[2025] NSWSC 663
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of NSW
2025-06-30
Yehia J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Cornwall v Attorney General for New South Wales [2007] NSWCA 374
Lynn v State of New South Wales (2016) 91 NSWLR 636; [2016] NSWCA 57
State of New South Wales v Cole (Final) [2024] NSWSC 1640
State of New South Wales v Holschier (No 3) [2019] NSWSC 341
State of New South Wales v Keech [2024] NSWSC 408
State of New South Wales v Sturgeon [2019] NSWSC 559
State of NSW v Tozer [2017] NSWSC 109
(a) On 29 July 2016, Harrison J (as his Honour then was) made a continuing detention order ("CDO") for a period of two years.
(b) On 3 October 2018, R A Hulme J made an ESO for a period of five years.
(a) While it is true that Mr Strong's NDIS plan, funding, and engagement is voluntary:
(i) There is no evidence to suggest that it will cease, rendering him homeless and without support for daily living and community access which he currently receives. His NDIS plan and support has now been in place since 2021 and his "promising progress in the community" is a testament to how successful and robust his NDIS support is.
(ii) From 31 May 2016 to 25 October 2023, the defendant was the subject of a guardianship order, with the Public Guardian as appointed guardian. While it was allowed to lapse on review by the Tribunal, on 25 October 2023, on the basis that the Tribunal was persuaded there was no longer any need for it, the Tribunal noted:
"[18] We explained to the participants that if there is any change to Mr Strong's circumstances it is open to anyone with a genuine concern for his welfare to bring a further application to the Tribunal if required."
(iii) If the defendant were to seek to terminate his NDIS plan and funding and/or disengage from his supports (including his accommodation) "anyone with a genuine concern for his welfare" may "bring a further application to the Tribunal" seeking a guardianship order with functions of accommodation and services to compel him to remain as an NDIS participant, be accommodated with support, and impose restrictive practices to compel him to take his depot medication.
(b) The plaintiff notes that the defendant has been on "repeated, rolling" CTOs since being released into the community and while the plaintiff contends "there is no guarantee that they will continue", there is, conversely, no guarantee that they will not. The defendant submitted that there is every likelihood that they will continue given how successful they have been. Further, the defendant will remain a "mentally ill person", as defined in s 14 of the Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW) ("MH Act") by reason of his continuing condition of schizophrenia. Although he has a history of non-compliance, the efficacy of the rolling CTOs is unquestioned. In Mr Samuel Ardasinski's Risk Assessment Report dated 17 December 2024 ("the December 2024 Risk Assessment Report") it is noted that the defendant's "diagnosed psychotic illness has been quite stable for many years now, thanks in no small part to hi[m] being made subject to repeated, rolling Community Treatment Orders (CTOs)."
(c) According to an email from the defendant's senior behaviour specialist and psychologist, Ben Fulham, dated 16 April 2025, the defendant has:
1. Been compliant with his mental health treatment and CTO conditions
2. Been working well with his NDIS service providers day to day
3. Been following ESO rules and not been in trouble for a while
4. Been developing good skills and independence
(d) According to the Corrective Services NSW ("CSNSW") ESO Completion Report, dated 18 June 2024 and authored by Community Corrections Officer, Jamie Burton ("June 2024 ESO Completion Report"):
"[The defendant's] case management appears to have sufficiently intervened to address his criminogenic factors. Since 2023 he has progressed from Stage 1 to Stage 3 of the electronic monitoring scheme and has not been charged with any offences or served any time within a custodial centre. [The defendant's] mental health appears to be the primary consideration for his overall well-being and reduction of high-risk behaviours. This appears to be sufficiently managed via a Community Treatment Order, which will likely continue upon expiration of the Extended Supervision Order. It would appear that no further order is required, should [the defendant] continue on his current trajectory. [Emphasis added]
(e) This report is approximately one year old, and it is submitted that the defendant has continued on his positive trajectory to date.
(a) The defendant took advantage of the victim's unconscious state.
(b) The offence was opportunistic brought about by heavy drinking leading up to the actual incident.
(c) The defendant did not employ the use of threats or pressure before or after the offence but took full toll of the victim's vulnerability due to her being asleep after a heavy night of drinking.
