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Category: Principal judgment

Parties: State of New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Bradley Moore (Defendant)

Representation: Counsel:
Ms N Evans (Plaintiff)
Ms C Goodhand (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor for New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Legal Aid New South Wales (Defendant)

File Number(s): 2025/00486219

Publication restriction: Not applicable.

JUDGMENT

1. HIS HONOUR: The plaintiff has applied for an extended supervision order (“ESO”) pursuant to the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (“the Act”) for a period of three years.

2. The application is made on the basis that the defendant is a high-risk sex offender who should be kept under supervision to ensure the safety and protection of the community.

3. A preliminary hearing took place before me on 22 May 2026. Following that hearing, I made an order pursuant to s 7(4) of the Act appointing two doctors to conduct separate psychiatric and/or psychological examinations of the defendant.

4. Two reports were furnished to the Court, in accordance with those orders, on 8 July 2026. They were prepared by psychiatrists Dr Natalie Puchalski and Dr Calum Smith.

5. It is worthwhile to note that this Court’s jurisdiction is enlivened by the index offence that was committed by the defendant in 2015. The index offence concerned the defendant’s use of a carriage service to procure a person under 16 years for sexual activity in contravention of s 474.26 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth).

6. The defendant opposes the making of an ESO. It will become apparent that all statutory preconditions to the making of an ESO are conceded, except for the “unacceptable risk” test under s 5B(d) of the Act. This question of “unacceptable risk” is the primary issue raised by this application.

7. In short, I have reached the requisite state of satisfaction with respect to all of the necessary preconditions to the making of an ESO, including the test under s 5B(d) of the Act. These are ultimately my reasons.

Background and criminal history

8. It is sufficient to refer to the background already set out in State of New South Wales v Moore (Preliminary) [2026] NSWSC 578, as follows:

[5] The defendant, a 65-year-old man, reported an “uneventful” childhood in Valentine, New South Wales, with his parents and younger sister. He was appointed school captain when he was in Year 6, but that resulted in him spending time alone with the school headmaster who, as it transpired, was a ‘serial abuser of children’. The defendant developed a very low sense of self-esteem and a chronic state of shame arising from those experiences.

[6] The defendant completed high school and chose to enter the workforce instead of university. But, since then, the defendant has suffered various setbacks and complications throughout his life.

[7] In 1988, the defendant was assessed as being affected by Borderline Personality Disorder. In the early 1990s, his business failed and he filed for bankruptcy. In 2004, he was injured in a home invasion and was unable to work for a number of years. In 2007, he started his own dog-sitting business which then ended after his own dog died.

[8] The defendant’s criminal history is limited but it is nevertheless serious. It will become apparent that, while his criminal history is not overly lengthy, he quite clearly found it particularly challenging to comply with the ESO that was imposed in 2020 for a period of 3 years.

[9] His first set of offences came about in 1988 when he was convicted of 3 counts of indecent assault, each committed against a child, while he was in a position of authority. For these offences, he was placed on a recognisance and ordered to perform community service.

[10] The next set of relevant offences, which occurred in 2015, concern offences against s 474.26 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) and s 91H of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (the former being the index offence).

[11] For the use carriage service offence (s 474.26 of the Criminal Code Act), the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 4 years with a non-parole period of 2 years and 6 months. Then, for the [possession] offence (s 91H of the Crimes Act), he was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 2 years without a non-parole period. In the sentencing proceedings, Syme DCJ made the following more pertinent remarks:

‘I do note that the offender, by his statement to his psychiatrist and to the Probation and Parole author, he shows little insight into the consequences of his offending. He shows, I find, a callous disregard to the victims of the child abuse material and no insight into the probable consequences for a child who he thought he was procuring for penetrative sexual activity. He apparently has little insight into the personal consequences for children often being forced, or convinced to participate in the activities depicted in the child abuse material or for the consequences for young people who are convinced by online activity to make themselves available for sexual activity’.

