Stewart v Masterpiece Caravans Pty Ltd & Anor [2026] NSWCATAP 113;

1 The Tribunal orders that the respondent NewCastle Caravan and RV's Pty Ltd or their contractor undertake the following work to the caravan in a proper and workmanlike manner.

replace the defective flooring;

remove and reinstall the inverter and then repair or replace (whichever is necessary) the damaged wheel arch;

rectify any loose wiring located in the caravan's electrical hub;

ensure the entrance door lock latch aligns and the door can seal and shut property (sic).

2 For the purposes of facilitating order 1 above, the applicant deliver the caravan to Newcastle Caravans and RV's within 30 days from the date of these orders and thereafter, the supplier arrange for the repairs to be carried out (including by the manufacturer) and have the caravan available for collection by the applicant from the supplier's business premises, within a further 30 days from the date the applicant drops off the caravan.

1. Implicitly, by these orders, the Tribunal rejected the appellant's application (as it came, ultimately, to be) for a refund of the purchase price.

1. On 31 October 25 a differently constituted Appeal Panel heard and determined the appellant's application lodged on 13 October 2025 for a stay of the Tribunal's orders. This was the same date on which the appellant lodged the appeal. At the time of the stay decision the caravan was located at the premises of Masterpiece Caravans in Victoria. The stay application was refused. A stay of Order 1 was not pressed following the statement by the manufacturer that it had performed almost all of the works set out in Order 1. The Appeal Panel was not satisfied that a stay of Order 2, which simply provided for the vehicle to be made available for collection, was warranted.

1. Before referring to the salient facts and matters, it is convenient to first set out the relevant remedial provisions of the ACL concerning non-compliance with the guarantee of acceptable quality contained within Part 5-4 of the ACL. It is important to pay close attention to these provisions because the appellant proceeded both before and during the primary proceedings to assert rights which did not reflect the remedies that were available to him under the ACL.
2. It is particularly relevant to focus upon the following features of these remedial provisions:

(1) No claim exists under Part 5-4 of the ACL against a manufacturer for a refund of the purchase price or replacement of goods.

(2) With respect to a claim against a supplier for a refund of the purchase price where there has been a "major failure", the rejection period within which the notice of rejection must be given to the supplier ends at the time when the relevant failure to comply with the guarantee would reasonably be expected to have become apparent.

(3) The giving of a rejection notice is precluded in various circumstances, including where the goods have been "damaged" after being delivered for reasons unrelated to the relevant non-compliance with the guarantee.

(4) A consequence of giving a notice of rejection is that the goods must be returned to the supplier, except in limited circumstances.

1. The relevant remedial provisions of the ACL are as follows:

Part 5‑4 - Remedies relating to guarantees

Division 1 - Action against suppliers

Subdivision A - Action against suppliers of goods

259 Action against suppliers of goods

(1) A consumer may take action under this section if:

(a) a person (the supplier) supplies, in trade or commerce, goods to the consumer; and

(b) a guarantee that applies to the supply under Subdivision A of Division 1 of Part 3‑2 (other than sections 58 and 59(1)) is not complied with.

(2) If the failure to comply with the guarantee can be remedied and is not a major failure:

(a) the consumer may require the supplier to remedy the failure within a reasonable time; or

(b) if such a requirement is made of the supplier but the supplier refuses or fails to comply with the requirement, or fails to comply with the requirement within a reasonable time - the consumer may:

(i) otherwise have the failure remedied and, by action against the supplier, recover all reasonable costs incurred by the consumer in having the failure so remedied; or

(ii) subject to section 262, notify the supplier that the consumer rejects the goods and of the ground or grounds for the rejection.

(3) If the failure to comply with the guarantee cannot be remedied or is a major failure, the consumer may:

(a) subject to section 262, notify the supplier that the consumer rejects the goods and of the ground or grounds for the rejection; or

(b) by action against the supplier, recover compensation for any reduction in the value of the goods below the price paid or payable by the consumer for the goods.

(4) The consumer may, by action against the supplier, recover damages for any loss or damage suffered by the consumer because of the failure to comply with the guarantee if it was reasonably foreseeable that the consumer would suffer such loss or damage as a result of such a failure.

(5) Subsection (4) does not apply if the failure to comply with the guarantee occurred only because of a cause independent of human control that occurred after the goods left the control of the supplier.

(6) To avoid doubt, subsection (4) applies in addition to subsections (2) and (3).

(7) The consumer may take action under this section whether or not the goods are in their original packaging.

260 When a failure to comply with a guarantee is a major failure

(1) A failure to comply with a guarantee referred to in section 259(1)(b) that applies to a supply of goods is a major failure if:

(a) the goods would not have been acquired by a reasonable consumer fully acquainted with the nature and extent of the failure; or

(b) the goods depart in one or more significant respects:

(i) if they were supplied by description - from that description; or

(ii) if they were supplied by reference to a sample or demonstration model - from that sample or demonstration model; or

(c) the goods are substantially unfit for a purpose for which goods of the same kind are commonly supplied and they cannot, easily and within a reasonable time, be remedied to make them fit for such a purpose; or

(d) the goods are unfit for a disclosed purpose that was made known to:

(i) the supplier of the goods; or

(ii) a person by whom any prior negotiations or arrangements in relation to the acquisition of the goods were conducted or made;

and they cannot, easily and within a reasonable time, be remedied to make them fit for such a purpose; or

(e) the goods are not of acceptable quality because they are unsafe.

