//
[2025] NSWSC 1152
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of NSW
2025-09-29
Hamill J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Zoe will write a short plain-English summary of this judgment and email it to you for free: what it was about, what the court decided and why. It can take up to a minute.
General information, not legal advice.
Or create a free account to save it and ask Zoe follow-up questions.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: State of New South Wales v Strong [2025] NSWSC 1152
Hearing dates: 29 September 2025
Date of orders: 29 September 2025
Decision date: 29 September 2025
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Hamill J
Decision: (1) Revoke the interim supervision order made by Yehia J on 30 June 2025 and thereafter extended.
(2) An order pursuant to ss 5B and 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (“the Act”) that the defendant be subject to an extended supervision order for a period of two years commencing today.
(3) An order pursuant to s 11 of the Act that the defendant, for the period of the extended supervision order, comply with the conditions set out in Annexure A to this judgment.
(4) Confirm the order made by Yehia J restricting access to the Supreme Court file.
Catchwords: CIVIL LAW – high risk sexual offender – extended supervision order – conditions – relevant considerations – lengthy history of predatory conduct – recent signs of rehabilitation – 66-year-old Anaiwan man – mental health and cognitive issues – parsimonious approach to duration of order and conditions
Legislation Cited: Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), ss 4A, 5(1), 5B, 5B(d), 5I, 9(1)(a), 11
Cases Cited: R v Strong [2003] NSWCCA 123; (2003) 141 A Crim R 56
State of New South Wales v Strong [2016] NSWSC 1041
State of New South Wales v Strong [2025] NSWSC 663
State of New South Wales v Strong by his Tutor Ainsworth (Final) [2018] NSWSC 1438
State of New South Wales v Strong, Robert [2018] NSWSC 1113
State of New South Wales v Wilkinson (Preliminary) [2020] NSWSC 1813
Texts Cited: N/A
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: State of New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Robert Strong (Defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
M England SC with R Thampapillai (Plaintiff)
B Fogarty (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor’s Office (Plaintiff)
Legal Aid Commission (NSW) (Defendant)
File Number(s): 2025/00168639
Publication restriction: N/A
The State of New South Wales seeks an extended supervision order (“ESO”) against the defendant, Robert Strong. Mr Strong is currently subject to an interim supervision order (“ISO”) made by Yehia J on 30 June 2025 following a preliminary hearing held on 24 June 2025: State of New South Wales v Strong [2025] NSWSC 663. The ISO was extended by orders of the Court made on 28 July 2025, 19 August 2025 and 16 September 2025. The case is now before the Court for final hearing. While there is no dispute that an order should be made, there is a dispute as to the duration of the order and various disputes about the conditions to which Mr Strong should be subjected.
Mr Strong has been subject to previous orders made under the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (“the Act”). On 29 July 2016, Harrison J made a continuing detention order for a period of two years (State of New South Wales v Strong [2016] NSWSC 1041), and on 3 October 2018, R A Hulme J made an ESO for a period of five years: State of New South Wales v Strong by his t**utor Ainsworth (Final) [2018] NSWSC 1438; and see State of New South Wales v Strong, Robert [2018] NSWSC 1113, where Latham J made the ISO pending the final hearing. The calendar length of that ESO was extended by operation of the statute during periods when Mr Strong was incarcerated, for offences involving breaches of the order, between 2018 and the order made by Yehia J in June this year.
I assume those present and any reader of this judgment once it is published is familiar with the content of the four earlier judgments, each of which was before me on the final hearing along with three folders of material of the usual kind. The material included the facts of several earlier criminal cases involving Mr Strong, and the observations in some instances of the judges who dealt with those cases. The evidence also included Mr Strong’s criminal record, progress notes made by officers who have supervised him both in a custodial setting and since his release on the 2018 ESO as well as several psychological and psychiatric, risk assessment and risk management reports. Included in the latter category of material are the two expert reports prepared on the order of Yehia J at the preliminary hearing. Those reports are the report of Dr Gordon Elliott, a forensic psychiatrist, dated 18 August 2025, and a report by Dr Sally McSwiggan, a neuropsychologist, dated 20 August 2025. The parties also provided a 55-page chronology, a summary of the plaintiff’s case, thorough and focused written submissions, and a table of conditions summarising the disputes between the parties and succinctly referring to their respective arguments.
