plaintiffs would be the owners of the lots as so subdivided within the meaning of the Home Building Act. This was the position advanced by the plaintiffs.
However, if that question was answered in favour of the plaintiffs (and it is not obvious that it should be so answered, including because the lots identified in the draft strata plan did not physically exist at the time of the deed), a separate question would arise about whether they would relevantly cease to own the whole of the Land together. This is where SICorp attacks the plaintiffs’ argument. The thrust of SICorp’s argument is that whatever the position in equity, at law the plaintiffs remained the registered proprietors of the whole of the Land as tenants in common, and would remain so until after the construction of the dwellings had been completed, a strata plan was registered, and formal transfers were registered.
The plaintiffs submit that for the purposes of s 3A of the Home Building Act, if there is an owner of the Land in equity, ownership at law is irrelevant. They rely on the proposition that the rules of equity will prevail over those of the common law, citing s 5 of the Law Reform (Law and Equity) Act 1972 (NSW) and Segal v Barel (2013) 84 NSWLR 193; [2013] NSWCA 92 at [86] (Barrett JA; McColl JA and Preston CJ of LEC agreeing).
While the rules of equity prevail over those of the common law, that does not mean that the rules of the common law evaporate. There is no incongruence in the proposition that the whole of the Land is owned by the plaintiffs as tenants in common at law as the registered proprietors and, at the same time, the separately identified lots are owned in equity on the basis of the agreed subdivision reflected in the deed of partition. It would mean that the plaintiffs jointly hold the Land on trust for the plaintiffs on the basis of their subdivided equitable interests.
The definition of “owner” in the Home Building Act expressly refers to the concept of “at law or in equity”. These words contemplate that the owner at law might not be the owner in equity. The effect of the definition means that if there is one owner at law and another in equity, both will be owners. The words “the only person who” in the definition do not drive a different conclusion. As a matter of legal analysis, one person may be entitled to land for an estate of freehold in possession at law and a different person may have that entitlement in equity. Both persons would meet the description of being “…the only person who … at law or in equity – (a) is entitled to the land for an estate of freehold in possession…” One is the only person at law and the other is the only person in equity.
At the time of the work that is the subject of the claim under the Policy, the legal arrangements in place meant that when the building work was expected to be completed, the plaintiffs would be the joint owners of all of the dwellings at law, as the registered proprietors of the Land. That relevantly means that all 10 of the proposed dwellings “will be owned” at law by all 5 plaintiffs, as tenants in common. That is the position at law, and holds whatever might be their separate interests in the specific dwellings in equity. Even if the plaintiffs owned the dwellings when they were completed in equity, in accordance with the deed of partition, that would not alter the position at law.
It follows that the plaintiffs are all developers within the meaning of s 3A, and hence within the meaning of the Policy. It follows that the claim (which was made by them as the registered proprietors) is not covered by the Policy.
It may be recognised that at one level, this outcome seems harsh. The plaintiffs have suffered loss and damage because of the breach of the building contract by the now insolvent Builder. In one sense, that may be thought to be the kind of loss that the Home Building Act seeks to protect against. However, there is another perspective. The Home Building Act protects home owners by imposing statutory warranties on builders and developers. The 5 plaintiffs joined to have a construction project that would result in 10 dwellings. It is reasonable to suppose that at least some of the plaintiffs contemplated that he or she would sell one of more of the dwellings at some point. That purchaser would enjoy the benefit of statutory warranties as against the 5 plaintiffs as the developers. That is the kind of beneficial outcome that is contemplated by the Home Building Act.
Each of the plaintiffs is a “developer” within the meaning of the exclusion in the Policy. The answer to the separate question is “yes”.
It was agreed that if this is the answer, the proceedings should be dismissed.
I make the following orders:
The answer to the separate question is “yes” for each of the plaintiffs.
The proceedings are dismissed.
If the parties wish to be heard about costs, they must notify my Associate by 5pm on 24 September 2026 and a date will be fixed for the hearing of oral argument about costs.
If there is no notice in accordance with (3), there will be an order that the plaintiffs are to pay the second defendant’s costs of the proceedings.
**********
Succar
Dominium Homes Pty Ltd
[2005] HCA 53
[2026] NSWCATAP 184
(2010) 77 NSWLR 613
(2005) 224 CLR 98
(1915) 20 CLR 490
(2013) 84 NSWLR 193
(2010) 241 CLR 576
(1972) 126 CLR 297