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[2026] NSWSC 528
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-05-15
Roberts J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: State of New South Wales v Peters (Final) (No 2) [2026] NSWSC 528
Hearing dates: 30 April 2026
Date of orders: 15 May 2026
Decision date: 15 May 2026
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Roberts J
Decision: (1) Pursuant to ss 5B and 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), the defendant is to be subject to an extended supervision order for a period of 18 months, commencing on 15 May 2026 and expiring on 14 November 2027.
(2) Pursuant to s 11 of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), the defendant is to comply with the conditions set out in the schedule annexed to this judgment for the period of the extended supervision order.
(3) Access to the Court’s file in respect of any document is not to be granted to a non-party without leave of a Judge of the Court and, if any application for access is made by a non-party in respect of any document, that the parties be notified by the Registrar so as to allow them an opportunity to be heard in relation to the application for access.
Catchwords: HIGH RISK OFFENDER – final hearing – application for extended supervision order (ESO) – application for ESO is not opposed by the defendant – where the defendant had been subject to a previous ESO – where the defendant has a history of non-compliance with supervision – where there is a relationship between drug use and the risk posed by the defendant – where the court is satisfied that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious violence offence if not supervised – ESO granted
Legislation Cited: Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), ss 3(1), 3(2), 5B, 5I, 6, 9
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), s 10A
Cases Cited: R v Peters [2002] NSWSC 1234
State of New South Wales v JC (Preliminary) [2023] NSWSC 31
State of New South Wales v Peters (Final) [2022] NSWSC 1205
State of New South Wales v Peters (Preliminary) [2022] NSWSC 109
State of New South Wales v Peters (Preliminary) [2026] NSWSC 47
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: State of New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Damien Peters (Defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
A Tembe (Plaintiff)
I Fay (Solicitor) (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor’s Office (Plaintiff)
Hugo Law Group (Defendant)
File Number(s): 2025/00436216
By amended summons dated 13 April 2026, the plaintiff, the State of New South Wales, seeks final relief under the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (“the Act”) in respect of the defendant, Damien Peters. [1]
The defendant pleaded guilty to two separate murders in 2001. On 20 December 2002, he was sentenced by Wood CJ at CL as follows (R v Peters [2002] NSWSC 1234):
for the murder of Tereaupii Akaii, to 17 years’ imprisonment commencing on 11 September 2001 with a non-parole period of 9 years, taking into account six offences of obtaining money by deception on a Form 1; and
for the murder of Bevan Frost, to 17 years’ imprisonment commencing on 11 September 2005 with a non-parole period of 9 years.
The effective minimum non-parole period expired on 10 September 2014, with the balance of the term expiring on 10 September 2022.
After 10 September 2014, the defendant was released to parole three times: in November 2016, July 2018 and December 2018. On each occasion, parole was revoked for non-compliance with parole conditions.
On 15 December 2021, the plaintiff filed its first application in this Court for orders under the Act in respect of the defendant. On 17 February 2022, Lonergan J granted the plaintiff interim relief by ordering that the defendant be subject to an interim detention order (IDO) for 28 days: State of New South Wales v Peters (Preliminary) [2022] NSWSC 109. On 8 September 2022, following the final hearing, Wright J ordered that the defendant be subject to a 3-year extended supervision order (ESO): State of New South Wales v Peters (Final) [2022] NSWSC 1205. That ESO commenced on 10 September 2022 and was originally set to expire on 10 September 2025. It was suspended for the period the defendant spent in lawful custody for further offending, which is discussed below. As a result, the defendant’s first ESO ultimately expired on 22 February 2026.
On 10 November 2025, the plaintiff filed its original summons in the present matter, seeking the following relief:
in prayers 1 and 2, interlocutory and interim orders for psychiatric and psychological examinations under s 7(4) of the Act and a 28-day interim supervision order (ISO); and
in prayers 3 and 4, final relief by way of an 18-month extended supervision order (ESO); and
in prayer 5, an order that access to the Court’s file in respect of any document not be granted to a non-party without leave of a Judge of the Court and, if any application for access is made by a non-party in respect of any document, that the parties be notified by the Registrar so as to allow them an opportunity to be heard in relation to the application for access.
On 9 February 2026, Sirtes J heard the application for the interlocutory and interim orders sought in the summons. On 10 February 2026, Sirtes J published his judgment, State of New South Wales v Peters (Preliminary) [2026] NSWSC 47, and made the following orders:
“(1) Pursuant to s 10A of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (the Act), the Defendant is to be subject to an interim supervision order.
(2) Pursuant to s 10C(1) of the Act, the interim supervision order is to be for a period of 28 days, commencing on 22 February 2026.
(3) Pursuant to s 11 of the Act, the Defendant is to comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule of Conditions of Supervision annexed to this judgment for the duration of the interim supervision order.
(4) Pursuant to s 7(4) of the Act:
(a) two qualified psychiatrists or two registered psychologists (or any combination of two such persons) are appointed to conduct separate psychiatric and/or psychological examinations of the Defendant and to furnish reports to the Supreme Court on the results of those examinations by a date to be fixed; and
(b) the Defendant is directed to attend those examinations.”
