State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2025] QIRC 166

Allen v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2018] QIRC 41

Allwood v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] QIRC 088

Anglo Coal (Capcoal Management) Pty Ltd v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] QIRC 103

Blackwood v Toward [2015] ICQ 008

Church v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2015] ICQ 031

Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar [2011] HCA 21; (2011) 243 CLR 588

De Alwis v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2016] ICQ 8

Deshong v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2021] QIRC 205

Dickenson v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 68

Edmunds v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2022] QIRC 285

Gilmour v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 022

Granato v Workers Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 162

Myer Holdings Ltd AND Q-COMP (WC/2013/118) - Decision

O'Neil v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2022] QIRC 310

Qantas Airways Limited v Q-COMP [2006] QIRComm 27; (2006) 181 QGIG 301

Q-Comp v Rowe [2009] ICQ 32

Read v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] QIRC 072

Robinson v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2016] ICQ

Sheridan v Q-COMP [2009] ICQ 33

SSX Services Pty Ltd v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2016] QIRC 62

State of Queensland (acting through Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services) AND Q-COMP and Mrs B (C/2013/2) - Decision

State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 53

State of Queensland (Department of Communities Disability Services) AND Q-COMP and Mrs B (WC/2011/247) - Decision

State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Q-COMP and Beverley Coyne (2003) 172 QGIG 1447

Toodayan and Toodayan v Metro South Hospital and Health Service & Others [2023] QIRC 036

Tuesley v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2021] QIRC 71

Verhagen v Q-COMP (2008) 189 QGIG 542

Whipps v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] QIRC 29

Ms K. Riedel of Counsel instructed by Crown Law for the Appellant.

Mr S. Gray of Counsel directly instructed by the Respondent.

• [1] The State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) ('DAF') ('the Appellant') appeals a decision of the Workers' Compensation Regulator ('the Regulator') dated 3 February 2022 to set aside a decision of WorkCover Queensland to reject Ms Fullerton's application seeking compensation for psychological injury in accordance with s 32 of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) ('the WCR Act').

• [2] Ms Fullerton was a worker pursuant to s 11 of the WCR Act through her employment with the Appellant within the National Red Imported Fire Ant Eradication Program ('RIFA program' or 'the program') within Biosecurity Queensland. Ms Fullerton was employed as an AO8 Manager (Community and Stakeholder Engagement) within this program from 1 July 2019 to February 2021.

• [3] Ms Fullerton's role 'involved coordinating communications with target audiences, to advise them about the presence of fire ants and what was being done to eradicate them'.[1] Her role supported the treatment program and did not actually involve the treatment of fire ants.[2]

• [4] The Respondent identifies the following events or factors which it says are causally connected with the development of Ms Fullerton's injury:[3]

• The structural nature of the organisation, which involved both arms of the state and federal governments, led to Ms Fullerton experiencing a low level of control over some aspects of her work (Factor 1 in the Appellant's Statement of Facts and Contentions ('SOFC'));

• Ms Fullerton developed extreme stress and anxiety about her role and an inability to actually deliver any of her work (Factor 3 in the Appellant's SOFC); and

• The demands of Ms Fullerton's role were high, requiring extended work hours, including working on weekends (Factor 4 in the Appellant's SOFC).

• [5] It is not in dispute that Ms Fullerton suffered a psychiatric or psychological disorder. On that basis, the matters in dispute for my determination are:

• the date of injury, or as the Respondent contends, whether the date of the injury is necessary to determine;

• whether Ms Fullerton's psychiatric or psychological injury arose out of or in the course of her employment, or whether employment was a significant contributing factor; and

• whether the injury is removed by the reasonable management action provisions of the WCR Act.

• [6] The hearing of the appeal is to be conducted as a hearing de novo.[4]

• [7] The Appellant bears the onus of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that Ms Fullerton's claim is not one for acceptance.[5]

• [8] The crux of the Appellant's case is that Ms Fullerton's claim should not be accepted because:[6]

• the injury did not arise out of or in the course of her employment but rather, was caused by events and medical issues unrelated to her employment;

• further and alternatively, the work-related stressors nominated by Ms Fullerton are unsubstantiated;

• further and alternatively, with regard to the work-related stressors, any injury suffered by Ms Fullerton arose out of, or in the course of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way by the employer in connection with her employment; and

• further and alternatively, with regard to the work-related stressors, any injury suffered by Ms Fullerton arose out of, or in the course of, her expectation or perception of reasonable management action being taken against her.

• [9] It is agreed that Ms Fullerton's application for compensation was lodged on 9 March 2021.

• [10] With respect to the date of injury, Industrial Commissioner Hartigan (as her Honour then was) in Tuesley v Workers' Compensation Regulator stated:[7]

[26] As noted by Deputy President Bloomfield in Kiesouw, events which occur after a worker suffers a psychological or psychiatric injury, cannot have contributed to the development of such an injury. Consequently, there is a need to identify when an injury occurred so as to only permit material relevant to the development of causation of that injury to be canvassed in an appeal proceeding.

• [11] In terms of s 141 of the WCR Act, the Respondent says that the focus should be the date upon which the doctor forms the opinion that Ms Fullerton suffered an injury in accordance with the provisions of the Act, as distinct from simply requiring time off work. To that end, the Respondent directs me to Blackwood v Toward.[8] In that decision, at paragraph [29], his Honour Martin J said:

Section 141(1) concerns the worker and whether, in the opinion of a doctor or other nominated medical professional, the worker has suffered a "personal injury arising out of, or in the course of, employment if the employment is a significant contributing factor to the injury" as described in s 9. That is what is meant by "the worker is assessed by ... a doctor". To confine it as the respondent suggests is to equate assessing a worker with assessing an injury.

• [12] Further, in De Alwis v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator),[9] at paragraph [4], his Honour Martin J said:

In Blackwood v Toward, it was held that in order for a doctor to "assess" an injury as an "injury" within the meaning of the Act there must be evidence of some evaluation, that is to say, some conclusion or expression of opinion that the injury arose out of the employment.

• [13] The Respondent's position is that, ultimately, 'it is not necessary for a determination about the date of injury because all matters discussed in the oral and documentary evidence before the Commission are relevant to the claimed injury'.[10]

• [14] While the Appellant states that Ms Fullerton's application for compensation identified the date of injury as 8 February 2021, the Respondent says that it was WorkCover that nominated this as the date of injury.

• [15] The Appellant notes that the date of decompensation is often considered to be the signifier of the injury.[11] To that end, the Appellant says that the evidence before the Commission identifies 8 February 2021 as the date of Ms Fullerton's injury. The Appellant says that between 1 July 2019 and 8 February 2021, Ms Fullerton 'had been able to work consistently and complete work that her superiors were happy with and endorsed'.[12]

• [16] The Appellant points to the evidence of psychiatrist Dr Greig Richardson, whose evidence was that Ms Fullerton's performance as outlined at paragraph [15] above indicated that Ms Fullerton was not adversely affected by a particular psychiatric or psychological disorder during that time and that she was 'working su[13]essfully'.13

• [17] The evidence demonstrates that on 8 February 2021, Ms Fullerton attended on her General Practitioner, Dr Thakrar, who wrote in her consultation notes that Ms Fullerton was experiencing 'a lot of stress, just separated from husband'.[14] Dr Thakrar issued Ms Fullerton with medical certificates which stated that she was unfit for work during the periods 9 February 2021 to 12 February 2021[15] and 16 February 2021 to 19 February 2021.[16] Ms Fullerton took sick leave from work during these periods.[17]

• [18] On 5 March 2021, Dr Thakrar issued a work capacity certificate stating that Ms Fullerton had required treatment over the period 9 February 2021 to 5 April 2021 and had no functional capacity for any type of work until 5 April 2021. The work capacity certificate also stated that Ms Fullerton was first seen in the practice for the injury of '... stress - anxiety and physical symptoms' on 8 February 2021.[18]

• [19] Later, in response to correspondence from WorkCover, Dr Thakrar wrote on 23 March 2021 that: Ms Fullerton's diagnosis was stress - anxiety and resulting in somatic/physical symptoms (dizziness, chest pain, palpitations); that she was first seen in the practice in relation to the issues on 8 February 2021; and, Ms Fullerton had used sick leave before being issued with a work capacity certificate.[19]

• [20] Dr Thakrar's evidence was that she had initially provided Ms Fullerton with regular medical certificates because Ms Fullerton needed time off work, however, it subsequently became a WorkCover claim.[20]

• [21] I have reviewed the consultation notes for the visits following the 8 February consultation. On 11 February 2021, Dr Thakrar records that Ms Fullerton had been seen at the Royal Brisbane & Women's Hospital Emergency Department on 9 February 2021 with the presenting problem listed as 'GP REF - RESOLVED CHEST DISCOMFORT, PALPITATIONS 3/7 INTERMITENT (a) Ms Fullerton's stated date of injury was 25 February 2021;

(b) Ms Fullerton was first seen in the practice for the injury on 8 February 2021;

(c) The diagnosis was Work related stress à anxiety and physical symptoms;

(d) The mechanism of injury of several incidents over a period of months was consistent with the clinical findings; and

(e) Ms Fullerton required treatment from 9 February 2021 to 5 April 2021, and would be reviewed again on 5 April 2021.

• [59] Dr Thakrar's evidence was that she had nominated 8 February 2021 as the date of injury because that was the episode where Ms Fullerton was dizzy on the boat, and that was when she started issuing the medical certificates, including the first medical certificate on 8 February 2021.[65]

• [60] The Respondent notes that there was a 'bigger trigger' on 25 February 2021.[66] This appears to be the date upon which Ms Fullerton determined that she was unable to work as a result of her symptoms.

• [61] The Respondent also points to a report Dr Thakrar provided to WorkCover in response to a series of questions posed by it where she stated the following:[67]

(a) Ms Fullerton's employment was a significant contributing factor in causing her injury;

(b) the causative events which led to the onset of the work-related diagnosis was a number of incidents over a period of months;

Stressàanxiety and resulting in somatic/physical symptoms (dizziness, chest pain, palpitations).

(d) There were no external factors or pre-existing conditions contributing to Ms Fullerton's psychological injury;

(e) All Ms Fullerton's symptoms are triggered by work related matters - meetings/emails/communications;

(f) Ms Fullerton had been referred to a psychologist for treatment;

(g) Ms Fullerton will also see a cardiologist to exclude cardiac causes for her physical symptoms; and

(h) Ms Fullerton had been a patient of the practice since 6 January 2020 (Q 7).

• [62] Dr Thakrar's evidence was that the causative events were the work duties Ms Fullerton had to perform and that the pressure of the work Ms Fullerton did, built up over time.[68]

• [63] The Respondent notes that Ms Fullerton saw a cardiologist who advised Dr Thakrar that Ms Fullerton did not require blood pressure tablets and that she suffered from 'situational hypertension' where the high blood pressure was related to Ms Fullerton's work.[69]

• [64] Dr Greig Richardson was engaged by WorkCover to assess Ms Fullerton and produce a report as a part of Ms Fullerton's claim. Dr Richardson's report is dated 3 August 2021.[70]

• [65] The Respondent notes that Dr Richardson diagnosed Ms Fullerton as having an adjustment disorder with depressed and anxious mood, with a differential diagnosis of an acute stress disorder.[71] Dr Richardson provides his report on the basis of documents provided by WorkCover and the individual he is assessing.[72]

• [66] Dr Richardson's evidence was that he takes a history of the presenting complaint from the individual he is assessing. He said that he tries to '... make it clear in a linear manner. This is the nature of the journey, what are the circumstances of the injuries, what treatment she had, where she had [it], that sort of thing ... so we have a complete understanding of the nature of the injury and its sequalae and the circumstances in which it has occurred.'[73] Dr Richardson said that his diagnosis is based on that information from the individual but also it is in the context of other reports he had.[74]

• [67] Dr Richardson's evidence was that he 'is not a detective' and so he relies on the individual's personal history and what they say has occurred. Dr Richardson said that if some material fact he has considered in forming his opinion was wrong, it could change his opinion.[75]

• [68] Ms Riedel took Dr Richardson through his report and clarified the matters that Dr Richardson had identified in the 'history of the presenting complaint' part of his report. Dr Richardson agreed that these matters fed into his opinion regarding causation and diagnosis. In summary, these matters were:[76]

• Difficulty matching expectations of national steering committee with what could be developed due to interventions by DAF;

• Difficulties understanding the requirements of different organisations, which led to conflict and difficulties moving through appropriate approval channels;

• Writing and preparing campaigns to achieve goals and having these cancelled by the Department and the Minister's office;

• Developing extreme stress and anxiety about her role and the inability to deliver any of the work;

• Significant difficulties with Ms Beck, Director of Communications whom she felt began micromanaging her and being overly critical of her performance. Being under scrutiny of Ms Beck while not being directly accountable to Ms Beck; and

• Believing it was impossible to reconcile a Queensland Government organisation wishing to have their imprimatur on a program that was essentially nationally funded.

• [69] Dr Richardson also took into account Ms Fullerton's report that she had a loving, stable relationship with her husband.[77]

• [70] Dr Richardson confirmed that the history given by Ms Fullerton included that the demands of her role were somewhat high and she had worked on weekends from the beginning of her employment in July 2019.[78]

• [71] The Respondent points out that Dr Richardson understood that Ms Fullerton felt she had a low level of control over aspects of her work.[79] The Respondent also notes that Dr Richardson seemed to understand that Ms Fullerton was having trouble working with both her employer, the State Government and the Federal Government level Steering Committee.[80]

• [72] Dr Richardson's opinion is that Ms Fullerton's employment was the major significant contributing factor to the diagnosed injury:[81]

I consider employment to be the major significant contributing factor to her injury with Ms Fullerton documenting from the beginning of her employment that demands of her role were high and she found herself working on weekends with feelings at times she had a low level of control over some aspects of her work given the structural nature of the organisation which involved both arms of the state and federal governments.

Subsequently with difficulties with role clarity, Ms Fullerton as I have documented reported difficulties understanding the requirements of the different organisations which led to conflict and difficulties moving through the appropriate approval channels.

Subsequently she found herself developing extreme stress and anxiety about her role and an inability to actually deliver any of her work with her stating it became obvious to her that she began to lose the support of Mr Graeme Dudgeon with her developing extreme distress and panic episodes for which her General Practitioner Dr [Artia] Thakrar issued her a certificate for stress leave and referred her to counselling with Psychologist Amy Underwood.

To this end I consider employment to be the major significant contribution factor to her injury.

