Stephenson & Baird [2025] FedCFamC2F 1379 (1 October 2025)

4A. The father pay the costs of the said supervision service or centre.

1. A new paragraph 4B be added to the Orders dated 18 September 2025 as follows:

4B. Y born in 2017 and Z born in 2020 ("the younger children") spend time with the father each Monday (commencing 13 October 2025) for a period of two (2) hours after school or daycare as agreed, and failing agreement, from 3.00pm to 5.00pm.

1. Paragraph 6 of the of the Orders dated 18 September 2025 be varied to read:
   1. In the event that the parties agree on a suitable third party to supervise time between the older children and the father and such third party executes appropriate Undertakings which are filed with the Court, the older children's time with the father shall be supervised by such third party and this order shall be in substitution for Orders 2 to 4 herein (excluding paragraph 4B) with time to be on one (1) day each week for periods not exceeding four (4) hours.

1. Paragraph 7 of the Orders dated 18 September 2025 be varied to read:
   1. All changeovers shall be at a public venue agreed to by the parties in writing and in the absence of such agreement as follows:
      1. As In relation to paragraph 4 herein, as determined by the supervision service; and
      2. In relation to paragraph 4 herein, Where where supervision is by an agreed third party other than a supervision service at the closest McDonalds to the half-way point between each parent's place of residence**.; and**
      3. In relation to paragraph 4B herein, the father is to collect the younger children from their relevant school/preschool/daycare centre and return them to the mother at McDonalds Suburb B.

Attendance by the children at therapy/counselling

1. Paragraph 14 of Orders dated 18 September 2025 be varied to read:

1. In order to the facilitate the children's attendance at therapy or counselling the mother shall attend upon her GP in order to obtain any required mental health plans for the children. 14. The parties cause the children to attend non­ reportable counselling or therapy with Ms D or such other therapist or counsellor as determined by the mother ("the therapist"); and for the purposes of this Order:

(a) the mother shall attend upon her GP in order to obtain any required mental health plans for the children; and > > (b) the father shall pay the costs of the therapist and be entitled to the proceeds of any rebate received from Medicare or private health insurance on the costs payable (if applicable).

2. Each party is permitted to serve a copy of these Orders upon the children's schools/pre-schools/daycare centre, their nominated General Practitioner or to any emergency services.
3. A copy of these Orders may be provided by the mother to any therapist, counsellor or psychologist attended on by any of the children.
4. The question of costs arising from the interim hearing of the parties' parenting dispute be reserved to the final hearing.

1. These Orders should be read in conjunction with the Orders dated 18 September 2025.
2. Further case management directions will be provided by the Court following the release of the Court's reserved decision in respect of the parties' interim property, spousal maintenance and child support disputes.

1. Pursuant to ss.65DA(2) and 62B of the Family Law Act 1975, the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders are set out in Annexure A and those particulars are included in these orders.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. In this matter the Court is being asked to decide multiple interim matters relevant to the family law dispute between the Applicant, MR STEPHENSON ("the father") and the Respondent, MS BAIRD ("the mother").
2. The parties are in dispute about parenting, property, spousal maintenance and child support matters. This decision deals with their interim parenting dispute only. Further interim decisions are reserved in relation to their property, spousal maintenance and child support disputes.
3. There are five children of the relationship: V aged 15 years, W who will turn 13 years old, X aged 10 years, Y who will turn eight (8) years old and Z who will turn five (5) years old, (collectively, "the children").
4. This interim hearing of the parties' parenting dispute proceeded before me on 18 September 2025.
5. The interim parenting issues requiring determination in this decision are:
   • whether the mother should have sole parental responsibility for the children;
   • whether different arrangements should be made for the younger children's time with the father, and if so, whether the younger' children's time should be supervised;
   • whether the children's time with the father (as applicable) should progress to unsupervised and overnight time;
   • whether the parties should equally share the cost of supervision and the children's therapy (as the father and ICL seek) or whether the father should bear these costs (as the mother seeks); and
   • upon noting that the parties agree that the children should engage in therapy and the form of order proposed by the ICL (save for the payment of the therapist's costs), whether the children's engagement in therapy should occur concurrently with the older children's time with the father (as the father and ICL seek) or whether it should be delayed (as the mother seeks).
6. Details of the precise orders proposed by each party are discussed later in these reasons.
7. At the interim hearing the father was represented by Mr Schonell of counsel, the mother by Mr Roberts of counsel, and Mr Hill of counsel appeared for the Independent Children's Lawyer ("ICL").
8. Any statutory references I made in these reasons (unless otherwise stated) will be to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act").

1. The father was born in 1975 and he is currently 49 years of age.
2. The mother was born in 1987 and she is currently 47 years of age.
3. The parties commenced cohabitation around mid-2010 and married in 2011.
4. As stated, there are five (5) children of the relationship:
   • V, born in 2010 (15);
   • W, born in 2012 (12);
   • X, born in 2015 (9);
   • Y, born in 2017 (7); and
   • Z, born in 2020 (4).
5. The mother gives evidence that the parties separated on a final basis under the same roof in April 2020. The father contends that the parties separated on a final basis on 27 December 2024 when the mother moved out of the matrimonial home.
6. The father commenced proceedings on 20 March 2025. In his Initiating Application, he sought, on both a final and interim basis, inter alia joint parental responsibility, that the children live with the mother, and that they spend time with the father each alternate weekend from Thursday after school until before school Tuesday. He sought that V spends time with him in accordance with the child's wishes.
7. The matter came before a Senior Judicial Registrar of this Court for first return on 23 April 2025.
8. The mother filed a Response on 30 May 2025 seeking, on a final basis, that she have sole parental responsibility, that the children live with her, and that she have leave to amend her response. On an interim basis, she sought that the children live with her and spend time with the father every alternate Thursday for 2 hours supervised by a professional service, as well as the appointment of an ICL and the production of a Child Impact Report. In her response, the mother also applied to this Court for property orders.
9. On 4 June 2025, orders were made for the production of a Child Impact Report, appointment of an ICL, and listing the matter for interim hearing.
10. The father replied to the mother's property application on 7 July 2025.
11. On 28 July 2025, the Child Impact Report was released to the parties.
12. As stated, the interim hearing in relation to the parenting dispute proceeded before me on 18 September 2025.
13. Following the interim hearing the Court reserved its decision.

1. The following Chronology has been provided by the ICL in his case outline document.

Mother asserts the parties finally separated under the same roof

Date of assessment report prepared by Ms C, clinical psychologist, who opines that Y presents with ASD

AVO Application states that X made disclosure to JIRT that the father had sexually abused her in between 2020 and 2021 (sexual touching). No charges laid against the father

Provisional ADVO made against the father restraining him from living with X. Mother deposes that the father moved out of the rental property at Suburb E

Interim ADVO made against the father to protect X

Final ADVO against the father protecting X. Order made for 12 months varied permitting removing the restriction that the father not live with X. Mother deposes that the father moved back into the rental property at Suburb E

Mother deposes that the parties moved to another property at Suburb F

Father asserts that the parties finally separated and that the mother vacated the former matrimonial home with the children without notice to him ("first time")

Mother deposes she moved out of the Suburb F property with the children on a final basis. Father deposes that this was the second time that the mother did so

1. There were some areas of agreement as reflected in the Orders dated 18 September 2025. These Orders are reproduced in Schedule 1 to these reasons.
2. In summary, the parties and the ICL agreed that:
   • the children will continue to live with the mother;
   • V will spend time with, and/or have communications with, the father in accordance with his wishes;
   • W and X (and V subject to his wishes) will commence spending supervised time with the father using a supervision service (although there is a disagreement about whether both parties should pay for the supervision service in equal shares);
   • changeovers will occur in a public location;
   • the children will have telephone/face time communications with the father not before 6:00pm and not after 6:30pm each Tuesday;
   • various injunctions will be imposed including mutual non-denigration;
   • the parties will each enrol in and attend a parenting after separation programme such as the keeping contact programme offered by "G Centre" or equivalent; and
   • the father will enrol in and compete the courses 'Tune into Kids', "Tuning into Teens' and the 18-week "Taking Responsibility" programme offered by "H Centre" or equivalent.
3. In addition, as previously noted, while the parties agree that the children should engage in therapy and the form of order proposed by the ICL (save for the payment of the therapist's costs), they disagree whether the children's engagement in therapy should occur concurrently with the older children's time with the father or whether it should be delayed. That said, the parties do agree that:
   • the mother shall be required attend upon her GP in order to obtain any required mental health plans for the children in order to the facilitate the children's attendance at therapy or counselling;
   • the parties and the ICL will be restrained from issuing any subpoena to the children's therapist or counsellor; and that
   • the ICL will be authorised to speak or communicate with the children's therapist or counsellor.
4. The Court notes that the ICL did not press the Court to consider ordering the parties at this time to obtain a comprehensive single expert report but rather to allow the parties time to engage in further discussions in an attempt to resolve that issue.