In accordance with orders 4(a) and (b) made by Sirtes J, the defendant was examined by Dr Gordon Elliot, a general and clinical forensic psychiatrist, on 11 March 2026, and Dr Katie Seidler, a clinical and forensic psychologist, on 23 March 2026, each of whom provided reports to the Court. These reports are considered below at [49]–[59] and [60]–[70].
The application for final relief was heard on 30 April 2026. In court, the plaintiff sought, and was granted leave, to file an amended summons. The amendments addressed only the proposed conditions of the order.
(1) The primary object of this Act is to provide for the extended supervision and continuing detention of high risk sex offenders and high risk violent offenders so as to ensure the safety and protection of the community.
(2) … to encourage high risk sex offenders and high risk violent offenders to undertake rehabilitation.
The Supreme Court may make an order for the supervision in the community of a person (an extended supervision order) if—
(a) the person is an offender who is serving (or who has served) a sentence of imprisonment for a serious offence either in custody or under supervision in the community, and
(b) the person is a supervised offender (within the meaning of section 5I), and
(c) an application for the order is made in accordance with section 5I, and
(d) the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order.
For the purpose of s 5B(a), the defendant is an “offender” as defined in s 4A. That is, the defendant is over the age of 18 and has “at any time been sentenced to imprisonment … to be served by way of full-time detention … following the person’s conviction for a serious offence”. A serious offence means either a serious sex offence or a serious violence offence (see s 4). The offences of murder, for which the defendant was convicted, fall within the meaning of the latter: s 5A(1)(a).
For the purpose of s 5B(b), the defendant is a “supervised offender,” as he was under an existing ESO at the time the application was made.
For the purpose of s 5B(c), the requirements in s 5I are met and the requirements of s 6(1) are met as the application was made in the last nine months of the defendant’s supervision, being any time after 23 May 2025, and before the defendant’s first ESO expired.
The primary issue to be determined is whether the Court is satisfied, to a high degree of probability, that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision: s 5B(d).
In State of N**ew S**outh W**ales v JC (Preliminary) [2023] NSWSC 31, Chen J observed the following in respect of the test in s 5B(d) of the Act:
“[46] The concept of an “unacceptable risk” has, unsurprisingly, been the subject of considerable judicial consideration, which establishes the following:
(1) The phrase is to be given its everyday meaning within its context having regard to the objects of the Act: Lynn at [55]-[58] (Beazley P).
(2) What the Court must find to be unacceptable is the risk that the offender poses of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision; that is, an assessment of the likelihood in the absence of any supervision: Lynn at [51] and [55] (Beazley P); State of N**ew S**outh Wales v Donovan [2015] NSWCA 280 at [24] (Beazley P, Macfarlan and Leeming JJA). That finding provides the basis for imposing control on the offender: Lynn at [127] (Basten JA).
(3) The interests of the offender to liberty and privacy are not relevant to the assessment of whether there is an “unacceptable risk”, but can be taken into account when considering whether to make, under s 9 of the Act, an ESO or to dismiss the application: Lynn at [44] (Beazley P), [143] (Basten JA), and [148]-[149] (Gleeson JA).
(4) Unacceptability of risk “involves considerations of both likelihood of the risk eventuating, and the gravity of the risk that may eventuate”: State of N**ew S**outh Wales v Simcock (Final) [2016] NSWSC 1805 at [71] (Wilson J) (‘Simcock’); State of N**ew S**outh Wales v Chaplin [2019] NSWSC 471 at [15] (Rothman J). The nature of the risk “posed had to be assessed by reference to past conduct, the seriousness of the possible future conduct and the period over which the risk may come to fruition”: Lynn at [126] (Basten JA).
(5) An offender may pose an unacceptable risk, even where the likelihood of committing another serious offence is low, if the likely consequences of such an offence are very grave: State of N**ew S**outh Wales v Kamm (Final) [2016] NSWSC 1 at [41] and [43] (Harrison J); Golding at [16] (R A Hulme J); State of N**ew S**outh Wales v Devaney (Final) at [73] (Dhanji J).”
The defendant’s background and criminal history were before the Court as part of the statement of the plaintiff’s case, tendered without objection.
The defendant was born in 1969 and raised in Sydney. He is now 57 years old. He is recorded as having had a difficult upbringing, with the death of his mother when aged 18 or 19, and an abusive father. He has been involved in drug use since his late teens, with a relatively minor criminal history until the murder offences.
The defendant was sentenced for the murder offences on the basis of agreed facts and pleas of guilty. The agreed facts indicate the following. The defendant was in a relationship with Mr Akai for a period of approximately 3 years, and they had lived together in Mr Akai’s apartment prior to the commission of the offence. During their relationship, and whilst living together, the defendant was diagnosed with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Initially, the defendant blamed Mr Akai, who was also HIV positive, for having infected him with the virus.
On 29 August 2001, the police became aware that Mr Akai had not been seen for some time. Police made inquiries regarding Mr Akai’s bank cards and they questioned the defendant. The defendant reported that he had not seen Mr Akai for some time but that they had a “gentleman’s agreement” whereby the defendant could use Mr Akai’s money to look after the apartment and his dog. The defendant reported that this agreement had been made before Mr Akai “went away”, some 6 months ago.
The defendant was subsequently charged with six counts of obtaining money by deception.
On 11 September 2001, police attended the residential address of Mr Frost, where it was understood the defendant may be found. The defendant was informed that he was under arrest. Whilst in the apartment, police discovered the body of Mr Frost. At a subsequent police interview, the defendant also admitted to killing Mr Akai and disposing of his body some 8 months earlier.
