Subeg Singh v Sydney Trains [2017] FWCFB 4562

Upon re-employment, the Applicant performs administrative tasks only, and does not perform any work on the tracks;

Subeg Singh v Sydney Trains [2017] FWCFB 4562 | Case summary | Zoe

[26] In relation to permission to appeal, Mr Singh submitted that permission should be granted for the following three reasons:

(a) First, the decision is disharmonious not only with other decisions of the Commission but with contract law principles generally. It involves a departure from the orthodox approach to contract formation;

(b) Second, the error involves a question of law of general importance, namely, whether a binding agreement is made by a purported acceptance which proposes new conditions; and

(c) Third, it would be a serious injustice if Mr Singh were denied an unfair dismissal remedy in circumstances where there the decision at first instance was erroneous.

[27] In relation to the first appeal ground, Mr Singh submits that on any orthodox application of contractual principles it could not be found that a settlement agreement was reached between the parties in circumstances where Sydney Trains purported to accept an offer of settlement but subject to qualifications.[2] Mr Singh contends that when the relevant principles of offer and acceptance are applied to the present case there is no unequivocal and unqualified acceptance but rather Sydney Trains' purported acceptance in an email on 16 February 2017 at 9:45am expressly proposed three new conditions and it was therefore not an acceptance but a counter-offer.[3] In oral submissions Mr Fagir submitted that none of the three qualifications were for Mr Singh's benefit or purely for his benefit.[4]

[28] Mr Singh further submits that Sydney Trains simply ignored the basic principles of offer and acceptance and distracted the Commission with references to Masters v Cameron[5] and other authorities concerned with questions of completeness and certainty. Mr Singh contends that the question was not whether the parties intended to be bound immediately or bound only on signing of a formal document nor was the question one of completeness or certainty. Those questions do not arise unless and until there is, in fact, an agreement and if there was no offer and precisely corresponding acceptance, there was no agreement to be tested for completeness, or certainty.[6]

[29] Relevant to appeal ground one, Mr Fagir in oral submissions made the point that the case that was put to the Deputy President was that a settlement agreement had been formed by the settlement offer of Mr Singh contained within a letter dated 13 February 2017 being accepted by Sydney Trains with qualifications in an email on 16 February 2017 at 9:45am. Mr Fagir says that there was no submission put by Sydney Trains to the Deputy President that there was an agreement formed at some later date.[7] Mr Fagir also contends that Sydney Trains' submissions should be rejected so far as they put a new case on appeal that there was either an acceptance by Sydney Trains of Mr Singh's counter-offer in an email on 16 February 2017 at 2:32pm or an agreement that emerged organically from the entirety of the parties' correspondence.[8] Mr Fagir submits that it is clear from the correspondence that there was no unequivocal acceptance of an offer between the parties. The communications were subject to further qualifications including Sydney Trains' solicitor obtaining instructions on the deed, Mr Singh's solicitor proposing alterations to the deed, Sydney Trains not agreeing to one of the proposed alterations in relation to the depot to which Mr Singh would be redeployed and the parties reserving leave to restore the unfair dismissal application in the case there was a disagreement about the deed.[9]

[30] In relation the second appeal ground, Mr Singh submits that the taxonomy of "essential" and "inessential terms" proposed by Sydney Trains and its suggestion that the email on 16 February 2017 at 9:45am was effective to create a contract despite the disagreement on some terms, because there was agreement on the allegedly "essential" terms, is manifestly contrary to principle.[10] In oral submissions Mr Fagir submitted that when assessing whether there has been an offer and acceptance it is irrelevant whether a qualification is as to a major issue or a minor one, or an essential or inessential term. Rather, any deviation from the offer vitiates acceptance.[11]

[31] In relation to the third appeal ground, Mr Singh submits that the subjective views of the parties are irrelevant and the Deputy President, although he formally embraced the requirement of objectivity, erred in considering at some length the parties' various actions after 16 February 2017 as evidence of their subjective understanding of their positions. Mr Singh says that the approach taken was contrary to the principle that the question of whether an offer has been made and effectively accepted depends on an objective view of the facts and circumstances.[12]

[32] In relation to the fourth appeal ground, Mr Singh submits that the Deputy President's conclusion that an agreement had been reached because the parties were ad idem on the "essential" features of a settlement agreement was wrong and should be corrected by the Full Bench.[13]

[33] Sydney Trains contends that the grounds relied on by Mr Singh in the notice of appeal do not enliven the public interest, and permission to appeal should be refused for the following reasons:

(a) First, the appeal does not raise matters of importance and general application and the Decision involved the application of uncontroversial principles to the particular facts of the case;

(b) Second, there is not a diversity of decisions at first instance as to the circumstances where a settlement agreement has been made so that guidance from the Full Bench is required or that the legal principles applied appear disharmonious when compared with other recent decisions dealing with similar matters; and

(c) Third, no arguable case of appealable error has been demonstrated.