1. The ICL's minute of proposed orders was contained within his Case Outline.
2. In summary, in relation to the remaining interim issues in dispute, the ICL proposes that:
   • the mother have sole decision-making authority in respect to all long-term decisions in respect to the children;
   • all five children spend supervised time each week with the father for two hours and with the costs of the supervision to be shared equally by the parties (and with V to spend time in accordance with his wishes);
   • that specified injunctions (such as non-denigration) be imposed upon each party.
   • the mother engage with a counsellor/therapist or psychologist for specified therapy;
   • the mother cause the children to attend non-reportable counselling or therapy with Ms D (or similar); and
   • the parties cause a single expert to be engaged to prepare a comprehensive family report and with the parties to equally share the costs of that assessment.

1. The father's proposed Minute of Orders was also included in his case outline document. I note that during oral submissions the father amended paragraphs 1 and 2 of his proposed Minute to remove any supervision of the time that Y and Z spend with him.
2. In summary, the father seeks orders for the children to spend time with him with incremental increases in time and with initial supervision only in respect of V, W and X.
3. In relation to Y and Z, he proposes that they recommence spending unsupervised time with him on Mondays for two hours after school/daycare with the addition of a Thursday (also for two hours) from 31 October 2025. He then proposes unsupervised time continue with these two children on Saturdays from 8.00am to 6.00pm until 17 March 2026 when all the children would spend time with him unsupervised each alternate weekend from after school/daycare on Friday until 6.00pm on Sunday.
4. In relation to V, W and X, the husband proposes that they spend supervised time with him each alternate Thursday from 4.30pm until 6.30pm until 1 December 2025 whereupon that time would become weekly and unsupervised. As noted above, the father proposes that from 17 March 2026 all five children would spend time with him unsupervised each alternate weekend from after school/daycare on Friday until 6.00pm on Sunday.
5. The father also proposes that all five children all spend time with him on Christmas Day 2025 and Easter Sunday 2026 from 10.00am to 2.00pm with overnight time occurring in future years during the Christmas and Easter periods. While he also proposes that all the children have "liberal communication" with both parties, I note that the parties have now agreed to defined communication time occurring each Tuesday.
6. I note that the father also proposes:
   1. That each party be at liberty to re-list the matter by arrangement with the Judge's Associate upon giving 48 hours' notice to the other party, in the event of an issue arising in relation to the supervision Orders ...
7. Lastly, the father opposes any parental responsibility order being made on an interim basis.

1. Although the mother included a Minute of orders sought in her case outline document, she ultimately aligned with the ICL's proposal referred to above save for the following:
   • the mother proposes that the father pay all the costs of supervision of the children's time with him and all the costs of the children's proposed therapy; and
   • the mother further proposes that the proposed therapy be delayed until after the children have spent some supervised time with the father.
2. I also note that the mother did not propose any order for parental responsibility in the Minute of orders attached to her Case Outline document.

1. The interim parenting issues requiring determination in this decision are:
   • whether the mother should have sole parental responsibility for the children;
   • whether different arrangements should be made for the younger children's time with the father, and if so, whether the younger' children's time should be supervised;
   • whether the children's time with the father (as applicable) should progress to unsupervised and overnight time;
   • whether the parties should equally share the cost of supervision and the children's therapy (as the father and ICL seek) or whether the father should bear these costs (as the mother seeks); and
   • whether the children's agreed engagement in therapy should occur concurrently with the older children's time with the father (as the father and ICL seek) or whether it should be delayed (as the mother seeks) and whether the parties should pay for the agreed therapy in equal shares (as the father and ICL seek) or whether the father should pay all those costs (as the mother seeks).

1. The parties and the ICL provided case outline documents and asked the Court to read and consider various documents that had been filed in these proceedings or produced under subpoena. For identification, the Court marked the parties' respective case outline documents Exhibit "A".

1. The father relied on the following documents at the interim hearing in relation to parenting issues:
   • Initiating Application filed on 21 March 2025;
   • His Affidavit filed on 28 August 2025;
   • His Notice of Child Abuse, Family Violence or Risk filed on 20 March 2025; and
   • Affidavit of Mrs Stephenson (paternal grandmother) filed on 28 August 2025.
2. In addition, the father tendered the following documents:
   • Text messages between the father and the mother (Exhibit "AF1");
   • Email from J Centre to father dated 18 September 2025 (Exhibit "AF2"); and
   • Letters from Dimocks Family Lawyers to Dorter Family Lawyers & Mediators dated 20 August 2025 and 9 September 2025; ANZ Online Saver Account ending #...21 statements from 5 February 2025 to 30 May 2025; and Notice of final decision from Office of the Children's Guardian dated 31 October 2023 ("AF3").

1. The mother relied on the following documents at the interim hearing in relation to parenting issues:
   • Response filed on 30 May 2025;
   • Her Affidavit filed on 29 August 2025; and
   • Her Notice of Child Abuse, Family Violence or Risk filed on 30 May 2025; and
   • Child Impact Report dated 24 July 2025 authored by Mr K.
2. In addition, the mother tendered the following documents:
   • Letter from Dorter Family Lawyers & Mediators to Dimocks Family Lawyers dated 26 February 2025 (Exhibit "RM1");
   • Child support arrears as of 10 September 2025; Child Support Assessment for period from 3 September 2025 until 6 March 2026; and Child Support Assessment from 27 December 2024 until 2 September 2025 (Exhibit "RM2");
   • Letter from Dorter Family Lawyers & Mediators to Dimock Family Lawyers dated 3 September 2025 (Exhibit "RM3"); and
   • Westpac Rocket Repay Home Loan Account ending #...96 statement and transaction listing from 1 November 2024 to 25 August 2025; Westpac Rocket Repay Home Loan Account ending #...33 statement and transaction listing from 1 November 2024 to 10 September 2025; and Westpac Rocket Repay Home Loan Account ending #...34 statement from 1 November 2024 to 2 May 2025 (Exhibit "RM4").

1. The ICL tendered the following documents:
   • Child Impact Report dated 24 July 2025 authored by Mr K ("ICL1").

1. As stated, the parties also have the benefit of a Child Impact (Assessment) Report authored by single expert, Mr K (Exhibit "ICL1").
2. The interviews and observations for the Report took place on 8 and 9 July 2025.
3. Mr K outlines the relevant background and proposals in paragraphs 1 to 15 and he notes in paragraph 16 that no agreements were reached.
4. Mr K then goes on to outline his interviews with V, W, X and Z in paragraphs 17 to 49 (noting in paragraph 44 that the expert did not spend any time alone with Y). Details of Mr K's interviews with the parties appear in paragraphs 50 to 76. Thereafter, Mr K provides comments about the risk of harm in paragraphs 77 to 88, the co-parenting relationship and conflict in paragraphs 89 to 96, developmental considerations in paragraphs 97 to 101 and the parties' understanding of the children's needs in paragraphs 102 to 103.
5. Mr K thereafter provides the following evaluation on the 'terms of reference' in paragraphs 104 to 132:

Any agreements reached between the parents;

1. No agreements were reached.

Identification of the key issues requiring resolution;

1. The key issues in this matter are parental decision-making responsibility for the children, the children's time in [Mr Stephenson]'s care and whether he poses a risk to their safety.

2. This family presents with a great deal of trauma which has had, and continues to have, an impact on the older children's ([V], [W] and [X]) emotional and psychological wellbeing and may have some impact on their developmental trajectory. The older children spoke about feeling settled in their new home and they perceive this is because [Mr Stephenson] no longer lives with them. [Ms Baird] and the older children raised similar concerns about [Mr Stephenson]'s parental capacity, especially his management of [Y]'s behaviour, and about him being the aggressor when conflict occurred between the parents.

3. The family violence allegations that [Ms Baird] makes about [Mr Stephenson] are serious and call into question the safety of the children in his sole care. She claims that [Mr Stephenson] behaved in a coercive and controlling way throughout their relationship, he was emotionally and psychologically abusive and financially controlling. She claims that [Mr Stephenson]'s behaviour towards her escalated significantly after he resumed living with the family in 2023 and continued throughout 2024 until she and the children moved out of the former family home. She said that there were many incidents of [Mr Stephenson] behaving in an aggressive and intimidating way towards her and she felt unsafe in the family home and sought some protection by having the children record any engagement she had with him. She also asserts that any aggressive behaviour on her part towards [Mr Stephenson] was to protect herself and in self-defence.

4. [Mr Stephenson] asserts that [Ms Baird]'s family violence allegations are untrue. He claims that he and [Ms Baird] engaged in conflict that, on occasion, included [Ms Baird] being violent towards him. He portrays [Ms Baird] as unpredictable and having a temper in which she could explode with anger. If [Mr Stephenson]'s account of [Ms Baird]'s allegations are found to be accurate, then it suggests she has trouble managing her temper and lashes out violently and does not take responsibility for her actions.

5. [Ms Baird]'s allegations are, to some degree, corroborated by the children's accounts of their father's alleged behaviour and various incidents they witnessed and were involved in between the parents. The family violence allegations and the dynamics in this family require further comprehensive assessment, however, it may be prudent, given the children views (outlined below) that any time [Mr Stephenson] has with the children, on an interim basis, be supervised at a contact centre (addressed below).

6. It is also unlikely, if [Ms Baird]'s allegations are found to be accurate, that the parents will be able to share decision-making responsibility for the children and sole decision-making responsibility may need to be assigned to the parent whose care the children are in for the majority of the time.