• [73] Dr Richardson said that the major stressor articulated by Ms Fullerton was working on weekends and having a low level of control over some aspects of her work given its structural nature involving both State and Federal Governments.[82] Dr Richardson said nothing in the personal history provided to him made him think there was anything else in Ms Fullerton's experience commensurate with the difficulties she was experiencing at work.[83]

• [74] With reference to the stressor Ms Fullerton identified in that she had developed campaigns which had received approvals, only to have them changed at the very end, Dr Richardson said that the reason for the change of the advertising campaign was not what had the impact, rather, it was the fact of the change itself.[84]

The Appellant argues Dr Richardson's opinion should not be accepted by the Commission

• [75] The Appellant submits that in forming his opinion, Dr Richardson 'relied heavily, if not exclusively', upon the information contained in the documents provided to him by WorkCover Queensland and Ms Fullerton.[85] The Appellant notes that Dr Richardson said his opinion regarding the cause of injury was based on all information, particularly that regarding health reasons leading up to the stress.[86] Dr Richardson also said that if the underlying facts contained in the information before him changed, it would impact on his opinion regarding the cause of Ms Fullerton's injury.[87]

• [76] The Appellant says that when he formed his opinion about Ms Fullerton, Dr Richardson was unaware of what the Appellant says were the significant, contemporaneous health and life events experienced by her as outlined above. The Appellant also says that Dr Richardson was unaware that Ms Fullerton took leave from work between 14 November 2020 and 3 January 2021[88] or that she had been given medical certificates for time off work between 9 and 22 February 2021.[89] Further, the Appellant says that Dr Richardson relied on Ms Fullerton's description of being in a loving, stable relationship with her husband and was not aware that Ms Fullerton had separated from her husband.[90]

• [77] The Appellant says that Dr Richardson identified a range of work-related factors as having caused Ms Fullerton's injury,[91] however, Dr Richardson's evidence is flawed and should not be accepted by the Commission on the basis that it was:

(a) 'formulated in a vacuum' devoid of knowledge of Ms Fullerton's significant health and life events between December 2020 and February 2021; and

(b) the factual basis for his opinion has not been made out, rendering his opinion irrelevant.[92] The Appellant points to various authorities supporting the proposition that an expert's opinion must have a relationship with the facts proved, or else it is irrelevant.[93]

• [78] While the Respondent says that the Appellant 'made no effort to disentangle the nominated events with Dr Richardson', the Appellant says this is untrue. The Appellant says that the law is clear and cites Heydon J in Dasreef:[94]

[90] Function of the proof of assumption rule. The function of the proof of assumption rule is to highlight the irrelevance of expert opinion evidence resting on assumptions not backed by primary evidence. It is irrelevant because it stands in a void, unconnected with the issues thrown up by the evidence and the reasoning processes which the trier of fact may employ to resolve them. If the expert's conclusion does not have some rational relationship with the facts proved, it is irrelevant. That is because in not tending to establish the conclusion asserted, it lacks probative capacity. Opinion evidence is a bridge between data in the form of primary evidence and a conclusion which cannot be reached without the application of expertise. The bridge cannot stand if the primary evidence end of it does not exist. The expert opinion is then only a misleading jumble, uselessly cluttering up the evidentiary scene. (citations omitted)

• [79] The Appellant says that Dasreef has been followed by the Commission. This matter was addressed in the Appellant's written submissions where reference was made to Vice-President O'Connor's decision of Toodayan:[95]

[238] There are numerous cases, including Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles and Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (Dasreef) that clearly outline the duty of an expert and the issue involved with unproven assumptions in expert witness reports.

[239] Heydon J, in Dasreef, addressed several of those issues in his judgment. He said:

An expert opinion is not admissible unless evidence has been, or will be, admitted, whether from the expert or from some other source, which is capable of supporting findings of fact which are sufficiently similar to the factual assumptions on which the opinion was stated to be based to render the opinion of value.

[240] Later in the decision, his Honour noted that:

If the expert's conclusion does not have some rational relationship with the facts proved, it is irrelevant. That is because in not tending to establish the conclusion asserted, it lacks probative capacity...(this extract appears above at [286]).

[241] Unless there is evidence to support the assumptions in an expert report, the report will be given little weight by the Commission. (citations omitted)

• [80] The Appellant also refers to Granato[96] where Industrial Commissioner Knight discusses principles relevant to the issue of the admissibility of evidence. Of particular relevance is the Commissioner's observation that where the 'factual underpinning of the report is disturbed by, for example, the rejection by the tribunal of parts of that underpinning, then it follows that the report itself is weakened to that extent'.[97]

• [81] The Appellant repeats that between 1 July 2019 and 8 February 2021, Ms Fullerton had been able to work consistently in her role,[98] and was considered capable by her supervisors and was meeting her KPIs.[99] The Appellant points to Dr Richardson's evidence which was that this conduct indicated that Ms Fullerton was not adversely affected by a particular psychiatric or psychological disorder during that time and was working successfully.[100]

What conclusions can be drawn from the medical evidence?

• [82] The Respondent says that having regard to the evidence of Dr Thakrar and Dr Richardson, the factors which have a causal connection with Ms Fullerton's diagnosed injury are:[101]

(a) The structural nature of the organisation which involved both arms of the state and federal governments led to Ms Fullerton experiencing a low level of control over some aspects of her work. This includes Ms Fullerton's difficulties understanding the requirements of the different organisations, resulting in conflict and difficulties moving through the appropriate approval channels.

Low role clarity where she had two masters (Factor 1) in the appellant's SOFAC.

(b) Ms Fullerton developed extreme stress and anxiety about her role and an inability to actually deliver any of her work. This naturally includes the impact of the change made to the advertising campaign.

Campaign changes (Factor 3) in the appellant's SOFAC.

(c) The demands of Ms Fullerton's role were high, requiring extended work hours, including working on weekends.

• [83] The Respondent says that while Ms Fullerton spoke to Dr Richardson about a deteriorating relationship with Ms Beck and that she felt Ms Beck was micromanaging her, this was not a matter identified by Dr Richardson as being a significant contributing factor to the injury.[102]

• [84] As the Appellant contends that the factual basis for Dr Richardson's opinion has not been made out, and noting the authorities set out above in the Appellant's submissions, it is necessary to turn to the evidence before the Commission in determining whether the nominated stressors did, in fact, exist.

Consideration of the work-related factors said to have contributed to Ms Fullerton's injury

• [85] The Respondent submits that it is important to consider the distinction between a worker's perception of events occurring in the workplace and the Commission's determination of the reality of what occurred.[103] The Respondent cites some cases containing judicial commentary regarding this matter.

• [86] The Respondent first turns to Sheridan v Q-COMP,[104] where President Hall wrote (emphasis added by Respondent):

... In respect to psychological injury, there is an "egg-shell psyche" principle which is the equivalent of the "egg-shell skull" principle, compare State Transit Authority of New South Wales v Chelmer [2007] NSWCA 249 at paragraph 40 per Spigelman CJ. So long as the events within the workplace are real rather than imaginary, it matters not that they impact upon the claimant's psyche because of a flawed perception of events attributable to a disordered mind, ... The inability of a worker to psychologically cope with an attitude or manner of another worker is analogous to a worker being unable to cope with any other feature, including a physical feature, or aspect of the work environment, Flinders Power Operating Services Pty Ltd (formerly NRG Flinders Operating Services Pty Ltd) v Amato [2007] SAWCT 33 at paragraph 125. There is of course a statutory deviation from the general rule where the psychological disorder arises out of or in the course of a claimant's expectation or perception of reasonable management action been taken against the worker, compare s. 32(5)(b) of the Act...

• [87] The Respondent also cites President Hall in Q-Comp v Rowe[105] (emphasis added by Respondent):

but for s. 32(5) of the Act, at least at a conceptual level, a psychological injury arising out of interaction between a worker's personality and the work environment would be compensable, compare Flinders Power Operating Services Pty Ltd (formerly NRG Flinders Operating Services Pty Ltd) v Amato [2007] SAWCT 33 at paras 125 and 126.

• [88] The Respondent then turns to Gilmour v Workers' Compensation Regulator,[106] where his Honour, Vice-President O'Connor rejected an argument that the worker's psychiatric injury developed due to his unique personality traits and misperception of events occurring in the workplace (Respondent's emphasis added):

[60] I do not accept that this is a case in which it can be said that "the only significant contributing factor" was the appellant's own peculiar attitude which led to the injury.

[61] In Attorney General's Department v K [2010] NSWWCCPD 76; (2010) 8 DDCR 120 R 52 Acting President Roche drew the following conclusions of the relevant authorities dealing with perception:

a) employers take their employees as they find them. There is an "egg-shell psyche" principle which is the equivalent of the "egg-shell skull" principle (Spigelman CJ in Chelmer at [40]);

b) a perception of real events, which are not external events, can satisfy the test of injury arising out of or in the course of employment (Spigelman CJ in Chelmer at [54]);

1. if events which actually occurred in the workplace were perceived as creating an offensive or hostile working environment, and a psychological injury followed, it is open to the Commission to conclude that causation is established (Basten JA in Chelmer at [69]);

d) **so long as the events within the workplace are real, rather than imaginary, it does not matter that they affected the worker's psyche because of a flawed perception of events because of a disordered mind (**President Hall in Sheridan);

e) there is no requirement at law that the worker's perception of the events must have been one that passed some qualitative test based on an "objective measure of reasonableness" (Von Doussa J in Wiegand at [31]), and

f) it is not necessary that the worker's reaction to the events must have been "rational, reasonable and proportionate" before compensation can be recovered.

• [89] In that decision, Vice-President O'Connor went on to say that he accepted that the appellant had a demanding workload and went on to find that it was more probable than not that there was a clear causal connection between the worker's employment and the psychiatric or psychological condition.[107]

• [90] The Respondent says that the above authorities are important to keep in mind because the Appellant argues that Ms Fullerton's injury is caused by her unpreparedness to work in the manner required and because of her desire to change existing practices relating to the approval of campaigns.[108] The Respondent argues that it was the system Ms Fullerton had to work within that caused her injury.

• [91] The expert evidence regarding the relevant stressors or factors is set out above. Ms Fullerton was asked about her visit to Dr Thakrar on 8 February 2021. Ms Fullerton's evidence was that she was stressed and continued to work up until 8 February 2021 but on the weekend before 8 February, her blood pressure was quite low. She said that she went to work on the Monday and burst into tears and then went to see the doctor. Ms Fullerton agreed that she told the doctor she was under a lot of stress and said that she 'was talking to her about stress relating to the decision that was taken by the Minister', and 'the leadup to all of that with the difficulty in understanding who was in charge and able to direct decision-making'. Ms Fullerton said that she was working 'ridiculous hours' to try and get the work done.[109]

• [92] I will now consider the submissions of the parties and the evidence before the Commission with regard to:

• [93] I note that regarding each of these factors, the Appellant first argues that the factor cannot be substantiated on the evidence. In the alternative, the Appellant argues that if established, each factor is extinguished by the operation of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way. Where I find that a factor has been established, I will consider whether it is removed by s 32(5).

• [94] Prior to the time Ms Fullerton was performing her role, the RIFA program had already been established and was operational. While it was being run by the Queensland Government, it was being funded by state and federal governments and was subject to a range of stakeholders.

• [95] This stressor relates to the interactions Ms Fullerton had involving the Steering Committee and the Department, or as was perceived by Ms Fullerton as the 'two masters issue'.

• [96] Ms Fullerton's role was managerial and included elements of media, stakeholder engagement and communication with the general public. The Respondent summarises the evidence of Mr Letts, the bio security officer in charge of the program at the relevant time, regarding elements of the role as follows: [110]

(a) with Queensland landholders, which was a critical part of the potential success of the program;

(b) responsibility for media releases and general communications, dealing with the media and those sorts of things; and

(c) a responsibility for reporting back to the steering committee in relation to all of those elements that were being delivered within the program.

• [97] Mr Letts' evidence was that the biosecurity fire ant response was of a scale that had not been seen before. Mr Letts said that he met weekly with the Minister's office and generally speaking, 25% of conversations were around the program.[111]

• [98] The Steering Committee featured heavily in the evidence throughout the hearing. Mr Letts described the role of the Steering Committee as being to give cost share partners oversight they would normally have by way of a consultative committee or a National Management Group:[112]

...it wasn't clear which, but at least to give them a seat at the table to have some input and say into the way that the program was being run and to - to monitor the performance of the program and report back as much as anything.

• [99] The Steering Committee had terms of reference which involved it providing guidance and support.[113] Mr Letts said that the membership of the Steering Committee changed with time, but that it was:[114]

... made up of people in either roles like myself or perhaps a level down, in terms of the general manager, invasive species type roles. They have some technical and scientific background in relation to invasive species control and eradication, so that it was as much as anything to give them an opportunity to have input into the way the program was being run. It - obviously they also had a responsibility in terms of accountability around the money - the way the money was being spent, the reporting back to their various jurisdictions in - on -on -on that. So yeah, all of those elements, as you would expect.

• [100] Mr Letts said that there was an agreement in place for each of the states to make a financial contribution to the program but that the financial accountability for the program sat with the Queensland Government.[115]

• [101] With reference to the program's governance plan, Mr Letts' evidence was that risks associated with the program flowed back to '... primarily, the Queensland Government'.[116] Mr Letts said '... it was as much about managing the risk that the steering committee members may actually walk away if we weren't running the program in a solid, accountable, you know, risk-mitigation manner ...'.[117]

• [102] I agree with the Respondent's submission that Mr Letts' evidence demonstrates the importance of the steering committee's role in the oversight of the program and that the steering committee took a very hands-on approach to its responsibilities.[118]

• [103] The Appellant asserts that Ms Fullerton was unwilling to work in the manner required or that she had some kind of particular preference with regard to the way the program ran, including the governance arrangements. However, the evidence demonstrated that the tension and complexities of the relationship between the Queensland team implementing the program and the Steering Committee oversight role existed well before Ms Fullerton took up her role.

• [104] Prior to Ms Fullerton's employment, Ms Louise Morgan held a role with similar responsibilities. The Respondent draws my attention to correspondence to and from Ms Morgan which addresses issues which clearly remained unresolved when Ms Fullerton took up the position.[119] The emails demonstrate that from as early as 28 June 2018, there was an awareness of the matters regarding communication about the program, branding and media and the interaction between the Queensland program and the Steering Committee.

• [105] The first email is from the then general manager Mr John Jordan and was sent to Ms Morgan and Dr Wendy Craik (Chair of the Steering Committee), among others, and related to the published 10-year eradication plan. Several issues were raised in that email. In the interests of brevity, I have adopted the summary of this material set out in the Respondent's submissions (including the Respondent's emphasis):[120]

(a) Branding and letterhead for the program: Mr Jordan wondered whether as this is a national agenda, it arguably should be branded as such, rather than the Queensland Government?

