State of Queensland (Office of the Governor) v Workers' Compensation Regulator and Anor [2025] QIRC 210

Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, s 32, s 548, s 548A, s 549, s 556, s 557 and s 558

Allison Greenaway as the Executor of the Estate of the Late Brian Greenaway v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2025] QIRC 142

Belal Yousif v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] ICQ 004

Church v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2015] ICQ 031; (2015) 252 IR 461

Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Absolute Commissioning Group Pty Ltd (No 2) [2024] FCA 1324

DJL v The Central Authority [2000] HCA 17; (2000) 201 CLR 226

EB v CT (No. 2) [2008] QSC 306

Fowler v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 149

Frigger v Trenfield (No 7) [2020] FCA 1740

Hicks v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 757

Inspector-General in Bankruptcy v Bradshaw [2006] FCA 22

Ngan Thanh Phan t/as Right Choices Construction Queensland v Workers' Compensation Regulator & Anor [2022] QIRC 251

Re: Applications to vary the Building, Engineering and Maintenance Services Employees (Queensland Government) Award - State 2016 [2024] QIRC 064

Spotlight Pty Ltd v NCON Australia Ltd [2012] VSCA 232; (2012) 46 VR 1

State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Q-Comp and Beverley Coyne [2003] ICQ 9; (2003) 172 QGIG 1447

Turay v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2023] ICQ 13

Wang v Workers' Compensation Regulator (No. 2) [2023] QIRC 163

Ms M. Brooks instructed by Mr X. Lake of Crown Law for the Appellant

• [1] Ms Angela Giles was employed by the State of Queensland, through the Office of the Governor ('the OOG'), in the position of Executive Support Officer in what is known as the Programs Team. Ms Giles was employed in that position from 30 October 2020 until her resignation on 4 October 2022.

• [2] On 12 October 2022, Ms Giles made an application, pursuant to the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 ('the WCR Act'), for workers' compensation in respect of a psychological injury sustained when she was employed in the OOG. Ms Giles claimed her injury occurred over a period of time, from 21 July 2021, and that her injury occurred because of her increased workload and insufficient management action about her increased workload.

• [3] By decision dated 19 December 2022, WorkCover Queensland rejected Ms Giles' application for workers' compensation.

• [4] On 27 February 2023, Mr Giles applied for a review of the decision by WorkCover Queensland with the Workers' Compensation Regulator ('the Regulator'). By review decision of 28 June 2023 contained in a letter dated 29 June 2023, the Regulator set aside the earlier decision of WorkCover Queensland and decided that Ms Giles' application for workers' compensation was one for acceptance ('the review decision').

• [5] By notice of appeal filed on 27 July 2023, the OOG appealed to this Commission against the review decision. That appeal was made pursuant to ch 13, pt 3, div 1 of the WCR Act.

• [6] In about February 2024, the Regulator indicated to Ms Giles that it would play no active part in the appeal.[1] As a consequence, at about that time, Ms Giles, pursuant to s 549(3)(a) of the WCR Act, became a party to the OOG's appeal.[2] The hearing of the OOG's appeal took place on 10 and 11 February 2025. Ms Giles actively defended the review decision.

• [7] Pursuant to a Directions Order I made on 5 March 2025, Ms Giles filed her final written submissions on 25 March 2025 and 12 May 2025. The OOG filed its final written submissions on 23 April 2025. A decision in respect of the OOG's appeal has been reserved.

• [8] There is no dispute that Ms Giles was a 'worker' within the meaning of the WCR Act. The ultimate issue for my determination in the OOG's appeal is whether or not Ms Giles suffered an injury within the meaning of s 32 of the WCR Act. Having regard to the statements of facts and contentions and the written submissions filed by the OOG and by Ms Giles, the questions that I have to answer to determine the ultimate issue are:

• did Ms Giles suffer a personal injury within the meaning of the WCR Act? and, if so

• did Ms Giles' personal injury arise out of, or in the course of, her employment, and was her employment a significant contributing factor to her injury? and, if so

• is Ms Giles' injury withdrawn from being a compensable injury by virtue of the operation of s 32(5)(a) or, in the alternative, s 32(5)(b) of the WCR Act?

• [9] By application in existing proceedings filed on 10 June 2025, Ms Giles applied to reopen the appeal hearing in order to lead new evidence namely, expert evidence from Dr John Chalk, Psychiatrist, in respect of the consultation Ms Giles had with Dr Chalk on 1 May 2025 ('Ms Giles' application'). The OOG opposes Ms Giles' application.
• [10] The present question for my determination is whether or not I should grant Ms Giles' application. For the reasons that follow, I will grant Ms Giles' application.