(2) A failure to comply with a guarantee referred to in section 259(1)(b) that applies to a supply of goods is also a major failure if:

(a) the failure is one of 2 or more failures to comply with a guarantee referred to in section 259(1)(b) that apply to the supply; and

(b) the goods would not have been acquired by a reasonable consumer fully acquainted with the nature and extent of those failures, taken as a whole.

Note: The multiple failures do not need to relate to the same guarantee.

(3) Subsection (2) applies regardless of whether the consumer has taken action under section 259 in relation to any of the failures.

261 How suppliers may remedy a failure to comply with a guarantee

If, under section 259(2)(a), a consumer requires a supplier of goods to remedy a failure to comply with a guarantee referred to in section 259(1)(b), the supplier may comply with the requirement:

(a) if the failure relates to title - by curing any defect in title; or

(b) if the failure does not relate to title - by repairing the goods; or

(c) by replacing the goods with goods of an identical type; or

(d) by refunding:

(i) any money paid by the consumer for the goods; and

(ii) an amount that is equal to the value of any other consideration provided by the consumer for the goods.

262 When consumers are not entitled to reject goods

(1) A consumer is not entitled, under section 259, to notify a supplier of goods that the consumer rejects the goods if:

(a) the rejection period for the goods has ended; or

(b) the goods have been lost, destroyed or disposed of by the consumer; or

(c) the goods were damaged after being delivered to the consumer for reasons not related to their state or condition at the time of supply; or

(d) the goods have been attached to, or incorporated in, any real or personal property and they cannot be detached or isolated without damaging them.

(2) The rejection period for goods is the period from the time of the supply of the goods to the consumer within which it would be reasonable to expect the relevant failure to comply with a guarantee referred to in section 259(1)(b) to become apparent having regard to:

(a) the type of goods; and

(b) the use to which a consumer is likely to put them; and

(c) the length of time for which it is reasonable for them to be used; and

(d) the amount of use to which it is reasonable for them to be put before such a failure becomes apparent.

263 Consequences of rejecting goods

(1) This section applies if, under section 259, a consumer notifies a supplier of goods that the consumer rejects the goods.

(2) The consumer must return the goods to the supplier unless:

(a) the goods have already been returned to, or retrieved by, the supplier; or

(b) the goods cannot be returned, removed or transported without significant cost to the consumer because of:

(i) the nature of the failure to comply with the guarantee to which the rejection relates; or

(ii) the size or height, or method of attachment, of the goods.

(3) If subsection (2)(b) applies, the supplier must, within a reasonable time, collect the goods at the supplier's expense.

(4) The supplier must, in accordance with an election made by the consumer:

(a) refund:

(i) any money paid by the consumer for the goods; and

(ii) an amount that is equal to the value of any other consideration provided by the consumer for the goods; or

(b) replace the rejected goods with goods of the same type, and of similar value, if such goods are reasonably available to the supplier.

(5) The supplier cannot satisfy subsection (4)(a) by permitting the consumer to acquire goods from the supplier.

(6) If the property in the rejected goods had passed to the consumer before the rejection was notified, the property in those goods revests in the supplier on the notification of the rejection.

264 Replaced goods

If the goods are replaced under section 261(c) or 263(4)(b):

(a) the replacement goods are taken, for the purposes of Division 1 of Part 3‑2 and this Part, to be supplied by the supplier; and

(b) the provisions of Division 1 of Part 3‑2 and this Part apply in relation to the replacement goods.

Division 2 - Action for damages against manufacturers of goods

271 Action for damages against manufacturers of goods

(1) If:

(a) the guarantee under section 54 applies to a supply of goods to a consumer; and

(b) the guarantee is not complied with;

an affected person in relation to the goods may, by action against the manufacturer of the goods, recover damages from the manufacturer.

272 Damages that may be recovered by action against manufacturers of goods

(1) In an action for damages under this Division, an affected person in relation to goods is entitled to recover damages for:

(a) any reduction in the value of the goods, resulting from the failure to comply with the guarantee to which the action relates, below whichever of the following prices is lower:

(i) the price paid or payable by the consumer for the goods;

(ii) the average retail price of the goods at the time of supply; and

(b) any loss or damage suffered by the affected person because of the failure to comply with the guarantee to which the action relates if it was reasonably foreseeable that the affected person would suffer such loss or damage as a result of such a failure.

(2) Without limiting subsection (1)(b), the cost of inspecting and returning the goods to the manufacturer is taken to be a reasonably foreseeable loss suffered by the affected person as a result of the failure to comply with the guarantee.

(3) Subsection (1)(b) does not apply to loss or damage suffered through a reduction in the value of the goods.

1. Our account of the salient facts below focuses upon the issues raised on appeal which were solely concerned with the remedial aspects of the appellant's claim.
2. At the outset, we point out that it is clear:

(1) The appellant did not provide the supplier with a notice of rejection of the caravan until, at the earliest, when the supplier was joined to existing proceedings he had commenced against the manufacturer seeking a replacement caravan.

(2) The appellant never returned the caravan to the supplier until after the final orders were made in the primary proceedings.

(3) The appellant never claimed damages against the manufacturer.

(4) The appellant never claimed damages against the supplier until after completion of the hearings in the primary proceedings.

(5) In closing oral submissions, the appellant sought a repair order as an alternative to the claim for a refund.