[12] The defendant sought to appeal his sentences, but the Court of Criminal Appeal ultimately refused leave. Beazley P (as her Honour then was) summarised the defendant’s offending at [7]-[11] in Moore v R [2018] NSWCCA 26 (Garling J and Hidden AJ agreeing):

‘The s 474.26(1) offence

7. In March 2015, the police identified the applicant, then 54 years old, as being involved in communicating with and befriending young males online. The police commenced a covert investigation using the fictitious identity of a 14 year old male. After the fictitious identity ‘friended’ the applicant on Facebook, the applicant and the fictitious identity engaged in sexually explicit communications over various forms of media for approximately 10 weeks.

8. During the course of these communications, the applicant described anticipated sexual acts, such as fellatio, anal intercourse and ejaculation, in explicit detail. On one occasion, he sent an image of a naked pubescent male to the fictitious identity. The applicant also activated his web cam during Skype communications and masturbated while the fictitious identity was online. The applicant urged the need for secrecy and caution. This was relevant as the fictitious identity was 14 years of age.

9. On or about 8 May 2015, the applicant sent the fictitious identity a prepaid mobile phone. The phone was later used to organise a meeting at Caves Beach on 22 May 2015. The applicant was arrested at the planned meeting place.

The s 91H(2) offence

10. On 22 May 2015, a search warrant was executed at the applicant’s home. The police located child abuse material on the applicant’s computer and an external hard disk drive.

11. The devices were analysed using forensic software, which randomly samples the files and estimates the number of offending files with an acceptable margin of error. The software calculated that the applicant’s computer contained between 284 and 714 images and 31 videos containing child abuse material, and the external hard disk drive contained between 1,238 and 2,776 images and between 28 and 52 videos containing such material. The images and videos identified were then classified according to the Child Exploitation Tracking System scale as falling within categories 1 to 4. The material thus ranged from material that depicted children with no sexual activity, although being sexually suggestive or sexual in nature (category 1), to penetrative sexual activity involving a child or children or both a child or children and adults (category 4).’

[13] In November 2020, this Court (Wilson J) made an ESO against the defendant for a period of 3 years: see State of New South Wales v Moore (Final) [2020] NSWSC 1695. Since then, he has been convicted of 13 offences on 6 separate occasions, almost exclusively pertaining to breaches of the ESO. The ESO expired much later than it was planned to because, each time the defendant entered custody, the ESO’s operation was suspended. It eventually expired on 17 January 2026 and, from that point onwards, the defendant has been solely subject to conditions of parole, which is set to expire on 21 August 2026.

[14] I will briefly set out the circumstances of the defendant’s breaches of this previous ESO.

[15] First, condition 27 of the ESO required the defendant not to approach or have contact with anyone he knew to be under 18 without the consent of his Departmental Supervising Officer (‘DSO’). In November 2021, the defendant spoke to a 17-year-old male who worked at Coles. He later returned to the same Coles and provided the young man with an envelope which included a note reading:

‘You asked if you could help me a couple of weeks ago… Maybe? I need a friend!!! [mobile number] BRAD.’

[16] The young man told his parents, and the matter was reported to police. On 30 November 2021, the defendant was charged with failing to comply with his ESO contrary to s 12 of the Act. He admitted to the incident and said he did it because he did not often have outings and was lonely. For this offence (and for the offence at paragraph [18] below), the defendant was convicted and sentenced on 23 January 2023 to a term of imprisonment for 12 months, with a non-parole period of 6 months, concluding on 16 March 2023.

[17] Secondly, between April and May 2022, when the defendant was on conditional bail for the first breach, he used his mother’s mobile phone in breach of condition 33 of the ESO. He used the device to send emails and had taken photos of himself naked. On 24 May 2022, he was charged with 3 counts of failing to comply with the ESO contrary to s 12 of the Act. He was sentenced to eight months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of four months.

[18] Thirdly, on 8 December 2022, when the defendant was on conditional bail for the breaches referred to immediately above, he set up a new bank account in contravention of his ESO. It subsequently became apparent that the defendant had done so with the intention of assisting his then-partner who was in custody. On 23 January 2023, he was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 6 months for this offence (together with the sentence relating to the offence set out above at paragraphs [15]-[16]).