(d) The defendant took advantage of the victim in the home in which she was living, and he is the uncle of the victim.
(e) The defendant's capacity to reason and to fully appreciate the rightness or wrongness of having sex with his niece while she was asleep was related to his mental illness and, therefore, to some extent lessened his moral culpability.
(f) The defendant was highly intoxicated at the time of committing this offence and noting that although this was self-induced, this tended to lessen the moral culpability of the offence.
(g) Dr Furst diagnosed the offender with schizophrenia, poly-substance dependence, antisocial personality disorder, borderline personality traits, as well as a history of depression.
(h) Due to the defendant's mental illness, his moral culpability was reduced, and he was a less appropriate vehicle for general deterrence.
(i) The defendant's record disclosed a history of sexual offending over a period of thirty-five years, and he generally re-offends within a very short period of being released from custody.
(j) The defendant expressed remorse in talking to the police and during a confidential psychological pre-sentence assessment.
(a) Assault female (charged 20 February 1975): The offending occurred in 1975 against a woman who was carrying her 20-month-old son. The defendant placed his hands up the victim's dress, and it was alleged he placed his hands on her thigh. The defendant was released on probation for 12 months to be of good behaviour.
(b) Assault with intent to rape (charged 30 May 1977): The offending occurred in May 1977. The defendant entered a flat occupied by a 28-year-old, taking with him a length of dog chain. He presented a fork to the woman and hit the victim multiple times to the upper part of her body and head. The defendant wrapped the dog chain around her throat and pulled it tight causing her to lose consciousness. When she regained consciousness, the defendant was attempting sexual intercourse with her. The defendant was sentenced to 4 years and 6 months' imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 2 years.
(c) Indecent assault (charged 13 January 1997): The defendant approached the victim and extended his arm to shake hers. After shaking hands and letting go, he reached down and grabbed her groin area with one hand and the zipper of her pants with another. The victim ran away before contacting police. On 18 February 1997, the defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 6 months commencing on 13 January 1997.
(d) Act of indecency with person 16 years or over (charged 14 September 1999): The victim commenced running along a trail and as she approached a bridge, the defendant was standing there and exposed his genitals to her as well as fondling them. The victim was afraid for her safety, continued running, and ran back to the carpark. The defendant followed her for a short distance. The defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 6 months commencing on 17 September 1999 and concluding on 16 March 2000, with an additional term of 3 months' supervision concluding on 16 June 2000.
(e) Stalk with intent; intimidate with intent; offensive language; custody of knife in a public place (charged 4 October 2000): In January 1998, while in prison for other matters, the defendant began sending numerous letters to the victim. The letters were of an explicit sexual nature. The victim had never been in any relationship with the defendant, and he had no reason to make these written advances towards her.
(f) In mid-August 2000, the defendant moved to a location directly across the road from where the victim was living with relatives. The defendant began watching the victim and her house across the road and was bragging to other persons that the victim was "his woman" and "his missus". At around 9:00pm on 1 September 2000, the defendant was outside the victim's house in the dark and followed her when she left the house to go out. The victim had to run to a friend's house to call a taxi to get away from the defendant. Later that night, the defendant was watching the victim as she left a number of pubs in the company of friends. On 3 September 2000, the defendant was outside the victim's home in an intoxicated state where he swore and yelled abuse and threats towards her, despite her not being home.
(g) On 4 October 2000, police observed the defendant acting suspiciously outside a pizza store in Newtown. Police observed that he appeared to be concealing something in the sleeve of his jacket, which, upon a search, was revealed to be a large black handled knife with a 15 cm serrated blade.
(h) On 20 February 2001, the defendant was convicted and sentenced as follows:
(i) Stalk with intent - 5 years' imprisonment concluding on 3 October 2008 with a non-parole period of 3 years concluding on 3 October 2006.
(ii) Intimidate with intent - 4 years' imprisonment commencing on 4 October 2001 with a non-parole period of 3 years concluding on 3 October 2003.
(iii) The charges of offensive language and custody of a knife were taken into account on Form 1.
(a) On the Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol (RSVP) Version 2, the defendant was assessed as presenting an elevated risk of committing further sexual violence of a similar nature to his previous offences, and his case prioritisation was considered as "High" (RAR [31]).