1. We will say more about each of these matters below.
2. The caravan purchased by the appellant (with a final payment made in September 2022) was a Performance 22'6 Triple Bunk new caravan. The purchase price was $128,000. The caravan was purchased to be driven around Australia with the appellant's wife and their two children.
3. It was purchased with a TARE weight of to 2828 kg which is the weight of the vehicle without any passengers, belongings, gas or water or fixtures and fittings other than those included in the manufacture. It had an Aggregate Trailer Mass (ATM) of 3500 kg which is the total maximum weight allowed for legal towing.
4. Some accessories were added to the caravan by the supplier before purchase. After purchase, the appellant, who is a plumber, made modifications to the interior of the caravan by removing and replacing the kitchen bench top and adding additional storage areas.
5. In about February 2023 the appellant and his family set off for their trip around Australia.
6. On 6 August 2023, the appellant sent an email to Newcastle Caravans asking for information to be passed on to the correct person to assist with a warranty issue. In the email he said that they were soft spongy areas in the floor which was spreading. He asked what they could do to fix this and said they were 3000 km from the dealership. As requested, the next day the appellant sent a video of the problem. Subsequently, Newcastle Caravans told the appellant by email that Masterpiece Caravans would be in contact with him directly. Following email exchanges with the Warranty Department of Masterpiece Caravans, the appellant was informed that they had a dealership called Abba Caravans in Rockingham, Western Australia which would first have to diagnose the issue before carrying out any rectification work. In those circumstances, Masterpiece Caravans raised the prospect of attending to the issue after the appellant had completed the trip by bringing the caravan back to Masterpiece Caravans in Victoria
7. On 11 October 2023, the appellant sent an email to the Warranty Department of Masterpiece Caravans in which he said that the flooring issue was now expanding and that their plans had changed so that they would now be in WA for quite some time. The appellant also raised two additional problems. First, that the front door would not close properly and lock. Secondly, that the shower did not drain properly. He also raised a question about the maximum charging rate with the batteries.
8. On 4 December 2023, the appellant's wife sent an email to the Warranty Department of Masterpiece Caravans concerning electrical wiring problems in the caravan. She referred to having paid for some electrical work they had carried out in Exmouth, WA. She also said that they would like to book the caravan into Abba Caravans in February 2024 to fix the other issues. Master Caravans responded by email on 12 December 2023. It said that they should contact Abba Caravans directly about the process to follow.
9. On 14 December 2023, the appellant sent an email to Abba Caravans. The email listed four issues which they would like to book in for "fixes" in the first week of February 2024. In addition to the "sagged flooring issue" and the problems with the front door and the drainage in the shower, four other issues were listed, namely that the roof of the caravan was sagging and held pools of water, the ceiling was sagging in some places, paint was flicking off the chassis and the cooktop lid hinge had come loose.
10. During the morning of 29 January 2024, the appellant dropped the caravan at Abba Caravans in Rockingham, WA. After conversations with Abba Caravans, the appellant decided not to send the caravan back to Masterpiece Caravans in Victoria for repair, as requested. By this time, it had emerged that fixing the floor issue alone would add additional weight to the caravan. The appellant also decided to leave the caravan with Abba Caravans to fix the electrical issue whilst he flew back to Sydney before returning to Perth on 3 March 2024 as planned.
11. On 29 January 2024 at 3:06 pm, Abba Caravans sent an email to the Warranty Department at Masterpiece Caravans. It stated that the appellant had decided not to return the caravan to Melbourne. It raised scheduling dates in August 2024 for the caravan to the brought by the appellant to Masterpiece Caravans. It set out a list of the problems for Masterpiece Caravans to attend to. With respect to the flooring issue, it stated that "... This is the worst one we have come across. Also, they have a weight issue already with the van and have stressed, they can't afford any more weight on the van,..." With respect to the paint issue, it was said that "... this is the worse I have seen a van come back. We usually touch this up on service, however it extends far beyond the aframe." With respect to the electrical issue, it was said that "Van was giving customer a spark-Scott found the inverter to be wired directly to 240V with no try switch, so van is live when plugged into 240V."
12. In an email from Abba Caravans to the appellant sent on 31 January 2024 it said "... Unfortunately, there wasn't a report written. We are aware there is a flooring issue, we haven't seen one as bad as yours though. MP would like to assess the roof and flooring at the factory themselves so they can better understand the issue and come up with a plan on how to rectify this."
13. On 5 March 2024, the appellant sent an email to Masterpiece Caravans setting out statements about rights under the ACL. It said he had sought legal advice. He stated that the problems with the floor, roof, ceiling and electrical issues were "major" problems and that minor problems were the paint, front door and shower drainage issues. He said they were entitled to either a refund or replacement and that the remedy they would like was a replacement caravan which they wished to discuss as soon as possible. As to the repair remedy for the floor, it stated "The suggested remedy to repair the major flooring issue by adding weight to the caravan firstly adds to the tare weight (which is different to the tare weight advised upon purchase) and secondly puts us over the legal weights, therefore voiding our insurance and this is unacceptable."
14. On 6 March 2024, Masterpiece Caravans replied to the appellant. It referred to an offer to transport the caravan from WA to Melbourne in order to fix it and send it back to WA at their cost. It stated that, as manufacturer, they had a right to fix the caravan first. It concluded that without first giving us an option to repair "..refunding the van is not an option." The appellant refuted this position in emails sent on 7 and 20 March 2024.
15. On 26 March 2024, the appellant commenced proceedings in the Tribunal. The respondent was Masterpiece Caravans only. An order was sought for replacement of the caravan. No other relief was sought. The account of the reasons for the order concluded "As per Consumer Law, when a business sells a product with a major problem, or a product that later develops a major problem, it must give the consumer the choice of a refund, or replacement. We wish to evoke (sic) our consumer right to our choice of remedy-a replacement caravan at the same tare weight we purchased at."
16. On 9 May 2024 the Tribunal made an order that Newcastle Caravans be added as the second respondent in the proceedings. No amended claim or pleading was filed by the appellant in connection with this step.
17. At all material times up until, at least, 30 November 2024 the caravan remained in the possession of the appellant. At some point, the appellant collected the caravan from Abba Caravans. At the time the appellant's affidavit was sworn on 6 June 2024 in the primary proceedings, the appellant and his family were living in the caravan and travelling full-time (see paragraphs [13] and [14]). In Those paragraphs were as follows:

13 Ultimately, if we were not in a position where we were living in the Caravan full-time and travelling full-time (the purpose for which we bought the Caravan), we would be able to return the Caravan to the First Respondent and reject it entirely. Unfortunately, to do so would put our family out of a home. This is why we have not chosen to reject the Caravan outright and are seeking a replacement Caravan.

14 Even if we were to accept the repair of the Caravan and the offer of accommodation, our family would have to stop our travel and put our life plans on hold.

1. At the time of the hearing of the proceedings on 22 August 2024, the appellant was still using and travelling in the caravan (see transcript at page 85.8).
2. From an affidavit sworn by the appellant on 19 November 2024, it is apparent that the appellant had still been using the caravan for travelling until not long before the date of that affidavit. In that affidavit, the appellant referred to a decision made to return to the Sydney area and that on their way home they brought the caravan to Newcastle Caravans. It was said that on this occasion the owner of Newcastle Caravans looked at the caravan for about 15 minutes.
3. At the time of the hearing on 20 November 2024, the caravan was still in the possession of the appellant. On that occasion, the Tribunal made an order that the appellant was to deliver the caravan on or before 30 November 2024 to Newcastle Caravans for collection by Masterpiece Caravans for the purposes of inspection and report (see transcript at page 124.8). There was also a notation that the appellant did not consent to the respondents undertaking any repairs to the caravan and that if the new hearing date was to be after 31 January 2025 the appellant intended to drive to the factory of Masterpiece Caravans in Melbourne to collect the caravan.
4. In accordance with the order made on 20 November 2024, the appellant delivered the caravan to Newcastle Caravans on 30 November 2024 from where it was collected by Masterpiece Caravans and taken to their premises in Melbourne. Following the inspection of the caravan by Masterpiece Caravans, the caravan was stored by Masterpiece Caravans in Victoria.

The primary proceedings and the Tribunal's decision

1. On 31 May 2024 there was a conciliation hearing in the primary proceedings.
2. Subsequently, final hearings occurred on 22 August 2024, 20 November 2024 and 12 February 2025.
3. Masterpiece Caravans undertook principal carriage of the defence of the proceedings. Newcastle Caravans did not present any written evidence. Mr Puxty, General Manager of Newcastle Caravans appeared at all the hearings. He played a minor role in those hearings compared to the representative of Masterpiece Caravans.
4. Importantly, for reasons which will emerge, in final oral submissions by the solicitor for the appellant on 12 February 2025 the appellant sought a refund of the purchase price and "In the alternative" sought what was said to be "very specific repair orders if you are not with us. If, if the Tribunal is not with us with regards to the refund issue, we are seeking very specific orders with regards to the repairs which would also outline the maximum amounts of weight to be added..."
5. This submission, in the alternative, for a repair order came against a background of a number of occasions in which the Tribunal had stated that the relief to be ordered was either a refund or a repair order (see, hearing on 12 February 2025, transcript, 133.2; hearing on 22 August 2024, transcript, page 86.6).
6. In arriving at the decision, the Tribunal's reasons included:

(1) It addressed the appellant's case, including making reference to relevant correspondence between the appellant and Masterpiece Caravans and to a report on the defects in the caravan by Mr Marshall of ACE Assessing Services dated 10 April 2024.

(2) Next, the Tribunal addressed the manufacturer's case. The Tribunal noted that the manufacturer conceded a flooring defect with the caravan because of a manufacturing defect by their flooring supplier which had caused the internal floor to delaminate. The manufacturer did not accept that this was a "major failure". The Tribunal noted that the manufacturer conceded that repairing the flooring defect could not be achieved without adding additional weight to the caravan, the manufacturer could not precisely say how much weight but estimated it would be no more than 25 kg, which the manufacturer believed was reasonable and would still allow a sufficient payload for a triple bunk family caravan (at [27]). The Tribunal referred to the manufacture's contention that the appellant had caused damage to the caravan, which it listed (at [30]), and the contention that to repair the damage and restore the caravan for resale there would be a cost of $24,327.60 (at [34]). The Tribunal referred to the manufacture's contention that if it was found there was a "major failure" then the appellant was not entitled to replacement or refund in circumstances where damage had been caused and/or the consumer had not rejected the caravan in compliance with the ACL.

(3) The Tribunal referred to the supplier's case, including that it had relied upon the evidence submitted by the manufacturer (at [38]).

(4) The Tribunal then turned to a consideration of the law and facts (at [39]-68]). It set out the terms of ss 54, 260 and 262 of the ACL and made reference to s 259 (1) (b) and s259 (3) (a).

(5) The Tribunal addressed the alleged defects and concluded that the flooring defect alone gave rise to a breach of the consumer guarantee in s 54 of the ACL (at [48]). Earlier, it had concluded that it could only be satisfied of four of the alleged defects, namely the flooring, the shower drain, the entrance door, the loose wiring and inverter issues (at [42]).

