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[2002] AIRC 1527
procedural. The Commission granted the s111AAA applications and ceased dealing with the relevant industrial disputes in relation to the Queensland employees, except to the extent necessary to give effect to...
The Full Bench re-heard three applications under s111AAA after the High Court quashed an earlier dismissal and ordered the Commission to decide them. The Commission found a Queensland State award governed the wages and conditions of the employees who were the subject of the disputes. The CFMEU no longer pressed its award application in Queensland. Applying s111AAA(1), the Commission granted the applications and ceased dealing with the disputes, except insofar as necessary to implement the High Court's orders.
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1,940 words · generated 24/07/2026
Three separate applications were made to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) under what is now s111AAA(1) of the Workplace Relations Act. The applicants were the State of Queensland, the Furnishing Industry Association of Australia (Queensland) Limited Union of Employers (FIAA(Q)), and the Queensland Chamber of Commerce and Industry Limited, Industrial Union of Employers. They sought orders that the Commission cease dealing with a number of industrial disputes between the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) and employers in the furnishing (furniture manufacturing) industry in Queensland on the ground that a Queensland State award governed the wages and conditions of the employees in question [1]–[2].
2 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
A Full Bench originally dismissed those s111AAA applications on 27 November 1998 [1], [3]. The State of Queensland and the Commonwealth Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations pursued prerogative relief. After proceedings through the High Court and a remitted Full Court of the Federal Court, the High Court ultimately allowed the appeals and ordered (among other things) that a writ of mandamus issue requiring the Commission to hear and determine the s111AAA applications according to law, and quashed the Full Bench decision of 27 November 1998 ([4]; Attorney-General (Queensland) v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2002) 76 ALJR 1502).
Pursuant to that High Court order, the AIRC re-listed the applications for mention and proceeded to hear submissions on 7 November 2002 [5]. On that hearing the applicants (State, Minister, FIAA(Q)) sought the Commission’s grant of the s111AAA applications; the CFMEU indicated it no longer pressed its award application in Queensland [5]–[6]. The Commission applied the statutory test in s111AAA(1), found that a State award governed the employees and, given the CFMEU no longer pressed an award application, granted the s111AAA applications and ordered that the Commission cease dealing with the relevant disputes, save to the extent necessary to give effect to the High Court’s orders of 3 October 2002 [7]–[8], [11].
The Full Bench also noted that after the 1998 decision and before the High Court proceedings were resolved, a Furnishing Industry National Award 1999 was made that purported to extend to Queensland employers; the Commission observed that that award was not before it in the s111AAA proceedings and that the award’s validity as to Queensland employers was not a matter for decision on these applications, though the Commission described the grounds for setting it aside (as it applied to Queensland) as "seem[ing] irresistible" and left resolution of that issue to other simplification proceedings [9]–[10].
Three elements explain the Full Bench’s decision.
The statutory command in s111AAA(1). The relevant statutory text was quoted verbatim and was the core legal rule applied: if the Commission is satisfied that a State award or State employment agreement governs the wages and conditions of particular employees who are the subject of an industrial dispute, the Commission must cease dealing with the dispute in relation to those employees unless the Commission is satisfied that ceasing would not be in the public interest [7]. The statutory provision creates a mandatory rule subject only to the public interest exception.
The factual finding that the statutory precondition existed. The Commission expressly recorded that it was satisfied a State award governed the wages and conditions of the employees in question, and that no party suggested otherwise [8]. That factual stance was decisive because it triggered the mandatory operation of s111AAA(1).
The public interest assessment. The only statutory exception to mandatory cessation is where the Commission is satisfied that ceasing would not be in the public interest. The Commission considered submissions. Critical to that assessment was the CFMEU’s indication that it no longer pursued the award application in Queensland. Given that withdrawal and the support for cessation by the State, the Minister and FIFAA(Q), the Full Bench concluded there was no public interest reason to continue to deal with the disputes and accordingly granted the s111AAA applications [6], [8].
Finally, the Commission followed the High Court’s orders by re-hearing the applications and giving effect to that higher court direction. The Commission’s disposition expressly preserved the limited necessity to deal with the disputes insofar as may be required to give effect to the High Court’s orders of 3 October 2002 [4], [11].
Before these proceedings concluded, the Commission had dismissed the s111AAA applications (27 November 1998). That dismissal was the subject of High Court litigation, which culminated in the High Court quashing the dismissal and directing the Commission to hear the s111AAA applications according to law. The Full Bench’s decision under analysis implements the High Court’s corrective orders.
Substantively, the law under s111AAA(1) remained the same before and after: where a State award governs relevant employees, the AIRC must cease dealing with disputes concerning those employees unless it considers cessation would not be in the public interest [7]. What changed was the Commission’s application of the statutory test to the established facts on re-hearing: with the CFMEU no longer pressing an award application, the Commission concluded the public interest did not require it to continue dealing with the disputes and therefore granted the applicants’ s111AAA applications [8], [11].