The power of the Commission to reopen an appeal hearing under ch 13, pt 3, div 1 of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 where a decision has been reserved

• [11] It was not disputed by any party that the Commission lacked power to reopen a proceeding where the evidence had been heard, submissions made and a decision reserved.

• [12] The OOG submitted that s 484 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 ('the IR Act') conferred discretionary power on the Commission to re-open a proceeding such as the present.[3] Sections 484 and 485 of the IR Act provide:

(1) On application by a person mentioned in section 485, proceedings may be reopened by-

(a) for proceedings taken before the full bench-the full bench; or

(a) revoke or amend a decision or recommendation made by it; and

(b) make the decision or recommendation it considers appropriate.

(3) If a recommendation of the commission has been acted on by the Governor in Council and the commission later revokes or amends the recommendation, the Governor in Council may-

(a) cancel the action taken on the recommendation to accord with the commission's revocation or amendment; or

(b) amend the action to accord with the commission's revocation or amendment.

(4) Failure to give notice to a person of the proceedings reopened under this section, or any part of the proceedings, leading to the making by the commission of a decision binding on the person -

(a) does not invalidate or otherwise affect the decision; but

(b) the person may apply to further reopen the proceedings if-

(i) the person may apply for reopening of proceedings under section 485; and

(ii) the person's failure to participate in the previously reopened proceedings was because of the failure to give the notice.

(5) If the commission grants an application for reopening, it may give the retrospective operation to its decision made in the reopened proceedings it considers appropriate.

An application for reopening of proceedings may be made by-

(c) for proceedings other than proceedings relating to the making of a certified agreement or bargaining award-

(i) an organisation whose members are bound or affected by, or dissatisfied with, the proceedings; or

(A) is bound or affected by, or dissatisfied with, the proceedings; and

(B) satisfies the commission the person is not an officer of, or acting for, an entity (other than an industrial organisation) that purports to

represent the industrial interests of employees or employers.

• [13] A question arises as to whether, having regard to the statutory text of s 484 and s 485 of the IR Act, those provisions apply to an appeal against a review decision of the Regulator made pursuant to ch 13, pt 3, div 1 of the WCR Act. In Ngan Thanh Phan t/as Right Choices Construction Queensland v Workers' Compensation Regulator & Anor ('Phan'),[4] the applicant applied, pursuant to s 484 of the IR Act, to reopen an appeal made under ch 13, pt 3, div 1 of the WCR Act where a consent order, allowing the appeal, had been perfected. The consent order was made between the worker and the Regulator who were the only parties to the appeal. The applicant was the employer of the worker. Vice President O'Connor held that, having regard to the statutory text contained in s 485(c)(ii) of the IR Act, s 484 and s 485 of the IR Act did not apply to appeals under ch 13, pt 3, div 1 of the WCR Act.[5]

• [14] No reference was made to Phan by Ms Giles or the OOG. As a matter of judicial comity, I should follow Phan unless I am of the opinion it is plainly wrong.[6] I am not of the opinion that Phan is plainly wrong. The statutory text of s 485 of the IR Act, in identifying the applicants for reopening of proceedings, does not sit comfortably with those who are or may be parties to an appeal made under ch 13, pt 3, div 1 of the WCR Act. [7]

• [15] In any event, the facts of the present case are different from those in Phan. In the present case, evidence has been heard, final submissions have been made but, at the time Ms Giles made her application to reopen the appeal hearing, the decision had been reserved with no final order made under s 558 of the WCR Act. The question is whether, in those circumstances, the Commission has power to reopen the proceeding.
• [16] Section 553 of the IR Act provides:

The provisions of this Act providing for the powers of and procedures before the court, the commission or an Industrial Magistrates Court apply in relation to the jurisdiction of the court, the commission or an Industrial Magistrates Court under this Act or another Act, unless the contrary intention appears.

• [17] Section 451(1) of the IR Act provides:

(1) The commission has the power to do all things necessary or convenient to be done for the performance of its functions.

• [18] The Commission's functions are, in a non-exhaustive manner, set out in s 447 of the IR Act. Section 447(1)(n)(i) of the IR Act provides that the Commission's functions include '...dealing with...applications brought under this Act or another Act, including for public service appeals.' Section 447(1)(p) also refers '...to another function conferred on the commission under this Act or another Act.'

• [19] By the combined effect of s 548(1)(a), s 548A(1) and s 549(1) of the WCR Act, a claimant, a worker or an employer aggrieved by certain review decisions of the Regulator can appeal to the Commission, pursuant to ch 13, pt 3, div 1 of the WCR Act, against such decisions. Section 558 of the WCR Act sets out the power the Commission has in respect of such an appeal.