[34] In relation to appeal grounds one, two and four, Sydney Trains submits that the Deputy President concluded that the parties had reached a binding settlement agreement based on the totality of the surrounding circumstances, including the communications on 13 February 2017 and 16 February 2017 at 9.45am, supported by the subsequent correspondence between them and taking into account the commercial and industrial context of the conduct. Sydney Trains submits that Mr Singh focuses narrowly and wrongly on whether there is a precise correspondence between Mr Singh's offer on 13 February 2017 and Sydney Trains' acceptance of the offer on 16 February 2017 at 9.45am. Sydney Trains contends that this improperly limits the boundaries of the inquiry in determining whether a valid contract had been made. The task is to ascertain from the exchange of communication whether a reasonable person would infer or deduce that the parties have entered into a legally binding contract by reference to all the circumstances.[14]

[35] Sydney Trains submits that Mr Singh's use of the expression "counter-offer", to describe where a party rejects an offer from the other party and makes a fresh offer on different terms, is not a useful concept in all circumstances because it assumes that there is a binary approach between offer/acceptance and offer/rejection. Sydney Trains says that the courts have adopted a much more flexible approach and have held that it is not appropriate in all cases to have a mirror of a matching offer and acceptance of the essential terms to conclude a bargain. This approach accommodates the commercial reality that parties do not repeat in precise terms the same elements of the offer upon acceptance but may add more detail which does not affect the terms of the offer.[15] In oral submissions, Mr Seck submitted that one is not limited to trying to identify in precise terms what was the offer and what was the acceptance and it is not always appropriate in the circumstances to apply the rigid analysis of offer and acceptance.[16]

[36] Nevertheless, Sydney Trains submits that the email on 16 February 2017 at 9.45am did not constitute a counter-offer rejecting Mr Singh's offer made on 13 February 2017 for the following the following reasons:[17]

(a) First, Sydney Trains' email did not use, in terms or effect, the expression "offer" or "counter-offer" but rather stated that it "accepts" Mr Singh's offer subject to certain clarifying details which did not alter or detract from the essential terms of the offer. The use of the word "accepts" is strongly indicative that a binding agreement had been made. Nothing in the language suggests that Sydney Trains had rejected the offer. The additional details of the acceptance merely went to the machinery of working out the details of the agreement regarding the position but did not revoke the offer;

(b) Second, Sydney Trains' email simply set out expressly what would, due to its common law and statutory obligations to ensure Mr Singh was not re-deployed into a position which posed risk to his health and safety, have applied as a matter of law in the absence of express agreement. These details did not comprise additional terms departing from Mr Singh's offer but were included, for the avoidance of doubt, so that there was no misapprehension as to the basis of Mr Singh's re-employment;

(c) Third, nevertheless the additional terms could not amount to a rejection of an offer as they were made for the benefit of Mr Singh as they ensured he would be placed in a job which would avoid risk to his health and safety; and

(d) Fourth, in order to make a binding agreement, there need only be an agreement on the essential terms and no precise correspondence between offer and acceptance is required to make a valid agreement so long as the parties have reached consensus on the critical parts of the bargain.

[37] Further, Sydney Trains submits that even if its email on 16 February 2017 at 9.45am is found to be a counter-offer, it is plain that Mr Singh's solicitors accepted that counter-offer in the subsequent emails later in the day, in particular, Mr Singh's solicitor's email at 2.32pm, for the following reasons:

(a) it was communicated that a settlement had been reached "in principle" between the parties;

(b) the differences between the parties were "minor" issues concerning the deed which indicates that agreement had been reached on the essential terms; and

(c) the hearing dates would be vacated given the parties had reached agreement in principle.[18]

[38] Mr Seck submitted in oral submissions that the balance of the email correspondence between the parties goes to working out the terms of the particular deal but there was a category one Masters v Cameron settlement based on the totality of the correspondence up to 2:32 pm on 16 February 2017.[19]