The details of the killings and the way in which the defendant dealt with the remains of each victim need not be repeated in detail here, noting only that the sentencing judge found that “[u]pon any view of the objective circumstances of the two killings, they are exceedingly serious, and they were aggravated by the very disturbing subsequent dismemberment or partial dismemberment of each body.” [2]
With regards to Mr Akai, the defendant claimed that Mr Akai had manipulated him into sleeping with him, had violent mood swings, infected him with HIV (in 1998) and mistreated the defendant’s dog. The defendant said that at the time of the offence Mr Akai had been screaming at him, calling him “stupid”.
At the time of the murder of Mr Akai, the defendant said that he had consumed methylamphetamine over the preceding 2 days, smoked marijuana over the preceding 3 days, been on a daily dose of methadone and was receiving weekly testosterone injections. Prior to this, he had a prolonged history of substance abuse.
During the course of the police interview, the defendant also admitted to the murder of Mr Frost. The defendant said that this occurred on 9 September 2001 after he moved in with Mr Frost, following the locks being changed on Mr Akai’s apartment on or around 30 August 2001. He reported that he stabbed Mr Frost in the back, chin and neck while he was lying in bed. The defendant reported he “got sick of being used for sex” by Mr Frost, claiming that Mr Frost had allowed him to stay in the apartment but expected him to engage in sexual intercourse.
The sentencing judge in R v Peters [2002] NSWSC 1234 accepted at [72]:
“…in each case, the defendant found himself to be the submissive partner in somewhat disastrous relationships of the kind into which he had repeatedly entered, and from which he had found great difficulty escaping. That was in part due to his background and to his personality profile. The relationships were made all the more difficult by his contracting HIV, which had a very significant impact on his life, as well as a not unexpected anger for, and resentment of, Akai, and by the fact that [he] had nowhere to go, and no family to turn to for help. I also accept that at the time of the killings he was significantly depressed. To some degree that was attributable to the fact of his HIV condition but more relevantly and significantly, it was the result of his use of crystalline methamphetamine, the ingestion of which illegal substance was a matter of choice on his part.”
As noted above, on 8 September 2022, Wright J ordered that the defendant be subject to an ESO for a period of 3 years, commencing 10 September 2022. While subject to the ESO, the defendant committed offences of failing to comply with his ESO.
Regarding the first offence, the defendant’s phone was searched on 16 March 2023 when a Departmental Supervising Officer (DSO) located messages between the defendant and another person relating to the purchase of steroids. The defendant told the DSO that he needed to buy steroids because his prescribed testosterone gels were “not enough”. Evidence of four transactions totalling $1,700 was found on the defendant’s phone. Upon request, the defendant handed over 11 vials of steroids and needles. On 17 March 2023, the defendant was arrested and taken into custody. The defendant was convicted on 3 May 2023 for failing to comply with Condition 21 of his ESO (use of prohibited drugs) and sentenced to a community corrections order (CCO) for 12 months, commencing on 3 May 2023 and expiring on 2 May 2024.
Regarding the second group of offences, Community Corrections officers conducted a home visit on 9 January 2025. The officers observed that the defendant’s home was messy and he was behaving in an “elevated” manner. On 10 January 2025, Community Corrections officers and NSW Police officers attended the defendant’s home to conduct a search, a drug test and to fit the defendant with an electronic monitor. At this time, the officers observed that the defendant was struggling to keep his eyes open, was unsteady on his feet and was slurring his words. After searching the defendant’s home, the officers located prohibited drugs and other items in breach of his ESO conditions. The defendant was subject to an oral fluid drug test which returned a positive result for amphetamine, methylamphetamine and cannabis. The officers also spoke to the defendant’s neighbour who advised that they had observed the defendant outside his home after 10pm on one occasion in the lead up to the officers’ attendance.
On 28 March 2025, the defendant pleaded guilty to breaches related to drug use, possession of an additional mobile phone, and breaking his curfew. The possession of various drugs was also taken into account on a Form 1.
In relation to the drug use offence, the defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 8 months commencing 10 January 2025 and expiring 9 September 2025, with a non-parole period of 4 months. For the other offences, the defendant received a conviction with no other penalty pursuant to s 10A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW).
In 2022, following interim orders made by Lonergan J, the defendant was examined by a forensic psychologist, Mr Patrick Sheehan, and a forensic psychiatrist, Dr Andrew Ellis.
Each concluded that the defendant presented a risk of committing a serious violence offence and recommended supervision and intervention: State of New South Wales v Peters (Final) [2022] NSWSC 1205 at [36]–[46].
The defendant was also assessed in February 2025, in the context of the ESO breaches referred to above, by Dr Sam Calvin, a psychiatrist.