[20] While, as found by Vice President O'Connor in Phan, the contrary intention appears from the text of s 485 of the IR Act in respect of the application of s 484 of the IR Act to appeals such as the present, there is, in my opinion, nothing in the statutory text of s 451(1) of the IR Act which indicates a contrary intention to that provision applying to appeals under ch 13, pt 3, div 1 of the WCR Act. Indeed in Belal Yousif v Workers' Compensation Regulator, [8] Martin J, President was of the view that s 451(2)(a) of the IR Act[9] was an available source of power to the Commission, in an appeal under ch 13, pt 3, div 1 of the WCR Act, to direct parties, to such appeals, to file and serve statements of facts and contentions.[10]

• [21] In Re: Applications to vary the Building, Engineering and Maintenance Services Employees (Queensland Government) Award - State 2016,[11] I relevantly stated (citations omitted):

[44] However, by virtue of s 451(1) of the Act, the Commission has the power to do all things necessary or convenient to be done for the performance of its functions. This is a common way to describe such a power as conferred on a statutory body. A description similar to s 451(1) of the Act has been considered by the High Court. In Northern Land Council v Quall, Kiefel CJ and Gageler and Keane JJ relevantly stated:

[33] The power conferred on a representative body by s 203BK(1) in the familiar terms of a power "to do all things necessary or convenient to be done for or in connection with the performance of its functions", though "broad", is "strictly ancillary", authorising "the provision of subsidiary means of carrying into effect what is enacted in the statute itself" and encompassing "what is incidental to the execution of its specific provisions". The power does "not support the doing of a thing which departs from the scheme of the enactment by which the power is conferred".

A "necessary or convenient" power of that nature has already been emphasised to be ancillary, subsidiary or incidental.

• [22] The fundamental issue that concerns the exercise of a discretion by courts possessing the inherent or incidental power to allow a trial or proceeding to be reopened, prior to judgment being made, is the determination of where the interests of justice lie.[12] As a consequence, it seems to me that the power of the Commission to reopen a proceeding - albeit not a proceeding to which s 484 of the IR Act applies but, nevertheless, a proceeding conducted in the performance of one of the Commission's functions - would at least be an incidental power of the Commission in the performance of such a function.[13]

• [23] There are no provisions, in ch 13, pt 3, div 1 of the WCR Act that suggest an obvious contrary intention to s 451(1) of the IR Act applying to an appeal under that division. Chapter 13, pt 3, div 1 of the WCR Act prescribes a number of powers and procedures that apply to the Commission for the hearing and determination of such an appeal. However, in my view, none of those powers or procedures are inconsistent with the exercise of power of the Commission to reopen a proceeding prior to a decision being made.

• [24] Further, a conclusion that the Commission possesses such an incidental power does not lead to a conclusion that the Commission would be doing something which departs from the scheme of ch 13, pt 3, div 1 of the WCR Act. The scheme is for the Commission to determine appeals against certain decisions of the Regulator by a hearing de novo.[14] To conclude that the Commission possesses power to reopen such an appeal does not depart from that scheme.

• [25] Even if my reasons above are wrong, I am of the view that the Commission would still have an incidental power to reopen a proceeding. The Commission is established as a court of record in Queensland[15] and has the functions, jurisdiction and powers as are conferred on it by the IR Act and other Acts, such as the function conferred on the Commission by ch 13, pt 3, div 1 of the WCR Act. The Commission, therefore, is a statutory court. In DJL v The Central Authority,[16] Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ relevantly held:

A court exercising jurisdiction or powers conferred by statute "has powers expressly or by implication conferred by the legislation which governs it" and "[t]his is a matter of statutory construction"; it also has "in addition such powers as are incidental and necessary to the exercise of the jurisdiction or the powers so conferred". It would be inaccurate to use the term "inherent jurisdiction" here and the term should be avoided as an identification of the incidental and necessary power of a statutory court.[17]

• [26] For the same reasons given in paragraph [22] of these reasons, I am of the opinion that it is an incidental and necessary power of the Commission, in hearing and determining an appeal under ch 13, pt 3, div 1 of the WCR Act, to reopen a proceeding, before a decision is made, where the interests of justice favour such a course.

• [27] For these reasons, I am of the view that the Commission does have discretionary power to allow an appeal hearing, conducted under ch 13, pt 3, div 1 of the WCR Act, to be reopened prior to a decision being made.