(6) The Tribunal then concluded that the non-compliance with the s 54 guarantee with respect to the flooring was a major failure (at [50]-[52].

(7) As to the questions of notice of rejection and return of the goods, first, the Tribunal concluded that it was not able to find that the appellant had rejected the goods during the rejection period in compliance with the ACL (at [56]. As to this conclusion, the Tribunal concluded that the appellant had "constructively notified" the manufacturer of his desire to reject the caravan due to a major failure by email dated "5 March 2025" (plainly, an error for 5 March 2024; see email above) but "there was no evidence that the applicant notified the supplier of the same prior to commencing these proceedings in March 2024". Earlier, the Tribunal had said that "arguably" the appellant had become aware of the flooring defect in August 2023 when he emailed the supplier about it and was referred to the manufacturer to lodge a warranty claim (at [54]).

(8) We interpose hereto to note that the indication here of notice to the supplier by the proceedings in March 2024 seems to proceed from the Tribunal's mistaken understanding that in the application commencing proceedings on 26 March 2024 the appellant had named both the manufacturer and the supplier as respondents: see at [18].

(9) Furthermore, the Tribunal concluded that the appellant "had not returned the goods to the supplier in accordance with section 263 of the ACL" at ([56]).

(10) Accordingly, for these two reasons alone the Tribunal concluded that the appellant was not entitled to a replacement or refund under the ACL (at [56]).

(11) In the alternative, the Tribunal concluded that the appellant was not entitled to reject the goods because of the damage it caused to the caravan, having earlier set out the terms of s 262 concerning this issue (at [57]).

(12) The Tribunal then turned to the claim against Masterpiece Caravans as manufacturer. It noted that the remedy was limited to claiming damages under s 272 of the ACL but that the appellant had led no evidence of any such reduction in value "presumably, because compensation for any reduction in value below the purchase price is not the outcome sought by the applicant in these proceedings." Accordingly, it concluded that the only other remedies available to the appellant were against the supplier pursuant to s259 of the ACL.

(13) Having reached these conclusions concerning the relevant issues, the Tribunal returned to the question of a remedy of repair against the supplier (at [60]-[66]). As to such a claim, the Tribunal reasoned that it could make a repair order pursuant to s 79N (b) of the Fair Trading Act (NSW) 1987 (FTA). It concluded that this was the most appropriate remedy, namely to carry out the repairs necessary to remedy the defects concerning flooring, electrical wiring and to the entrance door (at [63]). It noted that although the order was to be made against the supplier it was the intention of the respondents that the manufacturer would carry out these repairs and that the caravan would need to be returned to the supplier in the first instance and then transported to the manufacturer.

(14) Finally, the Tribunal referred to a late claim by the appellant for a sum of $4,950 for accommodation expenses (at [67]-[68]). The Tribunal referred to these expenses as related to the expenses of renting a property in November 2024 for a period of nine weeks when the appellant returned to Sydney with his family and was unable to return to his own property because it had been rented out for a two year fixed. The Tribunal gave various reasons for rejecting this claim, and it was not made clear whether this was a claim against one or both of the respondents. One of the reasons for rejecting the claim was that it was a late claim for which the appellant had not sought leave to amend and there was a lack of opportunity given for it to be responded to.

1. In this case, at the hearing of the appeal, the solicitor for the appellant, Ms Ruf, informed us that the appeal was based solely upon questions of law and that leave to appeal was not sought.
2. Under s 80(2) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (NCAT Act), a party may appeal as of right to the Appeal Panel in an internal appeal on any question of law. Otherwise, the appellant requires leave to appeal.

1. The appeal was commenced by a Notice of Appeal, signed by the appellant, lodged on 13 October 2025, within the time requirement for commencing an appeal.
2. Subsequently, having obtained legal representation from Ms Ruf, the appellant lodged Amended Grounds of Appeal on 21 November 2025. At the hearing of the appeal, Ms Ruf informed us that these grounds of appeal replaced the grounds and contentions set out in the Notice of Appeal.
3. In addition to the Amended Grounds of Appeal, the appellant relied upon written submissions in chief lodged on 16 January 2026 and written submissions in reply lodged on 18 March 2023. Also, the appellant relied upon the application for a stay referred to above and the decision dismissing the stay application.
4. Newcastle Caravans relied upon a one-page letter lodged with the Tribunal on 20 February 2026 which, relevantly, stated:

The Applicant's caravan arrived to Newcastle Caravans & RVs premises on 15 December, 2025 and has been available for collection from this date, the applicant has not sought to do so or communicated that they will.

As per the hearing, we would store the caravan until such time as either the appeal process had concluded or if the applicant did seek to take possession of the vehicle but we understand they are also not ordered to do so by the Tribunal at this time.

The caravan has been repaired as per the order. The repairs were carried out by the manufacturer and First Respondent Masterpiece Caravans Pty Ltd.

The caravan remains in Newcastle Caravans & RVs possession and has been stored in our secure premises since its arrival.

In regards to the amended grounds of appeal by the applicant, it is the position of Newcastle Caravans & RVs that the law was applied correctly and fairly to the best of our knowledge.

1. Masterpiece Caravans relied upon a Reply to Appeal lodged on 5 December 2025 and written submissions lodged on 20 February 2026. It also relied upon an Appeal Book containing those submissions, amongst other documents, also lodged on 20 February 2026. Amongst the other documents was an affidavit by Mr Petrusevski affirmed on 20 February 2026 concerning the current status of the caravan and the repair work carried out. Ms Ruf objected to the manufacture's application for leave to rely upon this affidavit. We have decided to grant leave to rely upon the affidavit because of its potential relevance to the orders to be made on the appeal, including, having regard to the appellant's position (as seen below) that the Tribunal had no power to make the repair orders.