Dr Calvin’s conclusions were summarised by Sirtes J in State of New South Wales v Peters (Preliminary) [2026] NSWSC 47 at [51]. It is helpful to reproduce his Honour’s summary:
“51 My summary of Dr Calvin’s conclusions is as follows:
(1) the Defendant has a complex psychosocial and forensic history, characterised by longstanding mood instability, polysubstance dependence, and serious offending;
(2) substance dependence has had a significant impact on his offending behaviour, in contradistinction to periods of abstinence which are associated with relatively greater stability;
(3) the custodial environment, because it limited the Defendant’s access to illicit substances, caused his substance use disorder to be in partial remission. By comparison, the Defendant’s release into the community subject to the ESO caused “frequent and clinically significant relapses”;
(4) there is clear evidence of the Defendant suffering persistent emotional instability, poor impulse control and recurrent maladaptive interpersonal behaviours;
(5) the Defendant has a longstanding pattern of dysfunctional coping, mainly through substance abuse during periods of emotional distress and environmental instability. He has “consistently demonstrated difficulty managing anxiety, low mood, and interpersonal stresses” when there are disruptions to routine or reductions in structural support. At these times he historically reverts to substance abuse including methamphetamine, cannabis and benzodiazepines, which then lead to breaches of supervision conditions and increased risk-related behaviours;
(6) the Defendant’s substance abuse is not only a contributing factor to other risks such as emotional dysregulation or poor impulse control, but there is also a standalone independent risk factor due to its established association with increased likelihood of violence, offending and non-compliance with supervision or treatment;
(7) although the Defendant does not currently express violent attitudes, his history reflects an impulsive and poorly regulated response to distress and frustration. Symptoms of major mental illness are not present at the time, however the Defendant exhibits marked difficulty in managing stress, having a tendency to resort to maladaptive behaviours, particularly substance abuse; and
(8) the Defendant should continue to be managed under the conditions of his ESO with regular contact with supervisory staff and clearly defined expectations regarding compliance. A structured relapse prevention plan should be developed in collaboration with his treating team.”
In addition to the background already considered, the plaintiff relied upon a series of events which occurred following the defendant’s release from custody on 9 May 2025, as follows:
On 10 May 2025, the defendant’s DSO contacted the Electronic Monitoring Room four times to inquire as to the defendant’s whereabouts, for the purpose of conducting a welfare check. The ESO team drove the streets in search for the defendant but were unable to locate him. (In discussions during the hearing, it was clarified that the defendant’s absence from his residence during the day was not of itself in breach of any condition).
On 13 May 2025, an unannounced home visit was conducted at Nunyara Community Offender Support Program (the COSP), where the defendant was residing. It was observed that the defendant’s hand was shaking and he struggled to put his shoes on. He advised the DSO that he had missed his methadone dose at the clinic and the DSO made arrangements to drive him there. During the drive, the defendant advised the DSO that he had used cannabis whilst in custody but denied using any other substances.
On 14 May 2025, the defendant admitted to COSP staff to being intoxicated. The following morning, a DSO attended the COSP to conduct a room search. The defendant was not present when the DSO arrived. The Electronic Monitoring unit indicated that the defendant was in Surry Hills and had attended a block of units with a bar located nearby in the last 48 hours. A DSO attended Surry Hills but could not locate the defendant.
On 16 May 2025, two DSOs conducted an unannounced home visit. The defendant’s hands were observed to be shaking. The defendant repeatedly asked the name of one of the DSOs but kept forgetting. He was observed to be dazed and confused during the visit.
On 19 May 2025, the defendant failed to attend his scheduled appointment with a Corrective Services NSW (CSNSW) psychologist.
On 21 May 2025, the defendant’s DSO made multiple attempts to contact the defendant by calling his mobile phone, which was switched off. A DSO called the defendant and noted earlier concerns about his presentation and returning to the COSP intoxicated. In response, he stated, “I don’t drink, I don’t like alcohol”. The DSO expressed concern about the defendant’s apparent confusion and the defendant stated, “I’m a bit scared, I don’t remember things.” The DSO then encouraged him to attend the doctor for a health and mental health assessment. He was informed that he was being regressed to Stage 2 monitoring (which includes electronic monitoring with scheduling and a curfew).
On 25 May 2025, the defendant admitted to his DSO that he had used “ice” when he had been taken back into custody.
On 26 May 2025, the defendant apologised to his CSNSW psychologist for missing their previous session, explaining that he was “off with the fairies” and was having memory issues. He admitted to using “half a bottle of pills” that he found in his clothing.
On 2 June 2025, the defendant advised his CSNSW psychologist that upon his release from custody, he had taken a large quantity of prescription medication which he found in his property and had become confused, causing him to miss his appointment on 19 May 2025.
Whilst subject to the ESO, the defendant has engaged in weekly sessions with SMART recovery and in scheduled sessions with a CSNSW psychologist.
The plaintiff submits that the defendant remains socially isolated with limited friend support, no familial support, and is significantly reliant on CSNSW and professional supports within the community. The defendant has not engaged in employment due, at least in part, to the financial security he has gained as a result of two inheritances he has received while on the ESO.
The defendant tendered a case note from 24 December 2025. A DSO made a home visit during which the defendant was notified that he was progressing to Stage 4 and would no longer require Electronic Monitoring. The defendant responded positively to the fact that this reflected he had made some progress and made mention of the fact that the removal of the ankle bracelet would allow him to dress as he wished.
Dr Richard Parker, Senior Psychologist, prepared a Risk Assessment Report pursuant to s 6(3)(b) of the Act, dated 29 May 2025.
In that report, Dr Parker identified the following criminogenic needs as being the most relevant to the defendant:
Emotion control/mental disorder: the defendant was assessed as being troubled by fluctuating emotions, which is encapsulated in the diagnosis of a Personality Disorder, particularly with borderline features.