[39] In relation to appeal ground three, Sydney Trains submits that Mr Singh's contention that the actions of the parties constituted no more than "evidence of their subjective understanding of their positions", and is therefore irrelevant, is a mischaracterisation of the evidence. Sydney Trains contends that the cumulative effect of the email correspondence shows that each of the parties had proceeded to prepare a deed of release on the ground that an agreement had been reached based on a common understanding on the essential terms and such evidence is objective and not subjective in nature. Further, Sydney Trains says that to the extent that the Deputy President had regard to subjective view of the parties, this applies a long line of authority which holds that where the intention of the parties is equivocal, the conduct or correspondence subsequent to the alleged offer and acceptance can be relied upon to show whether or not a contract has been made.[20]

[47] The present case does not involve complexities which often arise where contractual intention is inferred from behaviour, or is imputed.[29] Whether there was a legally binding settlement reached between Mr Singh and Sydney Trains involves interpretation of the express written communications between the parties' solicitors.

[48] An offer and acceptance must precisely correspond. The following principles are relevant to this requirement:

• An acceptance corresponds to an offer if it is an unequivocal acceptance of the terms offered.[30]

• An acceptance is not an unequivocal acceptance of the terms offered if it deviates from the offer, even if that deviation is not material or important. However, as a qualification to this principle, if a new term is included in a purported acceptance of an offer and the new term is solely for the benefit of the offeror, then this can constitute a valid acceptance.[31]

• An acceptance will be effective if it does not depart from the terms of the offer, but simply repeats in the offeree's own words the effect of the offer.[32]

• Acceptance will be effective if it sets out expressly what would be implied by law in the absence of express agreement.[33] For example, an offer may contemplate that, were it to be accepted, a document would be prepared to record its terms. In proposing that a deed be prepared as part of an acceptance of such an offer, the offeree would be stating that which would be implied by law arising from the terms of the offer, namely, that it would be documented in some formal manner.[34]

• Similarly, if a purported acceptance of an offer merely includes the "machinery of working out what was meant by the offer, it is on the same plight as a request for information".[35] Such a request for information does not revoke the offer and may constitute acceptance of the offer.

[49] Ultimately the question is whether a "reasonable recipient of the acceptance would have regarded it as corresponding to the offer or whether they would have taken the acceptance to be qualifying the original offer such that it would amount to a counter-offer or, at any rate, not an unconditional acceptance of what was originally offered."[36] Put another way, the language used by the offeree in their acceptance of the offer must be such as would convey to a reasonable person in the position of the offeror a clear and definite decision by the offeree to be bound by the terms of the offer, leaving nothing further to be negotiated.[37]

[50] A purported acceptance which does not correspond to the offer does not necessarily reject the first offer; it is, nevertheless, a counter-offer capable of acceptance.[38] A counter-offer accepted by the original offeror creates a binding agreement.[39]

[51] Conduct of the parties after the making of the supposed agreement is relevant. Such conduct may be considered in order to determine whether the prior dealings between the parties gave rise to a binding contract.[40]

[52] The phrase "'in principle' agreement" or similar is often used when negotiating the settlement of litigation and generally indicates that there is no intention yet to enter into a binding contract.[41] However, such words must be construed in the context in which they appear and the commercial setting in which the parties were operating.[42] In each case, "much will depend upon the individual circumstances of each case as to whether those words demonstrate that the parties had or had not reached a consensus on the essential terms of their bargain and whether they intended to be immediately bound by them".[43]

[53] If parties who have been in negotiations reach agreement on terms of a contractual nature and also agree that those terms will be dealt with by subsequent formal documentation, there are several categories into which such negotiations fall.[44] First, the parties reach finality, intend to be immediately bound, and propose restatement of the terms of settlement in a fuller or more precise form but not different in effect. Secondly, the parties have completely agreed all terms but performance of one or more terms is conditional on execution of a formal document. Thirdly, the parties did not intend to make a concluded bargain at all, unless and until they execute a formal contract. Fourthly, the parties intended to be bound immediately and exclusively by agreed terms while expecting to make a further contract in substitution containing, by concept, additional terms.[45]

[54] When parties do reach an agreement of the first or fourth category referred to in Masters v Cameron and Baulkham Hills, they will be bound by the terms of their bargain, notwithstanding a later disagreement between the parties about the terms to be included in a deed or written agreement between them.[46]

[55] The Deputy President concluded that Mr Singh and Sydney Trains reached agreement in the email exchanges between their solicitors on 13 and 16 February 2017.[47]

[56] There is no doubt that the offer made by Mr Singh on 13 February 2017 was capable of acceptance by Sydney Trains. In fact, Sydney Trains purported in the email from its solicitors dated 16 February 2017 to accept Mr Singh's offer dated 13 February 2017, but its acceptance was expressed to be subject to three qualifications.