(b) On the Structured Assessment of Protective Factors against Sexual Offending (SAPROF-SO), the defendant was determined to have a moderate loading of protective factors that would inoculate against risk (RAR [38]).
(c) On the Dynamic Risk Factors (Actuarial Assessment) - Sexual Offending (STABLE-2007), the defendant received a score of 13 suggesting a high density of criminogenic needs relative to other male sexual offenders (RAR [36]).
(d) Mr Ardasinski identified the defendant's risk factors as follows (RAR [33] - [34]):
(i) Substance abuse.
(ii) Unstable mental health, with feelings of paranoia or persecution.
(iii) Sexual pre-occupation and sexualising potential victims.
(iv) Feeling lonely, unwanted or worthless, and lack of intimate relationships.
(v) Impulsivity and poor capacity to plan.
(vi) Poor work ethic/ability and an abundance of idle time.
(vii) Poor prior compliance with supervision and treatment, and poor insight into risk.
(viii) Lack of community support and suitable accommodation.
Section 9(3)(c) and (d) results of relevant assessments
(a) Level of Service Inventory - Revised (LSI-R): assessed in October 2024, scoring in the "Medium" range of risk for general reoffending.
(b) STATIC-99R: assessed in April 2020, with a score of 5 placing him in the "Above Average" risk for sexual recidivism.
(c) HCR-20: assessed in 2019 as exhibiting a "high loading on static risk factors for future aggression".
(d) ARMIDILIO-S: assessed in 2019, with results indicating a "High" loading of dynamic risk factors, and some protective factors.
Section 9(3)(d1) - report prepared by Corrective Services NSW as to the extent to which the offender can be managed in the community
Sections 9(3)(e) and (e1) - treatment or rehabilitation programs and options that might reduce the likelihood of the offender re-offending
(a) Completion of the high intensity Self-Regulation Program for Sex Offenders (SRPSO) between 23 October 2012 and 20 March 2014.
(b) Participation in Forensic Psychology Service ("FPS") upon the commencement of the current ESO in 2018. Despite reported engagement to an appropriate standard, the defendant's ability to undertake meaningful engagement was impacted by his disability and as such FPS intervention was discontinued in 2013.
Sections 9(3)(e2), (f), and (g) - likelihood of compliance with an ESO, previous compliance with parole and other obligations
(a) Fail to comply with extended supervision order (x 2) (charged 30 March 2019): The defendant took an oral drug test, and the results showed positive for the presence of a prohibited drug (Buprenorphine). On 16 April 2019, the defendant was sentenced to 6 months' imprisonment. On 11 July 2019, the sentence was varied to a term of imprisonment of 3 months and 12 days commencing on 30 March 2019 and expiring on 11 July 2019.
(b) Fail to comply with extended supervision order (charged 29 April 2020): In November 2019, the defendant met the victim during his Aboriginal art therapy class. He wrote the victim a number of letters, asked for the victim's relationship status, and her full name and date of birth. He revealed he had a photograph of the victim and asked for her address. On 12 December 2019, the defendant was issued with a written direction not to associate with the victim. On 27 April 2020, information was received that the defendant had disclosed to his forensic psychologists that he had been masturbating while having sexual thoughts about the victim. The defendant denied having any contact with the victim. It was then revealed that the defendant had contacted the victim via her mobile phone. On 30 April 2020, the defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 6 months commencing on 29 April 2020 and expiring on 28 October 2020.
(c) Fail to comply with extended supervision order - 2 counts (charged 18 January 2022): On 18 November 2021, directions were issued to the defendant regarding his use of classified material and use of social media. During a search of his phone on 8 January 2022, it was revealed that the defendant accessed "Facebook" at least 15 times. He also downloaded the "Facebook Lite" application. The search also revealed that the defendant had accessed at least 46 different pornographic videos through adult websites, in breach of his current ESO. On 3 February 2022, the defendant was sentenced to 9 months' imprisonment commencing on 18 January 2022 and expiring on 17 October 2022, with a non-parole period of 6 months expiring on 17 July 2022.