Speaking first quite broadly about the material that has been put into evidence this morning, Mr Strong is a 66-year-old First Nations man of the Anaiwan people. His country is what the white settlers would call the Northern Tablelands of New South Wales around, more or less, the city of Armidale and the small town of Tingha. Mr Strong has suffered from what I take to be treatment-resistant schizophrenia for most, if not all, of his adult life. That condition has made him more vulnerable to risk taking, disinhibition and predatory behaviours. The evidence shows that for many years Mr Strong represented a danger to the public, particularly to vulnerable women, if left to his own devices in the community. More recently, the experts have observed a decline in his cognitive functioning which may be a sign of some form of dementia in its early stages.
Against those things, Mr Strong has made remarkable progress over the last couple of years since he was sentenced in 2022 to imprisonment for a breach of the conditions of the previous ESO. He was released from that six-month non-parole period on 13 April 2023, and his behaviour under the ESO since that time has been compliant and extremely promising.
His conduct was so promising that the original completion report authored by Mr Jamie Burton on 18 June 2024 included an opinion that:
“it would appear that no further order is required should Mr Strong continue on his current trajectory”.
Mr Strong was in fact notified that no further order would be sought, but the State ultimately elected to make the present application. In saying that, I mean no criticism of the State or the decision to seek the order. Rather, I refer to it because it speaks eloquently to the promising signs that Mr Strong is now on a path towards rehabilitation and has some relevance to the decisions that I am called upon to make.
Before leaving that topic, I should acknowledge that the material suggests that those who have administered the ESO to this point have displayed admirable sensitivity to the position of the current defendant and his disabilities and difficulties. As recently as this morning, Senior Counsel for the State explained efforts that have been made to enable Mr Strong to visit his country, meet with his brother, and to pay respects to his parents at the Tingha Cemetery.
Further, his progress in more recent times has coincided with the availability of a generous National Disability Insurance Scheme (“NDIS”) grant, and what appear to be extremely motivated carers and health care professionals.
Before continuing, I will acknowledge the efforts of the HRO team, the carers and the professionals involved in the NDIS support programme, and most significantly to Mr Strong himself who appears motivated to continue on a path towards rehabilitation. I should also add an expression of gratitude to the lawyers on both sides of the bar table.
I am satisfied that the formal requirements for the making of an ESO are established. Mr Strong is an offender as defined in s 4A of the Act, and has been sentenced to imprisonment for a serious sex offence as defined in s 5(1). At the time the summons was brought, and indeed today, he was a “supervised offender” pursuant to ss 5B and 5I of the Act.
Based on the evidence, I am also “satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order”. In dot-point form, the reasons for that conclusion are as follows:
The seriousness of the offences of sexual intercourse without consent for which Mr Strong was sentenced in 2011 to imprisonment for six years and three months with a non-parole period of four years.
The remarks of the sentencing Judge in sentencing the offender on 21 September 2011. Judge North described the facts of the case which included the defendant having penetrative sexual intercourse with his niece while she was sleeping in her own home.
A series of offences going back many years which involved repeated incidents of violence, including sexual violence, against several women each of whom was, in their own way or by virtue of the circumstances prevailing, vulnerable to such predatory conduct.
In 1983, Mr Strong was sentenced for maliciously causing grievous bodily harm with intent to have sexual intercourse, maliciously causing actual bodily harm with intent to have sexual intercourse and two counts of sexual intercourse without consent. I have read the remarks of Enderby J in sentencing, and the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal (Street CJ, Begg CJ at CL and Lusher J) by which the total head sentence was reduced but the non-parole period of 14 years was confirmed.
In 2001, there was a series of stalking offences resulting in substantial custodial sentences.
Following sentencing in 2001, the defendant was pronounced to be a habitual offender, a pronouncement which was upheld in R v Strong [2003] NSWCCA 123; (2003) 141 A Crim R 56, while reducing the sentence and non-parole period.
In 2019, 2020, 2021 and 2022, Mr Strong was convicted and sentenced for failing to comply with the conditions of the earlier ESO. Each of those breaches involved conduct that was both contrary to the conditions of the ESO but, more importantly, had the potential to trigger some of the factors that increase the risk that Mr Strong will commit sexual offences.