1. At the hearing of the appeal, Ms Ruf confirmed that the Amended Grounds of Appeal were the only grounds of appeal relied upon. Subject to one matter referred to below, we have acted on that basis.
2. Having considered the amended grounds of appeal, and the oral submissions made by Ms Ruf, those grounds can be fairly summarised as follows:

(1) The Tribunal erred on a question of law by applying the wrong tests concerning satisfaction of the requirements of rejection and return of the goods for the purpose of a claim under the ACL for a refund of the purchase price with the consequence that, in some respects, the Tribunal failed to take into account relevant, mandatory, considerations (Ground 1).

(2) The Tribunal erred on a question of law by failing to give adequate reasons concerning the question of "damage" to the caravan in connection with the issue of rejection of the caravan (Ground 2).

(3) The Tribunal had no jurisdiction or power to make a repair order or otherwise erred in law in making any order at all for repair work to be carried out (Ground 3).

(4) By the delay in issuing the decision there was procedural unfairness to the appellant (Ground 4).

1. As to Ground 3, it is impossible to discern how this ground is contained in the Amended Grounds of Appeal. However, it was a ground of appeal that clearly emerged in the oral submissions of Ms Ruf at the hearing of the appeal and a sufficient opportunity was provided to the respondents, principally, through the legal representatives of Masterpiece Caravans, who appeared at the hearing of the appeal and took principal carriage of the opposition to the appeal.
2. We should also mention here that a considerable part of the written submissions from Masterpiece Caravans and the appellant in reply submissions was directed to whether the appellant was truly raising questions of law and whether, in fact, the appeal was concerned with questions of mixed law and fact or fact only for which leave to appeal was required. We consider that the appeal can be resolved without detailed reference to these questions.

Standing and role of Masterpiece Caravans on appeal

1. Before turning to address the grounds of appeal, we should deal with a question about the standing and role of Masterpiece Caravans on the appeal. It was a matter we raised at the commencement of the appeal. As was the case in the primary proceedings, Masterpiece Caravans had the principal carriage of the opposition to the appeal.
2. At the hearing of the appeal, Ms Ruf submitted that Masterpiece Caravans had no standing to appear and be heard on the appeal or otherwise should not be heard in circumstances where the orders the subject of the appeal were against Newcastle Caravans only.
3. However, the appellant identified the manufacturer as a respondent to the appeal-initially, it was the sole respondent in the Notice of Appeal lodged on 13 October 2025. Subsequently, Newcastle Caravans was joined as second respondent. In accordance with Rule 29 (b) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW) both respondents were proper parties to the appeal.
4. Even though the main challenge on appeal was to the dismissal of the refund claim and to the repair orders made against the supplier, nevertheless, in the Amended Grounds of Appeal the appellant also made contentions against the manufacturer and advanced claims for relief because of the manufacturer's knowledge of the flooring defect at the time of sale. Furthermore, at the hearing of the appeal, Ms Ruf sought an order that the proceedings be remitted to the Tribunal for determination of damages claims against both the manufacturer and the supplier.
5. The manufacturer had a direct interest in responding to these matters.
6. Furthermore, as submitted by Mr Pittavino of Counsel, who appeared for the manufacturer, because of the indemnity right contained in s 274 of the ACL, the manufacturer had what he described as a derivative interest in the outcome of the appeal insofar as it concerned the claim for a refund. Connected to this relationship, Mr Pittavino also drew our attention to the passage in the reasons for decision in which it was noted that it was the respondents' intention that the manufacturer would carry out whatever repairs which might be ordered (at [64]).
7. In these circumstances, we considered that the manufacturer was a proper party to the appeal, it had standing to appear and be heard on the appeal and that we should hear from the manufacturer in respect of the grounds of appeal and the appellant's submissions.

Consideration, Ground 1-applying the wrong tests to the questions of rejection and return of the goods.