Ms Morgan informed that it had been discussed in the past and the conclusion was that branding is accurate for a nationally funded program that is administered by a particular state i.e. for publications such as the 10 year plan, National Program is branded at the top, and Queensland Gov crest signified at the bottom right hand corner (as Qld is the combat state administering the effort).

The branding and independence scenario has also been discussed previously for the web space as detailed in a paper that was submitted to the Steering Committee at the first meeting. The Steering Committee agreed with the recommendation to leave the web space as is, as the most practical and efficient course of action. See Paper attached for your review.

(b) Protocol and pathway for the SC to release media, communique etc. - I imagine this will be via the secretariat following approval of the Chair?

Ms Morgan answered that the media release scenarios is very much a new process that sits outside of the department or Ministerial media protocols. As the aim for a media release is to be an independent, impartial message and from the Steering Committee, I would suggest FYI to Mins Office (so not held up in process and also no surprises their end) and released by the Chair, rather than secretariat (who is DAF personnel) - a generic email account for the steering committee would be an effective tool for this process and possibly other communication needs. The department's media team could support with supply of media outlet contacts to send to. The media contact would also be the Chair (or other nominated committee spokesperson in this circumstance.

• [106] A further email within that chain of emails shows that by 12 December 2018, the matter of media releases and the capacity of the steering committee to issue these independent of the Queensland program was still under discussion.[121] I again adopt the Respondent's summary of the content of an email where Ms Morgan provided more background on previous discussions:[122]

In my experience, there are two ways to progress a media release in this new scenario:

1. Via the department which would be subject to department media protocol (i.e. issued by the media team) and Ministerial comment;

1. Via the Steering Committee independently - if the media release is to be an independent, impartial message from the Steering Committee, it is suggested to be issued by the Chair, rather than secretariat being DAF personnel with a DAF email address. A generic email account for the Steering Committee would be an ideal tool for this process, and for other communication needs. The department's media team could support this process with supply of media outlet contacts to send to. It is suggested the media contact would also be the Chair (or other nominated steering committee spokesperson) in this circumstance.

• [107] Ms Morgan goes on in that email to note that option 2 (above) raises questions, including: whether it would be appropriate for the Steering Committee Secretariat to be fielding media enquiries and who would prepare and issue written statements and at what stage the Minister would be involved, particularly when issues are contentious.[123] Ms Morgan concludes the email by saying that the issues needed to be clarified to 'ensure a smooth process of issuing media releases in a timely fashion'.[124]

• [108] Ms Fullerton commenced employment in July 2019 and these matters were still not resolved. Ms Fullerton gave evidence that soon after her employment in the role, Dr Craik raised this matter with her. Some months after Ms Fullerton's commencement, Ms Morgan provided her with some information about these discussions. It is clear from this email sent in September 2019 that those matters were not resolved.[125]

• [109] Mr Letts' evidence was that 'branding' matters were a subject of discussion at the Steering Committee and that this 'bemused' him as what was needed was a recognisable brand for the program, rather than being concerned about 'whether or not it was a national cost-share program or whether it was a Queensland Government program'.[126] Mr Letts said that he was 'always looking to try and accommodate the steering committee funding partners as much as [he] possibly could in relation to these sorts of wishes even though [he] didn't necessarily see the sense in it ...'.[127]

• [110] The Respondent says that the evidence of Ms Morgan and Mr Letts regarding the 'branding' issues and tensions between the Steering Committee and the Queensland program needs to be compared with Ms Phillips' evidence.

• [111] Ms Phillips was the Engagement Manager for Biosecurity Queensland. Ms Phillips gave evidence about her understanding of the branding and imagery used on the RIFA program material and communications for the program. Ms Phillips spoke about a review of the program's communication program and activities undertaken by herself and Ms Morgan prior to Ms Fullerton's commencement. Ms Phillips said that she participated in a lengthy meeting with Mr Dudgeon and Ms Fullerton to present the recommendations of that review in the early days of Ms Fullerton commencing in the role.[128]

• [112] Ms Phillips understood that there had been some call from the Steering Committee with regard to branding of the RIFA program,[129] and that Ms Fullerton 'wanted documents tailored for the program'.[130] Ms Phillips said that the Steering Committee did not have any accountability, and that it could provide advice but ultimately, delivery of the program had to work within Queensland Government guidelines. Ms Phillips said that there were times where this created a conflict.[131]

• [113] Ms Phillips appeared to be of the view that branding had not been an issue before Ms Fullerton took up her position. This is not supported by the evidence of Mr Letts, and Ms Morgan. Ms Phillips said that Ms Fullerton was looking for a document that 'actually stepped out' how materials would represent Queensland as delivering the program but acknowledge the other funding partners nationally.[132] It appears that this document has now been adopted and is used by other states within the Biosecurity system.[133]

• [114] Ms Phillips said that due to the interest of the Steering Committee in these matters, she produced a fire ant branded version of the document. Ms Phillips said that Ms Fullerton was negative about the processes outlined in the document and that she gave the impression 'she just wanted to operate autonomously outside of these processes and systems'.[134] However, when asked about the requests the Steering Committee was making about how media releases would go out or about how information would be branded, Ms Phillips said, 'so that's not my area of expertise, that's Hayley Beck's area'.

• [115] I have reviewed the document that was put together to provide guidelines for the issuing of communications by the program. It clearly contains an 'approvals' page which had space for Dr Wendy Craik, as Steering Committee Chair to approve the document. I do not accept that this was simply 'for noting' or that a communication would be issued without Dr Craik's endorsement. The need to receive sign off from both the Queensland program leader and the national Steering Committee Chair clearly demonstrates the situation in which Ms Fullerton found herself.

• [116] On 22 August 2019, Ms Fullerton raised the 'two masters' issue by email in which she demonstrates an understanding of the Government approvals process but also addresses the matters raised by Dr Craik regarding branding and approvals for communications. Ms Fullerton worked for the Queensland Government and was required to work within the Queensland Government policies and structures to do her work, however, she also reported to and received guidance from the Steering Committee and Dr Craik was in direct contact with her.

• [117] The correspondence in evidence demonstrates that the branding issues and the management of State Government and Steering Committee expectations continued to be an issue and that Ms Fullerton continued to brief Mr Dudgeon on these matters, communicate with Ms Phillips about the branding document and through Mr Letts, took the branding document to the Steering Committee.[135] She also provided feedback received from the steering committee to Mr Dudgeon who responded to her by email.[136]

• [118] On 4 January 2020, Dr Craik provided feedback to Ms Fullerton regarding the Strategic Communication and Engagement Plan and stated that it should be considered by the Steering Committee along with budget discussions.[137]

• [119] On 20 January 2020, Ms Fullerton communicated with Dr Turley, Ms Fullerton's direct supervisor at the relevant time, among others, further discussing the matters Dr Craik had raised about branding and noting that the paper provided by Ms Phillips would not address the matters raised by Dr Craik. Ms Fullerton described a paper she would be presenting to the Steering Committee discussing not only cost-share branding matters, but also media protocols and major announcements.[138]

• [120] Ms Fullerton appeared to be actively seeking ways to deal with the preferences of Dr Craik and the Steering Committee within the confines of Queensland Government approval processes. One way Ms Fullerton suggested to do this was by the program submitting campaign information to the Government Advertising and Communication Committee ('GACC') for information only rather than approval. As Ms Fullerton put it, the Queensland Government only contributes 10% of the funding for the program but the GACC process was adding 'another layer of red tape' for the program to get communications out into the market.

• [121] Ms Fullerton presented the paper she prepared defining the issue between the Steering Committee and the Queensland Government to the Steering Committee on 20 February 2020.[139] Attending that meeting was Ms Fullerton's manager, Mr Dudgeon, Dr Turley, the Strategy Director and others. Mr Letts attended the meeting as an observer. Any suggestion that this was a personal agenda of Ms Fullerton's cannot be sustained.

• [122] The evidence demonstrated tension between the Queensland Government and the Steering Committee regarding the 'Lifestyle' campaign. At this stage, decisions were being made about communication regarding fire ants in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic messaging from government. The Minister's office had not provided approval for the campaign or associated medial releases. There was some discussion about media releases to be issued by the Steering Committee and Mr Dudgeon questioned the capacity of the Minister's office to have a 'power of veto' over the Steering Committee media releases. Mr Dudgeon's evidence was that he believed the Minister and Dr Craik had discussed the matter and the Steering Committee was able to have its own media releases, as long as the Minister's office had a capacity to look at them and provide feedback.[140]

• [123] In April 2020, Dr Craik was reporting to the Steering Committee that she had a discussion with the Minister where she expressed a view that as most of the funds for the Program are not from Queensland, things such as the advertising campaign should be going to GACC for information only, and not approval.[141]

• [124] Mr Dudgeon agreed that one of Ms Fullerton's tasks was to assist to resolve the process for Steering Committee communications.[142] Mr Dudgeon's evidence was to the effect that sometime after Ms Fullerton left, some of these suggested changes were adopted.[143]

• [125] Dr Turley gave evidence that he was aware of the matter of the 'two masters'.[144]

• [126] Mr Dudgeon's evidence was clear that Ms Fullerton was progressing the matters addressing the 'two masters' arising from Dr Craik and the Steering Committee.[145]

• [127] Discussions on this matter continued, with Ms Bock from the Department of Premier and Cabinet communicating with Ms Beck, among others, on 26 June 2020 and by email on 29 June 2020. The view expressed by Ms Bock was that as the campaigns were Queensland-led and developed by the Queensland Government, they should be reviewed and approved via the GACC process.

• [128] The matter was ongoing and on Sunday 9 August 2020, Ms Fullerton sent an email to Dr Turley further explaining the discussion paper and discussions she had had with Ms Beck. On 11 August 2020, Ms Fullerton wrote to Ms Beck requesting something in writing regarding the position on branding. Ms Beck sent an email to Mr Dudgeon and Mr Turley attaching the feedback Dr Craik had provided the Minister's office regarding the discussion paper.[146]

• [129] In that email, Ms Beck states that it is important for everyone to be on the same page, referring to the Minister's office, the RIFA program, the Department and the Steering Committee. Ms Beck also acknowledged Ms Fullerton's frustration with having 'two masters' and expressing hope that the policy and procedure would clear that up.[147]

• [130] Dr Turley then emailed Ms Fullerton asking her to review the documents, providing some of his own observations about them.[148]

• [131] The Respondent submits that Ms Fullerton had a responsibility to her employer but was also accountable to the Steering Committee and on this basis, the 'two masters' issue was 'very real'. Further, the Respondent submits that the 'two masters' issue was not of Ms Fullerton's own doing but was an integral part of her employment and is a significant contributing factor to her injury.[149]

• [132] The Appellant says that the evidence demonstrates Ms Fullerton did not have 'two masters' and that the nature of her role and what was in its ambit was 'readily apparent'.[150]

• [133] The Appellant sets out the RIFA program arrangements which mean that while it is funded by State, Territory and Federal Governments, it is based in Queensland as Queensland is the 'combat state'. The Steering Committee and its' chair, Dr Wendy Craik provide strategic oversight rather than direction. With reference to the Terms of Reference for the Committee, the Appellant points out that the Steering Committee has no legal basis or legal authority.[151]

• [134] The Appellant submits that Ms Fullerton knew she was employed by the Queensland Government and that she worked in the RIFA Program and that was part of Biosecurity Queensland.[152] The Appellant also submits that Ms Fullerton understood that she was an employee of the Queensland Government and her salary was not being paid by the Steering Committee.[153]

• [135] The Appellant also submits that Ms Fullerton understood that she reported to Mr Dudgeon, a Queensland Government employee and head of the RIFA program, and later Dr Turley. Further, the Appellant submits that Ms Fullerton understood that she was ultimately answerable to the Minister of Agriculture. The Appellant says that Ms Fullerton understood that she was subject to the Code of Conduct; that there were governance and standards with regard to communication and engagement that applied to the whole of the Department; that the RIFA programs marketing campaigns were to be submitted to GACC for approval and required endorsement from Ms Beck; and the reason for the GACC process.[154] The Appellant says that Ms Fullerton knew the Steering Committee's role and the governance of the program and that Mr Dudgeon was the line of report between RIFA and the Steering Committee.

• [136] The Appellant says that in cross-examination, Ms Fullerton stated that during her employment she had wanted clarity as to the accountability of the Queensland Government, who the decision-makers were with regard to the RIFA program and which she was to follow. She also sought clarity about corporate branding.[155] The Appellant says that while Ms Fullerton says that she wanted clarity on these matters, she understood these matters from August 2019 at the latest.[156]

• [137] The Appellant says that Ms Fullerton also knew from September 2019, at the latest, that the corporate branding used for the RIFA program was correct for a nationally cost shared program where the program was being administered by Biosecurity Queensland as part of DAF; that it was not possible to remove the Queensland Government logo from the uniform of RIFA Program staff as the field uniforms required the Government logo pursuant to the Biosecurity Act 2014 (Qld) for authorised access purposes; and that media releases issued via DAF would be subject to the Department's media protocol and Ministerial comment.[157]

• [138] The Appellant notes that ultimately, Ms Fullerton finalised the branding protocol and that it was the last thing she delivered before she went off sick.[158]

• [139] Based on the above, the Appellant says that Ms Fullerton's role was very clear and that that she understood she was a Queensland Government employee reporting to Mr Dudgeon who was in charge of the RIFA Program. The Appellant says that Ms Fullerton understood that she had to comply with Queensland Government policy and processes and that the Steering Committee had no power to direct her in how she performed her role and that it was not her 'master'. The Appellant says that the fact Ms Fullerton sought guidance and approval from Mr Dudgeon and other members of DAF when the Steering Committee requested things of her, is evidence that she knew that.[159]

Appellant submits that matters regarding the 'two masters' issue were reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way

• [140] The Appellant says that in the event there was a lack of clarity surrounding Ms Fullerton's role and the identify of her 'master': the Department's response to those matters constituted reasonable management action; the management action was reasonable and undertaken in a reasonable way; and that any lack of clarity arises from Ms Fullerton's expectation or perception of that reasonable management action.[160]

• [141] The Appellant points to what it says were attempts to provide Ms Fullerton with a greater understanding of the RIFA Program and the Steering Committee and how both operated:

• A PowerPoint presentation provided by Ms Phillips and Ms Morgan;

• Meetings with Mr Letts and Mr Dudgeon to discuss lines of accountability;

• Connecting Ms Fullerton with senior members of DAF experienced in communication and engagement;

• Mr Dudgeon facilitating meetings between the Chair of the Steering Committee and the Minister;

• Mr Dudgeon's suggestion that Ms Fullerton prepare a discussion paper about media and campaign submissions for the RIFA program with assistance from the Corporate Communication team;

• Resources (documentary and personnel) available to Ms Fullerton to understand her role, the RIFA Program and the Steering Committee.

