Storry v Department of Justice and Attorney-General - Office of Fair Trading & Ors [2025] QCATA 46

• [1] On 25 June 2024 Venetia Storry filed an application for leave to appeal or appeal a decision of the tribunal made on 16 December 2021 in matters GAR248-19; GAR249-19; GAR250-19; GAR251-19; GAR252-19; GAR254-19; GAR255-19; GAR256-19 and GAR257-19 which were determined together.
• [2] On 28 August 2024 Ms Storry sought to amend the application for leave to appeal or appeal to join further parties.
• [3] The appeal tribunal required Ms Storry to seek an extension of time to file the application for leave to appeal or appeal filed 25 June 2024 and sought submissions from the parties. The appeal tribunal directed that it would not consider the amended appeal application until the application for an extension of time with respect to the first application was decided.
• [4] On 20 November 2024 the application to extend time to file the application for leave to appeal or appeal was refused. Other interlocutory applications filed by Ms Storry were dismissed as a consequence.
• [5] On 27 March 2025 the tribunal registry provided me with a request for reasons for the 20 November 2024 decision. That request was made by Ms Reedy on behalf of the First Respondent which I will refer to as the OFT. That was the first notification provided to me in relation to a request for reasons.
• [6] My enquiries of the registry reveal that Ms Storry and the OFT have made requests for written reasons at earlier times, however that appears to have been attended by confusion as a result of what I understand to be a requirement to make requests through QTranscripts. That has resulted in regrettable delays.
• [7] In any event, the earlier requests for written reasons were made outside the 14 day time frame prescribed by s 122(2) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) ('QCAT Act'). On that basis the appeal tribunal might decline to provide reasons. Further, by s 122(4) of the QCAT Act the appeal tribunal is not required to provide written reasons for a decision made under s 61(1) whereby the appeal tribunal may extend a time limit fixed for the start of a proceeding.
• [8] Despite these considerations and to assist the parties I now give my reasons for the decision of 20 November 2024.
• [9] I wish to make clear that although I have been informed of an application to the Court of Appeal by Ms Storry relating to this matter, I have not read the grounds of appeal.
• [10] The decision not to grant an extension of time for the filing of the application for leave to appeal or appeal is made by reference to the following factors:

(a) whether a satisfactory explanation has been given to account for the delay in filing;

(b) the length of the delay;

(c) the merits of the application and its prospects of success;

(d) the likelihood of any prejudice to other parties; and

(e) whether an extension of time is in the interests of justice.[1]

• [11] I discuss below my conclusion that no compelling reason has been given by Ms Storry to depart from the time limit prescribed by the QCAT Act for the filing of an application for leave to appeal or appeal.[2]

• [12] Ms Storry nominated in her Form 39 that the decision made on 16 December 2021 is the decision she seeks to appeal. However, the parties' submissions make clear that Ms Storry also seeks to catch as part of the appeal proceeding three decisions each made on 17 May 2022 that review applications lodged on 28 June 2019 had been abandoned, and are deemed to have been withdrawn, in light of an election by Ms Storry's trustee in bankruptcy not to proceed with the review.
• [13] Although a question arises as to whether the application for leave to appeal or appeal seeks to appeal decisions different to the decision nominated in the Form 39, I am prepared for the purpose of this analysis to treat those decisions as also subject to the application for leave to appeal or appeal. That is because the grounds of appeal raise the review matters sufficiently to take this course. A question also arises as to Ms Storry's standing to appeal the 17 May 2022 decisions. That is discussed later in this decision.
• [14] Ms Storry's application for leave to appeal or appeal was required to be filed within 28 days of the date she was given the written reasons for the 16 December 2021 decision[3] and 28 days from the day she received notice of the 17 May 2022 decision.[4] Those decisions were emailed to her on 17 December 2021 and 16 June 2022 respectively. A delay of over two years has occurred since the relevant decisions were provided to Ms Storry.
• [15] The reasons given for the delay are that:

(a) Ms Storry did not know of the 2021 decision until she checked her email account sometime in January 2022. Lack of care in one's own affairs is not a reasonable excuse for delay in meeting statutory requirements if a party wishes to seek relief from the appeal tribunal. It appears Ms Storry had health issues in January 2022. That does not explain a delay of two years and it does not explain why the appeal proceeding was not lodged as soon as reasonably possible once Ms Storry's difficulties were overcome.