Mr Strong has a well-documented history of mental health issues and cognitive impairments, and these have played a significant part in his repeated offending over many years. He has, as I have said, a long-standing diagnosis of schizophrenia, and has more recently showed signs of cognitive decline which may be consistent with some form of dementia. A current community treatment order requires him to take anti-psychotic and anti-libidinal medication as well as anti-depressants.
There are a vast number of reports within the evidence which establish that the defendant is a person with an “elevated” risk profile when it comes to committing serious sexual offences.
As part of the preparation to bring the present application, a risk assessment report dated 17 December 2024 was prepared by Samuel Ardasinski, a psychologist with the High Risk Offenders unit within the Department of Corrective Services. Mr Ardasinski described Mr Strong as:
“…posing an elevated risk of future sexual violence with a high density of criminogenic needs.”
“plac[e] him in the well-above average risk group; the highest group.”
“Some symptoms of mental illness appeared to persist based on his propensity for delusional sexual fixations towards women during the ESO. With his history of offending, his mental health and substance use would be the most salient risks for Mr Strong.”
The pattern of committing offences of violence and sexual violence on vulnerable women over many years, considered alongside his mental health and cognitive difficulties, and instances of non-compliance with the previous ESO are such that I must accept the concession made on the defendant’s behalf that the precondition for making an order in s 5B(d) of the Act is satisfied.
In the absence of any discretionary matter that militates against making an order, an ESO should be made, and I propose to make the order.
The remaining questions concern the length of the ESO and the conditions that should attach to it. Those questions must be answered against the background of offending and the more recent positive developments towards rehabilitation.
As to the length of the order, the State seeks an order for three years while counsel for the defendant submits the order should be no more than 12 or 18 months. I accept there has been some progress and some positive signs. In particular, apart from breaching the conditions of the order, Mr Strong has committed no substantive offences since around 2010. He has significant support in the community through his NDIS program including supported accommodation, mental health care, a community treatment order, and a seemingly generous support network funded through the NDIS.
Further, the extent of electronic monitoring has been relaxed over the last year or so, and in March this year, the defendant was told that the Attorney General would make no further application for an ESO, a development which made the defendant “particularly happy” because he could “feel normal again”. The reversal of that decision, whilst entirely understandable on the evidence that I have read, has caused Mr Strong anxiety and disappointment, and the court hearing is constantly on his mind.
There is some force, however, in the State’s submission that a three-year order will continue beyond what is expected to be a two-year continuation or extension of the defendant’s NDIS funding which would be, if that extension is made, until November 2027.
However, I generally accept the thrust of the defendant’s submission that there are great benefits in what has been described by both counsel as a “step down” approach, and have concluded that this is consistent with the opinion expressed by Mr Burton in his completion report. Further, the secondary object of the Act – which is concerned with the rehabilitation of the offender – will be fostered by the defendant knowing that there is some light at the end of the tunnel, and that he has been rewarded for his good progress over the last year or so. Furthermore, if the State has concerns towards the end of the period of the ESO, it will have the ability to make a further application under the Act. If things continue to track as they have over the last couple of years, such an application may not be necessary. Much will turn on Mr Strong’s progress and compliance with the conditions that will be imposed.
For those various reasons, I will not make the order for the full three-year period urged for by the State. However, I do not accept the defendant’s submission that the making of an order for two years, as opposed to 12 or 18 months, would be “crushing” in all of the circumstances. Against the positive signs of progress, there is nothing to suggest that Mr Strong’s risk profile is likely to reduce rapidly over the coming year or so. I accept that there is much to be said for relaxing the conditions and adopting a parsimonious approach to setting the length of the ESO, but I am satisfied that a period of supervision amounting to two years is both appropriate and necessary to meet the circumstances of this case.
As to the conditions, I am largely satisfied that the defendant has made good his arguments for favouring relaxation of the conditions. However, that is not a categorical or all-encompassing observation, and I will deal with the disputed conditions in order, adopting the numbering in the amended summons.