• [142] The Appellant says that the issue of working with multiple stakeholders, including the Steering Committee and other arms of the Queensland Government was not something that Ms Morgan or Ms Phillips, as they were both previously employed in Ms Fullerton's role, experienced and it did not impact Mr Dudgeon's understanding of the RIFA Program.[161]

• [143] The Appellant says that the responses to the 'two masters' issue constituted management action and was conduct taken in relation to Ms Fullerton in managing, handling, directing or controlling her. The Appellant says that where Ms Fullerton had raised issues regarding working with multiple stakeholders where no other senior staff members had done so, the Appellant's actions in responding to these issues were reasonable and taken in a reasonable way.

• [144] The Appellant says that alternatively, Ms Fullerton did not interpret the various directions and information given to her as assistance or support.[162]

• [145] In reply, the Respondent says that the application of s 32(5) does not involve a comparison of whether other workers experienced similar issues.

• [146] With regard to the Appellant's submission that Ms Fullerton's injury arose out of her expectation or perception of the reasonable management action being taken against her, the Respondent says that the operation of s 32(5)(b) requires identification of management action being taken 'against' the interests of Ms Fullerton.

Consideration regarding Factor 1: Low role clarity

• [147] The evidence clearly demonstrates that the 'two masters' issue existed and was a persistent feature of Ms Fullerton's employment with the Appellant.

• [148] There is no evidence before the Commission that the 'two masters' issue was initiated by Ms Fullerton, or that these were personal views she held. It is apparent to me that the 'two masters' issue impacted Ms Fullerton's ability to do her work. It existed before she took up her role and continued to be an issue throughout the time she worked in the position. I do not accept any submission that Ms Fullerton was unable or unwilling to work within the confines of the Department's or Government's policies and procedures. It seems that Ms Fullerton was attempting to find a way to address the issues and concerns of Dr Craik and the Steering Committee while also working within the GACC approval process.

• [149] While the Appellant argues that Ms Fullerton was aware that she was employed by the Queensland Government and reported to Mr Dudgeon with the knowledge that Dr Wendy Craik had no line management of her or capacity to direct her, I readily accept that her experience in the role was more nuanced than that.

• [150] Ms Fullerton's role required her to interact with many stakeholders, perhaps none more so than the Steering Committee and its chair, Dr Wendy Craik. Dr Craik's preferences, frustrations and expectations were communicated to Ms Fullerton and there were clear tensions regarding branding and communication in circumstances where the Steering Committee represented parties contributing 90% of the funding for RIFA. While it is not unusual for there to be national cooperation regarding biosecurity issues, the evidence demonstrates that the RIFA program was unprecedented in its size and scale.

• [151] It is the case that a worker may find themselves in a complex context which gives rise to stress, even when the key individuals involved are not their direct line managers or ultimate decision-makers.

• [152] I do not accept the Appellant's submission that the 'two masters' issue was something experienced only by Ms Fullerton or that she had created the issue where no such tension existed. The 'two masters' stressor was real and not imagined.[163]

• [153] The tensions between the Steering Committee and the RIFA program existed prior to Ms Fullerton's appointment to the role. It is immaterial whether anyone else employed in the program was concerned about how to deal with the competing expectations or desires of the Steering Committee, the RIFA and the Minister's office. The test is not comparative. Ms Fullerton's role was directly impacted by these matters, and it is enough that she found dealing with the tension stressful.

• [154] I do not accept that any of the actions the Appellant identifies as 'management actions' with regard to the 'two masters' stressor constitute management action for the purposes of s 32(5).

• [155] As a preliminary matter, management action is not defined in the WCR Act. The authorities in this area have established that management action must be in relation to specific management action directed at the appellant's employment itself, and not action forming part of the everyday duties and tasks the worker performed in their employment.[164]

• [156] In Allwood v Workers' Compensation Regulator[165] Deputy President O'Connor (as his Honour then was) described 'management action' in the following terms:[166]

The concept of management action in the context of a worker's employment, and for the purposes of the Act, is not so broad that it encompasses anything and everything that a manager does or says in the particular workplace, rather the expression 'management action' relates to those actions undertaken when managing the worker's employment...

...The exclusory action in s 32(5) of the Act was, in my view, intended by the Parliament to related to specific management action directed to the appellant's employment itself, as opposed to action forming part of the everyday duties or tasks that the worker performed in their employment...

• [157] Following Allwood, the Commission has made findings with respect to management action, some of which I will summarise below. This summary is not intended to be exhaustive, however, I have been guided by the parameters drawn by the Commission with respect to whether an action will be considered management action for the purposes of the WCRA in previous decisions of the Commission.

• [158] In Allen,[167] Deputy President O'Connor (as his Honour then was) determined that a meeting held to discuss the appellant's position description, remuneration and hours of work constituted management action for the purposes of s 32(5) of the Act.

• [159] In Edmunds,[168] Industrial Commissioner Power determined that a conversation between a manager and the worker which '... progressed into a discussion about the Appellant's physical injury and fitness for work ...' is management action.

• [160] In O'Neil,[169] I held that decisions and actions with respect to the worker's '... role, duties, workload and support provided to him to undertake his work duties during the relevant period and during times of leave during the relevant period were 'management actions' for the purposes of s 32(5)'.

• [161] In each of these decisions, the actions taken are aimed at the worker's employment and are specific, rather than generic or steadily reproduced in the course of the worker's normal duties. Further, the action which was held to be management action within these decisions does not seek to manage business or departmental operations rather than the employee's employment.

• [162] With respect to this matter, the actions which the Appellant submits are management actions are not, in my view, aimed at managing Ms Fullerton in an analogous way to the actions canvassed in the preceding decisions. Rather, the actions were aimed at facilitating business or departmental organisation within the Department or the RIFA program, and not Ms Fullerton or her employment itself. I will set out my reasons for why each action cannot be understood to be management action from paragraphs [163]-[169] of this decision.

• [163] The Appellant says the PowerPoint presentation produced by Ms Phillips and Ms Morgan is a reasonable management action. This PowerPoint presentation cannot be said to be management action relating directly to Ms Fullerton's employment itself. It was a document summarising a review which had taken place regarding the RIFA program itself called 'Insights and recommendations: Assessment resulting from planning sessions, fire ants communication and engagement June 2019'.[170] It was prepared before Ms Fullerton started in the position. The audience for the document was to include whoever was to be employed in Ms Fullerton's position, and Mr Dudgeon as the lead for the program.

• [164] This document was provided to Ms Fullerton soon after she commenced in the role. I have reviewed the document. It consists of eight pages of 'high level' or 'over-arching' information providing an overview of program communication and engagement, identifying some future priorities. There is nothing at all about this document that could be said to consist of specific management action relating to Ms Fullerton's employment itself. It provided, as Ms Fullerton stated, 'a very clear view of where the organisation wanted to take the comms for the fire ant program'.[171] It appears to me to form part of the regular onboarding which one may expect to happen for a new employee and is not a management action specific to this stressor.

• [165] Other acts the Appellant considers to be reasonable management action have been canvassed at paragraph [141] of these reasons.

• [166] Again, I do not accept that these actions are excluded by the reasonable management action provision of the WCR Act. The nominated meetings are not, in my view, management actions specific to Ms Fullerton's employment itself. The interaction between the Steering Committee, the RIFA program, the GACC process and the Minister's office were a part of the everyday duties of Ms Fullerton and others within the RIFA program team. The discussions that were held were with a view to having a clear position on these matters rather than communicating an existing clear position to Ms Fullerton and directing her to follow it. A meeting Mr Dudgeon facilitated between the Steering Committee Chair and the Minister to discuss the Steering Committee Chair's desires and expectations regarding communication and engagement is not management action which is specific to Ms Fullerton's employment. The matter of the nexus between the Steering Committee and the RIFA program was being discussed and negotiated in an ongoing way, from before Ms Fullerton's employment to after she exited the role.

• [167] That Mr Dudgeon suggested that Ms Fullerton prepare a discussion paper was, in my view, an extension of the ongoing discussions regarding media and campaign submissions for the RIFA program. The preparation of such a discussion paper falls squarely within the types of everyday duties an AO8 level Communications and Engagement Manager with responsibility for media material and campaign development. The preparation of the discussion paper was not for Ms Fullerton's personal benefit. A range of stakeholders would be affected by any decisions or policies adopted following consideration of the matters raised in the discussion paper. This is not management action captured by s 32(5) of the WCR Act.

• [168] Resources which were available to Ms Fullerton to understand her role, the RIFA Program and the Steering Committee are, in my view, part of her everyday employment and onboarding. That Ms Fullerton may access various existing documents to better understand processes and policies specific to the program she was working in and the Department in which she was employed, inform part of her everyday duties in the role. I do not accept that the existence of documents or personnel Ms Fullerton may seek out to understand her role and the governance of the RIFA program are management actions as envisaged in s 32(5).

• [169] In any case, as I have identified above, the stress for Ms Fullerton did not emerge from any lack of understanding on her part as to who she was ultimately responsible to in her role. The stress arose from the tension between the 'two masters'.

Section 32(5)(b) is not enlivened with regard to this stressor

• [170] Having determined that none of the matters identified by the Appellant are management action, it seems to me that s 32(5)(b) is not enlivened. Section 32(5)(b) of the Act refers to perception of action actually taken.[172]

• [171] The Appellant argues that the conduct set out at [132] and discussed above from [144]-[149] is management action taken against Ms Fullerton in that it was specifically directed toward her.[173] However, even if this were the case, I cannot identify that any of those matters could be considered reasonable management taken against Ms Fullerton. Ms Fullerton does not complain that nothing was done to address the matters regarding the nexus between the RIFA and the Steering Committee or that steps that were taken were taken against her. Her stressor is the existence of that nexus in and of itself. Management action or perceptions of management action are not enlivened.

• [172] The Appellant has not demonstrated that Factor 1 cannot be established on the basis of the available evidence. I accept that Factor 1 was real and can be considered a Stressor. I do not accept that Factor 1 results from management action. I do not accept that Factor 1 relates to Ms Fullerton's perceptions of management action taken against her.

• [173] The Respondent's closing submissions do not specifically address the matter of micromanagement. However, the submissions do address the matter of Ms Fullerton experiencing a low level of control over some aspects of her work.

• [174] The Appellant says that in formulating his diagnosis and opinion regarding Ms Fullerton's injury and causation, Dr Richardson relied upon information that Ms Fullerton allegedly experienced significant difficulties with Ms Beck and believed that Ms Beck was micromanaging her in circumstances where Ms Fullerton was not directly accountable to Ms Beck.[174] The Appellant says that any such assertions are unsubstantiated.

• [175] The Respondent says that Dr Richardson did not rely on this stressor in his determination of the significant contributing factors to Ms Fullerton's injury. I have reviewed Dr Richardson's evidence. While he confirmed to Ms Riedel that it was one of the factors he took into account, when I consider his report and remarks he made during his evidence as to what factors he considered significant, the issue of 'micromanagement' by Ms Beck does not appear to be of significance.

• [176] The Appellant points to Ms Fullerton's evidence at the trial that she found Ms Beck to be 'delightful' and 'very helpful'.[175]

• [177] With reference to evidence before the Commission, the Appellant describes Ms Beck's role and says that Ms Beck and her team were focused on ensuring consistency across the Department; consistency when engaging with the Queensland public on behalf of the Government;[176] and compliance with Government communications and engagement policies and procedures.[177]

• [178] Ms Beck described her leadership style as 'collaborative'.[178] Ms Beck was asked whether she would describe herself as a micro-manager and said that it is not her style and that due to the size of her team, she would not have time to micromanage.[179]

• [179] The Appellant says that Ms Beck's oversight of Ms Fullerton and her team was management action taken for the reasons set out above. Further, it was appropriate for Ms Beck to request information of Ms Fullerton and to direct her inquiries and comments to Ms Fullerton, as Ms Fullerton was the manager of the communication and engagement team.[180]

• [180] The Appellant also notes that Ms Beck's approval was required by the Queensland Government before an advertising campaign could be submitted to GACC. That was necessary so that Ms Beck could review the proposed campaign and make any necessary changes before submitting it to the Director-General and GACC.[181]

• [181] The Appellant says that in the circumstances, Ms Beck's oversight of Ms Fullerton was provided in order to manage, handle, direct or control the way in which Ms Fullerton operated her team. Ms Beck's actions were taken to ensure Ms Fullerton's work product was consistent with the approach taken by the rest of the Department and was not part of the everyday duties Ms Fullerton performed in her employment.

• [182] The Appellant says that Ms Beck's direction and requests of Ms Fullerton were reasonable management action undertaken in a reasonable way. In the alternative, the Appellant submits that Ms Fullerton interpreted Ms Beck's actions as micromanagement.

• [183] The Respondent says that Ms Beck's views of her own management style do not matter and that what is relevant is Ms Fullerton's interactions in the workplace with Ms Beck.

• [184] It does not seem to me that the 'micromanagement' issue has been pressed by the Respondent as a stressor to be relied upon in determining whether Ms Fullerton's injury arose out of or in the course of employment.

• [185] It seems to me that Ms Beck was a skilled professional who was doing her job. Ms Fullerton described her as delightful and appeared to have a full understanding as to what Ms Beck's role was and why she was undertaking the actions she was undertaking. I do not consider Ms Beck's performance of the requirements of her own role to be management action taken with specific regard to Ms Fullerton's employment.

• [186] 'Micromanagement' has not been established as a stressor. For reasons which will be discussed below, I do not find that the removal of the issue of 'micromanagement' from the proven stressors undermines Dr Richardson's report to the extent that his opinion is inadmissible.

Factor 3: Campaign Changes/Ms Fullerton developed extreme stress and anxiety about her role and an inability to actually deliver any of her work

• [187] The Respondent says that this stressor naturally includes the impact of the changes to the advertising campaign.