7. [Ms Baird] also spoke about [Mr Stephenson] being disengaged from the family for many years, and the children feel disconnected from him consequently. She asserts that [Mr Stephenson]'s involvement in family life was insignificant because he prioritised his own needs above all else, therefore, he has not developed sufficiently close relationships with the children. She also asserts that [Mr Stephenson]'s behaviour has resulted in the children feeling traumatised and unsafe in his care. The older children's accounts of their father and their relationships with him appear to support the concerns raised by [Ms Baird] about [Mr Stephenson]'s parental capacity and his behaviour. Therefore, if the children are to have any chance of repairing their relationships with their father, priority needs to be afforded to the children feeling safe in his care, even if this is only their perception.

8. Therefore, this is a matter in which the children's need for safety, routine and structure and an opportunity to spend time with their father in a way they will feel safe will need to be given priority above all other considerations.

Any views expressed by the children and any matters (such as the children's maturity or level of understanding) that would affect the weight that the Court should place on those views;

1. The children's accounts of their lives prior to the parental separation, their parents' relationship and their experiences with their father were quite similar and this is understandable if the children are talking to [Ms Baird] and each other about their father and their lived experience.

2. It appears that the older three children were exposed to the parental conflict on a regular basis and were part of it on occasion and this has likely had some impact on their emotional and psychological wellbeing. Substantial exposure to interparental conflict can pose a serious risk to young children's development. It can result in children developing problems with emotion regulation, hypervigilance (being alert for any signs of danger), social and emotional problems such as internalising (anxiety) or externalising (aggression) behaviours, and an overarching belief that the world is unsafe.

3. The children's views were very clear about the time they want - or do not want - with their father. The older three children appear to have negative views of their father; they are primarily rejecting of him and do not want to take action to improve their relationships with him. Their involvement in the parental conflict, especially recording their father and interactions between the parents, has undoubtedly had some impact on their relationships with their father and the way they perceive him and their safety around him. Whilst [Ms Baird] provided a cogent explanation about why she involved the children in such behaviour; it appears she did not give sufficient thought to the possible negative impact such involvement could have on their already tenuous relationships with their father.

4. [V], whilst primarily negative about his father, indicated that he would be willing to spend some time with him.

5. This assessment suggests that [W] and [X]'s relationships with [Mr Stephenson] are in peril of collapsing altogether if no action is taken to try and salvage them and especially if they are not given the opportunity to see and spend time with their father.

6. Therefore, if the children were to spend supervised time with [Mr Stephenson] at a contact centre, given [Y] has reportedly absconded from [Mr Stephenson]'s care previously, this may alleviate some of their anxiety around spending time with him and release the older children from the burden of feeling responsible for [Y]'s safety and care as this will be their father's responsibility. Whilst such an arrangement will likely be very unsatisfactory to [Mr Stephenson], such an arrangement will also enable objective and independent information to be collected about [Mr Stephenson]'s ability to engage with and care for the children when in his sole care.

7. Children spending supervised time is not considered to be a suitable long-term solution as it impedes children's relationships with their parents from developing and minimises the ability for parents to play an active role in their children's lives across all domains.

The impact of the issues/dispute before the Court on the children; and

1. There are currently no agreed upon arrangements for the children's time with [Mr Stephenson]. If [Mr Stephenson]'s account of his relationships with [Y] and [Z] are accurate, they are likely to be missing him, and this could be having an impact on their emotional and psychological wellbeing.

2. Whilst [Mr Stephenson] has been spending time with [Y] and [Z] on an ad hoc basis, usually on a fortnightly basis for a few hours, this time was not discussed with or agreed upon by [Ms Baird] and [Mr Stephenson] reportedly gave no indication to her or either child's school or daycare that he was going to implement this arrangement. More importantly, however, was neither [Y] nor [Z] (or their educators) were prepared by [Ms Baird] to expect their father to collect them.

3. Children who have ASD and special needs require more planning and preparation in their lives to reduce any stress or anxiety they might experience by changing plans. They require structure, routine and consistency because without this they can feel unsettled, and this can have a significant impact on their emotional and psychological wellbeing and behaviour. This is certainly the case in the afternoon/evenings when they need to settle and begin their nighttime routine in preparation for bed (which sets them up positively for the next day).

4. Any time the children spend with their father needs to be planned, structured and consistent. As stated, if the children are to have the opportunity to repair their relationships with their father, they will need to spend time with him. Whilst [Ms Baird] suggested the children spend time with [Mr Stephenson] on a fortnightly basis because they have busy, happy weekends, such infrequency is not sufficient to give the older children the opportunity to develop a sense of feeling safe in their father's care and [Y] and [Z] to continue developing their relationships with him.

5. Whilst [Mr Stephenson] will likely consider spending supervised time with the children as a retrograde step, he will need to prioritise the children's needs first and foremost if he wants to have any chance of repairing and maintaining his relationships with them.

6. Given the concerns identified in this assessment including the family violence allegations, the current poor state of the co-parenting relationship, and the minimal involvement [Mr Stephenson] has reportedly had in the children's lives, and when taking into consideration the children's views, [Mr Stephenson]'s proposal for the children to be in his care for five nights per fortnight cannot be supported by this assessment. [Mr Stephenson] is also yet to find suitable accommodation to have the children in his care overnight. Further comprehensive assessment of the parents' competing parenting proposals, in the form of a single expert report, will be required.

Any other matters important to the welfare of the best interests of the children.

1. [Ms Baird] said that the children speak to her and among themselves about the incidents they witnessed or were involved in between the parents, and she believes this to be positive because she is able to assist them process their traumatic memories. While this may be the case, the older children would likely benefit from obtaining some professional therapeutic support and the parents may wish to consider the children attending upon [Ms D], psychologist, who has extensive experience working with children, especially in family law matters. The Court may need to take into consideration the affordability of such therapy and whether both parents can afford to contribute to this. If the children to commence counselling, it is recommended that this report be released to any therapist the children attend upon.
2. It is also recommended that the parents commence using a communication App, such as Our Family Wizard (www.ourfamilywizard.com) so that they can communicate about and make plans for the children.
3. It is recommended that the parents undertake a post-separation parenting course. Such courses are facilitated by several community organisations such as [G Centre], [H Centre], and [L Centre].
4. 130. It is recommended that [Mr Stephenson] complete the parenting courses 'Tune into Kids' and 'Tune into Teens'.
5. It is recommended that consideration be given to [Mr Stephenson] undertaking a men's behaviour change program to assist him to manage his behaviour more appropriately and gain greater insight into the impact that his behaviour has on others.

1. An interim hearing is a curtailed hearing which proceeds on the documents filed by each party and tendered into evidence. That evidence is yet to be tested. There is no cross-examination of parties or witnesses about what they allege in their affidavits, and so where facts are in dispute the Court cannot make conclusive findings about those matters. As the Full Court observed in Franklyn & Franklyn [2019] FamCAFC 256 at [73]:

In interlocutory hearings, to the extent it is possible, judges are enjoined to make decisions about interim orders based on agreed facts, less contentious evidence, and inferences which fairly arise [citation omitted], but decisions must still be made despite contentious evidence. Judges are obliged to act on the strength of the evidence presented and, if it is relatively weak, are entitled to treat it so. Contrary to the inherent premise of (one parties) submissions... judges are not required to treat all untested evidence as bearing the same weight.

1. All parenting proceedings are governed by the provisions of Part VII of the Act.
2. Parenting orders are defined in section 64B of the Act, and deal with outcomes relevant to this decision, including parental responsibility and the 'live with' and 'spend time with' arrangements for children.
3. The power to make a parenting order is found in section 65D(1) of the Act. The power to make a parenting order that "discharges, varies, suspends or revives some or all of an earlier parenting order" is found in section 65D(2) of the Act.

1. Section 64B(2) of the Act stipulates that a parenting order may include the allocation of parental responsibility for a child. That order may deal with the allocation of responsibility for making decisions about major long-term issues in relation to a child.[1]
2. In the absence of a parenting order, section 61C of the Act stipulates that "each of the parents of a child who is not 18 has parental responsibility for the child."
3. Provided it is safe to do so, and subject to any Orders to the contrary, section 61CA of the Act encourages both parents to consult each other about their child's major long-term issues and in doing so, to have regard to the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration.

1. Section 60CA of the Act makes it clear for the purposes of making a parenting order, the Court must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration. What is considered to be in the best interests of children in a parenting dispute depends on the particular circumstances in each case, as different circumstances require different outcomes. That said, the Court must consider the considerations in section 60CC(2) of the Act (and the considerations in section 60CC(3) of the Act if the child is an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander child) in light of the available evidence.
2. Section 60CC(2) specifies the non-hierarchical criteria which must be considered in arriving at a conclusion as to what is in the child's best interests. The matters to be considered include:

(a) what arrangements would promote the safety (including safety from being subjected to, or exposed to, family violence, abuse, neglect, or other harm) of:

(i) the child; and

(ii) each person who has care of the child (whether or not a person has parental responsibility for the child);

(b) any views expressed by the child;[2]

(c) the developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs of the child;

(d) the capacity of each person who has or is proposed to have parental responsibility for the child to provide for the child's developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs;

(e) the benefit to the child of being able to have a relationship with the child's parents, and other people who are significant to the child, where it is safe to do so;

(f) anything else that is relevant to the particular circumstances of the child.