An ancillary development noted by the Commission was the making in 1999 of a national Furnishing Industry Award that had been made to settle parts of the disputes and which purported to apply to Queensland employers. The Commission stated that the award’s validity as to Queensland employers was not before it in these applications, but observed that the grounds for setting that award aside insofar as it purported to apply in Queensland seemed irresistible; the award was referred to simplification proceedings under the relevant legislation [9]–[10]. Importantly the Full Bench did not decide the validity of that award in this s111AAA determination.
Text (s111AAA(1)) [7]: "If the Commission is satisfied that a State award or State employment agreement governs the wages and conditions ... the Commission must cease dealing ... unless ... ceasing would not be in the public interest."
Plain English: If a State award already covers the employees involved in a dispute, the AIRC has to stop handling the dispute unless it decides stopping would harm the public interest.
Finding [8]: "We are satisfied that there is a State award ... No party suggested otherwise."
Plain English: The Commission accepted that a Queensland State award governed the workers; none of the parties argued the opposite.
Application [8]: "In light of the fact that the CFMEU no longer presses for an award it is appropriate that we grant the s111AAA applications and cease dealing with the relevant disputes."
Plain English: Because the union dropped its push for an award in Queensland, the Commission thought there was no good public-interest reason to keep handling the disputes, so it stopped doing so.
Disposition [11]: "We have decided that the Commission should cease dealing with each of the relevant disputes except to the extent that it may be necessary to deal with them to give effect to the High Court's decision and consequent orders of 3 October 2002."
Plain English: The Commission will stop working on the disputes, but will still take whatever action is necessary to put into effect the High Court’s orders.
Obiter on the 1999 award [10]: "The award is not before us and its validity is not a matter which we need to decide. To say the least, however, the grounds for setting the award aside ... seem irresistible."
Plain English: The Commission is not ruling on the national award here, but it thinks the award’s attempt to cover Queensland employers looks very vulnerable; that issue will be addressed in other proceedings.
This decision demonstrates the Commission’s application of s111AAA(1). Triggering fact patterns include:
A State award exists which, on its terms and as applied, governs the wages and conditions of the employees who are the subject of an industrial dispute in that State. The presence (or undisputed existence) of such an award is the statutory precondition for cessation [7], [8].
The union party which is seeking a common rule or award ceases to press its award application at the federal level in relation to a State; that withdrawal is a weighty factor in deciding whether any public interest exception to cessation exists [6], [8].
A higher court has quashed an earlier AIRC decision and ordered the Commission to re-hear applications; the Commission is obliged to comply and must re-determine the matter according to law [4], [11].
Practitioners should expect the AIRC to grant s111AAA cessation where a State award unambiguously covers the employees in question and there is no compelling public interest reason to continue federal involvement, particularly where the union has withdrawn its federal award claim.
The Full Bench’s decision was given effect in the immediate context of the High Court’s earlier ruling. The AIRC explicitly followed the High Court’s direction to re-hear the matters and to give effect to the High Court’s orders when determining disposition [4], [11]. The decision itself is an administrative application of the statutory test in s111AAA(1) rather than a novel statement of law that later courts would need to apply; nevertheless two precedential touchpoints appear in the reasoning:
The Commission treated the High Court’s quashing and mandamus orders as binding and followed them in re-hearing and determining the matter [4], [11].
The Commission signalled that a national award made in partial settlement of the disputes and extended to Queensland was vulnerable in light of the High Court’s decision, and that separate simplification proceedings have the function of resolving those award questions [9]–[10].
Because the Full Bench did not purport to lay down novel interpretive principles beyond the statutory text of s111AAA(1) and its straightforward application to the facts, later courts would most likely treat this decision as an administrative application of the statutory rule rather than a binding precedent on matters of principle beyond those already contained in the statute and the High Court’s orders.
Several issues remain open or were expressly left for other proceedings:
The validity of the Furnishing Industry National Award 1999 insofar as it purported to apply to Queensland employers. The Full Bench declined to decide that question in these s111AAA proceedings, observing that the award was not before it and that separate simplification proceedings would address its status [9]–[10]. The Commission described the grounds for setting it aside as appearing "irresistible" but did not determine that point; therefore the legal fate of the award as applied to Queensland remains to be determined in the simplification proceedings.
The precise contours of the public interest exception to s111AAA(1). The decision shows that withdrawal of a union’s federal award claim is a strong factor, but the Commission did not catalogue exhaustively what public interest factors might justify continuing to deal with disputes despite a State award. Future cases may clarify the range and weight of public interest considerations under s111AAA(1).
The interaction between federal simplified award-making powers (such as under the referenced simplification allocation) and state awards where proceedings have been brought and awards made in different forums. The Commission’s reference to the simplification process indicates procedural paths for resolving overlapping award claims, but leaves open the substantive boundaries and interaction of those mechanisms in complex multi-jurisdictional disputes.
Practitioners should monitor the simplification proceedings and any further litigation about the 1999 Furnishing Industry Award to see how the Commission and courts resolve the outstanding questions left by this decision.
s.111AAA applications to cease dealing with matters
s.108 references to Full Bench
Furnishing Industry Association of Australia (Queensland) Limited Union of Employers
**Queensland Chamber of Commerce and Industry Limited,
Applications pursuant to s.111AAA - previous decision of Commission dismissing applications - decision quashed by High Court of Australia - applications required to be heard - State award governing the wages and conditions of employees whose conditions are the subject of an industrial dispute - award application not pressed - applications upheld.