The principles that guide the exercise of such discretion

• [28] In Ezra v Abrahams Pty Ltd, [18] Kyrou, Kay and McLeish JJA relevantly stated (citations omitted):

1. The principles governing the exercise of a court's discretion to permit a party to re-open its case were not in contention before the judge or before this Court. They are briefly summarised below.

1. The overriding principle is 'whether, taken as a whole, the justice of the case favours the grant of leave to re-open.' This principle was stated as follows by Kirby J in Goldsmith v Sandilands upon which the applicant relied in the present case:

The guiding principle for the grant or refusal of leave to call evidence in response to the evidence of another party, where this is sought by a party, is, ultimately, what the justice of the case - including procedural fairness - requires. That principle should not become unduly entangled in precedents or procedural rules.

Whilst efficiency and economy in the conduct of civil trials are important requirements of the contemporary trial process, those objectives are valid only as they contribute to just outcomes. Once the trial process is under way, rigidity should be avoided, certainly at a time before the evidence has been closed and before the decision foreshadowed or announced. To exclude relevant evidence during a trial, in response to evidence tendered by another party in its case, simply because it could, or should, have been adduced earlier may, in particular circumstances, deny the party tendering such evidence the fair opportunity to present its case. It may render that party unjustly hostage to the defective perception, imagination and industry of its legal representatives. This is why a large discretion is reserved to the trial judge in civil trials to admit or reject evidence in rebuttal or reply. In an appeal, the exercise of the judge's discretion in such matters is subject to the usual restraints upon appellate disturbance of discretionary decisions.

1. There are four recognised categories of case in which a court may grant leave to re-open a party's case: where fresh evidence, unavailable or not reasonably discoverable previously, becomes known and available; where there has been inadvertent error; where there has been a mistaken apprehension of the facts; and where there has been a mistaken apprehension of the law.[19] These categories are not closed.

• [29] In the same vein, in EB v CT (No. 2),[20] Applegarth J relevantly stated (citations omitted).

[2] The guiding principle in deciding whether to grant leave to re-open is whether or not the interests of justice are better served by allowing or rejecting the application. Reference is made in Finborough Investments Pty Ltd v Airlie Beach Pty Ltd and in the cases referred to in it to the need for finality in litigation.

[3] In Smith v New South Wales Bar Association the High Court stated that different considerations may apply depending on whether the case is simply one in which the hearing is complete, or one in which reasons for judgment have been delivered. As to the former situation, the court said it was difficult to see why the primary consideration should not be that of embarrassment or prejudice to the other side.

[4] In Reid v Brett the criteria governing the exercise of the discretionary power to reopen a case to admit further evidence where the hearing has concluded but judgment has not been delivered, were said to be as follows:

(a) the further evidence is so material that the interests of justice require its admission;

(b) the further evidence, if accepted, would most probably affect the result of the case;

(c) the further evidence could not by reasonable diligence have been discovered earlier; and

(d) no prejudice would ensue to the other party by reason of the late admission of the further evidence.

[5] Reference by the High Court to prejudice to the other party, and the guiding principle of the interests of justice, require account to be taken of the strain that litigation imposes on personal litigants. The prejudice caused by delay in the delivery of an expected judgment at the end of stressful litigation cannot always be measured in terms of money or cured by an order for costs. The interests of justice are served by finality in litigation, particularly where prolonged litigation imposes a strain on personal litigants.

• [30] Ms Giles read her affidavit affirmed on 5 June 2025. Ms Giles' evidence is:

• she was sent by WorkCover Queensland to see Dr Chalk on 1 May 2025 '...for the purpose of providing a work-related diagnosis.';

• she has since received Dr Chalk's report from that consultation '...regarding the Second Respondent's work-related diagnosis.'; and

• she was not able to tender that report during the hearing on 10 and 11 February 2025 due to the report being dated 1 May 2025.

• [31] Ms Giles submits that WorkCover Queensland originally sent her to see Dr Chalk on 30 November 2023 for the purpose of providing '...a work-related diagnosis'. Ms Giles then submits that on or about 20 September 2024, she received a report, dated 4 December 2023, from Dr Chalk regarding that consultation ('Dr Chalk's 2023 report').[21] Dr Chalk's 2023 report was exhibited to the affidavit of Mr Xavier Lake, Principal Lawyer of the Crown Solicitor, affirmed on 21 July 2025, being an affidavit read by the OOG for the purposes of Ms Giles' application. In his 2023 report, which he compiled after his clinical assessment of Ms Giles on 30 November 2023, Dr Chalk opined that Ms Giles '...has developed an adjustment disorder with anxiety and depressed mood.'[22]