Shame: using the ‘Compass of Shame’, Dr Parker explored the defendant’s use of the following four strategies to avoid feelings of shame: withdrawal, avoidance, attack self, and attack other. According to Dr Parker, as a result of using these strategies, the defendant had not developed the required level of social skills needed to maintain intimate relationships, resulting in further social isolation and greater fear of intimacy.
Relationships: the defendant’s index offences both involved dysfunctional intimate relationships. He has not engaged in any intimate relationships since his release on the ESO. He has been largely socially isolated, which Dr Parker opined as a probable side effect of chronic shame.
Substance abuse: Dr Parker noted that the defendant is yet to resolve this issue and is still prone to relapses despite having made some progress. Due to the rigour of the ESO, these relapses have been detected and acted against through breach actions. It is unknown whether the defendant would be able to curtail a relapse if he were not under supervision.
The Risk Management Report (RMR) prepared by Sheree Bernal, Community Corrections Officer on 13 August 2025 indicates that the following risk factors are relevant to the defendant: substance abuse, stability of relationships with significant others, emotional control, sexuality issues and mental health instability, violence cycle and cognitive distortions, work ethic, impulsivity, and lack of goals.
The RMR sets out the following supervision plan in the event an ESO is made:
Monitoring and weekly schedules, including regular movement audits and requiring adherence to any schedule of movements that may be imposed;
Electronic monitoring and the ability to flexibly apply and remove such conditions in accordance with the defendant’s presenting risks, which was considered imperative for the effective case management of the defendant;
Place and travel restrictions, to avoid places where there is a risk of reoffending;
Accommodation conditions and a curfew condition to address the defendant’s risk of late-night offending;
Non-association requirements and disclosure of intimate and non-intimate relationships;
Employment and finance supervision, to allow detection of patterns which might be indicative of problematic behaviours, such as purchasing illicit or non-prescribed substances;
Restrictions on access to the internet and other electronic communication, along with search and seizure of electronic devices;
Drug and alcohol testing conditions and requirements related to medical intervention and treatment;
Restrictions upon the defendant’s access to weapons.
On 11 March 2026, Dr Gordon Elliott, a general and forensic psychiatrist, assessed the defendant for the purpose of preparing a psychiatric report for the Court. The assessment was conducted online and the defendant attended from home. On 16 March 2026, Dr Elliott provided his report.
Dr Elliott considered that the defendant met the diagnostic criteria for a mixed Cluster B Personality Disorder and for multiple Substance Use Disorders.
Dr Elliott noted the defendant has a number of personality features of a borderline nature. These features include unstable and intense relationships, identity disturbance, an unstable sense of self, impulsivity, and emotional instability. In relation to the defendant’s Substance Use Disorders, Dr Elliott noted that the defendant remained opiate dependent on a methadone maintenance program and remained cannabis dependent to treat anxiety symptoms.
Dr Elliott considered and commented upon each of the conditions proposed in the original summons.
Dr Elliott did not support the continuation of a number of conditions:
Conditions 6-8 (Schedule of movements), opining that the defendant “appears to have progressed beyond the necessity of this condition”;
Condition 11 (Curfew), provided that Condition 12 (unannounced visits by a DSO) was imposed;
Condition 19 (Development of a case management plan), as he was unconvinced this would be useful and was concerned it may be counterproductive by increasing the defendant’s levels of stress;
Condition 25 (Attendance to drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs), as he considered “approaches mandating drug and alcohol treatment are rarely successful”;
Condition 31(a) (Weapons prohibition) as “[f]irearms have not been part of [the defendant’s] offending history…”;
Condition 47 (Assessment for a Mental Health Care Plan), as Dr Elliott considered this did not appear relevant given that he did not consider the defendant to have a major mental illness.
Dr Elliott considered Conditions 22, 23 and 24 (Alcohol and drugs) to be essential, noting “[s]ubstance use is a key risk factor for [the defendant’s] path to serious violent re-offending”.
Dr Elliott also supported the imposition of Condition 28 (Non-association), considering it “the most important of these conditions”, particularly given the index offences occurred in the context of “volatile intimate relationships”. He noted that this condition, alongside the mandated abstinence from illicit substances, are “the two key components of [the defendant’s ESO]”.
Dr Elliott also supported Conditions 33 to 39 relating to access to the internet and other electronic communication, given the defendant’s history of concealing and deleting his search history. He noted, for example, that the defendant’s purchase of anabolic steroids was only discovered through his DSO’s perusal of his devices. Dr Elliott also supported these conditions to allow supervision of the defendant’s access to “such things as dating websites and/or the purchasing of illicit substances”.
Dr Elliott concluded that the defendant’s ESO should be extended by 18 months. Dr Elliott considered this to be “the minimum period for the defendant to demonstrate assured abstinence from substances, stability in his accommodation and an absence of behaviours of concern given the enduring nature of his personality problems” (emphasis added).
Following an assessment of the defendant on 23 March 2026, on 2 April 2026 Dr Seidler, a clinical and forensic psychologist, prepared an expert report. The assessment was conducted remotely by audiovisual link but was terminated by the defendant after 30 minutes.
Noting that the defendant terminated the assessment, Dr Seidler stated she was “unable to offer a comprehensive assessment of [the defendant’s] mental health based on his contributions to the interview”. However, Dr Seidler observed that the defendant had been previously diagnosed with a Personality Disorder and a Substance Abuse Disorder.