In reaching conclusions as to which conditions should be included in the ESO, and which should not be, I have kept firmly in mind the primary object of the Act which is to protect the community. I have also borne in mind that a further object of the Act is to foster the rehabilitation of high risk offenders. I was taken helpfully to the judgment of Hoeben CJ at CL in State of New South Wales v Wilkinson (Preliminary) [2020] NSWSC 1813 where his Honour summarised some of the principles at [44]:
“Important principles to be considered in relation to the imposition of conditions are:
(i) having served a sentence of imprisonment for their offences, an offender has a right to personal liberty, however, this right is not absolute: State of New South Wales v Donovan at [83];
(ii) in imposing conditions, the Court needs to strike a balance between competing considerations: Attorney General for NSW v Tillman at [68];
(iii) a relevant consideration in imposing conditions is that a breach gives rise to a criminal penalty: State of New South Wales v Ley Thomas Baker (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 483 at [36];
(iv) conditions do not have to have a demonstrated link to past offending, but they should address the risk of future offending based on the scope, purpose and objects of the Act: Wilde v State of New South Wales [2015] NSWCA 28 at [53].
(v) conditions should not be designed toward future general criminal conduct, but instead focussed on mitigating the risk of a serious offence: State of New South Wales v Green (Final) [2013] NSWSC 1003 at [36]-[38].
(vi) conditions must not be unjustifiably onerous or punitive, ‘nor should they simply be an expression of State paternalism or imposed to meet what might be thought to be in the public interest in some generalised sense or because they might be a convenient or resource efficient means of the Department exercising supervision’: State of New South Wales v Bugmy [2017] NSWSC 855.
(vii) conditions ‘must be understood as having substantial work to do; a mere speculative possibility that it could be useful will not suffice’: State of New South Wales v Ley Thomas Baker (No 2) at [36].
(viii) to ensure a balance between the community interests and personal liberty, the Court should impose conditions that are the least intrusive possible (Lynn v State of New South Wales at [129]-[131].”
I accept the defendant’s submission that I should act on the opinion of Dr Elliott who indicates that both the electronic monitoring condition and the schedule of movements condition (the latter of which is no longer pressed by the State), “now appear [to be] overly punitive and an unnecessary component to manage his risk”. Dr Elliott noted that Mr Strong has progressed to the point where he is no longer subject to electronic monitoring at this point in time.
I have considered the relaxed version of the condition as proposed by the State. That amendment would prevent the Departmental Supervising Officer (“DSO”) from re-introducing electronic monitoring unless the defendant has breached the ESO, consumed drugs or alcohol, or stopped taking his medication. While there is something to be said for that, if there is any evidence that Mr Strong has done any of those things (i) he could be charged with an offence, and (ii) the State can apply to vary the order to allow for the reintroduction of electronic monitoring.
On balance, the preferable course is to delete the condition for electronic monitoring at this stage altogether. This will serve as a reward for Mr Strong’s efforts to this point, and as an incentive to continue to comply with the conditions of the ESO.
Accordingly, I do not propose to impose condition 5.
I agree that proposed condition 19, which would prohibit the defendant from entering premises and functions where alcohol is sold, should be modified to enable the defendant to enter licensed premises if he is in the company of an NDIS support worker or if the DSO approves him entering such premises. The State concedes that such a carveout is appropriate, and the condition will reflect what is now the agreed position between the parties.
The condition will become, in the revised conditions, condition 15.
I accept Dr Elliott’s opinion that this is no longer “a necessary or realistic condition” given the defendant’s cognitive decline. I accept the defendant’s submission that there is little utility in imposing this condition, and that it may expose Mr Strong to a punitive response by those supervising him or administering the ESO.
The real risk factor here is the defendant consuming alcohol or taking drugs that are not prescribed to him. Condition 13 will prohibit him from doing that, and condition 14 will require him to submit to drug and alcohol screening tests. I am satisfied that this will provide sufficient protection against this obvious risk factor. I am not convinced that requiring him to attend counselling will strengthen that protection.
Accordingly, the proposed condition 20 will not form part of the ESO.
Condition 23 would prohibit the defendant from engaging the services of sex workers without the prior approval of the DSO. Dr Elliott noted that the DSO “was at one point consider[ing] permitting him to visit a sex worker”. Dr Elliott then suggested the condition “could be covered by his monitoring and reporting condition”. It is unclear precisely how that would work in practice.
If it is correct, as Mr Strong has asserted, that he has no interest in engaging such services, the condition will not be an onerous one. If it is not correct, or if Mr Strong changes his mind about his interests in this area, the requirement for disclosure to the DSO will be an important protective measure.
Given the relaxation of the conditions relating to electronic monitoring and scheduling, and given the number of sexual offences on Mr Strong’s criminal record, I intend to impose the proposed condition 23, although, one would hope it is administered with sensitivity and a degree of flexibility. While I have some concerns about the extent to which such a condition intrudes into the defendant’s private life, the primary focus must remain on the safety of the community. I am satisfied that such a restriction remains an important protective measure in the circumstances of the case.