• [188] The RIFA team had engaged companies to undertake market research to assist in the design of advertising campaigns.[182] Prior to Ms Fullerton's arrival, Ms Morgan and Ms Phillips had worked on the previously mentioned PowerPoint presentation and included in that PowerPoint an example of a 'lifestyle' campaign, stating that it should be 'emotive'.[183]

• [189] On 1 August 2019, Minister Furner issued a press release in which he referred to fire ants as a 'super pest' and as aggressive, highly-adaptive and well-equipped for survival. The media release also mentioned that eradication efforts had been effective.[184]

• [190] An information brochure produced in April 2020 also referred to fire ants as 'super pests'. The Respondent notes that in several attachments accompanying the 'always on' campaign sent by Ms Beck on 28 August 2020, the term 'super pests' is used to describe fire ants.[185] That material also referred to the significant health threats posed by fire ants.

• [191] The Respondent refers to the content of a review article published by Dr Ross Wylie, RIFA programs chief entomologist and Sharon Janssen-May. That article states that the Red Imported Fire Ant is a 'super pest' whose impacts, if unchecked, will surpass the combined effects of many of the pests currently regarded as Australia's worst invasive animals.[186] That article also addressed the threat to human health posed by fire ants. This included that reactions to bites may include a pustule or rash through to severe secondary infection or life-threatening anaphylaxis. The article also cited statistics from a 1988 USA study which noted that there had been anaphylactic deaths caused by fewer than five stings.[187]

• [192] The Respondent goes on to provide a range of examples in evidence of the use of the term 'super pest' and with reference to the serious physical danger that might arise from a fire ant bite. This includes in the program's 'three year eradication plan'[188] and the stage 1 'always on' campaign submitted on 28 August 2020.[189]

• [193] The RIFA program created a major advertising campaign, the GACC Stage 1 lifestyle campaign, which had to be presented to GACC. The campaign material was sent by email from Ms Fullerton to Ms Beck, Dr Turley, Mr Dudgeon and others on 4 March 2020.[190] The campaign was also circulated to the Steering Committee.

• [194] The Respondent identifies some information which is useful in understanding the rationale for the campaign. I will include some of that here as I believe it is relevant in understanding the events which followed and which form the basis of this alleged stressor.

• [195] The campaign rational is articulated as:[191]

The National Red Imported Fire Ant Eradication Program is a nationally cost-shared program funded by all state and territory governments, and the federal government. The Queensland Government's funding contribution is 10%. The program is governed strategically and operationally by a national Steering Committee and independent chair, who work with Biosecurity Queensland to deliver the program on behalf of the other jurisdictions.

Fire ants are an invasive 'super pest' that were first detected in Australia in 2001 and currently infest an operational area of approximately 500.000 hectares in South-East Queensland (SEQ). They are a category 1 restricted matter under the Biosecurity Act 2014, and have the potential to cause significant social, environmental and economic impacts estimated to be $1.65 Billion a year. Without the intervention of the National Red Imported Fire Ant Eradication Program since 2001, the first ant infestation may have spread as far as Sydney and Mackay.

• [196] The campaign document was accompanied by a Market Segmentation Research project undertaken in June 2018[192] and a Self-management Research Project - Top line results and survey instrument dated February 2020 with a full report due late March.[193] The campaign budget was $750,000, of which the Queensland Government was to contribute $75,000.[194]

• [197] The GACC paperwork required a brief description of the campaign of no more than 100 words. Ms Fullerton wrote that description:[195]

The campaign is an integrated multi-media campaign across a range of digital and traditional media, subject to a media strategy through Mediacom. Using strong emotive concepts to cut through the clutter of everyday life and draw the audience's attention to the detail of the message will be critical. The creative concepts and messaging will highlight the risk that fire ants present to the health and lifestyle in your own back yard. Concepts will be built on everyday lifestyle activities that people take for granted, and showing them being impacted by fire ants. This will appeal to the underlying value placed on lifestyle and lend the message individual personal relevance. No longer will it be just another biosecurity pest, or just another ant, but a super pest that has the ability to significantly affect what Queenslanders take for granted, personally and for their family.

• [198] In its submissions, the Respondent sets out the chronology of interactions regarding the campaign occurring over the period following Ms Fullerton sharing the campaign with the steering committee and with Ms Beck, Dr Turley, Mr Dudgeon and others.[196] I am assisted by this summary of the evidence and have repeated it here:

[203] On 11 March 2020 at 7.05pm, Ms Fullerton sent an email to Dr Turley referring to feedback that had been given from the steering committee that the draft communication and stakeholder engagement plan 'is not hitting the target and requires amendment'.[197]

[204] On 18 March 2020 at 5.52pm, Ms Fullerton reported to Mr Dudgeon, Dr Turley and others that the lifestyle campaign was unlikely to be supported by GACC. It was not considered essential and there was a reference to a belief that the program had overspent, and Mr Letts was looking for savings.[198]

[205] Mr Dudgeon responded on 18 March 2020 at 6.32pm that the overspent comment is incorrect. It was because cost share partners were behind in their payments and the program's budget was underspent by more than $12M.[199]

[212] On 20 March 2020, Mr Andrew Clark, DAF Manager, Communications and Engagement sent an email to Ms Fullerton, copied to Ms Morgan, referring to a discussion he had had with Ms Fullerton the day before providing notes about their discussion, observing:[200]

Both campaigns are important and have a way forward at different levels.

[213] Mr Clark's comments about the lifestyle campaign included that the GACC application could be 're-jigged to be an 'activity for noting' - given fire ants are a sensitive issue for govt'.[201]

[214] On 20 March Ms Fullerton responded to Mr Clark, copying in Ms Morgan, Mr Dudgeon and Dr Turley, advising him that the identified matters would have to be discussed with the management team and potentially the steering committee.[202]

[215] The ramifications for those changes and the steering committee are evidenced from the email then sent from Dr Turley to Mr Dudgeon and Ms Fullerton (emphasis added):

I think we need to have a discussion about this. Particularly in the context of how much the steering committee is happy for us to go quiet - as being dictated by BQ Comms - during the COVID-19 crisis.

I'm also concerned that the push back on the lifestyle campaign is partly attributed to the rumour that we're over budget - something that should not be a BQ comms consideration.

[216] Ms Fullerton attempted to address the concerns about the overspend in her email to Ms Beck, copied to Mr Clark, on Friday, 20 March 2020 at 5.35PM. She provided a copy of Mr Dudgeon's comments about the program actually being underspent.[203]

[217] Ms Fullerton then sent an email to Dr Turley and Mr Dudgeon on Saturday, 21 March 2020 at 5.32PM writing:

I sent this off to Hayley on Friday, just in case that message was getting around at 41G.

She immediately rang me and told me that the lifestyle campaign wasn't supported by the Minister, or Beth or Malcom.

I had another go at explaining that if schools close and kids are in the back yard getting stung and suffering anaphylaxis, that's an additional load on the health system. She advised COVID is the priority.

She then went on to talk about us doing a smaller low key push through social, as per our previous discussion.

[218] The discussions about the lifestyle campaign and other alternative proposals continued.

[219] On 26 March 2020 Ms Fullerton sent an email to Mr Dudgeon, copied to Mr Letts, Mr Hodd, Dr Turley, Ms Beck and others about an urgent approval for the April social campaign-self treating fire ants:[204]

As per our discussion on the lifestyle campaign, I'd like to get the social campaign ($20K) going in April and Cathy will be back from sick leave to progress it tomorrow.

Given the announcement around schools today, we're really concerned that more people will be stung and create a potential further load on the health system. If our field teams are pulled completely, we need the community to know how to treat fire ants themselves as we navigate COVID-19.

Attached is the revised plan for social and the media release we produced some time ago regarding the policeman who was stung over Christmas. I've tweaked it to be much stronger and clearer on self-treatment. With your approval, I'll send it forward to DAF Comms.

I believe the older version has been through Malcolm and is sitting with the Mins Office. The interview with the police officer hasn't changed.

[220] Dr Turley responded to Ms Fullerton and Mr Dudgeon advising that he approved, but questioned what 20K of social media would actually get.[205]

[221] Ms Fullerton responded that that is what was supported by Ms Beck and what could go through without going to GACC:

Anything over $20K and up to $50K goes to GACC for 'advice only'. I'm going to pitch for this option next but it requires me to revise our GACC application.

Anything beyond $50K requires full approval of GACC - this was the lifestyle campaign that was rejected by everyone.

[222] Mr Dudgeon said he would speak with Ms Beck about how to 'get this going':[206]

She has offered to weave it into the broader COVID campaigns which may help us leverage the $20K.

[223] The evidence otherwise shows the changes that needed to be made to the advertising campaigns interrupted by Covid and the dedicated response required by the government to that health crisis.

• [199] There continued to be conflict between what the Queensland Government wanted and what the Steering Committee wanted. Dr Craik wanted a particular media release to go out and the Minister's office did not approve it.[207]

• [200] Following submission of the Stage 1 'always on' campaign on 28 August 2020, a GACC notice of decision was issued on 2 September 2020 advising of the committee's support for the campaign to proceed to the next stage of development.[208] One of GACC's requests was that DAF provide detailed information to explain the overarching strategy of the campaign and the differences between the operational 'always on' campaign and the fire ant lifestyle and self-management 'always on' campaign in the Stage 2 submission.

• [201] At 2.42pm on 4 December 2020 Ms Beck submitted to the Director-General the stage 2 GACC submission 'always on' campaign (which had been approved by Dr Turley and Ms Beck). At 5.28pm that same day, an email was sent to Ms Beck containing a copy of the Director-General's approval.[209]

• [202] On 16 December 2020, GACC advised that the stage 3-final off-line creative material was supported. There was a request that the Department remove any images depicting fire ants spreading like wildfire from the materials as there may be potential sensitivities for regions impacted by recent bushfire/wildfire events. Alternative imagery was to be used.[210]

• [203] On 25 January 2021, the final stage, approved by Mr Dudgeon, Mr Letts and Ms Beck was submitted by Ms Morgan to the Director-General at 4.04pm.[211]

• [204] The Respondent notes that despite the final stage being approved by all necessary persons, and based on extensive market research, a different view was held by the Minister's office.[212] At 4.51pm on 25 January 2021, Mr McIntyre from the Minister's office emailed Ms Beck and others seeking to discuss concerns before the proposal went to GACC.[213]

• [205] Ms Beck was asked what the concern with the campaign was and she said she believed that the Minister's office wanted to remove the word 'super' from the campaign, so the fire ant was not referred to as a 'super pest'. Ms Beck said she did not know why and that this would be a question for the Director-General (who did not give evidence).[214]

• [206] Ms Beck said that this change was not a significant change as it was 'just one word'.[215] However, in cross-examination, Ms Beck agreed that the use of the term 'super pest' was included as a key part of the campaign to get a response from the public to help deal with the problem.[216]

• [207] Mr Dudgeon agreed that the term 'super pest' and the potential for its impacts to include human deaths appeared in many documents and research material. Mr Dudgeon agreed that he supported the inclusion in the campaign of reference to the risk of death and the 'super' pest.[217]

• [208] The Respondent says that the term 'super pest' was not just 'one word' but was a term integral to the messaging and was well-entrenched in documents, ministerial media releases and national program media releases.[218]

• [209] At 7.17pm on 25 January 2021 the Director-General sent an email to Mr Letts which he forwarded at 7.20pm to Mr Dudgeon copied also to Dr Turley and Ms Fullerton in which he said:[219]

Graeme I will need to discuss this with you first thing Wednesday morning. MO are concerned tone is too inflammatory and needs some softening. Will discuss after I have reviewed tomorrow.

• [210] On 26 January 2021, Ms Fullerton sent an email to Mr Dudgeon and Dr Turley providing assistance to Mr Dudgeon in preparation for the meeting he was going to have with Mr Letts.[220] Over the course of that day (a public holiday), there was communication between Ms Fullerton, Mr Dudgeon and Ms Lennon, a member of Ms Fullerton's team, about what specific issue was causing concern for the Minister's office.

• [211] Ms Fullerton had a discussion with Ms Beck who advised her that the materials needed to be reviewed. At 5.10am on 27 January 2021, Ms Fullerton sent an email to Mr Dudgeon and Dr Turley advising that: there were 40,000 fliers which were with Australia Post to go into the Minister's electorate the following Monday; Ms Beck had advised, inter alia, that the full suite of materials required a review; and that Ms Beck had been in touch with one of Ms Fullerton's staff members to get some dot points for a member of GACC.[221]

• [212] At 6.09am, Ms Fullerton sent an email to Ms Beck and Mr Dudgeon providing Ms Beck with information about public health concerns, the risk of anaphylaxis and the need to increase awareness of the risk posed by fire ants and the ability for people to manage fire ants themselves.[222]

• [213] Mr Dudgeon sent an email to Ms Fullerton and Dr Turley at 6.20am suggesting that it would be useful to have a copy of minutes from the Steering Committee to quote from regarding the decision on messaging being one for the Steering Committee rather than DAF or the Minister. Mr Dudgeon stated this his concern was that the message about the devastating impacts of the Red Imported Fire Ant on the lives of Queenslanders would be diluted.

• [214] Ms Fullerton responded to that email saying that she was in the office because Ms Beck had asked her to produce alternatives to present at the meeting.[223] At 7.45am, Mr Dudgeon replied stating that he was unclear as to what it was in particular that the Minister's office did not 'like'.[224]

• [215] On 29 January 2021, Ms Fullerton sent an email explaining the approved changes:[225]

The following is the advice from the MO via Hayley Beck:

1. No imagery from the lifestyle campaign is to be used i.e. swing, dog etc.
2. The main campaign key message 'Nowhere is safe from fire ants' can't be used.
3. No mention of protecting loved ones.
4. 'Don't let fire ants take over your suburb' is out.

Obviously what's gone through from GACC is the new campaign which doesn't speak to lifestyle or health impacts at all.

We'll just need to press forward with what we have once approvals come through from GACC next week, as we're out of time on Yarrabilba.