1. So far as the rejection issue is concerned, whilst it is not easy to discern the specific points made by the appellant, it appears that they consist of the various points which we now address.
2. The appellant submitted that the Tribunal failed to appreciate that notification of rejection could occur by the commencement of proceedings. However, the Tribunal did recognise notification by this means and, in fact, implicitly, accepted, incorrectly, as we have already pointed out, that the supplier was notified by commencing proceedings in March 2024 (at [55]). On appeal, the appellant did not point to any step capable of being treated as notification of rejection to the supplier until, at least, the supplier was joined to the proceedings in May 2024.
3. The appellant submitted that the Tribunal failed to have regard to the relevant considerations that the consumer had "clearly and repeatedly communicated their desire for rejection and refund both in communications and by conduct but have been steered into repeated repair attempts by the dealer and manufacturer." However, as can be seen from the salient facts set out above, this contention is not supported by the evidence, at least so far as the pertinent issue is concerned, namely a communication of notice of rejection to the supplier.
4. The appellant submitted that the Tribunal erred by concluding that the appellant's ongoing use of the vehicle extinguished his right to reject. However, the Tribunal did not arrive at any such a conclusion.
5. In the Amended Grounds for Appeal the appellant stated that the Tribunal had found that the appellant failed to provide proper notice of rejection within "a reasonable timeframe". However, the Tribunal did not come to such a conclusion. It did not apply a test of "reasonable timeframe". Instead, the Tribunal directed itself to the definition of "rejection period" in s 262 (2) of the ACL (at [53]).
6. Further, as to the question of error in relation to "rejection period", the appellant made a number of submissions about the facts, including, correctly, that the question of the "rejection period" is fact specific. However, nowhere in the appellant's submissions did they demonstrate that the "rejection period" had not expired before 9 May 2024 when the supplier was joined to the proceedings, this being the earliest time at which it could be said that notification of rejection was given to the supplier. A number of the appellant's submissions about the "rejection period" consist of contentions about the supplier or the manufacturer abdicating or refusing their obligations. However, these are not to the point because the focus must be upon an objective question concerning when it would be reasonable to expect the failure to comply with the relevant guarantee to become apparent.
7. In our view, on the incontrovertible facts we have already set out, it was reasonably open to the Tribunal to conclude that the "rejection period" had ended before notification of rejection was given to the supplier. At the latest, it would be reasonable to expect the failure to comply with the guarantee in s 54 of the ACL have become apparent to the appellant in late January/early February 2024 when the appellant became aware that the work to be done to repair the flooring would add to the TARE weight of the caravan. Accordingly, any error, if there was one, by a finding that the rejection period ended earlier than this time, was immaterial.
8. The appellant criticised the decision for allegedly failing to have regard to the TARE weight issue when addressing the issues of acceptable quality and major failure. However, the Tribunal did see this factor as instrumental in its conclusions on these matters (see at [51] and [26]-[27]).
9. The appellant submitted that the Tribunal erred because it's denial of rejection rights was "premised on the application of the consumer's obligation to return the goods" pursuant to s 263 of the ACL. However, the Tribunal did not reason in this way. Rather, having, first, concluded that the appellant had not rejected the goods within the rejection period, the Tribunal came to the additional conclusion that the appellant had not returned the goods within s 263 of the ACL and, accordingly, was not entitled to a replacement or refund.
10. With respect to the Tribunal's conclusion that the consumer had failed to return the caravan to the supplier, the appellant submitted that the Tribunal had failed to apply subsections 263 (2) (b) and 263 (3). The appellant made reference to the burden which the appellant faced in returning the goods. However, the appellant did not show that in the primary proceedings s 263 (2) (b) was relied upon and by reference to what evidence. Importantly, questions arise as to "significant cost" arising from specific matters only, including the height or size of the goods. In any event, on appeal the appellant did not demonstrate any basis upon which the specific provisions could be satisfied in this case.
11. Furthermore, as appears from our account of the salient facts above, in particular, the appellant's own evidence in his 9 June 2024 affidavit, the appellant came to a decision to continue to use the caravan rather than return it for reasons unrelated to the cost of transport of the caravan.
12. In relation to the failure to return the goods issue, the appellant also submitted that the Tribunal failed to appreciate that the caravan was "in the custody and control of the manufacturer's agent for a period such that any return/collection obligations under s 263 were satisfied. In this regard, it appears that the appellant seeks to rely upon the delivery of the caravan to Abba Caravans in Rockingham in January 2024. However, this step is incapable of satisfying the return of the goods requirement. First, it was not a return to the supplier Newcastle Caravans. Secondly, it was a delivery for the purpose of inspection and some repair. It was a step that preceded any question of giving notice of rejection of the goods.
13. Finally, we should mention a submission made orally at the hearing of the appeal, namely that the manufacturer was also the supplier. However, as accepted by Ms Ruf at the hearing of the appeal, this was a new argument raised on appeal. Clearly, it raises controversial questions of fact. It is not a contention that can be permitted on appeal: see Suttor v Gundowda [1950] HCA 35; (1950) 81 CLR 418.
14. Finally, with respect to rejection rights and the Tribunal's conclusion that damage to the caravan precluded the exercise of the rejection right (at [57], the appellant made two submissions. First, that the Tribunal's reasons for this conclusion were inadequate-this is the subject of Ground 2, which, for the reasons set out below, we do not accept. Secondly, the appellant submitted that the facts referred to by the Tribunal "do not amount to relevant "damage" beyond expected use and, therefore, did not extinguish the rejection right.
15. As to this second submission, it could only be a ground of appeal which raises a question of law if the submission is either that the Tribunal applied the wrong test of "damage" or that there was no evidence to support this conclusion or, potentially, that it was such an unreasonable conclusion that the resulting decision of the Tribunal was legally unreasonable. We can, shortly, reject the latter two grounds because, clearly enough, as emerges from the Tribunal's findings as to "damage" at [30] and [57] there was a sufficient basis to preclude any such contentions.
16. As to the submission that the wrong test of "damage" was applied, the appellant submitted, without any support from authorities, that the Tribunal should have excluded impacts from "reasonable use". However, that is not the language of the section. Nor did the appellant show there was any evidence that the matters listed by the Tribunal were from "reasonable use". It was just asserted that it was.
17. In any event, even if we be wrong about the question raised concerning "damage" to the caravan, this does not affect the outcome of the appeal because of the additional conclusions concerning rejection rights that have not been the subject of successful challenge on this appeal.
18. For the above reasons, we reject Ground 1 of the appeal.