(b) Ms Storry says that she was admitted to hospital and isolated by flooding in February and March 2022. Accepting some practical impediment to filing caused by these events the proceeding could have been filed around that time, with limited delay. It was not and no explanation is given as to why not.

(c) Ms Storry had other legal proceedings on foot between March 2022 and October 2023. Ms Storry has chosen to pursue her complaints by extensive litigation. To my mind that is beside the point. If Ms Storry thought she had real grounds of appeal at the time of receipt of the decisions she should have acted expeditiously rather than raising her complaints at a time of her own choosing, years down the track.

(d) Ms Storry asserts the 2021 and 2022 decisions were difficult to appeal without the finalisation of all her claims. The OFT says that this is nonsensical because the 2021 and 2022 decisions brought all of her review applications to an end. I accept that Ms Storry seems to have had multiple pieces of litigation on foot across many Courts and this tribunal, which are interlinked in diverse ways as they arise out of the same fact scenario. However, I do not consider it reasonable to wait until other arguments have been exhausted and to later raise grounds of appeal on earlier issues when it occurs to a party that there might be a fresh field to plough despite the elapse of a time limitation.

• [16] The period of the delay involved in this matter is very long. A satisfactory explanation has been said to require evidence of exceptional or unusual circumstances, outside of the ordinary vicissitudes of life or commercial activities, which causes or materially contributes to the delay. The applicant must demonstrate in some material way that she is not primarily at fault or otherwise responsible for the delay.[5]
• [17] The explanations given by Ms Storry do not amount to a satisfactory explanation for the long delay in this matter.

• [18] My consideration of the merits of the matter is a preliminary assessment only and does not involve the making of any findings.
• [19] In brief, the background to this matter is that Ms Storry sought to review nine decisions of the OFT to pay certain sums to claimants and to seek re-imbursement from her of those amounts, pursuant to the Agents Financial Administration Act 2014 (Qld) ('AFA Act'). Those review applications and other interlocutory applications were dealt with following an oral hearing resulting in the decision of 16 December 2021. The end result was that an application to transfer the matters to the Supreme Court was dismissed. All but three review applications were dismissed in their entirety. Three review applications GAR248-19 ('Norman'), GAR249-19 ('Kambos') and GAR252-19 ('Gallpen') were struck out as to liability and were ordered to proceed as to an assessment of quantum only.
• [20] Subsequently a sequestration order was made against the estate of Ms Storry on 18 March 2022. The trustee in bankruptcy made no election as to the action in GAR248-19, GAR249-19 and GAR252-19 and it was ordered on 17 May 2022 in relation to each of the three matters that the proceeding be deemed abandoned under s 60(3) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ('Bankruptcy Act') and withdrawn by Ms Storry pursuant to s 46 of the QCAT Act. It is those orders which are the true focus of Ms Storry's application for leave to appeal or appeal.
• [21] Relevantly, Ms Storry is the subject of a disciplinary proceeding in matter OCR268-19 on grounds set out in s 172 of the Property Occupations Act 2014 (Qld). In brief it is asserted that Ms Storry did not operate a trust account and that an account was operated in contravention of the AFA Act. That matter will proceed to a hearing after 1 July 2025.
• [22] Ms Storry's grounds of appeal are set out in the application for leave to appeal or appeal first filed by her and later supplemented in her submissions and affidavit with respect to an extension of time. Ms Storry asserts:

(a) an error of law in that the decision (which I take to be the 16 December 2021 decision), could only be legitimately heard on its financial merits when the Kombos, Gallpen and Norman reviews were finalised.

That is in fact the outcome of the proceeding. If it had not been for the subsequent sequestration order those reviews would in all likelihood have proceeded to determination on the question of quantum. No error is likely to be successfully raised on this ground.

(b) An error of law by treating the three review matters as abandoned by the trustee in bankruptcy under s 60(3) of the Bankruptcy Act. That is said to be because under s 60(4) of the Bankruptcy Act, the reviews amount to part of the disciplinary hearing in OCR268-19. Ms Storry relies on Fisher v Transport for NSW[6] which held that judicial review of a decision cancelling a bus driver's authority because he was not a fit and proper person of good repute was captured by s 60(4).