• [216] The Respondent says that in that email, Ms Fullerton was clearly articulating that the changes were dramatic and not what was intended of the lifestyle campaign. The Respondent says it acknowledges that there were impacts caused by COVID-19 and that changes had to occur and Ms Fullerton 'got on with the job'.[226]

• [217] Mr Letts' evidence was that Ms Fullerton's role was 'complex', that the Steering Committee had a say in what happened in the lifestyle campaign,[227] and that the broader DAF communications and engagement team also had an opportunity to contribute.[228]

• [218] The Respondent says that the 'significant issue for Ms Fullerton was that ultimately, she was unable to deliver the lifestyle campaign she had taken so much effort to craft'.[229] The Respondent says that it is not a case of fault or blame, and that the evidence demonstrates that the campaign was 'well-founded on the research given to the program and was at the very heart of what the steering committee was wanting to achieve'.[230]

• [219] The Respondent says that the images within the campaign were not Ms Fullerton's creation but had been provided by consultants commissioned by the program. The Respondent notes that Mr Letts agreed that the lifestyle campaign as presented in March 2020 was consistent with the content of the PowerPoint presentation given to Ms Fullerton when she commenced in the role.[231] Mr Letts also agreed that the campaign was intended to be emotional and was in accordance with the market research.[232] Mr Dudgeon also supported the advertising campaign and said that the Steering Committee had an interest in major campaigns and that the size of the campaign was unprecedented in terms of the Program.[233]

• [220] The Respondent says that Mr Letts understood that there would be disappointment from those who had contributed to the campaign and that he also was disappointed with the changes to the campaign.[234] Mr Letts said that there was always some time constraint and pressure to do things quickly and that that campaign had to be reworked within a short timeframe.[235]

• [221] The Respondent points out that the campaign had passed the three stages of the GACC process and that it was not rejected by GACC but by the Minister's office which wanted to 'change the tone of the messaging'.[236]

• [222] The Appellant says that a critical factor in the formulation of Dr Richardson's opinion was the assertion that the three campaigns she wrote and prepared were cancelled by the Minister's office.[237] The Appellant notes that Dr Richardson said it was the cancellation of the campaigns that progressively led to Ms Fullerton's distress.[238]

• [223] The Appellant says that those assertions are not established by the 'objective evidence' which reveals that the campaigns Ms Fullerton worked on had progressed.

• [224] The Appellant notes that the first campaign Ms Fullerton worked on during her employment was a 'Lifestyle Campaign'.[239] The Appellant says that the total cost of the campaign was to be $750,000 and that as the budget exceeded $20,000, it had to be reviewed and approved by GACC.[240] The Appellant provides detailed information about GACC and how it operates at paragraph [84] of its submissions.

• [225] The Appellant says that before the campaign could be submitted to GACC for review and approval, it needed to be approved and endorsed by Ms Beck and the Director-General.[241] The Appellant notes that it was also common practice to notify the Minister's Office when making a submission to GACC as it was a stakeholder and required the opportunity to provide feedback about proposed campaigns.[242]

• [226] The Appellant says that the Lifestyle Campaign Stage 1 GACC submission explicitly acknowledged that the COVID-19 pandemic could prevent the delivery of the campaign, resulting in an inability to purchase media spots.[243] It was also the case that communication around the COVID-19 pandemic took priority.[244] The Appellant says that the campaign was put on hold but not cancelled.[245]

• [227] However, the Appellant acknowledges that while the campaign was not cancelled, its scope and budget were significantly reduced.[246] The Appellant also notes that the smaller campaign was implemented with the social media campaign being rolled out in March 2020. The Appellant says that in her Performance and Development Agreement,[247] Ms Fullerton noted that significant progress had been made toward achieving her KPIs with direct mail and social media being distributed in relevant areas. Ms Fullerton noted that self-management had been promoted consistently through the web, media releases and other means.[248]

• [228] The Appellant says that the Lifestyle Campaign was subsequently reinvigorated in September 2020,[249] and run later in the year.[250]

• [229] The Appellant then turns to the second campaign that Ms Fullerton worked on, a self-treatment and surveillance campaign.[251] That campaign was said to be an 'always on' campaign.[252]

• [230] The 'always on' campaign meant that GACC approval was secured initially for the substantive campaign material and then each time that same material was to be used in a new areas, approval could be sought by simply lodging a Stage 1 GACC submission.[253] This streamlined the work required and reduced the amount of paperwork and submissions required to be made through GACC.[254] The Appellant notes that approval was secured in April 2020 for the campaign to be prepared on an 'always on' basis[255] and that GACC's support of a submission being made on that basis was indicated in June 2020.[256]

• [231] The progress of the second 'always on' campaign is described in the Appellant's submissions from paragraphs [95]-[100]. It has also been canvassed above from paragraphs [200] - [201].

• [232] With regard to the changes to the campaign to soften the imagery and tone of some of the language which were required in late January 2021, the Appellant says it is notable that:[257]

1. Much of the imagery and wording was extracted from the Colmar Brunton report prepared for Ms Fullerton and her team in March 2020. It was not Ms Fullerton's own creative product; it had been produced by an external marketing agency.[258]

1. The majority of the messages listed in paragraph 97 above remained acceptable[259] and while the imagery and some of the phrases was removed (sic), the substantive content of the brochures to be used remained the same.[260]

• [233] The Appellant notes that the requested changes were made by Ms Morgan and approval was ultimately secured from the Director-General in late January 2021. The updated Stage 3 GACC submission was lodged[261] and approved in early February 2021 to proceed to market.[262]

• [234] For those reasons above, the Appellant says that the evidence does not substantiate an allegation that all of the campaigns that Ms Fullerton worked on while employed by the appellant were cancelled.[263]

• [235] The Appellant says that Ms Fullerton's evidence is disconnected from the facts and the documentary evidence, in circumstances where small changes were required, but the core message remained.[264]

• [236] The Appellant says that rather than being unable to achieve her task, Ms Fullerton was able to launch, during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, a social media campaign; prepare a surveillance and treatment campaign, ultimately approved on an 'always on' basis; and was able to put in train a mass Lifestyle Campaign aimed at increasing public awareness about fire ants.[265] The Appellant also points to Ms Fullerton's Performance and Development Agreement which noted the good progress being made with Yarrabilba and Gold Coast social media projects.[266]

• [237] With regard to the change or removal of the term 'super pest', the Appellant says that this was a change requested by the Minister's office on 12 February 2021 which is after the date that Ms Fullerton sustained her injury.[267] The Appellant says that Ms Fullerton was not at work on that day as she was on sick leave.[268]

• [238] The Appellant goes on to say that if the Commission finds that the campaigns were changed or cancelled and that this impacted upon Ms Fullerton's psychological condition, the decision-making relating to the campaign constituted reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way.[269]

• [239] The Appellant says that part of Ms Fullerton's job involved preparing campaigns to submit to her superiors for review approval. The Appellant says that feedback and directions that were provided to Ms Fullerton and her team constituted management action. The Appellant says that the feedback and direction was provided in order to manage, handle, direct and/or control the campaigns to be put to market under the auspices of the Queensland Government. On this basis, the Appellant says that any such direction was not simply part of the everyday duties which Ms Fullerton performed in her employment.[270]

• [240] The Appellant says that this management action was reasonable and was undertaken in a reasonable way.[271] The Appellant makes submissions as to why the actions taken in relation to the campaigns were a 'wholly reasonable course to take' and aligned with The Queensland Government Advertising and Marketing Communication Code of Conduct.[272]

• [241] Despite the evidence before the Commission demonstrating that emotive language had formed part of campaigns, media releases, and arose from the market research and academic papers on the subject, the Appellant says that, in keeping with the Code of Conduct, the Minister's office and the Director-General directed that all communications and engagement be very factual and neutral and this is what Ms Beck reminded Ms Fullerton of in February 2021.[273]

• [242] The Appellant says that Ms Fullerton had raised concerns about the Minister's office endorsing the approach taken in a GACC submission and then changing its mind.[274] The Appellant notes that in cross-examination, Ms Fullerton agreed that the decision-maker was entitled to change their mind[275] and that it was the Government's prerogative to change its mind if the proposed campaign did not align with the message it wished to convey to its people.[276] The Appellant says that this is especially so in circumstances where there was a change in Director-General and they wished to take the Department in a different direction.[277]

• [243] In the alternative, the Appellant says that Ms Fullerton's injury arose out of her expectation or perception of reasonable action being taken against her. Ms Fullerton interpreted changes and feedback about the campaigns she prepared as personal attacks on her work, or a slight upon the effort which she put into preparing them.[278]

Consideration regarding Factor 3: Campaign Changes

• [244] The lifestyle campaign, and for that matter the earlier campaigns, were not cancelled. However, the campaigns were certainly materially altered. And for the reasons which follow, I accept that this stressor has been substantiated on the basis of the evidence before the Commission.

• [245] I understand the Appellant's argument here to be that Dr Richardson's report refers to 'cancelled campaigns'. In my view, that matter was clarified with Dr Richardson during his evidence before the Commission. It is unclear to me whether Ms Fullerton actually used the term 'cancelled' when speaking to Dr Richardson, but that is certainly what he records in his report. However, Dr Richardson was specifically asked questions about the impact of changes to the campaign on Ms Fullerton. It seemed to me that Dr Richardson clearly understood that the issue Ms Fullerton was concerned with was that campaigns for which she believed she had gained support and approval were changed at a very late stage, after development had been completed.[279]

• [246] So much seemed to be accepted by the Appellant who asked Dr Richardson about campaign changes and the impact of these on Ms Fullerton. In fact, Dr Richardson was specifically asked whether the rationale for the changes to the campaign would be relevant to his diagnosis. There was an exchange where the Respondent's representative asked Dr Richardson whether it was the fact of the changes, not the reasons for the changes which had an impact on Ms Fullerton, to which Dr Richardson agreed. The Commission also confirmed this matter at hearing.[280]

Factor 3 does not constitute management action directed at Ms Fullerton

• [247] I do not accept that the campaign changes were management action directed at Ms Fullerton. The changes were directed at the campaign and the direction was being given to a range of employees. As I understand it, some of the direction and feedback that was being provided is part and parcel of the development of communications and engagement strategies for government. However, there were prevailing circumstances, including but not limited to the COVID-19 pandemic, which meant that changes were being made in a more pressured environment characterised by uncertainty. The fact remains that the development of campaigns and the capacity for the Minister to intervene and demand that changes be made, was part of Ms Fullerton's day to day work and was not a management action directed toward her. The changes to the campaign were real and Ms Fullerton found these changes stressful. Management action is not enlivened by these circumstances.

Factor 3 is not excluded due to Ms Fullerton's perception of actions taken against her

• [248] Further, there is no evidence that Ms Fullerton took the changes as a personal attack on her work. It seems to me that Ms Fullerton was very concerned for the general public who may be at risk of serious harm or death. The evidence regarding the campaign rationale and the urgency with which the issue was being treated makes clear that fire ants pose a serious threat. Ms Fullerton was undertaking her role within that context. In the words of the Respondent, Ms Fullerton 'got on with the job' after receiving the feedback and went about providing messages and putting forward alternatives. I do not accept that this stressor is excluded due to s 32(5)(b).

Factor 4: The demands of the role were high, requiring extended work hours, including working on weekends.

• [249] The Respondent says that it is apparent from the evidence that Ms Fullerton described her role as having high demands, requiring extended work hours, including working on weekends.

• [250] The Respondent points to the evidence of Ms Morgan, who worked in the role previously, that the program was ramping up with additional funding, a change in function, changes in roles and responsibilities and a change of oversight in terms of the Steering Committee.[281] The Respondent says that the program Ms Fullerton worked in was very different to the one Ms Morgan worked in.[282] However, the Respondent notes that even before the significant ramp up in the program, Ms Morgan described the position as dealing with a lot of different people, different activities running concurrently and described it as a diverse, busy and challenging role.[283]

• [251] The Respondent notes that Ms Morgan described the role as busy and said it was not extraordinary to have to work overtime in communications and engagement. She said that there was sometimes a requirement to undertake after hours or weekend work as that is when the audience is available.[284] Examples provided by Ms Morgan were that a particular community may not be available at 9.00am but might be available at 7.00pm when their day had ended. Ms Morgan said that there might be particular media deadlines to deal with for press conferences and that it was necessary to cater for the audience.[285]

• [252] The Respondent then points to Mr Hodder's evidence about the demands of Ms Fullerton's position, describing media as a critical function for the Department. Mr Hodder described the program as a big, ambitious program with big scope.[286] Mr Hodder did note that media was just one part of Ms Fullerton's work duties, noting that he was providing assistance only in the 'narrow spectrum' of media.[287] Mr Hodder said that it was necessary to deal with issues as they arise[288] and that there was a need for the program to be 'very reactive' to current events and that this could place a lot of pressure on those responsible for turning around a response.[289]

• [253] The Respondent notes that Mr Hodder described his presence in the fire ant office one day a fortnight as being to lend the team 'a bit of oomph' and to help out with media given that the 'fire ant program is a big, complicated program' which attracts media attention which often tends to be negative.[290]

• [254] The Respondent says that this evidence from Mr Hodder differs from that of Ms Beck who said that she sent Mr Hodder to the fire ant office to 'up skill the team' and provide help. The Respondent submits that if it was intended that Mr Hodder 'up skill the team' he did not share this understanding.[291] Mr Hodder gave evidence that he discussed turnaround time for media releases and the amount of information contained in the media releases with Ms Fullerton.[292]

• [255] Mr Hodder described Ms Fullerton as a professional and competent person and said that she probably struggled with delegating and 'getting out of the way sometimes' because she felt compelled to stay on top of and control everything.[293] The Respondent contrasts this view of Ms Fullerton feeling a need to stay on top of everything with what Ms Beck says Mr Hodder told her, which was that Ms Fullerton had a lack of clarity.[294]

• [256] Mr Hodder described the types of challenges and time demands that characterised Ms Fullerton's role. He said that a lot of time is spent 'putting out bushfires' and that to plan something well in advance was a 'luxury' given that there was a need to deal with the issue of the day.[295] Mr Hodder also described the 'series of people' that material had to be approved by before it could be released to the media and the need for the information provided to the media to be '100 per cent correct'.[296]

• [257] The Respondent points to an email sent by Ms Fullerton on 12 May 2020 which it says identifies the high workload and Ms Fullerton's high blood pressure. In that email, Ms Fullerton refers to 250 emails she had yet to get to.[297]

• [258] The Respondent also points to Ms Phillips' evidence that 'loads of meetings' had happened and that an attempt was being made to create more structure around meetings.[298]

• [259] Ms Fullerton described the time pressures she was facing in an email to Ms Phillips on 17 July 2020. Ms Phillips had suggested extending a particular fortnightly meeting to one hour. Ms Fullerton said that she was 'finding it hard to find time in the day to do [her] job due to a prolific number of meetings that go for long periods of time'. Ms Fullerton instead suggested weekly meetings of strictly 30 minutes given that a lot of ground was covered in a week.[299]

• [260] The Respondent then turns to the evidence relating to Ms Fullerton's performance and development appraisal with Dr Turley on 6 October 2020. In the document, Ms Fullerton provided a self-assessment noting that workload continued to be high and that it was 'exacerbated by excessive approval processes and additional reporting requirements'. Ms Fullerton referred to her use of technology to triage work. She also noted that she might need to push back on deadlines to deliver work within normal working hours and to minimise excess accumulation of ATL and TOIL.[300]

• [261] Ms Fullerton also noted that there needed to be a further review of approvals processes. Further, Ms Fullerton identified weekly reports and weekly meetings as an issue. She also stated that she had worked closely with Ms Beck on the recent rejection of the lifestyle campaign by the Minister's office noting that she took Ms Beck's guidance on how to proceed with the changes requested by the Minister and that she flagged that departure from the 'lifestyle' message would be a problem.[301]

• [262] The Respondent also notes that a new risk-based approval process for communication and engagement activities was introduced. In an email sent on 21 December 2020 to RIFA Program Managers copied to Ms Fullerton it was stated that the move was a 'direct response to the WFQ survey results that identified excessive approvals and red tape as the number one pain point for staff in our team'. The email noted that there was still 'a large number of approvals in place to ensure information we prepare is accurate'.[302]

• [263] Mr Dudgeon gave evidence that he knew workload was an issue for Ms Fullerton and her team and said that he tried to help deal with this issue by encouraging prioritisation, and for Ms Fullerton to delegate. Mr Dudgeon noted that if something was 'really important and really needed to be done within a short timeframe, she'd try and do it herself'.[303] Mr Dudgeon noted that Ms Fullerton was working 'hours that were too long' and that as he was leaving the office, he would see her continuing to work and would tell her to go home and that she could not keep working long hours.[304] Mr Dudgeon observed that there were times when Ms Fullerton 'probably overreached on behalf of the whole team on what it was that she was trying to do' and said that at one stage he spoke to her about taking leave because she 'had a fair bit of leave up'.[305] Mr Dudgeon said that it was within Ms Fullerton's responsibility to negotiate back through himself and Dr Turley regarding expectations, work distribution and resources.[306] Mr Dudgeon said that he had fewer of these conversations with Ms Fullerton once Dr Turley became her direct line manager.