[57] The first qualification stated that Mr Singh's re-employment was subject to him "passing any category 3 medical assessment which is applicable to the role in which he is re-employed". Given that Mr Singh had included, as part of his settlement offer, that he be re-employed by Sydney Trains in the position of Team Leader, we consider this first qualification to be the expression of that which would be implied by law in the absence of express agreement. That is, if Sydney Trains had simply accepted Mr Singh's offer of 13 February 2017, we are persuaded that an implied term of the agreement reached between the parties would have been a requirement that Mr Singh pass the applicable medical assessment for the position in which he was to be re-employed. Accordingly, the first qualification did not render the acceptance ineffective.

[58] The second qualification sought to amend paragraph two of the offer as follows: "Upon re-employment, the Applicant performs administrative tasks only, and does not perform any work on the tracks or [in] any safety critical environments." By seeking to limit where Mr Singh could work on his re-employment, we consider that Sydney Trains proposed a term which deviated from the offer made by Mr Singh and was not solely for his benefit. We are also persuaded that such a term was neither implied nor a machinery provision; it would, if accepted, have had a material impact on where Mr Singh could have worked on his re-employment, including precluding him from working at the Sutherland satellite depot where he had worked for many years.

[59] The third qualification proposed that the parties enter into a deed of release, drafted by Sydney Trains' solicitors, including the "usual provisions with respect to confidentiality". That Sydney Trains proposed the settlement agreement be recorded in subsequent formal documentation does not, of itself, establish that the parties did not intend to enter into a binding agreement on 16 February 2017.[48] However, Sydney Trains' proposal that the settlement be confidential deviated from Mr Singh's offer, which was silent on the question of confidentiality. It was therefore not an unequivocal acceptance of the terms offered and the new term (confidentiality) proposed was not solely for the benefit of Mr Singh. An obligation requiring each party to keep the terms of settlement confidential would be primarily for the benefit of Sydney Trains, particularly in a context where Mr Singh had been employed by Sydney Trains for 34 years, believed he had been unfairly dismissed, was seeking re-instatement, and was only prepared to settle the proceedings if Sydney Trains agreed to re-employ him.

[60] We reject Sydney Trains' submission that the proposed confidentiality term was either implied or merely included the "machinery of working out what was meant by the offer". Absent Mr Singh's agreement to keep any settlement confidential, he would not have been under any obligation not to disclose the terms of the settlement to any third party, including his work colleagues at Sydney Trains. There is every reason to believe that Mr Singh may have wanted to make such a disclosure to his work colleagues upon his return to work following his long period of employment, his dismissal and a period of absence from the workplace. In those circumstances, it could not be said that confidentiality of the settlement agreement went without saying, regardless of the fact that as events transpired Mr Singh did later express a willingness to agree that the settlement be kept confidential. Mr Singh's position in relation to confidentiality was not known by Sydney Trains at the time it purported to accept Mr Singh's offer on 16 February 2017.

[61] Because the second and third qualifications proposed new terms which were not solely for the benefit of Mr Singh and the proposed terms were neither implied nor merely included the "machinery of working out what was meant by the offer", Sydney Trains purported acceptance of the offer on 16 February 2017 was not effective. We are therefore satisfied that the Deputy President erred in concluding that Mr Singh and Sydney Trains reached agreement in the email exchanges between their solicitors on 13 and 16 February 2017. Our conclusion in this regard says nothing about the reasonableness or otherwise of any of the qualifications referred to in the communication from Sydney Trains' solicitors dated 16 February 2017.