(d) Fail to comply with extended supervision order (charged 14 October 2022): On 7 October 2022, a search of the defendant's phone revealed a number of downloaded pornographic videos, and the search history showed several searches for pornographic material, in breach of the current ESO. The defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 9 months to commence on 14 October 2022 and expire on 13 July 2023, with a non-parole period of 6 months expiring on 13 April 2023.
Sections 9(3)(h) and (h1) - offender's criminal history and views of the sentencing court
Section 9(3)(i) - any other information as to the likelihood that the offender will commit a further serious offence
5B Making of extended supervision orders - unacceptable risk
The Supreme Court may make an order for the supervision in the community of a person (an extended supervision order) if -
(a) the person is an offender who is serving (or who has served) a sentence of imprisonment for a serious offence either in custody or under supervision in the community, and
(b) the person is a supervised offender (within the meaning of section 5I), and
(c) an application for the order is made in accordance with section 5I, and
(d) the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order. Each of these preconditions is satisfied.
(a) The determination of the existence of an unacceptable risk is an evaluative task, which requires a normative context in which to be made;
(b) the preferable approach is to give the words their everyday meaning in the context of the provision in which they appear and having regard to the objects of the Act;
(c) In the context of the Act, the evaluation being made by the Court is "... directed to the assessment of risk in the context of making the community secure from harm as opposed to guaranteeing its safety and protection"; and
(d) The risk which must be unacceptable is one of the commission of a serious violent offence, if the individual is not kept under supervision.
"[56] ... [A] firm foundation, rather than a merely reasonable basis, for the conclusion that the risk posed by the offender is unacceptable absent supervision. Reasonable satisfaction is of itself insufficient."
"[5] A preliminary hearing does not require the Court to be satisfied that the matters in the supporting documentation will be proved. The Court is only required to be satisfied that if those matters are proved, an order would be justified, bearing in mind the elevated standard of proof, namely 'a high degree of probability': s. 5B and s. 5C ...
[6] The Court, in undertaking this exercise, is not involved in weighing up the documentation or resolving any conflicts, inconsistencies or uncertainties which appear in the documentation. It is no part of the Court's function to predict the ultimate result, or assess the likelihood of the ultimate result. If on the matters alleged in the supporting documentation it is open to the Court at a final hearing to make a CDO or [an] ESO, then a conclusion that the Court would be justified in making the order, is inevitable. The issue is to be resolved without considering what evidence might be called by [the defendant] at a final hearing, and without taking into account any evidence which may be called by a defendant at an interim hearing, because such evidence would not cast light upon what is alleged in the supporting documentation_: Attorney-General (NSW) v Tillman_ [2007] NSWCA 119 at [98]."
(a) that the offender's current custody or supervision will expire before the proceedings are determined, and
(b) that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order.
"[138] In Keech I set out the principles to be considered in assessing the necessity of conditions proposed by the plaintiff at [45]:
'As indicated earlier in this judgment, the real issue between the parties is whether, and to what extent, the conditions proposed by the plaintiff are necessary and/or appropriate. A summary of the principles regarding the imposition of conditions attaching to a supervision order are helpfully summarised in the defendant's written submissions (at [30]) and are extracted below:
(i) Having served their sentence, an offender has a right to personal liberty, although this right is not absolute: State of NSW v Donovan [2015] NSWSC 1254 at [83].
(ii) In imposing conditions, the Court needs to strike a balance between competing considerations to provide an outcome which is fit and proper: State of NSW v Ali [2010] NSWSC 1045 at [88]; State of New South Wales v Fisk [2013] NSWSC 364 at [96].
(iii) It is relevant that a breach gives rise to criminal penalty of up to 5 years imprisonment, which supports the position that a proper basis must be shown to warrant the imposition of each condition: Wilde v State of New South Wales [2015] NSWCA 28 at [48].
(iv) A link to past offending is not necessary, but conditions should address the risk of future offending based on the scope, purpose and objects of the Act.
(v) Conditions should focus on mitigating the risk of a 'serious offence', and not on reoffending generally: State of New South Wales v Green (Final) [2013] NSWSC 1003 at [36]- [38].
(vi) Conditions must not be unjustifiably onerous, punitive, paternalistic, in the 'general' public interest, or for the convenience or efficiency of those supervising the offender: State of New South Wales v Bugmy [2017] NSWSC 855 at [89].