[19] Fourthly, on 12 June 2022, when the defendant was on [parole], a search of his mobile phone revealed he had set up an Etsy account in the name of ‘Brad the lad’. He used Etsy to initiate conversations with other men and, according to the facts, a large portion of the conversations were of a personal nature and were centred around the defendant’s sexuality and his parents’ illnesses. On 14 June 2023, when police attended his address, he asked the police to enter through the side of the house, where he was found in the backyard with two large kitchen knives concealed under his dressing gown. He said, ‘don’t come near me, I’m not going back to jail. You are going to have to shoot me’. On 14 June 2023, he was charged with failing to comply with his ESO and for carrying a cutting weapon under apprehension contrary to s 547D of the Crimes Act. For the first offence, he received a community correction order (‘CCO’) for 2 years, while for the second offence he received a CCO for 12 months.

[20] Fifthly, between August and September 2023, when the defendant was subject to the CCOs for the previous offences, he wrote a lengthy handwritten letter to a person in custody at South Coast Correctional Centre, despite being issued a formal direction not to have contact with any incarcerated inmates. On 28 September 2023, he was charged with failing to comply with his ESO and, then on 11 October 2023, he was sentenced to 6 months imprisonment to be served by way of an intensive correction order (‘ICO’). In delivering the sentence, Magistrate Olischlager (as his Honour then was) noted in respect of this offending:

‘As far as the objective seriousness, it is the failure to comply with the direction not to communicate with inmates and in terms of that it is no dispute that you well knew that there was that direction not to communicate by way of letter. I do accept that the nature of that communication is nothing inappropriate in terms of the content, particularly in light of the nature of these types of orders, but clearly, of course, you well knew that you should not have been communicating. I do accept that it is still in the lower end of objective seriousness range for this type of offence’.

[21] Sixthly, between January and March 2024, when the defendant was subject to the ICO, he joined multiple social media sites directed to sex, dating or chats. On 22 May 2024, he was charged with 5 counts of failing to comply with his ESO. On 17 December 2024, he was convicted and sentenced (after a successful appeal to reduce his sentence) to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 2 years and 3 months, concluding on 21 August 2026, with a non-parole period of 15 months, concluding on 21 August 2025.

The statutory framework

9. It is also sufficient, for present purposes, to refer to relevant parts of the statutory framework already summarised in State of New South Wales v Moore (Preliminary) [2026] NSWSC 578.

10. However, before doing so, it is necessary to emphasise the following two objects of the Act:

3 Objects of Act

(1) The primary object of this Act is to provide for the extended supervision and continuing detention of high-risk sex offenders and high-risk violent offenders so as to ensure the safety and protection of the community.

(2) Another object of this Act is to encourage high risk sex offenders and high risk violent offenders to undertake rehabilitation.

(Emphasis added.)

11. These are protective, not punitive, objects. [1]

12. Now returning to the other applicable parts of the statutory framework:

[23] Section 5B of the Act provides for the relevant threshold requirements before the Court may make an ESO. It is worthwhile identifying the whole of that provision, as below:

5B Making of extended supervision orders—unacceptable risk

The Supreme Court may make an order for the supervision in the community of a person (an extended supervision order) if—

(a) the person is an offender who is serving (or who has served) a sentence of imprisonment for a serious offence either in custody or under supervision in the community, and

(b) the person is a supervised offender (within the meaning of section 5I), and

(c) an application for the order is made in accordance with section 5I, and

(d) the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order.

[24] It is necessary, in determining this application, to consider the meaning of ‘unacceptable risk’. Its meaning is very central to the resolution of this application [which remains the case for the purpose of this final hearing].

[25] Though not defined by the Act, s 5D expands upon the concept of ‘unacceptable risk’ insofar as it provides:

… the Supreme Court is not required to determine that the risk of an offender committing a serious offence is more likely than not in order to determine there is an unacceptable risk of the person committing such an offence.