1. In contemplating the specified matters, section 60CC(2A) of the Act requires the Court to consider any history of family violence, abuse or neglect involving the child or a person caring for the child together with any family violence order that current or has previously applied to a child, or a member of the child's family.
2. In this case, the ICL proposes an order for sole parental responsibility (subject to a consultation process) on the basis of past alleged family violence and that it is not otherwise in the best interests of the children. As previously noted, the mother aligns with the ICL's proposal (but did not initially propose an interim order for sole parental responsibility) and the father proposes that the Court make no interim order for parental responsibility.

1. Section 60CG of the Act requires a Court when considering what parenting Order to make to ensure that whatever Order is made, it does not expose a person to an unacceptable risk of family violence and is consistent with any family violence order.
2. The issue of unacceptable risk has been discussed in numerous cases including by the High Court in the case of M v M (1988) HCA 68; (1988) 166 CLR 69. In this case both parties argue that the children have been exposed to family violence.
3. The issue was also more recently considered by the Full Court of this Court in Isles & Nelissen [2022] FedCFamC1A 97, where a five-member bench[3] agreed with the view expressed by Austin J in Fitzwater v Fitzwater [2019] FamCAFC 251 that rejected the proposition that a finding of unacceptable risk needs to be made according to the civil standard of proof. The Full Court found the following commentary of Austin J to be a correct statement of the law in Australia:[4]
   1. In civil proceedings, s 140(1) of the Evidence Act provides the "case of a party" must be found proven if the court is satisfied of its proof on the balance of probabilities. For that purpose, the "case of a party" is defined (in the Dictionary to the Evidence Act) to mean "the facts in issue in respect of which the party bears the legal burden of proof". The substantive law determines where the legal burden of proof falls in respect of facts in issue.
   2. It must be borne in mind that proceedings in respect of children under Part VII of the Act, while civil in nature, are not disputes inter partes in the ordinary sense of that expression because the court is not enforcing a parental right to custody or access (M v M at 76; ZP v PS [1994] HCA 29; (1994) 181 CLR 639 at 647). The paramount consideration in Part VII proceedings is the child's best interests (ss 60CA, 65AA of the Act). Unlike in other forms of civil litigation, no party bears an onus of proving the factual elements of a common law, equitable, or statutory cause of action to justify an entitlement to remedy. Rather, each party adduces evidence and propounds a suite of orders which he or she contends meets the child's best interests, which gives the proceedings a different character (CDJ v VAJ at 188-189). The resultant orders represent the court's discretionary judgment about how the child's interests will be best served and, due to the sheer breadth of the discretion, two judges may, with complete integrity and upon the same material, come to differing conclusions (CDJ v VAJ at 231).
   3. The conclusion reached by a court in Part VII proceedings, as reflected in the decrees it makes, is still premised upon proof of relevant facts and circumstances by evidence, but the law draws a distinction between proof of historical facts and the prediction of future possibilities. In determining what did or did not happen in the past, a court decides on the balance of probabilities, but not when hypothesising about future possibilities (Malec v J.C. Hutton Pty Ltd [1990] HCA 20; (1990) 169 CLR 638 ("Malec")).
   4. In Malec, Brennan and Dawson JJ said (at 639-640):

... facts of that [historical] kind are ascertained for the purposes of civil litigation on the balance of probabilities ... the ascertainment of [future] earning capacity involves an evaluation of possibilities, not establishing a fact as a matter of history ... the court must form an estimate of the likelihood that the possibility will occur ...

... To make a finding on the balance of probabilities as though the prospect were something that had occurred in the past was to misconceive the process of evaluation ...

and Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ said (at 643):

... The future may be predicted and the hypothetical may be conjectured ... Where proof is necessarily unattainable, it would be unfair to treat as certain a prediction which has a 51 per cent probability of occurring, but to ignore altogether a prediction which has a 49 per cent probability of occurring...

1. The High Court was there referring to the prediction of a plaintiff's income earning capacity in the context of quantifying personal injury damages, but the principle has been applied just as aptly to predictions about the risk of harm to children in this jurisdiction (see Oswald & Karrington (2016) FLC 93-726 at [60]; Bant & Clayton [2015] FamCAFC 222; (2015) 53 Fam LR 621 at [99], [107], [171], [172]). Such application of principle is consistent with M v M.
2. The assessment of risk is a predictive exercise and while it is, naturally enough, liable to be influenced by factual findings about past events, the contemplation of risk entails the foresight of possible harm. It is an oddity to expect that the mere possibility of future harm can or should be proven as a probability, as has been implied before (Potter and Potter [2007] FamCA 350; (2007) FLC 93-326 at [110], [129]). Risks of harm must be heeded even if they are improbable eventualities.
3. Speaking of the risk of some future occurrence is just another way of expressing the chance of it happening. The concept of chance lies along a continuum, encompassing all outcomes which lie in the range between highly probable and remotely possible, assuming the polar extremes of certainty are ignored. In the current context, the higher the chance of the children's sexual abuse, the greater the risk of their physical or psychological harm. At some point on the continuum the risk of such harm becomes so potent it cannot be tolerated: it is unacceptable.
4. It cannot be correct that the unacceptable risk of a child's sufferance of harm through future sexual abuse can only ever be established if it is proven as a fact, on the balance of probabilities, that the child (or another) has already been sexually abused in the past. Depending upon the strength of the evidence placed before the court, the possibility of past sexual abuse may of itself be sufficient to establish the chance of future sexual abuse. That has long been accepted as true (Nikolakis & Nikolakis [2010] FamCAFC 52 at [41], [44], [49]-[53], [96]; Partington & Cade (No.2) [2009] FamCAFC 230; (2009) FLC 93-422 at [56]- [61]; Johnson and Page at [68], [71], [76], [77]).
5. Indeed, that was exactly the factual scenario in M v M. There, the trial judge concluded it was possible the father had sexually abused the subject child, but could not make a positive finding it had occurred on the balance of probabilities, and therefore discharged the "access" order (as it was then described) to eliminate the future risk of the child being sexually abused by the father. The father's appeal was dismissed because the possibility of the child's past sexual abuse was sufficient, on the evidence adduced in that case, to establish the unacceptably high risk of the child's future sexual abuse.
6. As was recognised by Hale LJ (as her Ladyship then was) in Re C and B (Children) (Care Order: Future Harm) [2001] 1 F.L.R 611 at [28], in child-related proceedings, a comparatively small risk of really serious harm can justify action, while even the virtual certainty of slight harm might not. It could hardly be otherwise, because no prudent adult would willingly expose a child to the risk of sexual abuse when there is an unacceptably high chance of its occurrence, even though the chance is not proven by the evidence to be probable. Requiring the proof of any possible future child abuse as a probability would pervert the law as settled by the High Court in M v M and Malec."

1. Pursuant to section 60CC(2)(a) of the Act the Court must have regard to that arrangement which would promote the "safety" of a child and those who have care of the child.[5] While the word "safety" is not defined in the Act, words in a statutory context should be given their ordinary or natural meaning.[6]
2. The Court favours the view that "safety" of a child and its carer means, in this context, protecting that child and carer against hurt or injury or danger, whether physical or psychological, arising from historic or ongoing acts or behaviours. It includes protection from fear. It is not the complete elimination of prospective hurt, injury or danger, but rather making such Order as affords the child and its carer the most optimal protection from these harms or potential harms.
3. In contemplating the child's safety, or by natural implication any risk of an unacceptable nature to that safety posed by a proposal, the Court is mandated to consider any history of family violence, abuse or neglect involving the child or a person caring for the child, together with any family violence Order previously or currently in place.
4. The assessment of risk, or the existence of indicators of potential harm, is an evidence-based conclusion referable to the statutory framework and is not discretionary.[7] The finding about whether an unacceptable risk to safety exists, based on known facts and circumstances, is either open on the evidence or it is not.[8]
5. The central task of the Court is to assess the risk of harm posed to the child and to determine what orders should be made to ameliorate that risk. Intrinsic to that process is the need to assess the strength of the evidence it is suggested demonstrates that risk.[9] Inconsistencies and anomalies can reduce the weight given to evidence.[10]
6. The Court must then examine the evidence carefully to determine whether it establishes an unacceptable risk of harm.[11] Some risk arising to a child's safety may be capable of amelioration by further Order of the Court.[12] A risk of some occurrence may be tolerable, but an unacceptably high risk of the same occurrence is not.[13]

1. As stated, the ICL proposes that all five children spend supervised time only with the father.
2. The ICL asks the Court to note that the parties each make serious allegations of family violence against the other including physical violence, emotional and verbal abuse and coercive and controlling behaviour (further noting that these allegations are referred to at paragraphs 77 to 81 of Mr K's report). While the ICL acknowledges that these allegations are substantially untested, the ICL argues that given their seriousness, significant caution is warranted. The ICL submits (ICL's Case Outline, 14 August 2025, page 9):

... It is clear to the ICL that there is an extremely high level of conflict within the family. The mother reports being extremely fearful of the father and does not wish to disclose her address to the father ... The parents each refer to some mental health issues in respect to each other. However, neither party has been diagnosed with any mental health condition. The ICL refers to paragraphs 82 to 85 of the expert report ... No drug, alcohol or substance abuse issues have been raised by either parent.