• [32] Ms Giles told me, at the hearing of her application on 25 July 2025, that she received Dr Chalk's 2023 report in September 2024 which was after the Regulator informed her it would not be actively defending the OOG's appeal.[23] Although Dr Chalk's 2023 report was in Ms Giles' possession from September 2024, Ms Giles did not disclose that report to the OOG.[24]

• [33] Further, Ms Giles did not list Dr Chalk's 2023 report in an email, listing the documents that she stated would be submitted at the hearing in February 2025, being an email she sent to the OOG and to the Regulator on 29 January 2025.[25] Ms Giles, in her written submissions, gave reasons for her decision not to rely on Dr Chalk's 2023 report at the hearing in February this year. Ms Giles submitted:

1. After sighting the report, Ms Giles considered submitting the report at the Hearing on 10 and 11 February 2025 but decided against that course of action for the following reasons:

1. Ms Giles was unaware at the time if she was able to submit a report with what appeared to be a different diagnosis to her original diagnosis of Burnout.

1. Ms Giles was unsure if the report would be detrimental to her case because there was no link in the report to Burnout and she was under the impression that part of the Hearing was to determine if she had an injury, that being Burnout. Ms Giles also reasonably assumed that the report may in fact be detrimental to her Matter because she believed that the Regulator had seen the report.

1. Ms Giles was not able to receive any advice from the Regulator because they had previously decided to take no part in the Matter.

1. Ms Giles was not able to seek advice from her lawyer that she engaged after the Regulator overturned the original decision (Slater and Gordon) because they would not assist her on a no win, no fee basis for a statutory claim.

1. Ms Giles was sent to see Dr John Chalk by WorkCover Queensland for a second time on 1 May 2025 for a work-related diagnosis after the original referral from Dr Chalk had expired. Dr Chalk diagnosed Ms Giles with significant residual symptoms of an adjustment disorder with anxiety and depressed mood while also acknowledging that her GP had diagnosed her with Burnout relating to the same workplace stressors as his diagnosis.[26]

1. Ms Giles now understands, based on further research, that the QIRC may consider multiple psychological diagnoses arising from a common set of workplace stressors.

• [34] Ms Giles then submits, in support of her appeal hearing being reopened to lead evidence from Dr Chalk in respect of his report dated 1 May 2025 ('Dr Chalk's 2025 report'), that:

• Dr Chalk's 2025 report '...constitutes evidence that is both material and probative.';

• Dr Chalk's 2025 report was not available to her at the time of the hearing in February this year;

• Dr Chalk's 2025 report is relevant as it directly addresses a pivotal issue in dispute, namely the existence and nature of her psychological injury which, she submits,'...is capable of materially affecting the outcome of the appeal under s 32 of the Act.'; and

• Dr Chalk's findings, in conjunction with those of her General Practitioner (Dr Caulley) '...confirm the existence of an injury as defined by the Act and establish that Ms Giles' employment was a significant contributing factor.'[27]

• [35] In oral submissions, Ms Giles submitted:

• although she read Dr Chalk's 2023 report, she was trying her best to understand why the Regulator would not '...have submitted it', she did not understand why the Regulator would not have continued with the case, and she reasonably assumed that the Regulator would have done their '...due diligence and requested an updated statutory claim file, my claim file, prior to making the decision not to continue on with the case.';[28]

• she looked at the report (Dr Chalk's 2023 report), formed the view that the Regulator thought it was irrelevant, although she had no idea why, and the '... only thing I could come up with was the fact that there was no - Dr Chalk made no link in the report to burnout.';[29] and

• while she read Dr Chalk's 2023 report, she formed an independent view that it was irrelevant to the OOG's appeal because:

• - '...an experienced office like the Regulator didn't submit it';[31] and

• - because Dr Chalk did not talk about burnout, she did not know if it was relevant or if it was going to muddy the waters, she did not know if she could put in another diagnosis, she did not know the process, she is not a litigator and she has no training in the law;[32] and

• while she believes that 'burnout' is the same injury as the adjustment disorder with anxiety and depressed mood as diagnosed by Dr Chalk, she did not rely on Dr Chalk's 2023 report at the hearing in February 2025 because '...he didn't mention burnout and I thought it was irrelevant because it hadn't been disclosed by the Regulator.'[33]

• [36] The relief sought by Ms Giles is that the Commission reopen the appeal hearing, that Dr Chalk's report dated 1 May 2025 be admitted as evidence and that Dr Chalk is called as a witness in the proceeding.[34]

• [37] The OOG submits that while Dr Chalk's 2025 report is relevant, it is not so material that the interests of justice require its admission.[35] This is said to be the case for eight reasons.