[62] The Deputy President focused on what he considered to be the "essential terms" of the settlement proposal and found that Sydney Trains' "email acceptance of this offer" did not alter or replace any of the "essential terms".[49] However, we consider that the Deputy President was led into error by Sydney Trains' submissions in relation to "essential terms". In some cases concerning a dispute about the existence of a binding contract it will be relevant to examine whether the parties have reached agreement on the essential terms of the contract. This issue may arise because one of the necessary elements of a contract is certainty of terms. That is, a contract must be clear and complete, at least in the essentials.[50] Certainty is required only of essential terms, not inessential terms, with the result that a contract may be in existence even though the parties have reached agreement on the essential terms of their bargain but they have not discussed inessential terms. This principle concerning certainty of terms, however, is not determinative of the question whether parties have entered into a binding contract in circumstances where they have agreed on what may be regarded as the essential terms of their contract but they have discussed and either expressly disagreed or not reached agreement on other inessential terms. In those circumstances, the questions remain whether there is an offer and acceptance which precisely correspond and whether the communications between the parties and their conduct expressed, objectively, an intention to make a concluded bargain.[51]

[63] Sydney Trains submits that, to the extent the Deputy President may have erred, the Full Bench may uphold the Decision on the basis that the email from Mr Singh's solicitor sent to the solicitor for Sydney Trains at 2:32pm on 16 February 2017 accepted Sydney Trains' counter-offer earlier that day.[52]

[64] Mr Singh contends that Sydney Trains should not be permitted to make such an argument on appeal, given that it did not do so at first instance and Mr Singh would be prejudiced by such a case being run for the first time on appeal. We do not accept that argument. Having reviewed the submissions made at first instance before the Deputy President, we are satisfied that Sydney Trains did make submissions in relation to the correspondence exchanged after the email sent at 9:45am on 16 February 2017 to support its argument that a binding settlement agreement was reached.[53]

[65] Accordingly, and in the circumstances of this case, we consider it is appropriate for this Full Bench to review the relevant correspondence and attachments thereto (summarised in paragraphs [7] to [24] above) and make a further decision in relation to the matter that is the subject of this appeal.[54] In doing so, we will apply the principles set out in paragraphs [46] to [54] above.

[66] We agree with Sydney Trains' alternative characterisation of the email sent by its solicitors at 9:45am on 16 February 2017 as a counter-offer, which did not reject Mr Singh's offer made on 13 February 2017, and the counter-offer was open for acceptance by Mr Singh.

[67] By email sent at 11:44am on 16 February 2017, Mr Singh's solicitor expressed the view that Sydney Trains' purported acceptance of the offer dated 13 February 2017, subject to three qualifications, was "great news", albeit she had not been "through these terms" with Mr Singh. A request was then made by Mr Singh's solicitor for a copy of the draft deed, so that she could "go through the major terms with him today".

[68] A draft deed was sent to Mr Singh's solicitor at 1:02pm on 16 February 2017, subject to the caveat that "it may be subject to amendment" because Sydney Trains' solicitor had not "yet obtained instructions on the deed from" her client. The draft deed imposed obligations on Sydney Trains to, inter alia, re-employ Mr Singh, but its obligations in that regard were "subject to Mr Singh complying with the terms of this Deed".[55] One of the terms of the deed with which Mr Singh had to comply was to execute the deed.[56] The draft deed also included a term to the effect that no provision of the deed "or a right conferred by it can be varied except in writing signed by the parties"[57] and an entire agreement clause, which stated that: "This document records the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes all previous negotiations, understandings, representations and agreements in relation to the subject matter of this document".[58] These three clauses[59] of the draft deed indicate two things:

First, contrary to Sydney Trains' submissions, its counter-offer made at 9:45am on 16 February 2017 was no longer open for acceptance by Mr Singh, because it had been "superseded" by the draft deed; and

• Secondly, the clauses are indicative of an intention on the part of Sydney Trains not to make a concluded bargain, unless and until the parties executed the deed.[60]

[69] Next in the chain of correspondence is the email from Mr Singh's solicitor to Sydney Trains' solicitor sent at 2:32pm on 16 February 2017. A copy of this email is set out in paragraph [13] above. This is the email which Sydney Trains contends constitutes acceptance by Mr Singh of Sydney Trains' counter-offer sent at 9:45am on 16 February 2017. We make the following observations in relation to this email:

(a) The first part of the second sentence of the email is indicative of an intention on the part of Mr Singh to bind himself immediately to a settlement of his application for an unfair dismissal remedy:

(b) However, that sentence must be read in context and in light of the balance of the email. The sentence goes on to refer to Mr Singh's solicitor's instructions to "settle the application in principle based on the Deed you provided to me" [emphasis added]. The words "in principle" usually indicate that there is no intention yet to enter into a binding contract, but such words must be construed in context and much will depend upon the individual circumstances of each case;[61]