1. In respect to the mother's allegations of family violence against the father, the ICL referred the Court to paragraph 107 of Mr K's report (previously extracted in these reasons) where the single expert seriously questions the safety of the children in the father' care. That said, at paragraph 108 of the report, Mr K commented that if the father's account of the mother's allegations "are found to be accurate, then it suggests she has trouble managing her temper and lashes out violently and does not take responsibility for her actions".
2. The ICL also asks the Court to note that there was a previous Apprehended Domestic Violence Order "(ADVO") in place protecting the child X from the father. The ADVO application was initiated by the NSW Police against the father following disclosures made by X initially to the mother and subsequently to the police in respect to "sexual touching". The interim ADVO dated mid-2022 restrained the father from having any contact with X. In mid-2023 a 12-month final ADVO was made against the father. However, the conditions were varied permitting the father to live with the family. That ADVO expired in mid-2024 and there is no current ADVO in place. While no charges were laid against the father following the child's disclosure, the father previously had a working with children clearance which was subsequently revoked following the ADVO.

1. The mother also asks the Court to take a cautious approach to ensure the children are safe from a continuation of family violence. While the mother acknowledges that there are limitations on the Court making fact findings at an interim stage, she submits that "those allegations, given the seriousness of them and the evidence of the impact of the alleged conduct has had on the Wife and the children, the Court cannot ignore such evidence" (Mother's Case Outline, 11 September 2025, page 6). The also argues that (Mother's Case Outline, 11 September 2025, page 5):

It is clear from the Husband's affidavit [that] he takes no responsibility for his conduct seeking to shift the blame of his poor relationship with his children to the Wife contending she is undermining the relationship. This complete lack of insight into his conduct and the consequences of the same in relation to his relationship with not only the Wife but his children would cause significant concern about a continuation of such conduct in the future on the part of the Husband.

1. In response to the father's assertion that the mother did not oppose Y and Z spending unsupervised time with him, the mother asserted that this occurred without her consent and was a clear example of the father's ongoing coercive control over both the mother and the children.

1. The father submits that both parties accept that the children have been through significant upheaval with the breakdown of the parties' relationship. In addition, the father submits that it "is equally evident [the children] have been involved in the dispute and sided with their Mother" (Father's Case Outline, 11 September 2025, page 8)
2. Notwithstanding the older children's estrangement with the father, the father argues that there is evidence that, post-separation, Y and Z have spent time with him after school/daycare once a fortnight on multiple occasions without supervision. That said, the father concedes for the benefit of the older children, and their need to feel safe, there should be a period of regular supervised time prior to supervision being lifted.
3. The father asked the Court to take particular note of the following comments made by Mr K in his report that support the view that it is in the best interests of the children to be "reunited with their father, the question therefore is how best to facilitate the time to ensure that the respective children's relationship with their father is fostered and the older children 'feel safe'" (Father's Case Outline, 11 September 2025, page 9):
   • "It will be important for [W] to try and repair his relationship with this father as rejecting a parent can have deleterious long term consequences for children" (paragraph 98).
   • "It will also be important for [X]'s emotional and psychological wellbeing that she be afforded some opportunity to repair her relationship with her father" (paragraph 99).
   • "[Y] is likely to be missing his father... it will be important for [Y] to spend regular and consistent time with [Mr Stephenson]" (paragraph 100).
   • "[Z], too, would likely be missing her father so it will be important for her to spend predictable and consistent time with him" (paragraph 101).
   • "The family violence allegations and the dynamics of this family require further comprehensive assessment, however, it may be prudent, given the children's views (outlined below) that any time [Mr Stephenson] has with the children, on an interim basis, be supervised at a contact centre (addressed below)" (paragraph 109).
   • "...the children's need for safety, routine and structure and an opportunity to spend time with their father in a way they will feel safe will need to be given priority above all other considerations" (paragraph 112).
   • "This assessment suggests that [W] and [X]'s relationships with [Mr Stephenson] are in peril of collapsing altogether if no action is taken to try and salvage them and especially if they are not given the opportunity to see and spend to see and spend time with their father" (paragraph 117).
   • "The children spending supervised time is not considered to be a suitable long-term solution as it impedes children's relationships with their parents from developing and minimises the ability for parents to play an active role in their children's lives across all domains" (paragraph 119).
   • "Therefore, the timeframe for such an arrangement to be in place will required determination by the Court but it is recommended that such an arrangement be in place for up to six months. It is impossible to make any comprehensive recommendations about the children's time in [Mr Stephenson]'s care without them first spending some time with him in an environment and under conditions they will likely feel supported in and tolerate" (paragraph 120).
   • "Whilst [Ms Baird] suggested the children spend time with [Mr Stephenson] on a fortnightly basis because they have busy, happy weekends, such frequency is not sufficient to give the older children the opportunity to develop a sense of feeling safe in their father's care and [Y] and [Z] to continue developing their relationships with him" (paragraph 124).
4. The father further submits (Father's Case Outline, 11 September 2025, pages 9 to 10):

The determination as to how long supervision should occur is one to be made by the Court, the Expert merely. recommending "up to six months". That is neither a recommendation of one month supervision nor 6 months supervision, merely a range of periods for which supervision could occur because, as the Expert said, it is impossible to make any comprehensive recommendations about the children's time in [Mr Stephenson]'s care without them first spending some time with him in an environment and under conditions they will likely feel supported in and tolerate.

And the risk is that if supervision goes on for too long, that will also place the children's relationship with their father at peril, particularly the older children.

In considering what period is appropriate one needs to look at the children's existing relationship with the Father.

We know the Father has continued to spend time, with [Y] and [Z], collecting them from school on a fortnightly basis. There is no suggestion that that time has not gone well ...

The older children's relationship with their father is more vexed given they have been witnesses to the breakdown of their parents' relationship, have sided with their mother and have to a certain degree been enlisted by her in her dispute against their father - whether it be having them record interactions, telling them of the family's financial woes (which the Mother blames the Father for) or confiding in them generally when she is upset with the Father.

The Father proposes a fortnightly supervised visit with the 3 older children for a period of 3 months in order that they may rebuild the trust in their relationship. After that supervision would be lifted and time would continue, albeit not overnight for a further 3 months ... the Mother would be at liberty to relist the matter if the supervision reports indicated that supervision should not be lifted.

After 6 months all children would spend alternate weekends unsupervised with the father.

This regime would also give the older children some opportunity to obtain professional therapeutic support as recommended by the Expert and for the parties to undertake their own development by way of parenting after separation courses and for the Father to undertake "Tune into Kids" and "Tune into Teens" as recommended by [Mr K].

The children: section 60CC(2)(b), (c), (e) and (f)

1. By virtue of sections 60CC(2)(b), (c), (e) and (f) of the Act, the Court must have regard to:
   • the views expressed by the child or children;
   • the developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs of the child or children;
   • the benefit to the child or children of being able to have a relationship with the child's parents, and other people who are significant to the child, where it is safe to do so; and
   • anything else that is relevant to the particular circumstance of the child.
2. As noted, the children were all seen by Mr K and the elder their children expressed their concerns about their relationship with the father and this is discussed further below.

1. The Court notes the following submissions from the ICL in relation to the children's views (ICL's Case Outline, 14 August 2025, pages 12 to 13):

At paragraph 27 of the expert report [Mr K] reports in respect to [V]: "[V]accepts that his father wants to see and spend time with the children saying "yes, that is fair", and he believes his mother would support this. He said he does not want to live with his father but would spend some time with him". The ICL notes the contents of the following paragraph 28 which states "He said that his mother also talks to him if she is upset about [Mr Stephenson] and he perceives that this has had some impact on the way he feels about his father".

[V]'s views as to his siblings spending 5 nights per fortnight with their father is referred to at paragraph 26 of the expert report which states "[V] looked shocked and said "hell no" when the writer told him [Mr Stephenson] proposed to have the children in his care for five nights per fortnight. At paragraph 116 of his report the court expert states "[V], whilst primarily negative about his father, indicated that he would be willing to spend some time with him".

ln respect to [W]'s wishes paragraph 33 of the expert report states "[W] said that he does not really want to have any contact with his father. When asked about enjoying his time with [Mr Stephenson] on [Mr Stephenson]'s boat, [W] spoke about the boat initially being fun, however, on one occasion his father took the boat out in bad weather and he ([W]) and his siblings got scared".

[X] reportedly does not have anything positive to say about her father. Paragraph 40 of the expert report states, "[X] described her father as "big, cranky and aggressive" and described their relationship as "bad, bad, bad". She expressed having little to no confidence in her father doing anything to try and improve their relationship and said, if he did, "he would only do it to get me on his side, so he gets more power".

In respect to [W] and [X] paragraph 117 of the expert report states "This assessment suggests that [W] and [X]'s relationships with [Mr Stephenson] are in peril of collapsing altogether if no action is taken to try and salvage them and especially if they are not given the opportunity to see and spend time with their father".