Accordingly, the State’s proposed condition 23 will be imposed but it will become condition 18 in the final form of the orders.
The defendant opposes proposed condition 37, which concerns access to pornographic material, based on Offender Information Management System notes which suggest that Mr Strong has no interest in accessing pornography or visiting a brothel. Reliance is also placed on the opinion of Mr Strong’s NDIS Senior Behaviour Specialist, Mr Fulham, who suggests a kind of tapered or controlled introduction to the internet. Again, I find it difficult to see how this would work in practice. The evidence suggests that Mr Strong has a long-standing pre-occupation with sexual matters and an unfortunate history of acting with disregard to the issue of consent.
Both Dr McSwiggan and Dr Elliott appear to support a condition along the lines of that proposed by the State. Dr McSwiggan says the defendant should not be permitted to access internet pornography for sexual stimulation while Dr Elliott says:
“It also remains important that his DSO be allowed to vet his access to the internet and other forms of electronic communication to screen for inappropriate or concerning access to pornography that might indicate a rise in his risk status.”
I do not think the fact, as I understand it to be, that Mr Strong does not presently have internet-capable smart phone – the device was described as a “dumb phone” – reduces the efficacy of this condition. He may well come into the possession of a smart phone at some point.
I am satisfied that the maintenance of proposed condition 37 is an appropriate protective response in the circumstances. The condition will become condition 28.
Proposed conditions 38, 39, 40 and 42 would forbid Mr Strong from using an alias, changing his name or appearance or, if he makes such changes, would require him to notify the DSO. The State presses the condition over the defendant’s objection. The defendant submits the conditions are unnecessary because there is no evidence that he is likely to do anything to change his name, appearance or identity. Each of the court appointed experts has ventured an opinion on this issue, although it might be thought those opinions are not based on their particular fields of expertise. Dr McSwiggan said, “these conditions are required to make the order effective.” Conversely, Dr Elliot said, “I do not consider the conditions under Part J [that is, conditions 38 through to 42] necessary.”
The only alias recorded on the defendant’s criminal record is “Robert James Strong” as opposed to “Robert John Strong” and there is nothing to suggest that this name or alias was used to deceive anybody as to the defendant’s identity. More generally, I accept there is no evidence of Mr Strong changing his name or appearance, and that his cognitive decline is such that he is unlikely to undertake any sophisticated measure to disguise his appearance or identity. On the other hand, there is nothing very onerous in requiring the defendant to advise his DSO of any change in his appearance, name or identity. I propose to impose a single condition in the following terms:
“You must notify the DSO within 24 hours if you intend to use a different name or if there is any significant change in your appearance.”
I raised that possible compromise condition in argument and neither counsel attempted with any degree of force to dissuade me from taking that middle course.
Accordingly, proposed conditions 38, 39, 40 and 42 will not be imposed, noting that the State does not press proposed condition 41. In place of those conditions will be a simple and single condition as at [41] of this judgment.
“Part L: NDIS conditions
49. You must agree to apply for the renewal of your NDIS funding package (at least to its current level of financial and other support), in sufficient time to allow the application to be processed before the current NDIS plan lapses, and must do everything necessary to support that application being made.
50. You must agree to accept supports under your NDIS funded package, and remain engaged with your NDIS-funded carers.”
Those conditions are calculated to ensure that the defendant continues to enjoy the support from the NDIS providers which, based on all of the material including the court ordered expert reports, is a significant protective factor.
Counsel for the defendant argues that these conditions are not necessary because there is no evidence to suggest that the defendant will disengage with his NDIS providers or fail to renew his funding from the NDIS. A recent affidavit of the defendant’s solicitor provides some relevant material in this regard, and I have considered the exchange of emails with Mr Fulham, who is Mr Strong’s Senior Behaviour Specialist. The exchange shows that if “Mr Strong were to disengage from the NDIS completely”, Mr Fulham “would be genuinely concerned for his welfare and would take further action.” That action would involve applying to the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal for a guardianship order.
There is something of an evidentiary vacuum concerning how this would work, the circumstances in which Mr Fulham or another member of Mr Strong’s NDIS support network would take such action, and how quickly such orders could be obtained. Counsel for the defendant acknowledged that there could be some delay and how long it will take for a guardianship order to be made is somewhat speculative.