Dr Seidler assessed the defendant’s general risk using the Level of Services/Case Management Inventory (LS/CMI) (a risk assessment guide designed to assist professionals to manage and plan treatment with offenders). Dr Seidler noted that the defendant’s score on the LS/CMI suggested he posed a high risk of general recidivism. Dr Seidler stated the primary factors contributing to the defendant’s risk were his criminal history, pro-criminal attitudes/antisocial pattern of behaviour and the absence of his involvement in structured activities in the community.
Dr Seidler also assessed the defendant using the Violence Risk Scale (VRS-2) (used to assess the risk for violence in forensic populations). Using the VRS-2, Dr Seidler opined that the defendant fell within the average risk range. The VRS-2 identified key areas of criminogenic need that remain treatment targets for the defendant, including “substance abuse, problems with affective regulation and emotional coping, interpersonal difficulties and the contributions the aforementioned have made to an identifiable cycle of violence for [the defendant]”. The VRS-2 also raised ongoing concern for the defendant with impulsivity, lack of insight into his risks of violence, antisocial attitudes and personality features and a lack of productive engagement with the community.
Dr Seidler assessed the defendant using the HCR-20 v3 risk assessment tool which suggested that the defendant continued to present with risks associated with violence, namely, the defendant’s minimisation in relation to his risks and problems with affective dysregulation and emotional coping.
Dr Seidler assessed the defendant’s protective factors using the Structured Assessment of Protective Factors for Violence Risk (SAPROF). Overall, the defendant presented with limited protective factors.
Dr Seidler assessed the proposed conditions in the original summons to be generally appropriate. Dr Seidler considered that Conditions 22 to 25 (Alcohol and drugs) were important in the defendant’s case, noting his history of substance abuse which contributed to the index offending and subsequent breach offences.
In relation to Conditions 26 to 30 (Non-association), Dr Seidler considered that managing the risks associated with the defendant entering a relationship were crucial, however, had concerns around the wording of Condition 28 (“If you start an intimate, sexual or romantic relationship with someone, you must notify a DSO within 24 hours of engaging in that relationship”) due to the difficulties defining when a relationship commences. Dr Seidler also held concerns around Condition 29 which would require the defendant to agree to a DSO disclosing his criminal history to a new partner. Dr Seidler noted that a new partner may not be prepared for the disclosure and without appropriate support and education might end the union, which would generate added emotional and social pressure for the defendant that could increase his risk. Dr Seidler considered that greater care needed to be taken in relation to the issue of disclosure, including how and when it occurs and this was not set out in the order.
In relation to Conditions 31 and 32 (Weapons), which restricted access to weapons, Dr Seidler considered these conditions to be important noting the nature of the index offending.
In relation to Conditions 46 to 53 (Medical intervention and treatment), Dr Seidler held concerns in relation to Condition 51 which would allow the defendant’s healthcare practitioners to share his information with his DSO, including information which was not directly relevant to his risk. Similarly, Dr Seidler held concerns about Condition 53, which allowed disclosure of the defendant’s criminal history to any treating healthcare professional, even if that history was not directly relevant to the service being provided.
The plaintiff pointed out that the two court-appointed experts largely agreed with respect to the following:
the defendant poses a continued risk of committing further serious offences if not managed in the community with an ESO;
the defendant’s risk cannot be managed in the community without an ESO;
an 18-month period for an ESO is appropriate;
the defendant does not suffer from any major mental illnesses;
the defendant lacks insight into his offending and risk factors, or at least avoided any real discussion of the same;
the defendant attracts certain critical diagnoses, including a personality and substance use disorder;
the defendant lacks social supports beyond the ESO; and
the type of offence the defendant might be at risk of committing aligns with his previous offending.
The Court’s paramount consideration in determining whether to make an ESO is preserving community safety: s 3(1) of the Act. In this regard, the plaintiff submits that the defendant has a criminal history consisting of the most serious offending. In a relatively short period of time, the defendant murdered two of his intimate partners whilst in domestic relationships and mutilated their bodies. The defendant has shown limited insight into his offending, his criminogenic needs, and his risk factors for further offending.
Section 9(3) sets out a non-exhaustive list of mandatory considerations when determining whether to make an ESO.
“Personality pathology is by its nature enduring and entrenched and the more severe the pathology, particularly with regards to psychopathy, the less likelihood of appreciable improvement. ln Mr Peters’ case, many of the features referred to in P-CLR assessments conducted in 2013, including shallowness, conceitedness, glibness, unreliability and a tendency to apportion all blame to others, were still much in evidence on this assessment.”
In his recent report, Dr Elliott observed the defendant to be subtly but effectively evasive, providing generalised answers with a view to avoiding any exploration of his answers. Dr Elliott noted that the defendant particularly provided inconsistent and implausible answers in respect to his drug and alcohol history when compared to his documented history.
Dr Elliott ultimately concluded that the defendant does pose a continued risk of committing a further serious violent offence and this risk could not be managed without an ESO. He opined as follows:
“Overall, I consider his level of risk to be moderate. My specific concern regarding Mr Peters is that, were he to re-offend violently, then his index offences are pointers towards that violent re-offending being extremely grave in nature. Also specific to him are the persisting features of his Personality Disorder despite treatment. He continues to display a poor sense of identity or sense of self. He constantly contradicts himself as one indicator of that identity disturbance. He remains evasive regarding his substance use and continues to seek medicinal cannabis.”
