It was clear that the applicant wanted to run as Senate candidate for the Party in Tasmania. In light of this, the applicant needed to resign from their position as electorate officer, as it was not possible for them to continue to work in both positions.

The respondent denies that the applicant was 'compelled' to work for the Party. The applicant chose to resign from their role with the Commonwealth and was happy to do so.

In these circumstances, the applicant was not dismissed within the meaning of section 386

• [27] Having regard to the material before the Commission, I consider the merits of the Applicant's unfair dismissal application to be a neutral factor. Whether the Applicant was forced to resign because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by the Respondent will depend on findings of fact that could only be made after the Applicant, Mr Rennick and other relevant witnesses give evidence and are cross examined. Further, it is not possible at this early stage to reach a view as to the Applicant's prospect of persuading the Commission that her resignation, if it was forced because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by the Respondent, was unfair.

Fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position

• [28] This consideration may relate to matters currently before the Commission or to matters previously decided by the Commission. It may also relate to the position of various employees of an employer responding to an unfair dismissal application. However, cases of this kind will generally turn on their own facts.

• [29] The Applicant makes the following submissions in relation to this factor:

"3 (f) - Firstly, even though I was reimbursed, it was unfair that I had to fight for monies because it is normal for Political Party Executives in similar positions to me to be paid. Furthermore, I worked THREE roles in the Gerard Rennick People First Party as Federal Secretary, Registered Officer and Acting Treasurer and should have been reimbursed accordingly. The former Senator Gerard Rennick strongly dictated the monies he thought I should be paid whereas I initially put forward a reimbursement fee of around $75,000.

Secondly, if I had NOT endured a constructive unfair dismissal, I would have been in a similar position to my office colleagues whose entitlements were paid up to around mid-July including 30% severance pay because the former Senator Gerard Rennick did not retain his seat, plus their years of public service according to the Commonwealth Members of Parliament Staff Enterprise Agreement 2024-2027. My final payout would have exceeded $40,000."

• [30] I do not consider that the other persons to whom the Applicant refers in her submission were in a "similar position" to the Applicant. They did not resign and have not alleged that they were constructively dismissed.

• [31] In all the circumstances, I consider this factor to be a neutral consideration.

• [32] Taking into consideration the matters I am required to take into account under s 394(3) of the Act and all of the matters raised by the Applicant, I am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances in this case, either when the various circumstances are considered individually or together. The Applicant does not have a reasonable or acceptable explanation for the delay in lodging her unfair dismissal application in the Commission. The other relevant factors are neutral or of little weight. Having regard to all the material before the Commission, I do not consider the circumstances of this case to be out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.

• [33] Because I am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, there is no basis for me to allow an extension of time. I decline to grant an extension of time under s 394(3). Accordingly, the application for an unfair dismissal remedy must be dismissed.

Mr A Sherr, solicitor, on behalf of the Respondent

[1] Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd [2011] FWAFB 975 at [13].

[3] Long v Keolis Downer [2018] FWCFB 4109 at [40]

[4] Shaw v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited T/A ANZ Bank [2015] FWCFB 287 at [12]; Ozsoy v Monstamac Industries Pty Ltd [2014] FWCFB 2149 at [31]; Diotti v Lenswood Cold Stores Co-op Society t/a Lenswood Organic [2016] FWCFB 349 at [29]- [31]

[5] Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd [2018] FWCFB 901 at [39]

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