Consideration, Ground 2-inadequate reasons concerning "damage" to the caravan and the consequential impact upon the appellant's rejection right

1. We start by repeating what we have already said about the challenge to the Tribunal's conclusion concerning "damage" to the caravan, namely that, even if this challenge was successful, it has no impact upon the outcome of the appeal so far as the appellant's claim for a refund is concerned.
2. Nevertheless, we address Ground 2 of the appeal. Whilst, the appellant submitted there were inadequate reasons he did not elaborate upon why it was said the reasons were inadequate. In our view, the reasons were sufficiently exposed to enable the parties to understand the essential basis of the conclusion and to otherwise provide adequate reasons. The Tribunal set out the details of the contention by the respondents concerning "damage" (at [30]) and then gave an explanation for why this factor was satisfied in the circumstances.
3. Accordingly, we reject Ground 2 of the appeal.

Consideration, Ground 3-the Tribunal allegedly lacked jurisdiction or power to make a repair order pursuant to s 79N of the Fair Trading Act 1987

1. In the Amended Grounds of Appeal the following was stated:

... Instead, repair was ordered as the only remedy, contrary to ACL ss 259(3), 260, 263 and established authority (Lam v Steve Jarvin Motors Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCATAP 186; Temple v AMR Motors Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCATAP 121).

1. As will be seen below, Lam's case addresses the relationship between the remedial provisions of the ACL and the remedial powers conferred upon the Tribunal in s 79N of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) (FTA). The decision in Temple's case has no relevance to the issue of jurisdiction or power to make the repair orders or to any other issue in this case.
2. We pause here to note that the appellant's written material contained references to many case law authorities but without reference to any specific passages in those authorities. We were not assisted by this approach. Furthermore, as far as we could tell, most of the case law authorities referred to turned upon their own facts.
3. The important decision in Lam's case was contrary to the appellant's submission about lack of jurisdiction or power. In that case, which has been applied in many cases, the Appeal Panel concluded that the remedial provisions in Part 5-4 of the ACL were not exhaustive and that s 79N of the FTA was a separate source of authority and power for the Tribunal to make orders in circumstances where liability was established under the relevant provisions of the ACL (see at [156]-[163] and [171].
4. The appellant also submitted that the repair orders were "statutorily barred". However, this was not a case in which the Tribunal made repair orders contrary to the established right of the consumer to a refund in circumstances where the consumer had established an entitlement to a refund according to the provisions of the ACL.
5. In connection with the appellant's challenge to the making of the repair orders, at the hearing of the appeal, Ms Ruf also contended that the appellant had never asked for repair orders to be made. However, as already mentioned, in closing oral submissions the solicitor for the appellant did submit that repair orders should be made if the Tribunal rejected the claim for a refund. Submissions were made by the solicitor as to the nature of the orders that should be made, including about the terms of a repair order in respect of the flooring issue.
6. Accordingly, we reject Ground 3 of the appeal.

Consideration, Ground 4 - procedural unfairness - delay in making decision

1. A period of about seven months elapsed between the final date of hearing and the issue of a decision accompanied by reasons for decision. That was a significant delay. However, such delay by itself does not result in procedural unfairness. Nor do the reasons for decision suggest that delay resulted in some material error or injustice in the decision.
2. Accordingly, we reject Ground 4 of the appeal.

1. In the Amended Grounds of Appeal and the appellant's written submissions a number of contentions were made raising issues about the terms of the repair orders, including that they had not had regard to the increased TARE weight issue or consequential registration issues and that no order had been made to remedy the defect with the shower. In the Amended Grounds of Appeal, as an alternative to the orders sought for a refund, the appellant sought an order that "Clear enforceable repair terms be specified, including assurance of roadworthiness/registration post-repair, tare, post-repair certification, inclusion of all major defects."
2. However, at the hearing of the appeal Ms Ruf informed us that the appellant took an all or nothing approach, namely that the appellant should receive a refund and not any sort of repair order and that if the appellant was unsuccessful in its appeal concerning the refund issue then the only appropriate order to be made was that the proceedings be remitted to the Tribunal for assessment of damages. It was made clear that the appellant did not wish for any further orders to be made concerning repair of the vehicle.
3. Accordingly, we do not address the criticisms in the appellant's written material on appeal concerning the terms of the repair orders.

1. In the Amended Grounds of Appeal and the appellant's written submissions, it is contended that he should have leave to amend his claim and to present evidence concerning the respondents' knowledge of the defects. This was associated with a contention that there had been a breach of s 71 of the NCAT Act. Leaving aside the fact that this is an entirely new claim raising controversial questions of fact and matters that are irrelevant to liability under Par 5-4 of the ACL, a breach of s 71 does not raise any cause of action by the appellant against the first respondent.
2. Finally, in the Amended Grounds of Appeal the appellant sought an order that he should be paid transport costs. However, the appellant did not show how there was any error by the Tribunal in relation to this subject, let alone how the appellant was entitled to some unstated amount of such costs.

1. Masterpiece Caravans sought an order that the appellant pay its costs of the appeal. We will give the parties an opportunity to make submissions about this application in light of the decision on the appeal. At the hearing of the appeal, we also raised with Masterpiece Caravans an issue as to why it, as the manufacturer, should receive the benefit of an order of costs in its favour for some (and, if so, in respect of what issues) or all of its costs of the appeal. That is a matter that should be addressed in the written submissions.

1. For the above reasons, we make the following orders:

(1) The appeal is dismissed.

(2) Within 21 days of the publication of these reasons, the first respondent is to file and serve written submissions concerning its application in relation to costs of the appeal.

(3) The appellant is to file and serve written submissions in relation to the first respondent's costs submissions within 21 days of receipt of those submissions.

(4) Within 14 days of receipt of the appellant's costs submissions the first respondent is to file and serve any written submissions in reply.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.