As already mentioned, the defendant also scored highly on the HCR-20 v3. Specifically in relation to this tool, Dr Elliott opined that the defendant would be considered a moderate to moderate to high risk of violent recidivism. Finally, Dr Elliott observed that given the defendant’s entrenched personality features, the defendant was yet to reach a point where his age would be considered a protective factor.
Dr Elliott describes the risk if the ESO should not be granted:
“…should his ESO be allowed to lapse, he will have no personal supports beyond his current pet. He will remain vulnerable to the effects of stress and he displays little in the way of adaptive coping strategies. His living situation is an isolated one and he reports that he is keen to move from his current tenancy at the end of his twelve month lease, meaning he will be exposed to further stress. Once again, his seeking of a medicinal cannabis prescription suggests that he may encounter problems with treatment. Finally, in terms of professional services and plans, the last of the items to be dealt with on the risk management scale, should Mr Peters’ ESO lapse, then he will have no targeted intervention addressing his specific risk factors beyond his GP and potentially voluntary engagement with a psychologist.”
Dr Seidler made similar observations to those of Dr Elliott in respect of the defendant’s evasiveness around his breach offences (which involved the use of drugs), noting that the defendant became argumentative and shut down.
Dr Seidler also noted that the chronic nature of the defendant’s personality disorder, and it being amenable to treatment but difficult to change.
Dr Seidler concluded as follows:
“[108] In my view, and consistent with the accounts of others who have assessed Mr. Peters previously, the primary risks in this case pertain to Mr. Peters’ personality structure, which includes the tendency to impulsivity, affective dysregulation and interpersonal difficulties, in addition to his substance abuse. These risks are chronic and clearly continue to impact on Mr. Peters’ functioning, including contributing to his ESO breaches, as recently as 2025, as well as his difficulties engaging in the assessment process with me.
…
[110] The information available to me suggests that risks remain for Mr. Peters and are not yet well mitigated in a sustained manner by protective factors. To this end, although risk is not considered imminent, under particular situations, it is argued that Mr. Peters remains vulnerable to an escalation in risk that under particular conditions may increase to the extent that an act of serious violence, as defined by the Act, is possible, especially given the history of his offending. That is, Mr. Peters’ risk is argued to be most acute in the context of interpersonal conflict within a close relationship, with which he copes poorly, experiences a decompensation in his mental health and likely turns to alcohol in order to cope. I agree with others that have suggested there are likely to be warning signs or leakage behaviours that Mr. Peters’ risk is increasing that would be observable to treating clinicians and/or supervising authorities. This would include a deterioration in mental health, increasing irresponsibility, expressions of victimhood, greater affective dysregulation and a return to substance abuse.”
The defendant has a lengthy history of substance abuse. It appears also that the use (and misuse) of prescription medication is an entrenched feature of the defendant’s life.
During the defendant’s first ESO, there was drug use and drug seeking behaviour.
The defendant presently attends the local pharmacy 2 days a week to pick up his methadone prescription. He has an extensive list of prescribed medications.
Dr Elliott noted that the defendant was an evasive historian but with regards to his substance use history, he was more obviously unreliable. The defendant did not participate in any high intensity therapeutic programs in prison but has completed others. He is attending the SMART program and scheduled sessions with a psychologist.
The defendant was released to parole on three occasions for his index offending, each time returning to custody because of breaches. The defendant breached his ESO on two occasions, both including the use of drugs.
Based on his history over the course of the ESO, his working relationship with his ESO team, and his compliance with the ISO, it is likely that the defendant will at least attempt to comply with the obligations of an ESO.
To reiterate, the paramount consideration in deciding whether to make an ESO is the preservation of community safety: s 3(1) of the Act. The defendant has a criminal history consisting of the most serious offending. In a relatively short period of time, the defendant murdered two of his intimate partners with whom he was in a domestic relationship and dealt with their bodies in a disturbing way.
Three years ago, the Court appointed experts pursuant to s 7(4) of the Act who each concluded that the defendant posed a risk of committing a further serious violence offence. Both experts who provided reports for the present proceedings agree that without further interventions, the defendant is at risk of committing another serious violence offence of a similar kind to those he committed previously.
The evidence establishes that the defendant continues to display entrenched antisocial personality features. He continues to lack insight into the circumstances that led to his offending, his own risk factors, and his behavioural patterns and their consequences, which supports the need for treatment and supervision. The monitoring of the defendant on his first ESO exposed continued difficulties with substance abuse.
The defendant has remained offence-free since May 2025; however, much of the success he has had in the community may be attributable to his recent financial security, his ability to afford prescription drugs, stable accommodation, his supervision and reliance on his ESO support staff. Considering the defendant’s need for repeated interventions to address his criminogenic needs, community safety considerations weigh in favour of the making of an order. As has consistently been found by the experts who have provided opinions to the Court, the defendant continues to pose a risk of committing offences in the context of drug relapse and problematic relationships.
For the reasons above, the Court is satisfied that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk pursuant to ss 5B and 9 of the Act of committing another serious offence, namely a serious violence offence defined in s 5A of the Act, if not kept under supervision under the order.