[1] On 27 November 1998 this Full Bench handed down a decision dismissing three applications pursuant to s.111AAA of the Act. The applications were made by the Queensland Chamber of Commerce and Industry Limited, Industrial Union of Employers, the State of Queensland (Queensland) and the Furnishing Industry Association of Australia (Queensland) Limited Union of Employers (FIAA(Q)) respectively. The applications were supported by the Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations on behalf of the Commonwealth (the Minister).
[2] The substance of each application was that the Commission should cease dealing with a number of disputes between the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) and employers in the furniture manufacturing industry in Queensland. The grounds for the applications were that there was an award of the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission which already governed the wages and conditions of employees in the industry in Queensland and that it would be in the public interest to cease dealing with those disputes in relation to Queensland.
[3] We decided that the s.111AAA applications could not be validly made and, to the extent that it was necessary to do so, we dismissed them.
[4] Queensland and the Minister initiated proceedings for prerogative relief in the High Court of Australia. The proceedings were remitted to a Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. In a decision given on 20 November 2000 that Court declined to grant relief: Re McIntyre and Others v Transport Workers' Union of Australia; Ex Parte Attorney-General of Queensland[1]. Queensland and the Minister each sought and was granted leave to appeal to the High Court. On 3 October 2002 the High Court upheld the appeals: Attorney-General (Queensland) v Australian Industrial Relations Commission[2]. The Court ordered that a writ of prohibition issue prohibiting the Commission from acting upon, giving effect to, further proceeding upon or enforcing the decision of 27 November 1998, that a writ of certiorari issue quashing that decision and that a writ of mandamus issue requiring the Commission to hear and determine the s.111AAA applications according to law.
[5] The applications were listed for mention on 7 November 2002. Mr Murdoch, of counsel, appeared on behalf of Queensland, Mr Macken on behalf of the Minister, Ms Salerno, solicitor, for the FIAA(Q) and Mr Payne, solicitor, on behalf of the CFMEU, instructed specifically by the Forestry and Furniture Products Division.
[6] Mr Murdoch submitted that in the circumstances the Commission is required to hear the applications. He further submitted that the applications should be upheld since there is a relevant State award. That submission was supported by the Minister and the FIAA(Q). Mr Payne indicated on behalf of the CFMEU that it no longer pressed its award application in Queensland.
[7] Section 111AAA(1) is in the following terms:
"(1) If the Commission is satisfied that a State award or State employment agreement governs the wages and conditions of employment of particular employees whose wages and conditions of employment are the subject of an industrial dispute, the Commission must cease dealing with the industrial dispute in relation to those employees, unless the Commission is satisfied that ceasing would not be in the public interest."
[8] We are satisfied that there is a State award which governs the wages and conditions of employees whose wages and conditions of employment are the subject of the industrial disputes in relation to which these applications are made. No party suggested otherwise. In light of the fact that the CFMEU no longer presses for an award it is appropriate that we grant the s.111AAA applications and cease dealing with the relevant disputes.
[9] It was noted, however, that between the time of our 1998 decision dismissing the s.111AAA applications and the High Court's decision, an award had been made in part settlement of the relevant disputes and which applies to the furnishing industry in Queensland. The award was made in 1999. The circumstances are set out in decisions made by Senior Deputy President Watson on 22 April 1999[3] and 17 May 1999[4]. By those decisions and the relevant order[5] a number of employers in Queensland were made respondent to an award which already applied to the furnishing industry in the States of Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania. The resultant award is known as the Furnishing Industry National Award 1999[6] (the award). It is clear that the Queensland employers were made respondent to the award without the s.111AAA applications having been considered.
[10] The award is not before us and its validity is not a matter which we need to decide. To say the least, however, the grounds for setting the award aside to the extent that it purports to apply to employers in Queensland seem irresistible. The award is presently allocated to Commissioner Hingley for simplification pursuant to s.51 of Part 2 of Schedule 5 to the Workplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 1996. Those proceedings provide an opportunity to deal with the award, to the extent that it purports to apply to employers in Queensland, in light of the High Court's decision and consequent orders.
[11] We have decided that the Commission should cease dealing with each of the relevant disputes except to the extent that it may be necessary to deal with them to give effect to the High Court's decision and consequent orders of 3 October 2002.
CJ Murdoch of counsel for the State of Queensland.
J Macken for the Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations.
L Salerno, solicitor, for the Furnishing Industry Association of Australia (Queensland) Limited Union of Employers.
J Payne, solicitor, with J Stein for the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union, Forestry and Furnishing Products Division.
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
(2002) 76 ALJR 1502
(2002) 105 FCR 584
The Commission granted the s111AAA applications and ceased dealing with the relevant industrial disputes in relation to the Queensland employees, except to the extent necessary to give effect to the High Court's decision and related orders of 3 October 2002 [11].