• [264] During cross-examination, Mr Dudgeon was asked about Ms Fullerton's timesheets. Mr Dudgeon noted that Ms Fullerton was required to fill out a timesheet and that this indicated that she was working over the standard 36.25 hour week, and that there was also a threshold for the number of flexible work hours that could be banked during a month. Mr Dudgeon said that it was obvious to him that Ms Fullerton was working outside of the usual scope of hours. Mr Dudgeon said that he had some conversations with Ms Fullerton about taking some of her banked time off and that it was not sustainable to continue working those hours. He said that it then became Dr Turley's role to have such conversations.[307]

• [265] Mr Dudgeon noted that Ms Fullerton took a period of leave over the Christmas and New Year period.

• [266] The Respondent says that there is no evidence of Dr Turley specifically addressing the long hours with Ms Fullerton. The Respondent notes that Mr Dudgeon signed off Ms Fullerton's timesheets from 1 July 2019 to 25 November 2019 and that Dr Turley continued to sign off timesheets from 23 December 2019.[308]

• [267] The Respondent points to Ms Fullerton's timesheets which it says are evidence of the increasing flex leave balances and TOIL balances.[309] The Respondent notes that Ms Fullerton would take time off to deplete the balances but that they would soon return to high levels.[310]

• [268] It was put to Ms Fullerton in cross-examination that she was working hard and that she was working hours to accumulate TOIL and flex time and got the benefit of that.[311] Ms Fullerton replied that she wasn't working hours to accumulate TOIL and flex time, rather that she was working the hours necessary to deliver the work by the required deadlines. Ms Fullerton also said that all of her out-of-hours work was approved by Dr Turley, who understood her workload and approved the hours. Ms Fullerton said that while she had the benefit of taking flex and TOIL time, she would prefer to be working a normal workflow. Ms Fullerton said that she didn't mind 'working the occasional out of hours ...' but that '(i)t was continual'.[312]

• [269] The Respondent also points to an email from Dr Turley on 22 December 2020 discussing workload pressures and strategies to deal with them. I note that this email is directed to several individuals and not just Ms Fullerton. It does not contain specific direction, but some strategies and behaviours for the team to consider and provide feedback on.[313]

• [270] The Appellant says that the evidence does not substantiate the allegations about workload. On that basis, the Appellant says that Dr Richardson's opinion is not admissible as it relies on assertions regarding workload.[314]

• [271] The Appellant says that Ms Fullerton's employment required her to work a 7.25 hour day, five days a week.[315] She received a standard 20-days of leave per year, and that accrued or untaken leave was paid out on the termination of her employment.[316] The Appellant also noted that Ms Fullerton was able to accrue flex time and TOIL, entitling her to take paid leave commensurate with the accrual.[317] Ms Fullerton stated that she recorded all hours she worked accurately and that she was confident that what she recorded was correct.[318]

• [272] The Appellant has undertaken an analysis of Ms Fullerton's timesheets for the period between 1 July 2019 and 28 February 2021.[319] The Appellant submits that during her first three months of employment (July to September 2019), Ms Fullerton worked 96 hours more than her contracted hours of work and notes that this equates roughly to working one day each weekend. The Appellant notes that during cross examination, Ms Fullerton agreed that during the period of probation at the start of her employment, she was trying to get up to speed, make a good impression and demonstrate that she had a strong work ethic and was diligent.[320]

• [273] The Appellant goes on to note that:[321]

• Between October and December 2019, Ms Fullerton worked 20 hours less than her contracted hours of work for the period;

• Between January and March 2020, Ms Fullerton worked 34.75 hours more than her contracted hours of work for the period, equating to working roughly one weekend day each fortnight;

• Between April and June 2020, Ms Fullerton worked 0.25 hours more than her contracted hours for the period;

• Between July and September 2020, Ms Fullerton worked 16.5 hours more than her contracted hours for the period;

• Between October and December 2020, Ms Fullerton worked 181 hours less than her contracted hours for the period; and

• Between January and February 2021, Ms Fullerton worked 48.25 hours less than her contracted hours for the period.

• [274] The Appellant says that against that background, during the course of her approximately 20-months of employment with the Appellant, Ms Fullerton took a total of 651.45 hours of leave (89.53 days), which comprised flex time, TOIL, recreational leave, sick leave and special leave. Of that leave, 10-days were taken as recreational leave and approximately 70-days were taken using flex time and TOIL.[322]

• [275] The Appellant says that while there were quarters where Ms Fullerton worked more than her contracted hours, not only was she compensated for those hours through the accrual of flex time and TOIL, but she also took the leave that she accrued.[323]

• [276] The Appellant submits that Ms Fullerton took extended periods of leave during her employment, including a number of instances where she took leave on a Monday or a Friday, giving rise to a long weekend. The Appellant lists all these occasions in its submissions.[324] As these matters do not appear to be in dispute, I will not reproduce them here.

• [277] Based on its extensive analysis of Ms Fullerton's work hours and leave taken, the Appellant submits that the hours Ms Fullerton worked fluctuated throughout the 20-month period of her employment with the Appellant. The Appellant says that the timesheets indicate the 'sprint' nature of the work performed by Ms Fullerton and shows that she worked to deadlines and was then able to take leave following the completion of tranches of work.

• [278] Further, the Appellant says that Ms Fullerton was compensated for the additional hours she worked through the provision of flex time and TOIL. On that basis, the Appellant says that Ms Fullerton was able to access periods of reprieve from her work. The Appellant notes that the amount of leave Ms Fullerton ultimately took is almost three times the amount of annual leave that would have been available to her over the course of the period she was employed by the Appellant.[325]

• [279] The Appellant argues in the alternative that if the Commission finds that Ms Fullerton had a high workload, then it falls within the ambit of management action. To this end, the Appellant's argument is that the workload and pattern of work undertaken by Ms Fullerton arose from the need to meet the deadlines required to facilitate collaboration with multiple stakeholders and the necessary approvals to produce marketing campaigns.[326]

• [280] The Appellant submits that Ms Fullerton was aware of all of the GACC policies, procedures and processes, including the dates of the GACC meetings. The Appellant also notes that GACC required the Department submit an Annual Advertising Plan, reviewed on a six-monthly basis, encompassing any fire ant campaigns proposed for the upcoming year.[327]

• [281] The Appellant says that the imposition of deadlines upon the work performed by Ms Fullerton was management action. The Appellant says that it was specific action undertaken to manage, handle, direct and/or control the work Ms Fullerton did in relation to developing campaigns and the submission of them for GACC approval. The Appellant says that this was not simply action forming part of the everyday duties Ms Fullerton performed in her employment.[328]

• [282] The Appellant says that when Ms Fullerton raised concerns about her workload, the Appellant offered support and assistance to her. The Appellant notes that Ms Fullerton had a team of 17 people in communications and engagement and that she had the power to recruit more.[329]

• [283] The Appellant says that Mr Dudgeon mentored Ms Fullerton regarding prioritising work, limiting the work she did, reducing workload and reducing the hours she worked. The Appellant notes that Mr Dudgeon also encouraged Ms Fullerton to take leave.[330] The Appellant says that Mr Dudgeon facilitated meetings between Ms Fullerton and other members of the Department and National Biosecurity Communication and Engagement Network (NBCEN) who were able to assist Ms Fullerton with work, resourcing and sharing communication and marketing collateral.[331] Mr Dudgeon also encouraged Ms Fullerton to delegate work to others and assisted Ms Fullerton to outsource design work and other work to external providers.[332]

• [284] The Appellant says that Mr Letts and Mr Dudgeon sought to connect Ms Fullerton with senior members of the Department and arranged for them to provide Ms Fullerton with more support.[333]

• [285] The Appellant also states that Ms Morgan, who was the previous manager, was an additional resource ready to assist if Ms Fullerton's team was at capacity and that this had been explained to Ms Fullerton when she commenced her employment.[334]

• [286] The Appellant says that Ms Beck offered the services of members of her team who were responsible for social media and web and who could support Ms Fullerton with campaign planning and budgeting. Members of Ms Beck's team could also help draft communications and media releases, helping with content and planning.[335]

• [287] The Appellant submits that Ms Beck met with Ms Fullerton regularly and visited Ms Fullerton in her office every six to eight weeks to discuss workload and identify when additional support was required. Ms Beck also met fortnightly with Ms Fullerton and Ms Phillip to discuss communications and engagement issues,[336] and facilitated a monthly Community of Practice meeting which Ms Fullerton was encouraged to attend. These meetings were a forum to share learnings and engage with colleagues in similar roles to develop networks of support.[337] Ms Beck also drafted a visual identity and communications policy document for Ms Fullerton's benefit discussing the functions of the Corporate communication team and the RIFA program communication team.[338]

• [288] Further actions the Appellant says Ms Beck took were to direct Mr Hodder to meet with the RIFA communications team regularly to upskill the team in media matters.[339] Ms Beck invited members of Ms Fullerton's team to sit with corporate communications team every couple of weeks to foster professional development.[340]

• [289] Ms Beck also facilitated the 'Always On' campaign to streamline and simplify the GACC approval process for treatment and surveillance campaigns to GACC for the four stages of approval so that campaigns could be submitted for noting only.[341]

• [290] The Appellant says that Ms Phillips offered Ms Fullerton assistance throughout her employment and provided her with induction.[342] Ms Phillips offered Ms Fullerton help to prepare a stakeholder plan in November 2019.[343] In June 2020, Ms Phillips offered to assist Ms Fullerton to streamline support for her team.[344] And in July 2020, Ms Phillips offered to assist Ms Fullerton identify how work between the RIFA program, Biosecurity Queensland and DAF Communications and Engagement could be streamlined.[345] Ms Phillips also offered to assist Ms Fullerton to find ways to streamline weekly reporting in January 2021.[346]

• [291] The Appellant also notes 'Department wide' actions implemented to assist staff with workloads, including developing a tool for work prioritisation, including work prioritisation in the annual planning process, increasing personnel resources available and investigating ways to do things differently to improve operational efficiency.[347]

• [292] The Appellant says that action taken in response to Ms Fullerton's concerns was management action and that it did not form part of her day-to-day role but was specifically taken in response to concerns she raised to assist her in managing her role. The Appellant says that the management action was reasonable and aimed to equip Ms Fullerton with resources to help her do her job.

• [293] In the alternative, the Appellant says that Ms Fullerton's injury arose out of her expectation or perception of the reasonable action being taken against her. The Appellant says that Ms Fullerton interpreted the deadlines imposed upon her, particularly with regard to the GACC process, as arbitrary and says that she lacked an appreciation of other matters requiring GACC's attention beyond the RIFA Program.[348] The Appellant says that Ms Fullerton perceived attempts to connect her with other senior communication and engagement members of the Department and suggestions she prioritise her work and delegate as unnecessary and unhelpful.[349]

• [294] The Respondent says that the Appellant's submissions relating to Ms Fullerton's work hours are a 'gross misstatement' of the evidence. The Respondent says that the fact Ms Fullerton had accumulated 70-days of flex time and TOIL demonstrates the 'sheer volume of work' Ms Fullerton was doing and the time required of her position. The Respondent says that it is extraordinary that during a period of 20-months, Ms Fullerton accumulated such a large amount of flex time and TOIL.[350]

• [295] The Respondent notes that all flex time and TOIL was approved and that the approval occurred because Ms Fullerton had to work those extra hours to discharge the duties required of her employment.[351]

• [296] The Respondent provides an analysis of the 86-week period from 1 July 2019 to 28 February 2021 saying that if allowing for public holidays et cetera, that is a period of 83 weeks. The Appellant says that excluding periods she was on leave, this means that on average, Ms Fullerton accrued about .85 of a day each week because of the extra time spent by her.[352] The Respondent says that if leave periods are excluded, the average weekly accrual of TOIL is far more significant.[353]

• [297] The Respondent says that it does not matter that Ms Fullerton was compensated by accumulating flex time and TOIL and that what matters is the sheer demands of her job.[354]

• [298] With regard to the Appellant's argument that the amount of leave taken by Ms Fullerton was almost three times the amount of annual leave that would have been available to her over the course of the period she worked with the Appellant, the Respondent says that this fundamentally misrepresents the work Ms Fullerton was required to do and the demands of her role. The Respondent says that Ms Fullerton could not achieve what was required of her in the allocated working hours of her job.[355]

• [299] The Appellant maintains that its assessment of Ms Fullerton's working hours was fair and accurate and revealed Ms Fullerton's hours of work fluctuated. The Appellant says that Ms Fullerton did not consistently work in excess of her contracted hours.[356]

• [300] With regard to the Respondent's submission that Ms Fullerton's role could not be achieved in her working hours, the Appellant says that Ms Fullerton's timesheets indicate that there were times when she was able to perform her role in less than the allocated work hours and that there were times when she was able to take 89.53 days of leave during her employment. The Appellant says that Ms Fullerton was able to achieve what was expected of her in her working hours and that the amount of leave she took in that time would, in itself, have curtailed her working hours.[357]

• [301] I am satisfied on the basis of the available evidence that Ms Fullerton experienced a significant workload and that this work was undertaken in circumstances often characterised by preparing materials in time for meetings or deadlines. That was the nature of the work. It seems to me that further pressure was brought to bear by the urgent and important nature of the RIFA program. Added to this was the complex environment Ms Fullerton was working in, as explored above in Factor 1 where there is extensive discussion about the role of the Steering Committee and the program being situated and run by the Department.