On my reading of the material, Mr Strong’s rehabilitation and his ability to avoid various risk factors identified has been, and will continue to be, enhanced and assisted by him continuing to receive assistance from the NDIS program and his carers. While I accept he is unlikely to let the funding lapse, particularly given that it provides him with, amongst other things, a roof over his head, there are issues around his ability to manage his affairs and this feeds into his exposure to the kinds of risk factors which drive the seemingly unanimous view that he presents a risk of serious sexual offending if he is not managed and supported. Again, there is nothing particularly onerous about requiring the defendant to maintain his NDIS support, particularly where he is dependent on it in a variety of ways, including the provision of suitable and appropriate accommodation. The existence of the support network and the stability created by the NDIS is one of the reasons the State does not press for all of the conditions originally sought. The availability of that support network has also guided me in deciding to relax the conditions, including the requirement for electronic monitoring.
I am satisfied that conditions 49 and 50, as proposed by the State, provide a layer of protection that may not be 100% necessary, but is very important in giving effect to the primary objective of the Act. Accordingly, those conditions will be included in the ESO and will become conditions 36 and 37.
For those reasons, and I thank the lawyers for their patience in listening to them, I make the following orders:
Revoke the interim supervision order made by Yehia J on 30 June 2025 and thereafter extended.
An order pursuant to ss 5B and 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (“the Act”) that the defendant be subject to an extended supervision order for a period of two years commencing today.
An order pursuant to s 11 of the Act that the defendant, for the period of the extended supervision order, comply with the conditions set out in Annexure A to this judgment.
Confirm the order made by Yehia J restricting access to the Supreme Court file.
**********
Schedule of Conditions
In these conditions:
“Associate” includes, but is not limited to, being in company with, or communicating with by any means (including by post, facsimile, telephone, email or any other form of electronic communication).
“CSNSW” means Corrective Services NSW.
“Commissioner” means Commissioner for Corrective Services.
“Defendant” means Robert Strong, the defendant in these proceedings and the subject of the order.
“DSO” means Departmental Supervising Officer, that is, any Corrective Services Officer supervising the defendant under the order.
“Electronic Identity” means each of the following:
(a) an email address,
(b) a user name or other identity allowing access to an instant messaging service,
(c) a user name or other identity allowing access to a chat room or social media on the internet,
(d) any other user name or other identity allowing access to the internet or an electronic communication service.
“Material” includes:
(a) any written or printed material;
(b) any picture, painting or drawing;
(c) any carving, sculpture, statue or figure;
(d) any photograph, film, video recording or other object or thing from which an image may be reproduced;
(e) any computer data or the computer record or system containing the data; and
(f) any other material or object on which an image or representation is recorded or from which an image or representation may be reproduced.
“NSWPF” means NSW Police Force.
Part A: Reporting and Monitoring Obligations
Monitoring and Reporting
1. You must accept the supervision and guidance of a DSO and obey all reasonable directions of a DSO.
2. Where a direction maybe given in writing (or is required to be given in writing) it may be given electronically including by SMS or other messaging service.
3. You must truthfully answer questions from a DSO, or any other person supervising you, about:
(a) where you are or have been;
(b) where you are going;
(c) who you are with or have been with;
(d) what you are doing or have been doing; and
(e) the nature of your associations.
4. You must agree to any information relating to your risk, supervision or rehabilitation being shared between those persons and agencies that are involved in your supervision including, but not limited to, a DSO, NSWPF and CSNSW.
Part B: Accommodation
5. You must live at an address approved by a DSO and notify a DSO of any intention to change your approved address or living arrangements.
6. If directed, you must be at your approved address overnight between the hours specified by a DSO unless other arrangements are approved by a DSO.
NOTE: For the purposes of Condition 6, overnight means a time no earlier than 9:00pm and no later than 6:00am.
7. You must allow a DSO to visit you at your approved address at any time and to enter the premises at that address, provided such visits do not occur with unreasonable frequency on any day or night.
8. You must not spend the night anywhere other than your approved address or any alternative approved addresses without the approval of a DSO.
9. You must not permit any person to stay overnight at your approved address (other than persons who ordinarily reside there) without the prior approval of a DSO.