The report writer did not spend any time alone with [Y] who is non-verbal and reportedly fell asleep by the time of the interviews. The report writer spent some time with [Z] who is aged 4 years [...] as at the date of the interviews. Paragraph 46 of the expert report states "The writer asked [Z] who lives in the house, and she replied "Mummy, [V], [W], [X] and [Y]". The writer asked her about her 'Daddy' and she replied "Daddy, I don't have a Daddy". The writer told [Z] she does have a 'Daddy', and she replied "oh, Daddy [Stephenson]".

At paragraph 115 the court expert provides the following evaluation of the children's wishes:

"The children's views were very clear about the time they want - or do not want - with their father. The older three children appear to have negative views of their father; they are primarily rejecting of him and do not want to take action to improve their relationships with him. Their involvement in the parental conflict, especially recording their father and interactions between the parents, has undoubtedly had some impact on their relationships with their father and the way they perceive him and their safety around him. Whilst [Ms Baird] provided a cogent explanation about why she involved the children in such behaviour, it appears she did not give sufficient thought to the possible negative impact such involvement could have on their already tenuous relationships with their father".

1. The Court further notes that the ICL met with the children on 9 August 2025 by videoconference. On page 13 of the ICL's Case Outline document, the ICL states that the "views and wishes of the children as expressed to the court expert were consistent with comments made by the children to the ICL".
2. The ICL also outlines his submissions in relation to section 60CC(2)(c), (e) and (f) of the Act on pages 11 to 18 of his Case Outline document.

1. The Court notes the following submissions from the mother about the children's views (Mother's Case Outline, 11 September 2025, pages 6 to 7):
   1. The Single Expert, [Mr K], addresses the expressed views of the children which make it clear that none of the children express a view to spend time with their Husband in accordance with his proposal of five nights per fortnight. The three elder children presently hold very negative views about spending time with their Husband.
   2. The Single Expert, [Mr K], summarises and evaluates the children's wishes at paragraph 115 of his Report where he says:

The children's views were very clear about the time they want- or do not want- with their father. The older three children appear to have negative views of their father; they are primarily rejecting of him and do not want to take action to improve their relationship with him.

1. The mother also outlines his submissions in relation to section 60CC(2)(c), (e) and (f) of the Act on pages 7 to 8 of her Case Outline document. This includes the following submissions:
   1. In relation to the children's relationship with the Husband, it is clear, particularly from the Child Impact Report, that the three older children have a very fractured relationship with their father arising from their lived experiences including the ongoing conflict post-separation.
   2. Whilst it is accepted that ordinarily it is in the best interests of children to spend time with each parent and have a relationship to the best extent possible, however, it must be in a safe environment. As identified by the Single Expert, forcing unsupervised time on the children at this stage will raise issues of them feeling safe and it is submitted that it could be counter­ productive ...
   3. It is evident from the nature of the Application sought on behalf of the Husband for the children to live with him for five nights per fortnight and half school holidays, that he either has no regard for the children's views or needs taking into account the history of trauma they have suffered or that he simply cannot identify those matters.
   4. This is unsurprising given the content of his Affidavit and his largely blanket denial or ability to take any responsibility for his involvement in the situation the children now face.
   5. This is a relevant consideration what parenting Orders promote the safety for the children in circumstances where given the Husband's position, it is likely that he will simply not change his behaviour.

1. In relation to the children's 'views', the father submits the following (Father's Case Outline, 11 September 2025, page 10):
   1. No weight would be placed upon the views of [Z] (given her age) and [Y] was not interviewed given his condition.
   2. In relation to [V], [W] and [X], somewhat unsurprisingly given the history of the matter, they had little positive to say about the Father to the Single Expert. That said. [V] did tell the Expert he wanted to spend some time with him (CIA#27).
   3. Notwithstanding their less than favourable views of the Father, the Single Expert is of the opinion that it is critical that time be resumed as quickly as possible as the long term impact upon the children of not having a relationship with their father will be significantly deleterious to their overall wellbeing in the future.
2. While the father notes that Y has been diagnosed with Level 3 Autism Spectrum Disorder ("ASD"), Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder ("ADHD"), global developmental delay and severe behavioural issues, he argues that there is nothing otherwise about Y or the other children that would inhibit the Court making orders along the same terms as proposed by him.

1. The capacity of a parent to ensure the safety of a child, is further a consideration under section 60CC(2)(d) of the Act, requiring as it does consideration of the capacity of each person who has or is proposed to have parental responsibility for the child to provide for the child's developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs.

1. The ICL asks the Court to note paragraph 88 of Mr K's report where he states:
   1. [Ms Baird] asserts that the children are at risk in [Mr Stephenson]'s care because he has very limited parenting capacity and cannot manger his temper which was directed towards the children on occasion.
2. The ICL further asked the Court to note that the father reports to living in Airbnb accommodation and that he is seeking to spend five nights per fortnight with them.

1. The mother gives considerable evidence in relation to the father's alleged perpetration of family violence and the impact it has had on her and the children, which she argues is corroborated, at least in part, by the children. The mother argues that this evidence raises serious questions as to the father's parenting capacity. Moreover, the mother argues that the father has had limited involvement in the children's lives throughout their upbringing which, when compounded with his alleged inability to control his temper towards the children, puts into question his parenting capacity.

1. The father submits the following (Father's Case Outline, 11 September 2025, pages 10 to 11):
   1. The Father has not spent any time with the 3 eldest children for over 9 months and the 2 youngest children for a number of months.
   2. Whilst there are some concerns raised about the Father's ability to meet the children's needs, it is submitted the regime of time proposed by him is somewhat limited, and significantly given it is supervised, both the Mother and the Court will have the benefit of supervision reports which it is submitted will provide the necessary comfort that he is able to appropriately care for them.

1. As noted earlier, section 61CA of the Act encourages the parents of a child, where it is safe to do so, to consult each other about major long-term issues in relation to a child and in doing so, to have regard to the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration. Should a parenting order deal with the allocation of responsibility for making decisions about major long-term issues in relation to the child, then provision can be made for joint or sole decision-making in relation to all or specified major long-term issues. Any encouragement of consultation is rendered obligatory upon the making of a joint parental responsibility order requiring each person to consult each other in relation to such a decision and to make a genuine effort to come to a joint decision.
2. As noted earlier, the issue of parental responsibility is in dispute. The ICL proposes that the Court make an interim order for the mother to have sole parental responsibility. This is opposed by the father. Interestingly, as also noted previously, the mother did not propose any parental responsibility order in her Minute of orders attached to her Case Outline.
3. While the ICL submitted that they would not normally seek orders in respect to interim parental responsibility, this matter was a special case as "there are 5 children with divergent needs, [Y] who has special needs, the age of the children, the lack of communication between the parents and the high level of conflict between the parents" (ICL's Case Outline, 14 August 2025, page 18).
4. The ICL asked the Court to note the following comments from Mr K at paragraph 110 of his report:
   1. It is also unlikely, if [Ms Baird]'s allegations are found to be accurate, that the parents will be able to share decision-making responsibility for the children and sole decision making responsibility may need to be assigned to the parent whose care the children are in for the majority of the time.
5. The father submits that it "is premature to make any order as to parental responsibility and there appears to be no compelling reason why it would be addressed on an interim basis" (Father's Case Outline, 11 September 2025, page 7).

1. Having considered the submissions in light of the available evidence and the relevant statutory provisions and case law, the Court finds as follows.

Whether there should be an interim order for parental responsibility

1. The Court is not persuaded, on the available evidence, to make any order for parental responsibility on an interim basis.
2. While the parties have multiple disputes presently before the Court, much of their disagreement is in respect of financial matters arising from the breakdown of their relationship. The change in the children's schools for example in relation to the three elder children appears to have been necessitated by the father's decision to stop paying the school fees for their former private schools. The father, in turn, argues that he no longer has the funds necessary for such due to the impact that the cancellation of his 'Working With Children Check' clearance has had on his income. In due course the evidence relevant to these outcomes will be tested. At this time, however, the Court does not find it to be in the children's best interests for an order to be made for the mother to have sole parental responsibility. That does not mean that the Court makes any criticisms of any decisions taken by the mother post-separation. In any event, it does not appear there are any issues arising from the arrangements currently in place for the children's educational and medical needs nor any serious contentions in relation to other issues (such as religion) which would require the Court to make such a determination at this interim stage.
3. The Court finds accordingly.