(c) The reference in the email to Mr Singh having instructed his solicitor to settle in principle "based on the Deed you provided to me" [emphasis added] is significant, for it suggests, taken at its highest, a settlement in principle on the basis of the terms of the draft deed, rather than the terms of the counter-offer sent by Sydney Trains at 9:45am on 16 February 2017;

(d) In the next sentence of the email Mr Singh's solicitor refers to what she considers to be a few "minor alterations" to the draft deed, but does not disclose what they are. The requirement for alterations to be made to the draft deed meant that the response was not an unequivocal acceptance of the terms offered in the deed. Mr Singh's solicitor then states in her email that she will "send an updated version [of the deed] to you shortly for you to get instructions from your client". That Sydney Trains' solicitor is being requested to obtain instructions, obviously as to whether or not Sydney Trains agrees to Mr Singh's alterations to the deed, suggests no binding agreement has been concluded. These words communicated that there was a plan about the way forward but not yet a final binding agreement; and

(e) The final paragraph of the email refers again to an "agreement in principle" and goes on to propose that Mr Singh's solicitor will "email the Associate to Sams DP advising we have settled subject to the parties signing a Deed and the matter can be removed from the list, with leave to restore if necessary in the unlikely event there is disagreement about the Deed." The reference to the parties "hav[ing] settled" is indicative of a binding agreement, but it is expressed to be "subject to the parties signing a Deed" and, importantly in our view, "leave to restore ... if there is disagreement about the Deed". We are persuaded that this part of the email would not convey to a reasonable person in the position of Sydney Trains a clear and definite decision by Mr Singh to be bound by the terms of the offer, leaving nothing further to be negotiated. Reserving leave to restore the matter would, in our view, indicate to a reasonable person in the position of Sydney Trains that there may be a hearing on the merits of Mr Singh's application for an unfair dismissal remedy if any disagreement(s) about the deed could not be resolved. We do not accept Sydney Trains' submission that leave to restore in these circumstances would be interpreted by a reasonable person in the position of Sydney Trains as leave to restore for the purposes of seeking assistance from the Commission to reach agreement on the terms of the deed, to enforce an alleged binding settlement, or for some other purpose. The reference in the email to the matter being "removed from the list" was a reference to the listing of the matter for hearing on 20 and 21 February and 2 and 3 March 2017. Viewed in that context, the ordinary meaning of the phrase "leave to restore" was restoration of the matter to the list for hearing. We consider that a reasonable person in the position of Sydney Trains would have construed it in that way.

[70] Later on 16 February 2017, Sydney Trains' solicitor thanked Mr Singh's solicitor for her email and expressed the view: "That all sounds great." Mr Singh's solicitor then communicated to the Associate to the Deputy President by email, a copy of which is set out in paragraph [15] above. In our view, that email supports the conclusion that the earlier email sent at 2:32pm did not constitute an effective acceptance of Sydney Trains' counter-offer, principally because it refers to a settlement "in principle" and requests, by consent, that the imminent hearing dates be vacated, with leave to "restore the matter in the unlikely event we are unable to agree upon the Deed". Those words do not disclose evidence of an intention on the part of the parties to be immediately bound. They indicate that the negotiations had not yet reached that stage.

[71] The balance of the communications between the solicitors for the parties relate to proposed amendments to the draft deed. It is clear from those communications that the parties could not reach agreement on the terms of the deed; the main sticking point was the location at which Mr Singh would work on his re-employment with Sydney Trains.

[72] The text and circumstances of the communications between the solicitors for the parties do not, for the reasons we have given, support Sydney Trains' submission that the email from Mr Singh's solicitors sent at 2:32pm on 16 February 2017 constituted an unequivocal acceptance of the counter-offer made by Sydney Trains.

[73] Further, the weakness in Sydney Trains' alternative argument that a contract was made when Mr Singh accepted, at 2:32pm on 16 February 2017, Sydney Trains' counter-offer is evident when one asks "what were the terms of the contract?" Mr Seck, counsel for Sydney Trains, submitted that the terms of the contract are what is recorded in paragraph [55(a) to (e)] of the Decision, where the Deputy President refers to what he considered to be the "essential terms", together with re-employment to a non-safety critical role performing administrative tasks and the requirement for Mr Singh to pass a medical examination prior to his re-employment.[62] The "essential terms" are recorded in paragraph [55] of the Decision as follows:

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Source

Judgment (129 paragraphs)

Parties

Legislation Cited (1)

Cases Cited (19)

Subeg Singh v Sydney Trains [2017] FWCFB 4562 (3 October 2017)