Part C: Place and travel restrictions
10. You must not leave New South Wales without the approval of the Commissioner.
11. You must not go to any place specified by a DSO.
12. You must not attend any place used solely or mainly for the sale or display of sexually explicit material, or for providing sexual services or sexually explicit entertainment, without the prior approval of a DSO.
Part D: Drugs and alcohol
13. You must not:
(a) Possess, purchase or consume alcohol without the prior approval of a DSO;
(b) Possess or use prohibited drugs; or
(c) Abuse prescription drugs.
14. You must submit to drug and alcohol testing.
15. You must not enter any licensed premises (including hotels, bars, racecourses and licenced clubs, but excluding cafes and restaurants) except in the company of an NDIS support worker or with the prior approval of a DSO.
Part E: Non-association
16. You must not associate with any person specified by a DSO.
17. Without limiting condition 16, you must not associate with any person:
(a) who is consuming or under the influence of alcohol; or
(b) who you know is consuming or under the influence of illegal drugs.
NOTE: You are not required to comply with condition 17(a) if a DSO has given you prior approval to associate with a person consuming or under the influence of alcohol.
18. You must not engage the services of sex workers without the prior approval of a DSO.
19. You must agree to a DSO disclosing your criminal history to another person with whom you commence an intimate relationship. Before any disclosure is made, you will first be given the opportunity to make the disclosure yourself within a timeframe as identified by a DSO.
Part F: Weapons
20. You must not possess or use any of the following:
(a) a prohibited weapon within the meaning of the Weapons Prohibition Act 1998.
21. At any time you have left your approved address, you must not have in your possession any knife (or cutting instrument) or any rope, chain or other instrument of restraint.
Part G: Access to the internet and other electronic communication
22. You must obey any reasonable direction by a DSO the use of electronic devices and access to the internet.
23. You must disclose the following information to a DSO if directed:
(a) Aliases, electronic identities and log-in names;
(b) Email addresses;
(c) Telephone numbers;
(d) SIM cards;
(e) Applications used (including any social networking service);
(f) Online gaming services;
(g) Instant messaging services;
(h) Service provider account numbers; and
(i) All passwords and log-in details.
24. You must give a DSO a list of the electronic devices you use to communicate with or access the internet. This includes computers, phones, tablet devices, data storage devices and gaming devices. You must advise a DSO of any change to the list immediately.
25. You must provide a list of communication devices and data storage devices in your possession and advise a DSO of any change to the inventory immediately.
26. You must provide consent for a DSO (or any other person requested by a DSO) to remotely inspect any internet account used by you, including any internet service provider account, email accounts and social media accounts, in monitoring compliance with this Order.
27. You must provide consent for your telephone provider and internet service provider to share information about your accounts with a DSO.
Part H: Access to pornographic, violent and classified material
28. You must request and obtain approval from a DSO to purchase, possess, access, obtain, view, participate in or listen to material classified as Category 1 Restricted and Category 2 Restricted as defined under the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 (Cth), or any other material as directed by a DSO with respect to concerns related to risk of committing a serious offence.
Part I: Personal details and appearance
29. You must notify the DSO within 24 hours if you intend to use a different name or if there is any significant change in your appearance.
Part J: Medical intervention and treatment
30. You must undergo any ongoing psychological or psychological assessment or counselling (or any combination of these) as directed by a DSO, including therapy sessions, support and treatment programs the subject of the direction.
31. You must notify a DSO of the identity and address of any healthcare practitioner that you consult.
32. You must take medications that are prescribed to you by your healthcare practitioners (including anti-libidinal medication) and only in the manner prescribed.
33. You must notify a DSO immediately if you cease to take or decline to commence taking any medication as referred to in the above condition.
34. You must agree to your treatment and service providers and healthcare practitioners sharing information, including reports on your progress and attendance, and information you have told them, with each other and with a DSO.
35. You must agree to any information obtained under condition 34 being shared between those persons and agencies that are involved in your supervision including, but not limited to, a DSO, NSWPF and CSNSW.
Part K: NDIS conditions
36. You must agree to apply for the renewal of your NDIS funding package (at least to its current level of financial and other support), in sufficient time to allow the application to be processed before the current NDIS plan lapses, and must do everything necessary to support that application being made.
37. You must agree to accept supports under your NDIS funded package, and remain engaged with your NDIS-funded carers.
State of New South Wales
Strong [2025] NSWSC 1152