Whether different arrangements should be made for the younger children's time with the father, and if so, whether the younger' children's time should be supervised

1. There is no disagreement between the parties that the three older children should resume spending time with the father in a supervised setting, at least in the short term.
2. The issue for the Court to determine is whether the two younger children should also spend the same supervised time with the father together with their three older siblings. This, in turn, raises several concerns for this Court. Firstly, the two younger children are developmentally different to their siblings which may create some difficulties for the father, the supervisor and the three older children as to how the two-hour supervised period would both be practically managed in a manner which is productive for all five children particularly given Z and Y's higher needs. Secondly, if the Court accepts that the supervision is necessary to shield and support the three older children as they reconnect and improve their fractured relationship with their father, it does not follow automatically that supervision is necessary for the two younger children given they have been spending unsupervised time with the father, albeit for short periods of time, post separation. While the risk to the three older children spending unsupervised time would be both counterproductive and arguably unacceptable at this time (as was sensibly accepted by both parties), the same cannot be said for the two younger children.
3. Given the above concerns, the Court is persuaded by the argument that different parenting arrangements for the two younger children are appropriate on an interim basis. Moreover, the Court is unable to find that there is an unacceptable risk in the two younger children spending unsupervised time with the father, provided that time is for short periods occurring in daylight hours.
4. The Court acknowledges the mother's submission that the time which has occurred between the father and the two younger children has, in effect, been a "continuation of coercive and controlling behaviour". The Court accepts the parties both making competing assertions as to the nature of this time, whether notice was given, and about broader concerns relating to family violence. That said, the Court does not accept the mother's submission that she did not stop the time because she was either afraid of the father or concerned about exposing the children to police intervention. The Court is satisfied that this time has occurred on a number of occasions during a period when these proceedings have been before the Court, where no application for a restraint was prosecuted, and where both parties were represented. There is no evidence before this Court which would indicate that the mother's concerns about this time where either raised with the father directly or through the parties' solicitors. It is otherwise somewhat illogical for the mother to argue that she was afraid to discuss this specific issue with the father when she otherwise had no difficulty actively litigating a number of other issues with him.
5. Whilst the parties competing assertions will ultimately need to be tested, the Court is not satisfied that the potential risk is so substantial as to require the two younger children's time with their father to be supervised, particularly in circumstances where the time will be restricted to short periods of daytime only. The Court otherwise accepts the time between the two younger children, and the father has been sporadic. Whilst the Court places no weight on the mother's contention that the sporadicity of the time should reflect poorly on the father's insight, given she has facilitated this ad hoc arrangement, the Court accepts it is undesirable. Given this, the Court does not find that it is in the two younger children's best interests for their time with the father to include Thursdays or increase to overnight time at this stage. The Court will accordingly make orders and find that the two younger children should spend unsupervised time with the father each Monday (commencing 13 October 2025) for a period of two (2) hours after school or daycare as agreed, and failing agreement from 3.00pm to 5.00pm with the father to collect the children from their relevant school/daycare and to return the children to the mother at McDonalds Suburb B. The Court is satisfied this will ensure the two younger children's time with the father progresses in a consistent, routine manner and otherwise notes this will constitute an overall increase in their time with the father.
6. The Court otherwise notes the parties were not agreed as to the frequency with which supervised time should occur between the father and the three older children. The Court notes the ICL, supported by the father, proposed that the time should occur each week on a Thursday from 4:30pm to 6:30pm, whilst the mother also proposed time should occur on Thursday, she proposed it occur on a fortnightly basis. The parties did not address this issue in detail in submissions. The Child Impact Report writer Mr K explicitly commented that, in their view, fortnightly time would not be "sufficient to give the older children the opportunity to develop a sense of feeling safe in their father's care". In such circumstances, the Court is satisfied and finds that it is in the best interests of the three older children that they commence spending supervised time with father for two (2) hours once a week in the form proposed by the ICL.
7. The Court finds accordingly.

Whether the children's time with the father should progress to unsupervised and overnight time

1. The Court is not satisfied that it is in the best interests of the three older children that the supervision of their time with the father should automatically transition to unsupervised time by December this year or otherwise increase as he proposes. While the Court understands the logic underpinning the father's argument, there appears to be an assumption that the time will go well and that the relevant children's relationship will repair to the point that they would willingly wish to spend unsupervised time with the father, further progressing to overnight block time within six months. While that may be possible, some oversight of the supervised time is warranted to ensure the overall safety of the children in circumstances where it is undisputed the relationship between the three older children and the father is significantly fractured at this time.
2. Consequently, the Court is satisfied that it is in the best interests of the older children that their time with the father continue on a supervised basis as outlined above without change unless otherwise agreed in writing between the parties. The Court acknowledges this outcome may result in further litigation, noting the father's specific application with respect to the Christmas period. Nevertheless, the Court is satisfied a cautious approach is in all five children's best interests given the issues raised in this case. That said, it is obvious that if the time progresses in a positive manner, it would be appropriate for the ICL to seek assistance from NSW Legal Aid to sponsor a mediation in respect of parenting matters that could occur at the appropriate time with the benefit of supervision reports. Should that mediation fail to produce an agreed outcome (interim or final), it may then be appropriate for either party to file a further interim application seeking changes to the interim parenting arrangements.
3. The Court finds accordingly.

Whether the parties should equally share the cost of supervision and the children's therapy or whether the father should bear these costs

1. While the Court understands the even-handed approach taken by the ICL in proposing that the parties equally pay the costs of supervision, the Court finds it appropriate at this time that the costs of supervision be paid for by the father.
2. The Court has reserved its judgement in relation to issues relevant to interim spousal maintenance orders, interim child support departure, and interim property distribution. That said, the father plainly has a significant child support debt owing to the mother. He otherwise plainly earns a higher income than the mother who is responsible for the primary care of the children.
3. The Court finds accordingly.

Whether the children's agreed engagement in therapy should occur concurrently with the older children's time with the father or whether it should be delayed and whether the parties should pay for the agreed therapy in equal shares or whether the father should pay all those costs

1. The Court finds that it is in the children's best interests that the proposed therapy should not be delayed and should occur in tandem with the three older children's supervised time with the father. This issue was not discussed in depth during submissions, and there was no cogent reason put forward to delay the older children's engagement in therapy.
2. For the same reasons outlined above, the Court also finds that the applicable therapy costs should be borne by the father subject to any Medicare rebate or payment of any private health insurance benefit (if applicable).
3. The Court finds accordingly.

1. The Court's findings are now stated.
2. In summary, the Court will make orders for:
   • Paragraphs 4 and 6 of the Orders dated 18 September 2025 to be varied to reflect that the older children only will spend supervised time with the father at the father's expense and for a new provision to be added to enable the younger children to spend time with the father each Monday (commencing 13 October 2025) for a period of two (2) hours after school or daycare as agreed, and failing agreement, from 3.00pm to 5.00pm.
   • Paragraph 7 of the Orders dated 18 September 2025 be varied to require the father to collect the younger children from their relevant school/preschool/daycare centre and return them to the mother at McDonalds Suburb B.
   • Paragraph 14 of Orders dated 18 September 2025 to be varied to require the parties to cause the children to attend non­reportable counselling or therapy with Ms D or such other therapist or counsellor as determined by the mother and for the father to pay the costs of the therapist subject to being entitled to the proceeds of any rebate received from Medicare or private health insurance on the costs payable (if applicable).
3. In addition, Orders will be made in similar terms to paragraphs 20 and 21 of the Orders dated 18 September 2025 to enable:
   • each party to be to serve a copy of the additional Orders upon the children's schools/pre-schools/daycare centre, their nominated General Practitioner or to any emergency services; and
   • the mother to be able to provide a copy of the additional Orders to any therapist, counsellor or psychologist attended on by any of the children.
4. The question of costs arising from the interim hearing of the parties' parenting dispute can be reserved to the final hearing.
5. Further case management directions will be provided by the Court following the release of the Court's reserved decision in respect of the parties' interim property, spousal maintenance and child support disputes.
6. There will be Orders of the Court in accordance with these reasons.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and twenty-four (124) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Monahan.

THE COURT ORDERS BY CONSENT PENDING FURTHER ORDER THAT:

Live with and spend time with arrangements of the children

1. V born in 2010, W born in 2012, X born in 2015, Y born in 2017, and Z born in 2020 (collectively referred to herein as "the children") live with the mother.
2. Within seven (7) days of these orders the parties do all things necessary and sign all documents required to complete any and all intake procedures at a supervision centre or service agreed to by the parties in writing to enable the children to commence spending supervised time with the father.
3. In the event that the parties are unable to agree as to a suitable supervision entre or service within 7 days of these orders the supervision service shall be either M Contact Centre, N Contact Centre or O Contact Centre as determined by the Independent Children's Lawyer.
4. The children spend time with the father supervised by the supervision centre or Service provided for by these Orders for a period of two (2) hours on one (1) day each week at dates and times agreed to by the parties in writing and in the absence of agreement between the parties on dates and times as determined by the said supervision service or centre.
5. IT IS NOTED THAT V may spend time with or have such communications with the father in accordance with his wishes.
6. In the event that the parties agree on a suitable third party to supervise time between the children and the father and such third party executes appropriate Undertakings which are filed with the Court the children's lime with the father shall be supervised by such third party and this order shall be in substitution for Orders 2 to 4 herein with time to be on one (1) day each week for periods not exceeding four (4) hours.

1. All changeovers shall be at a public venue agreed to by the parties in writing and in the absence of such agreement as follows:

(a) As determined by the supervision service; and

(b) Where supervision is by an agreed third party other than a supervision service at the closet McDonalds to the half-way point between each parent's place of residence.

1. Unless otherwise agreed between the parties the children shall have telephone/face time communications with the father not before 6:00pm and not after 6:30pm each Tuesday.
2. The mother shall do all things necessary to facilitate telephone/facetime communications between the children and the father.