• [38] First, the OOG submits that Ms Giles defended the appeal on the basis that she suffered 'burnout', and not any other condition, so that Ms Giles contends that 'burnout' is the psychological injury for the purposes of the application of s 32 of the WCR Act. For that reason, the OOG submits that Dr Chalk's 2025 report does not fill any evidentiary gap.[36]

• [39] Secondly, the OOG submits that it is also open to conclude that Dr Chalk's 2025 report is not relevant since he was asked to make a '...work-related diagnosis' of a '...work-related injury' such that Dr Chalk approached his task on the basis that Ms Giles injury was one for acceptance. It is on that basis that the OOG makes the alternative submission that Dr Chalk's 2025 report is not relevant to any question the Commission is being asked to decide.[37]

• [40] Thirdly, the OOG submits that on its case, any psychological injury suffered by Ms Giles is not a compensable injury because:

• she was not exposed to an unreasonable workload nor was she provided with insufficient support, such that her employment was not a significant factor to any such injury; and

• any such psychological injury she suffered arose out of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way.[38]

• [41] On the above basis, the OOG submits that Dr Chalk's 2025 report cannot be said to be evidence that will 'most probably' affect the result of the case, or is so material that the interests of justice require the admission of that report.[39]

• [42] Fourthly, in the context of submitting that Ms Giles bears the onus of demonstrating that she could not obtain the evidence with reasonable diligence for use at the hearing in February this year, the OOG submits that the evidence Ms Giles seeks to adduce from Dr Chalk in respect of his 2025 report is the same evidence as that contained in his 2023 report, namely, that Ms Giles developed '...an adjustment disorder with anxiety and depressed mood'. In that respect, the OOG submitted that the assessments undertaken by Dr Chalk in 2023 and in 2025 were the same, namely, canvassing Ms Giles' history and current symptoms.[40]

1. Ms Giles submits the evidence in the May 2025 report is 'new information' because Dr Chalk makes reference to her GP's diagnosis of burnout. There was never a question Dr Chalk was making a diagnosis, after either assessment, of an injury that was alleged to arise out of the same circumstances her GP Dr Shanti Caulley also assessed as relevant to her diagnosis of burnout. Indeed, the Claim Summaries referred to by Dr Chalk in both reports refer to the diagnosis of burnout. The submission by Ms Giles that the May 2025 report provides 'new information' with respect [sic] Dr Chalk's diagnosis should not be accepted,

• [44] Sixthly, the OOG submits that even if Dr Chalk's 2025 report was in fact new evidence, there is no explanation as to why Ms Giles could not have obtained such evidence before the hearing in February and led such evidence at that hearing.[41]

• [45] Seventhly, the OOG refers to Ms Giles' submissions that she has done further research in the context of her contention that she has received two diagnoses for the same injury. The OOG submits that Ms Giles has not provided any satisfactory explanation as to why such research was not undertaken prior to the February 2025 hearing.[42] In this regard, the OOG submits:

Nothing has changed except the Appellant has now had to lay its evidentiary cards on the table at a hearing, and make its final submissions, and Ms Giles now seeks to adduce additional evidence in circumstances where there is clear prejudice to the Appellant because Ms Giles is now, in effect, running a different case.[43]

• [46] Finally, the OOG submits that if Dr Chalk's 2025 report is admitted, it is possible it will seek to obtain further medical evidence in support of its case, call that expert and cross-examine Dr Chalk and at least require the recalling of Dr Caulley for further cross-examination, and also possibly Ms Giles. The OOG submits that it would be highly prejudicial to it if it was put to that time and expense in these circumstances.[44]

• [47] In oral submissions, Ms Brooks of counsel for the OOG submitted:

• Ms Giles' oral submissions, as to why she did not believe that she could rely on Dr Chalk's 2023 report - because the Regulator had not relied on it and she made certain assumptions on that basis - are new submissions in that, in her written submissions, Ms Giles submitted that she was not able to receive advice from the Regulator because they had previously decided not to take part in the appeal;[45]

• while Dr Chalk's 2023 report and his 2025 report are similar, contrary to Ms Giles' submissions, they are not the same in that in his second report, Dr Chalk opines that Ms Giles has residual symptoms of an adjustment disorder;[46] and

• a reopening application is not a process that permits a litigant, in hindsight, to revisit forensic decisions they made in the first instance about the conduct of their case and, in the circumstances, Ms Giles has been given a fair opportunity to run her case.[47]

• [48] There are distinct considerations pointing against the Commission's discretion being exercised in favour of Ms Giles.

• [49] First, the evidence Ms Giles seeks to lead, in the form of Dr Chalk's 2025 report, is not new evidence.