As observed above, the defendant did not seek to be heard on any of the proposed conditions. Despite this, there was some discussion during the hearing about particular conditions. The conditions are made to address the particular supervision needs of the defendant, following consideration of the findings and opinions of Dr Elliott and Dr Seidler.
Conditions 1 to 5 (Monitoring and Reporting) are necessary in order to address the nature of the defendant's offending and to provide a mechanism for ongoing supervision within the community.
Condition 5 (Electronic Monitoring): the plaintiff sought a continuation of the defendant’s first ESO Electronic Monitoring condition, on the basis that it is necessary given the defendant’s history of “becoming uncontactable, missing appointments, or presenting concerning behaviour”. This was a reference principally to the defendant’s conduct in May 2025 when he was first released from custody. He is not presently subject to Electronic Monitoring and responded positively to this (see [44] above). Given the secondary purpose of rehabilitation (see s 3(2) of the Act), a variation of this condition was discussed during the hearing. The condition is phrased so that it is clear that Electronic Monitoring will not automatically be reinstated upon commencement of this ESO, but only should the defendant’s DSOs consider it necessary.
Conditions 6 to 8 (Schedule of movements) were sought in the same terms as the defendant’s first ESO. This condition applies depending upon the defendant’s progress on the ESO and the condition permits that flexibility. Conditions related to closely monitoring the defendant’s movements are directed towards the risk presented by his largely untreated substance misuse issues and/or a deterioration in his mental health.
Conditions 9 to 15 (Accommodation) are aimed at managing the defendant’s stability and limiting his opportunity to enter personal relationships unnoticed.
Conditions 16 and 17 (Travel Restrictions) prevent the defendant from leaving the jurisdiction. These are relevant where the defendant now has the financial means to leave the jurisdiction. Condition 18 (Place Restrictions) allows a DSO to monitor and manage where the defendant goes and what activity he might engage in. Both Dr Elliott and Dr Seidler support these conditions.
Condition 19 (Participation in programs re Employment, Finance and Education) seeks to encourage the defendant to pursue prosocial activities in the community. Dr Elliott does not support Condition 19, questioning the benefits of, in effect, forced participation. In response to Dr Elliot’s concerns, the plaintiff submitted that it is within the discretion of a DSO to recommend appropriate programs for the defendant and it is expected that some level of individualisation would be afforded in implementing this condition. If able to be achieved, participation in education and training is capable of advancing the rehabilitative purpose of an ESO.
Condition 20 (Employment), as presently proposed, offers more flexibility than the defendant’s previous ESO, requiring him to notify a DSO of starting employment, as opposed to requiring prior approval. Condition 21 (Finances) allows DSOs to monitor the defendant’s level of spending on prescription drugs and illicit drugs, which has been an issue in the past.
Conditions 22 to 25 (Alcohol and drugs) are necessary, given the defendant’s Substance Use Disorders, and his history of abusing prescription medication. These conditions seek to mitigate the increased risk he poses from destabilisation.
Conditions 26 to 30 (Non-association) are necessary to address any concerning associations and monitor the defendant entering a relationship. Dr Elliott supports these conditions. The plaintiff submitted that these conditions are important for the safety of others given the context of the defendant’s previous offending, and can be safely implemented through proper planning by the defendant’s ESO team to address Dr Seidler’s concern. I have accepted that submission.
Conditions 31 to 32 (Weapons) effectively seek to continue conditions to which the defendant was previously subject. The plaintiff removed part of Condition 31 in their amended summons. Condition 32 reformulates three conditions of the defendant’s previous ESO, which prevent him from possessing certain weapons (knives) but allow him to have knives at home. I accept the plaintiff’s submission that these are important conditions for the defendant, given his use of a knife in his offending.
Conditions 33 to 39 (Access to the internet and other electronic communication) allow a DSO to monitor the defendant’s use of internet and telephone services. Access to the internet, social media, and encrypted applications provide opportunities to access illicit drugs and to form relationships, which could lead to destabilisation and increase risk.
Conditions 40 to 41 (Search and seizure) effectively seek to continue conditions to which the defendant was presently subject, with some revision for increased flexibility. They are a logical extension of other conditions, permitting the DSOs to investigate or enforce a breach.
Conditions 46 to 53 (Medical intervention and treatment) are necessary to manage the defendant’s mental health, given that his heath is a significant factor in his risk of re-offending. The plaintiff has amended Condition 51 in accordance with Dr Seidler’s views by limiting the defendant’s disclosure obligations to sharing information relevant to his risk of serious violent offending or his supervision.
The Court makes the following orders:
Pursuant to ss 5B and 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), the defendant is to be subject to an extended supervision order for a period of 18 months, commencing on 15 May 2026 and expiring on 14 November 2027.
Pursuant to s 11 of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), the defendant is to comply with the conditions set out in the schedule annexed to this judgment for the period of the extended supervision order.
Access to the Court’s file in respect of any document is not to be granted to a non-party without leave of a Judge of the Court and, if any application for access is made by a non-party in respect of any document, that the parties be notified by the Registrar so as to allow them an opportunity to be heard in relation to the application for access.
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The amendments to the original summons filed 10 November 2025 were limited to parts of the Schedule of conditions sought.
R v Peters [2002] NSWSC 1234 at [70] (Wood CJ at CL).
State of New South Wales
Peters (Final) (No 2)