(vii) An identifiable and substantive purpose is required for each condition. Speculation that it will be useful will not suffice: State of New South Wales v Ley Thomas Baker (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 483 at [36].
(viii) Conditions imposed ought to be the least intrusive conditions that are still consistent with the objects and purpose of the Act: Lynn v State of New South Wales [2016] NSWCA 57 at [129]- [131].'
See also State of New South Wales v Wilkinson (Preliminary) [2020] NSWSC 1813 at [44]."
(1) Pursuant to s 7(4) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW):
(a) I appoint two qualified psychiatrists or psychologists (or any combination of such persons) to conduct separate examinations of the defendant and to furnish reports to the Supreme Court on the results of those examinations by a date to be fixed by the Court; and
(b) I direct that the defendant attend those examinations.
(2) Pursuant to s 10A of the Act, the defendant be subject to an Interim Supervision Order.
(3) Pursuant to s 10C(1) of the Act, the Interim Supervision Order is to commence on 6 July 2025 and be in force for a period of 28 days.
(4) Pursuant to s 11 of the Act, I direct that the defendant, for the period of the Interim Supervision Order, comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule to this judgment.
(5) I order that access to the Supreme Court's file in respect of any document shall not be granted to a non-party without the leave of a judge of the Court and, if any application for access is made by a non-party in respect of any document, the parties are to be notified by the Registrar so as to allow them an opportunity to be heard in relation to the application for access.
"Associate" includes, but is not limited to, being in company with, or communicating with by any means (including by post, facsimile, telephone, email or any other form of electronic communication).
"Commissioner" means Commissioner for Corrective Services.
"Defendant" means Robert Strong, the defendant in these proceedings and the subject of the order.
"DSO" means Departmental Supervising Officer, that is, any Corrective Services Officer supervising the defendant under the order.
"Electronic Identity" means each of the following:
(a) an email address,
(b) a user name or other identity allowing access to an instant messaging service,
(c) a user name or other identity allowing access to a chat room or social media on the internet,
(d) any other user name or other identity allowing access to the internet or an electronic communication service.
(e) any written or printed material;
(f) any picture, painting or drawing;
(g) any carving, sculpture, statue or figure;
(h) any photograph, film, video recording or other object or thing from which an image may be reproduced;
(i) any computer data or the computer record or system containing the data; and
(j) any other material or object on which an image or representation is recorded or from which an image or representation may be reproduced.
(k) A garment search, being a search of any article of clothing worn by the defendant or in the defendant's possession, where the article of clothing is touched or removed from the person's body; and
(l) A pat-down search, meaning a search of the defendant where the defendant's clothed body is touched.
"Schedule of movements" refers to a weekly plan (referred to in Conditions 7-9), to be submitted to a DSO each Wednesday and which commences on the following Saturday if approved by a DSO.
(a) where you are or have been;
(b) where you are going;
(c) who you are with or have been with;
(d) what you are doing or have been doing; and
(e) the nature of your associations.
NOTE: For the purposes of Condition 10, overnight means a time no earlier than 9:00pm and no later than 6:00am.
(a) Possess, purchase or consume alcohol without the prior approval of a DSO;
(b) Possess or use prohibited drugs; or
(c) Abuse prescription drugs.
(a) who is consuming or under the influence of alcohol; or
(b) who you know is consuming or under the influence of illegal drugs.
NOTE: You are not required to comply with condition 22a if a DSO has given you prior approval to associate with a person consuming or under the influence of alcohol
(a) a firearm, firearm part or ammunition within the meaning of the Firearms Act 1996; or
(b) a prohibited weapon within the meaning of the Weapons Prohibition Act 1998.
Part G: Access to the internet and other electronic communication
(a) Aliases, electronic identities and log-in names;
(b) Email addresses;
(c) Telephone numbers;
(d) SIM cards;
(e) Applications used (including any social networking service);
(f) Online gaming services;
(g) Instant messaging services;
(h) Service provider account numbers; and
(i) All passwords and log-in details.
Part I: Access to pornographic, violent and classified material
Part L: NDIS conditions
State of New South Wales
Strong [2025] NSWSC 663
(2016) 91 NSWLR 636