• [50] Dr Chalk, in his 2023 report, expressed the opinion that there was a causal connection between Ms Giles' employment and her adjustment disorder with anxious and depressed mood as diagnosed. Dr Chalk took a history from Ms Giles for the purposes of completing that report.[48] On page 7 of 8 of that report, Dr Chalk opines:

SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT: Ms Giles has developed an adjustment disorder with anxiety and depressed mood. She has had some but limited treatment. She is not on any psychotropic medication, and I do not think she requires any. Her incapacity because of the work-related psychological injury has ceased. She is working in an alternative role. There did not appear to be other factors that are germane to the development of this illness, although she is clearly stressed by the fact that the accepted claim is now to be appealed.[49]

• [51] On page 3 of 4 of Dr Chalk's 2025 report, handed up during the hearing of Ms Giles' application, Dr Chalk expressed the opinion that Ms Giles had residual symptoms of an adjustment disorder with depressed and anxious mood.

• [52] In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the evidence Ms Giles seeks to now lead, namely, Dr Chalk's 2025 report, is new evidence.

• [53] Secondly, Ms Giles had Dr Chalk's 2023 report in her possession prior to the hearing in February of this year. As is apparent from her written submissions, Ms Giles made the deliberate decision not to defend the OOG's appeal on the basis that she had a work-related injury of the nature as diagnosed by Dr Chalk. As submitted by the OOG, Ms Giles made the decision to run her case on the basis that the personal injury she suffered was that of 'burnout' as diagnosed by her General Practitioner.

• [54] In oral submissions, Ms Giles gave reasons for not disclosing, and for not relying upon, Dr Chalk's 2023 report. Primarily, this was because the Regulator had Dr Chalk's 2023 report and, as it was not resisting the OOG's appeal, she formed the view that Dr Chalk's 2023 report was not relevant to, or not of assistance in, her defence of the OOG's appeal.

• [55] In its appeal against the review decision, the OOG put in issue all elements of the definition of injury contained in s 32 of the WCR Act, including, relevantly to the above opinion expressed by Dr Chalk in 2023, whether or not Ms Giles, suffered a '...personal injury' and whether her employment was a significant contributing factor to her personal injury. On any objective reading of Dr Chalk's 2023 report, the relevance of Dr Chalk's assessment to the OOG's appeal is clear.

• [56] Despite the above, I have come to the ultimate conclusion that the interests of justice are better served by allowing Ms Giles' application.

• [57] I have come to this conclusion for two reasons.

• [58] First, as I have stated, the hearing before me is a hearing de novo.[50] The legal onus of proof is on the OOG to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that Ms Giles did not suffer an injury within the meaning of the Act.[51] The OOG has put in issue every relevant element of the definition of 'injury' contained in s 32 of the WCR Act, including whether Ms Giles had a personal injury and, if so, whether Ms Giles' personal injury arose out of or in the course of her employment with the OOG and whether that employment was a significant contributing factor to her personal injury. Having regard to Dr Chalk's 2023 and 2025 reports, it seems to me that Dr Chalk, given his two examinations of Ms Giles, can give evidence that is directly relevant to these issues. That is to say, Dr Chalk can give evidence that may tend to prove or disprove:

• whether Ms Giles had a personal injury; and, if she did

• whether there was a causal connection between such a personal injury and her employment.

• [59] I acknowledge the OOG's submissions that in 2023 and 2025, Dr Chalk was requested by WorkCover Queensland to review Ms Giles in the context of Ms Giles having an accepted claim for compensation. However, in 2023 Dr Chalk took a history from Ms Giles and, on the face of his 2023 report, formed the view that there was a causal connection between Ms Giles' adjustment disorder with depressed and anxious mood and her employment.

• [60] That is to say, for the above reasons, the direct relevance of the evidence that Dr Chalk could give, in the context of a hearing de novo about whether or not Ms Giles suffered a personal injury and, if so, its relationship with her employment, is an issue that points to the justice of the case favouring the appeal hearing being reopened. Of course, whether or not Dr Chalk's evidence is determinative is another matter. That will depend upon the ordinary issues that are thrown up in the course of an expert giving evidence and being cross-examined.

• [61] Secondly, I am of the view there is substance to Ms Giles' assertion regarding her conclusion about the lack of relevance of Dr Chalk's 2023 report by reference to the position taken by the Regulator in respect of the OOG's appeal.