Section 60(4) allows a bankrupt to continue certain legal actions in their own right, which relate to any personal injury or wrong done to the bankrupt.

The scope of s 60(4) was discussed by Judicial Member McGill SC when it was raised by Ms Storry in another piece of litigation[7]. The Judicial Member set out the test for the cases contemplated by s 60(4), being whether the claim relates to pain felt by the bankrupt in respect of his mind, body or character and without reference to rights of property.[8] Judicial Member McGill said the section has been held to apply to actions for defamation, assault, false imprisonment and habeus corpus. An application to set aside the appointment of receivers to a solicitor's practice has been held not to be within s 60(4), no matter how aggrieved the solicitor felt. Judicial Member McGill held that an appeal from a decision dismissing a strike out application with respect to the disciplinary proceeding did not fall within the scope of s 60(4).

Judicial Member McGill's decision was subject to appeal.[9] No criticism was made of the description of the test applied as to the scope of s 60(4), however the Court of Appeal thought that an application for leave to appeal refusal of Ms Storry's strike out application is part of her "action" to resist a disciplinary order. Whilst it was not necessary to determine finally whether that comes within s 60(4), the Court of Appeal thought Ms Storry raised an arguable error of law on the part of the Judicial Member, in relation to her application for leave to appeal.[10]

Ms Storry takes comfort from the Court's observation and relies on it in support of her application to appeal the decisions that the review matters had been abandoned.

The OFT submits that decisions as to re-imbursement of the Claim Fund, being the substance of the review matters, do not fall within s 60(4) of the Bankruptcy Act. I think that submission is likely to succeed. The question is, as framed by the Court of Appeal, whether the review matters are part of Ms Storry's "action" to resist any disciplinary order.

Without reaching a conclusion, I think that is a long bow to draw. The review matters do not of themselves have the character of a matter falling within s 60(4). The review matters do not have the purpose of defending the disciplinary proceedings (unlike the strike out application and the application for leave to appeal the dismissal of that application). To the extent that facts relevant to the review matters are exculpatory of any order sought in the disciplinary proceedings, I cannot think of a reason why relevant facts cannot be raised in those proceedings.

In all, I think this ground of appeal has poor prospects of success.

(c) A denial of procedural fairness because the reviews cannot now be finalised before the hearing of the disciplinary matter in OCR268-19.

That contention relies on the previous ground of appeal. I think it unlikely that the review matters would be found to fall within s 60(4) and to form "part" of the disciplinary proceeding so as to be cloaked with the character of a "personal injury or wrong" done to Ms Storry. The ground of appeal has poor prospects of success.

• [23] In Ms Storry's submissions filed 16 September 2024 and her supporting affidavit filed 16 September 2024 detailing the history of Ms Storry's interactions with the OFT, the Tribunal and the Courts is canvassed. Not all the matters raised are relevant to the decisions Ms Storry seeks to appeal and have been dealt with in the other extensive litigation conducted by Ms Storry. Despite that Ms Storry remains aggrieved.
• [24] Ms Storry wants the opportunity to establish that Kambos, Gallpen and possibly the Normans were overpaid and that there were no irregularities in the management of funds. I draw from her submissions that Ms Storry does not think she can defend the disciplinary proceedings without first determining these matters.
• [25] I consider that it remains open to Ms Storry to rely on such facts as she can establish in her defence of the disciplinary proceedings and that it is not necessary to now re-instate the review matters for determination before the hearing of the disciplinary proceeding later this year, even if it were possible for her to do so.
• [26] It is relevant that it is strongly arguable that continuing to prosecute the review matters was not a matter for Ms Storry, rather falling to her trustee in bankruptcy to make an election whether to do so or not, on a proper construction of ss 60(2) and (3) of the Bankruptcy Act. The trustee in bankruptcy chose not to do so.
• [27] Ms Storry seeks the following orders from an appeal tribunal, using her words:

(a) that the claim reviews of relating to claimants Gallpen, Kambos and Norman be heard and finalised according to s 60(2)(4) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 as they now form (unreviewed) a ground in the disciplinary action of OCR268-19;

(b) that OCR268-19 hear the review claims prior to any hearing in OCR268-19; and

(c) that QCAT 35 (the 16 December 2021 decision) be set aside as based on incomplete financial evidence - no reference being made to Soraya Annells submissions and urgent application for Mr Sermosi dated 5 March 21 - not viewed by QCAT at any stage - proved false evidence basis for receiver appointment.