1. WITHOUT ADMISSION the mother and the father be restrained from the following: -

(a) Exposing the children to violence including physical or verbal threats or intimidation, whether such threats or intimidation or violence be directed at the children, the mother, the father or any other member of either party's household;

(b) Physically disciplining the children;

(c) Denigrating the other party or members of the other party's family in the presence or heading of the children and each party shall do all acts and things reasonably necessary to prevent any other person doing so;

(d) Conveying messages through the children and or using the child as a go-between to convey messages to each other;

(e) Discussing these proceedings or any issues arising out of these proceedings with the children or permitting any third party to do so; and

(f) Making critical or derogatory remarks on social media, such as Facebook or Twitter in relation to the other parent or referring in any way to the proceedings.

Attendance by the parents at courses, programmes and on mental health professionals

1. In the event that they have no already done so each of the parents are to enrol in and complete a parenting after separation programme such as the keeping contact programme offered by G Centre or equivalent such programme offered by H Centre or L Centre.
2. The father shall forthwith enrol in and complete the following parenting programmes:

(a) Tune into Kids (noting the father has now enrolled in, but is yet to complete, this programme); and

(b) Tuning into Teens.

1. The father shall forthwith enrol in and complete a men's behaviour change programme and in particular the 18-week "Taking Responsibility" programme offered by H Centre.

Attendance by the children at therapy/counselling

1. In order to the facilitate the children's attendance at therapy or counselling the mother shall attend upon her GP in order to obtain any required mental health plans for the children.
2. The parties and the Independent Children's Lawyer are restrained from issuing any subpoena to the child's therapist or counsellor referred to in the proceeding order.
3. The Independent Children's Lawyer is authorised by these orders to speak or communicate with the children's therapist or counsellor.

1. These orders operate as an authority of any professional care provider for the children (whether school, doctor, allied health care workers, hospital, extra-curricular activity, director or otherwise) to release any information and/or discuss with both parents separately concerning the care, welfare and development of the children to all parties. Should any party seek any documentation in relation to the children (including but not limited to notices, reports, photographs, and order forms), the party seeking any documentation is to be responsible for any expense involved.
2. The parties are both entitled to receive from the school or preschool that the children attend, any information regarding the children that she or he requests, including but not limited to school reports, correspondence, school notices, invitations to attend parent/teacher interviews and other activities to which parents are invited and school photographs and order forms.
3. Nothing in these orders shall prevent either parent from attending any school event in which parents are ordinarily invited to attend provided that the parents shall provide to each other at least 48 hours' notice of their intention to attend on any school event or function.

1. Each party is permitted to serve a copy of these Orders upon the children's schools, and on pre-school, their nominated General Practitioner or to any emergency services.
2. A copy of these orders and the short form expert report prepared by [Mr K] and dated 24 July 2025 may be provided by the mother to any therapist, counsellor or psychologist attended by any of the children.
3. In the event that any of the children shall suffer any injury, be hospitalised or suffers any significant illness the parent in whose care the child/children is/are in shall notify the other parent immediately except in the case of emergency where they shall do so as soon as is reasonably practicable.

AND THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS BY CONSENT PENDING FURTHER ORDER THAT:

1. From the date of these Orders and pending further order, the parties be restrained by way of injunction from further encumbering the property situated at and known as P Street, Suburb Q in the State of New South Wales, folio identifier ... ("the Suburb Q Property"), drawing down on the mortgage secured against the Suburb Q Property, accessing any redraw facility available on any loan secured against the Suburb Q Property or doing anything to reduce the equity in the Suburb Q property.
2. The husband be restrained (whether by himself, or by his officers agents or assigns) from disposing, transferring, selling, encumbering or otherwise altering any interest he may have whether directly or indirectly in all companies and trusts in which he has an interest, including but not limited to any of the following:

(a) R Trust;

(b) S Trust;

(c) Stephenson Family Trust;

(d) T Pty Ltd;

(e) U Pty Ltd; and

(f) V Pty Ltd.

1. The husband be restrained from taking any steps to effect, induce or otherwise procure:

(a) a change in officeholdings of the company;

(b) a change in the shareholders and or change in the beneficial entitlements of shares of the company;

(c) a change in the Constitution, Articles of Association and or Memorandum of Understanding of the company;

(d) a change in the trustee of the trust;

(e) a change in the trust deed of the trust;

(f) a change in the power of appointment of the trust;

(g) a change in the persons entitled to benefit from the assets form the company or trust;

(h) a reduction in the net assets of the company or trust other than in the ordinary course of business;

(i) a distribution of profits of the trust other than in the ordinary course of business; and

(j) an increase in the indebtedness, otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade from the level of indebtedness as existing on and from 23 May 2025, for any of the following companies and trusts:

(i) R Trust;

(ii) S Trust;

(iii) Stephenson Family Trust;

(iv) T Pty Ltd;

(v) U Pty Ltd;

(vi) AA Pty Ltd; and

(vii) Any other entity of which the husband has an interest.

1. The parties engage a mediator at their expense and participate in a mediation conference by no later than 30 November 2025 in an attempt to resolve their property dispute.
2. By no later than 4:00pm on 23 September 2025 the wife provide the names of three appropriately qualified mediators together with their costs to the husband.
3. By no later than 4:00pm on 26 September 2025 the husband select one mediator from those nominated by the wife, for the parties to jointly instruct.
4. The directions hearing listed on 24 September 2025 be vacated.

1. The interim judgement be reserved to a time and date to be fixed.
2. The parties have leave to approach the Court with a signed minute of consent order with respect to their participation in mediation or otherwise resolving any part of their interim dispute.
3. The parties have liberty to approach the Court for the matter to be relisted with respect to any issues in relation to the appointment of a single expert report writer.

1. Orders 1 to 22 herein (with some minor amendments by the Court) reflect the Minute of Orders proposed by the Independent Children's Lawyer ("ICL") and consented to by the parties.
2. The relevant interim issues for determination are:

(i) Whether the mother should have sole parental responsibility for the children;

(ii) Whether different arrangements should be made for the younger children's time with the father, and if so, whether the younger children's time with the father should be supervised;

(iii) Whether the children's time with the father (as applicable) should progress to unsupervised and overnight time;

(iv) Whether the parties should equally share the cost of supervision and the children's therapy (as the father and ICL seek) or whether the father should bear these costs (as the mother seeks);

(v) Upon noting that the parties agree that the children should engage in therapy and the form of order proposed by the ICL (save for the payment of the therapist's costs), whether the children's engagement in therapy should occur concurrently with the older children's time with the father (as the father and ICL seek) or whether it should be delayed (as the mother seeks);

(vi) Whether orders should be made to cause payment of the entirety of the trust account funds in the name of both parties operated by the father's solicitors to the mother (as the mother seeks) or whether these monies should be paid in equal shares to the parties (as the father seeks) further noting that the father will consent to his one half share to be paid to the mother to reduce his child support arrears;

(vii) Whether an interim spousal maintenance order should be made (as the mother seeks); and

(viii) Whether an interim child support departure order should be made (as the mother seeks).

1. The mother is currently engaged with a therapist, and the child Y is currently under the care of a paediatrician Dr BB.

1. The parties reached agreement to participate in mediation in an attempt to resolve their property dispute. In such circumstances, the wife did not press her application for the sale of the Suburb Q property (and associated interim distribution of the net sales proceeds thereof) on this occasion but noting she seeks to retain the right to do so should the mediation fail to resolve the property dispute.
2. Pursuant to ss.65DA(2) and 62B of the Family Law Act 1975, the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders are set out in Annexure A and those particulars are included in these orders.

[1] Section 64B(3) of the Act. See also section 61D(3) and section 61DAA in relation to parenting orders dealing with allocation of responsibility for making decisions about major long-term issues.

[2] Pursuant to section 60CD of the Act, the Court may inform itself of views expressed by a child by having regard to anything contained in a report provided under subsection 62G(2) or (if appointed) through the Independent Children's Lawyer or, subject to the Court's Rules, by such other means as the Court thinks appropriate. By virtue of section 60CE of the Act, nothing in Part VII permits the Court or any person to require the child to express his or her views in relation to any matter.

[3] Alstergren CJ, McClelland DCJ, Aldridge, Austin & Tree JJ.

[4] Fitzwater v Fitzwater [2019] FamCAFC 251 at [133] - [142].

[5] Whether or not a person has parental responsibility for the child.

[6] Momcilovic v The Queen [2011] HCA 34; (2011) 245 CLR 1 at [56].

[7] Illes & Nelisson [2022] FedCFamC1A 97 at [84].

[8] It is not always necessary to make a positive finding that past conduct occurred when assessing the future risk in a particular case. If a positive finding of past conduct is to be undertaken, there must be a proper evidentiary basis for any such finding which meets the standard in section 140(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).

[9] Cao & Cao [2018] FamCAFC 252 at [46].

[10] Cao & Cao [2018] FamCAFC 252 at [56].

[11] The test embraced by the High Court of Australia in M v M [1988] HCA68 at [25] expressed as a means of balancing, out of an effort to prioritise a child's interests, the risk of detriment to the child of abuse and the possibility of benefit to the child from parental access.

[12] Keane & Keane [2021] FamCAFC 1 at [84]; See also Kozma & Bielen [2022] FedCFamC2F 1003.

[13] Fitzwater v Fitzwater [2019] FamCAFC 251 per Austin J at [148]-[149] as endorsed by the Full Court in Isles & Nelissen [2022] FedCFamC1A 97.