• [62] On the undisputed assertions before me, Ms Giles exercised her right to be a party to the OOG's appeal upon the decision being made by the Regulator not to actively defend the appeal. Ms Giles has represented herself. Ms Giles asserts that a principal reason she formed the view that Dr Chalk's 2023 report was not relevant, was because it was in the possession of the Regulator and it had made the decision not to defend the OOG's appeal. I can appreciate how a self-represented worker, in those circumstances, could form such a view about the relevance of Dr Chalk's 2023 report, despite its relevance as discernible from its content.

• [63] In my view, the direct relevance of Dr Chalk's report outweighs the obvious prejudice, pointed to by the OOG in its submissions, that it will suffer from the appeal being reopened.

• [64] For these reasons, it is in the overall interests of justice that Ms Giles should be allowed to reopen her case.

• [65] In coming to this conclusion, I stress that, on the material before me, in respect of Dr Chalk's 2023 report, the OOG and the Regulator have acted properly and fairly as model litigants.

• [66] For the reasons I have given, I will grant Ms Giles' application.

• [67] I will mention the matter on a date to be fixed for the purposes of resuming the appeal hearing.

Pursuant to s 451(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, the application in existing proceedings, filed by the Second Respondent on 10 June 2025 in Matter No. WC/2023/105, is granted.

[3] The written submissions of the State of Queensland (Office of the Governor) filed on 22 July 2025 ('the OOG's submissions'), paras. 8-9.

[4] [2022] QIRC 251 ('Phan').

[6] Hicks v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 757, [74]-[76] (French J) and Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Absolute Commissioning Group Pty Ltd (No 2) [2024] FCA 1324, [49]-[50] (Katzmann J).

[7] In my view, having regard to the statutory text of s 484 and s 485 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, a question also arises as to whether the power conferred on the Commission by s 484 of Industrial Relations Act 2016 applies to a circumstance where a hearing of the matter has been conducted and final submissions made, but where a decision has been reserved.

[8] [2017] ICQ 004 ('Belal Yousif').

[9] Section 451(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 provides:

(2) Without limiting subsection (1), the commission in proceedings may-

(a) give directions about the hearing of a matter; or

(b) make a decision it considers appropriate, irrespective of the relief sought by a party; or

(c) make an order it considers appropriate.

[10] Belal Yousif (n 8), [11]. See also generally Turay v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2023] ICQ 13, [77] (Davis J, President) which is authority for the proposition that certain provisions of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 have application in appeals to the Industrial Court of Queensland pursuant to ch 13, pt 3 div 1A of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003. Further, in respect of the application of s 486 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 to appeals to the Commission pursuant to ch 13, pt 3, div 1 of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, see Allison Greenaway as the Executor of the Estate of the Late Brian Greenaway v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2025] QIRC 142, [23]-[34] (Industrial Commissioner O'Neill).

[11] [2024] QIRC 064.

[12] See Spotlight Pty Ltd v NCON Australia Ltd [2012] VSCA 232; (2012) 46 VR 1 [26] (Harper and Tate JJA and Beach AJA) and Frigger v Trenfield (No 7) [2020] FCA 1740, [20] and [22] (Jackson J).

[13] As occurred in Fowler v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 149, [40]-[41] (Deputy President Merrell) and in Wang v Workers' Compensation Regulator (No. 2) [2023] QIRC 163, [13]-[14] (Deputy President Merrell).

[14] Church v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2015] ICQ 031; (2015) 252 IR 461 ('Church'), [29]-[30] (Martin J, President).

[15] Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 429.

[16] [2000] HCA 17; (2000) 201 CLR 226.

[18] [2017] VSCA 355.

[19] Spotlight Pty Ltd v NCON Australia Ltd [2012] VSCA 232; (2012) 46 VR 1, 7 [25], citing Inspector-General in Bankruptcy v Bradshaw [2006] FCA 22, [24].

[20] [2008] QSC 306.

[21] The written submissions of Ms Angela Giles filed on 2 July 2025 ('Ms Giles' submissions'), paras. 3-4.

[22] The report of Dr John Chalk, Psychiatrist, dated 4 December 2023 ('Dr Chalk's 2023 report'), page 7 of 8.

[25] The affidavit of Mr Xavier Lake filed on 22 July 2025, exhibit 'XL-01', page 7.

[27] Ms Giles' submissions, paras. 13-16.

[34] Ms Giles' submissions, paras. 17-19.

[40] The OOG's submissions, paras. 15-16.

[48] Dr Chalk's 2023 report, pages 2 and 3 of 8.

[49] Dr Chalk's 2023 report, page 7 of 8. My emphasis.

[51] State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Q-Comp and Beverley Coyne [2003] ICQ 9; (2003) 172 QGIG 1447, 1448 (President Hall).