• [302] Workload across DAF was clearly something recognised at the time. Ms Fullerton was not the only person experiencing issues with 'red tape' and approvals processes and high workload. Ms Fullerton herself recognised that she needed to have ways to deal with her workload and that the accumulation of flex time and TOIL was an indicator of the additional hours she was undertaking.

• [303] While at one point the Appellant's representative asked a question of Ms Fullerton to the effect that she was working long hours and gained the benefit of TOIL and accrued time, there is no evidence before the Commission of any suggestion that Ms Fullerton misused flex time or TOIL accruals. Mr Dudgeon and Dr Turley properly signed off on Ms Fullerton's timesheets and accruals.

• [304] The sheer amount of flex time and TOIL accrued by Ms Fullerton during her time in the role are evidence that, either due to the need to get work done, or the 'sprint' nature of her work patterns, there were periods where Ms Fullerton was working significantly more time in the week than her allocated hours. I accept that Ms Fullerton needed to work these hours in order to get her work done.

• [305] It also seems that Ms Fullerton's workdays involved attendance at many meetings and that there was some frustration that time spent at meetings made it difficult to complete work tasks.

• [306] It seems that the Appellant's argument is that any workload pressures or long hours Ms Fullerton was undertaking are mitigated by the fact that she accessed periods of leave using the flex time and TOIL she had accumulated.

• [307] Flex time and TOIL are important entitlements as they provide recognition for additional hours worked by an employee. However, it is not necessarily the case that the impact of a high workload is reduced or alleviated by the provision of flex time and TOIL. The time spent working while one is accumulating flex time and TOIL is time spent after hours or on weekends. This means not attending to personal commitments to self and others. Ms Fullerton's evidence was that she would have preferred to be working normal hours and not accumulating flex time or TOIL. When Ms Fullerton returned from an extended weekend or a period of flex time or TOIL utilisation, there was still work awaiting her, and the patterns of work characterised by either deadlines or out of hours tasks requiring her attention remained.

• [308] I accept that Ms Fullerton had a heavy workload and that she undertook significant work outside of regular work hours. Ms Fullerton's large amount of accumulated TOIL time, approved via her timesheets, is evidence of the number of additional hours she was working. Ms Fullerton found the working environment and system of work stressful.

Is Factor 4 removed because of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way?

• [309] I have considered the Appellant's submission that the pattern of work and requirement for communication and engagement material to be completed to meet deadlines was management action. I have also considered the submission that Ms Fullerton was aware of the requirements of the GACC process. The Appellant says that these requirements were not simply action forming part of the everyday duties Ms Fullerton performed in her employment. I disagree. The GACC process is one that must be followed by all Departments, not specifically Ms Fullerton. This is not a situation where Ms Fullerton was subject to some directed and specific instruction that she produce work to meet deadlines which had been created to manage her work and performance. The approvals process was more general and involved a range of people. The submissions made by the Appellant regarding the extra resources available and the suggestion that Ms Fullerton did not need to complete tasks herself but could delegate them makes it clear that any direction regarding deadlines was a direction to the program and not to an individual person.

• [310] With regard to the second limb of the Appellant's argument that this factor is excluded due to management action, I accept that there were discussions held with Ms Fullerton about workload and the hours she was working. I also accept that suggestions may have been made to her about delegating tasks, streamlining work and additional resources available to her. These 'suggestions' are not specific intervention or direction given to Ms Fullerton by way of management action directed at her to address the amount of TOIL she was accumulating because of working additional hours. In any case, I find that this stressor arises from the amount of work Ms Fullerton had to do and the additional hours required for her to get it done. The stressor does not arise from management actions purportedly taken in response to Ms Fullerton raising concerns about workload.

Is Factor 4 excluded on the basis that Ms Fullerton's injury arose out of her expectation or perception of the management action being taken against her?

• [311] The evidence indicates that while Ms Fullerton struggled with the workload and the hours associated with the role, she got on with the job, working within the required processes necessitated by GACC. Ms Fullerton did the work necessary to meet deadlines and worked with her team and others in the program as required.

• [312] The evidence simply demonstrates that Ms Fullerton had a lot of work to do. She had so much work to do that she accumulated many, many hours of flex time and TOIL. She held concerns about how she could complete the tasks she was required to complete. These things were real and they were stressful to her. I am satisfied that Factor 4 is substantiated and is not excluded on the basis of s 32(5)(a) or (b).

Was employment a significant contributing factor to Ms Fullerton's injury?

• [313] The expert witnesses were of the view that employment was a significant contributing factor to Ms Fullerton's injury.

• [314] The Appellant invites me to disregard Dr Richardson's evidence on the basis that the factual underpinnings he relied upon have not been established at the hearing. For the reasons given above, I have found that except for Factor 2 (or 'Micromanagement'), the evidence supports the stressors Dr Richardson relied upon in forming his diagnosis.

• [315] A review of Dr Richardson's report and oral evidence leaves me with the impression that the matter of micromanagement did not hold the same significance as the factors relating to the 'two masters' issue, the impact of the campaign changes, and the matter of workload and hours of work. I am satisfied that Dr Richardson's evidence is admissible.

• [316] Both Dr Thakrar and Dr Richardson were aware of Ms Fullerton's marriage breakdown. Relationships can be complex and in this particular context, I have no issue reconciling Ms Fullerton's marriage separation with her description of the relationship as loving and stable. There is no evidence before the Commission to indicate that Ms Fullerton's marriage breakdown was of such significance that its contribution to any personal injury should serve to displace the employment-related stressors established at the hearing.

• [317] Dr Thakrar was Ms Fullerton's treating GP and was aware of the physical health issues Ms Fullerton was experiencing. Dr Thakrar was of the view that Ms Fullerton's psychological injury arose out of employment.

• [318] As I have determined regarding Ms Fullerton's marriage breakdown, even if her physical health issues had some contribution to her psychological condition, I am satisfied that the work-related stressors were a significant contributing factor or factors to Ms Fullerton's injury. Therefore, employment was a significant contributing factor to Ms Fullerton's injury.

Is the injury removed by the reasonable management action provisions of the Act - s 32(5)(a)-(b)?

• [319] For the reasons I have given above, I am satisfied that Factors 1, 3 and 4 are not removed by the reasonable management action provisions of the WCR Act.

• [320] For the reasons set out above, Ms Fullerton's claim is one for acceptance. Therefore, the decision to approve the claim remains undisturbed.

1. Failing agreement between the parties, a decision on costs will be subject of a further application to the Commission.

[1] Appellant's written closing submissions filed in the Industrial Registry on 10 October 2024 [3]; TR1-67, LL14-34.

[2] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [3]; TR5-5 LL25-26.

[3] While 'micromanagement' was initially identified as 'factor 2' contributing to Ms Fullerton's injury, this factor is not pursued in the Respondent's case following the hearing.

[4] Church v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2015] ICQ 031, [24]-[27].

[5] SSX Services Pty Ltd v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2016] QIRC 62, [29] citing State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Q-COMP and Beverley Coyne (2003) 172 QGIG 1447; State of Queensland (Department of Communities Disability Services) AND Q-COMP and Mrs B (WC/2011/247) - Decision; State of Queensland (acting through Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services) AND Q-COMP and Mrs B (C/2013/2) - Decision; Myer Holdings Ltd AND Q-COMP (WC/2013/118) - Decision; Qantas Airways Limited v Q-COMP [2006] QIRComm 27; (2006) 181 QGIG 301.

[6] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [7]; Appellant's Amended Statement of Facts and Contentions filed in the Industrial Registry on 22 June 2023 [3], [7], [8].

[7] [2021] QIRC 71.

[8] [2015] ICQ 008.

[9] [2016] ICQ 8.

[10] Respondent's written closing submissions filed in the Industrial Registry on 10 July 2024 [138].

[11] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [13] citing Robinson v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2016] ICQ [16]; Dickenson v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 68; Whipps v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] QIRC 29.

[12] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [15](a) with reference to the Performance Development Agreement completed on 6 October 2020 and again on 2 February 2021 (Exhibit 1, [85]); Mr Turley's evidence that he had no concerns with the worker's work performance at TR4-56 LL12-14; Mr Dudgeon's evidence that Ms Fullerton was a very capable employee with a strong work ethic at TR3-31 LL32-33; TR3-15 LL42-45.

[13] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [15](a); TR3-56 LL40-45.

[27] Respondent's submissions (n 10), [132] citing TR3-70 LL5-25.

[28] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [129] citing Exhibit 1, 644.

[30] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [20].

[34] TR4-3 ll26-47; T4-4 LL1-7; T4-3 LL38-41.

[40] Exhibit 17; TR4-23 LL35-45; TR4-24 LL1-5.

[44] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [21(a)].

[46] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [21(b)].

[48] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [33].

[49] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [39(b)]

[53] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [64]; Exhibit 19.

[67] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [85]; Exhibit 20.

[69] TR4-26; Respondent's closing submissions [68].

[81] Noting that the question Dr Richardson was required to answer was whether employment was a significant contributing factor; Exhibit 1, 641-2.

[84] TR3-62 LL40-45; TR3-63 L10 - TR3-64 L5.

[85] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [24]; TR3-48 LL33-45; T3-54; Exhibit 1, 631.

[90] TR3-68 LL22-26; TR3-61 LL39-47; TR3-52.

[91] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [28]; Exhibit 1, 631.

[93] See for example Toodayan and Toodayan v Metro South Hospital and Health Service & Others [2023] QIRC 036.

[94] Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar [2011] HCA 21; (2011) 243 CLR 588 ('Dasreef').

[95] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [30]; Toodayan and Toodayan v Metro South Hospital and Health Service & Others [2023] QIRC 036 ('Toodayan').

[96] Granato v Workers Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 162 ('Granato').

[99] TR4-56 LL12-14; TR3-31 LL32-33; TR2-15 LL43-45.

[101] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [118].

[104] [2009] ICQ 33,16.

[105] [2009] ICQ 32.

[106] [2019] QIRC 022.

[108] With reference to paragraphs [24] and [25] of the Appellant's SOFC.

[110] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [140] with reference to TR1-25 LL5-20.

[112] As summarised in Respondent's submissions (n 10) [143] with reference to TR1-16 LL35-45.

[118] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [148], [149].

[120] Exhibit 1, 7-9; Respondent's submissions (n 10) [151].

[122] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [152].

[130] Exhibit 1, 701 and TR2-20 - TR2-21 L20.

[149] Respondent's submissions (n 10) 55, [258], [259].

[150] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) 16, [36].

[154] These matters are not controversial and were put to Ms Fullerton who agreed with them. In the interests of brevity, I will not footnote extracts of the transcript here.

[156] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) 21 [50]; Exhibit 1, 3.

[163] Gilmour v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2009] ICQ 33,16.

[164] Anglo Coal (Capcoal Management) Pty Ltd v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] QIRC 103, [73] citing Read v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] QIRC 072, [8]-[10] and Allwood v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] QIRC 088, [57]-[68]. Also cited in Deshong v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2021] QIRC 205, [91].

[165] Allwood v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] QIRC 88 ('Allwood').

[167] Allen v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2018] QIRC 41 ('Allen').

[168] Edmunds v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2022] QIRC 285 ('Edmunds') [65].

[169] O'Neil v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2022] QIRC 310 ('O'Neil').

[172] Verhagen v Q-COMP (2008) 189 QGIG 542, 546.

[173] Appellant's submissions in reply filed in the Industrial Registry on 6 December 2024, [31].

[174] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [63].

[175] TR5-9 LL22-24; TR5-74 LL17-20; TR5-93 LL29-35.

[180] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [75].

[190] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [198]; Exhibit 1, 194.

[193] Exhibit 1, 258 - I note that this was ultimately submitted on 22 May 2020.

[196] Respondent's submissions (n 10), [203]-[205], [212]-[223].

[212] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [285].

[214] TR2-61 LL5-20 and TR2-62 LL30-45.

[218] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [292], [293].

[226] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [307].

[229] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [309].

[236] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [315].

[237] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [80]; TR3-51 LL33-35; TR3-52 LL1-8; TR3-60 LL10-25; TR3-63 LL31-44; TR3-64 L1-3; TR3-64 LL45-47; TR3-65 L1-7.

[245] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [87]-[88].

[248] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [89].

[249] Exhibit 1, 125-127, 165; TR5-53 LL12-17; TR5-74 LL12-27.

[253] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [92]-[93].

[257] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [99].

[260] Exhibit 27, Exhibit 28, TR5-141; TR5-142, LL1-20.

[263] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [101].

[269] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [106].

[270] Ibid [107]; State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 53.

[273] Ibid [111]; TR5-143 LL16-29; Exhibit 3.

[274] TR5-138; LL39-47; TR1-139 LL19-22.

[278] Exhibit 1, 147, 165-166, 167-169.

[291] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [324], [325]; TR2-47 LL5-10.

[297] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [338]; Exhibit 1, 66.

[300] Hereafter, 'TOIL' refers to Time Off In Lieu; Exhibit 1, 696.

[308] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [350].

[310] Respondent's submissions (n 10) [351].

[314] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [116]-[117].

[320] TR5-159; Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [120](a).

[328] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [130]; State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 53.

[333] For example: TR1-26; TR1-27; TR1-30

[335] TR1-70 LL13-19; TR2-43 LL19-23; Exhibit 1,1; Exhibit 1, 83.

[337] TR1-82 LL37-42; TR2-4 LL42-49; TR5-27 LL18-25.

[341] TR2-56; Exhibit 1, 85-86; TR5-58 LL15-19.

[347] Appellant's written closing submissions (n 1) [134]; TR1-37; TR1-38 LL1-3.

[349] Exhibit 1, 147-149; Exhibit, 165-166; Exhibit 1, 167-171, Exhibit 1, 180-181.

[350] Respondent's closing submissions in reply filed in the Industrial Registry on 19 November [54].

[356] Appellant's submissions in reply (n 174) [47]-[53].