• [28] The last item of claimed relief raises matters which may be intended as grounds of appeal. The OFT says that submissions of Ms Annells in the claim review involving her, to the effect that there has been no misapplication of funds, do not relate to the Norman's claim on the Claim Fund and are irrelevant. The Chief Executive only addresses the Norman's claim rather than the Gallpen and Kambos' claims, which were also dealt with in the 16 December 2021 decision and the later May 2022 decisions. In any event it is arguable that the Annells submissions are irrelevant.
• [29] The reference to an application by Mr Sermosi going to a false basis for appointment of a receiver to the trust property of Anthony Storry Real Estate appears to be only tangentially related to the decisions the subject of the application for leave to appeal or appeal. As I understand it the challenge to the appointment of a receiver has been unsuccessful. I do not think any ground of appeal on this basis has good prospects.
• [30] In all I think it unlikely that the orders sought by Ms Storry would be made by an appeal tribunal because she has poor prospects of success in any appeal and arguably has no standing to conduct the review matters.

• [31] Ms Storry must establish that appeal proceedings commenced after a long delay would not result in significant prejudice the respondent. By way of example, Mr and Mrs Norman are parties to GAR248-19. The Chief Executive says that they lodged their claim in 2019. They were paid from the Claim Fund in September 2022 many months after the 28 day appeal period had passed. It is submitted that they are entitled to finality and not to be prejudiced by involvement in litigation.
• [32] Ms Storry does not address this point.
• [33] It has been said in the context of judicial review that the public interest in good administration requires that public authorities and third parties should not be kept in suspense as to the validity of a decision for any longer than is absolutely necessary in fairness to the person affected by the decision.[11]
• [34] In this case I think that the very lengthy delay and the weak prospects of success mean that re-commencing the review matters would result in prejudice which cannot be compensated by an order for costs or damages, and which cannot be justified. The parties are entitled to think that the decisions in question are final and to move on.

• [35] The interests of justice require an examination of the relevant circumstances of the case and balancing the competing interests and rights of the respective parties.[12]
• [36] The obligation to observe time limits is consistent with the public interest in finality of litigation. [13]In this case the delay is extreme. Ms Storry has not acted in her own best interests in leaving the matter so long.
• [37] Ms Storry has many grievances which she raises as justification for allowing her to commence an appeal out of time. Most of her grievances have been dealt with by the Tribunal and the Courts. Ms Storry seeks to embark on a long road involving an appeal and if successful the conduct of reviews of decisions as to quantum only. I do not understand her to complain about the decision to strike out those parts of the review proceedings which relate to liability. The Chief Executive has submitted that all moneys claimed on the Claim Fund have been paid out. Even if she were successful Ms Storry would cause a great deal of costs and delay in pursuing the course she proposes. Her purpose in doing so is to meet the disciplinary proceeding. Other means of doing that are available to her.
• [38] In the end I conclude that granting an extension of time to appeal is of little utility and is not in the interests of justice.

1. The application to extend time to file the application for leave to appeal or appeal is refused.
2. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal or appeal, and all other interlocutory applications are dismissed.

[1] Crime and Misconduct Commission v Chapman [2011] QCAT 229; Queensland Police Service v ZIL [2019] QCATA 162 [7].

[2] Coppens v Water Wise Design Pty Ltd [2014] QCATA 309 [13]-[15].

[3] Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s 143(5)(c).

[4] Ibid s 143(5)(b).

[5] Reeve v Hamlyn [2015] QCATA 133 ('Reeve v Hamlyn') [42].

[7] Storry v Chief Executive, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2022] QCATA 43.

[8] Cox v Journeaux (No 2) [1935] HCA 48; (1935) 52 CLR 713, 721.

[9] Storry & Anor v Chief Executive, Department of Justice and Attorney General [2024] QCA 22.

[11] O'Reilly v Mackman [1983] UKHL 1; [1983] 2 AC 237 [280]-[281].

[13] Pappas v Meiklejohn's Accountants [2017] QCATA 60 [10].