[26] The authorities have provided extensive guidance on its meaning, with Chen J more recently summarising the concept in State of New South Wales v O’Hara (Final) [2024] NSWSC 225 at [34], as follows:

‘Unacceptable risk

…

[34] The concept of an ‘unacceptable risk’ has, unsurprisingly, been the subject of considerable judicial consideration, which establishes the following:

(1) The phrase is to be given its everyday meaning within its context, having regard to the objects of the Act: Lynn at [55]–[58].

(2) What the Court must find to be unacceptable is the risk that the offender poses of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision; that is, an assessment of the likelihood in the absence of any supervision: Lynn at [51] and [55]; State of New South Wales v Donovan [2015] NSWCA 280 at [24]. That finding provides the basis for imposing control on the offender: Lynn at [127].

(3) The interests of the offender in liberty and privacy are not relevant to the assessment of whether there is an ‘unacceptable risk’, but can be taken into account when considering whether to make, under s 9 of the Act, an ESO or to dismiss the application: Lynn at [44], [143] and [148]–[149].

(4) Unacceptability of risk ‘involves considerations of both likelihood of the risk eventuating, and the gravity of the risk that may eventuate’: *State of New South Wales v Simcock (*Final) [2016] NSWSC 1805 at [71]; State of New South Wales v Chaplin [2019] NSWSC 471 at [15]. The nature of the risk ‘posed ha[s] to be assessed by reference to past conduct, the seriousness of the possible future conduct and the period over which the risk may come to fruition’: Lynn at [126].

(5) An offender may pose an unacceptable risk, even where the likelihood of committing another serious offence is low, if the likely consequences of such an offence are very grave: *State of New South Wales v Kamm (Final) [*2016] NSWSC 1 at [41] and [43]; [State of New South Wales v Golding (Preliminary) [2018] NSWSC 1041] at [16]; State of New South Wales v Devaney (Final) [2022] NSWSC 60 at [73].’

[27] In determining the threshold test under s 5B(d), regard must be had to s 9 of the Act, which provides that the Supreme Court may determine an application for an ESO by either making the order or dismissing the application for one [by reference to various mandatory considerations outlined in ss 9(2)-(4)]…”.

Mandatory considerations in s 9(3)

13. The paramount consideration when determining whether or not to make an ESO is the safety of the community (s 9(2)). It is also mandatory to consider the matters prescribed by s 9(3), in addition to any other matters the Court considers to be of relevance.

14. The material relevant to the matters prescribed by 9(3) can mostly be found within Exhibit JM-1 to the affidavit of Jessica Leigh Murty dated 10 December 2025. Given this material formed part of the evidence before me at the preliminary hearing, it is again convenient to adopt summaries, where relevant, from within State of New South Wales v Moore (Preliminary) [2026] NSWSC 578.

The expert reports; and results of any statistical testing or other assessments: ss 9(3)(c)

15. Senior psychologist, Dr Richard Parker, previously assessed the defendant and prepared two risk assessment reports dated 18 April 2004 and 25 September 2025. His first report pertinently provides (at [106]):

“As Mr Moore aged, it would have been increasingly difficult for him to access prepubescent or pubescent children due to being a single male who was not involved in professional or leisure activities that provided access to children. This may be a reason why he acquainted himself with teenagers and young adult males. Some individuals from this age group may likely still retain youthful physical characteristics that resemble those of a pubescent male and are less likely to be subjected to adult supervision compared to younger individuals. It is noted that since his sexual offence charges in 1998, Mr Moore did not receive any further charges for sexual offences until his index convictions. This appears to be more reflective of psychological and physical issues that he experienced following an assault in 2004 and restricted access to the target age group after he returned to reside with his parents, rather than a reflection of active self-management. As evident from index offences, when Mr Moore’s mood improved or became elevated and he discovered a new avenue that allowed him to access the target age group, he resumed his offending behaviour by offering some form of support to build trust with the victim in aim to pursue the victim for sex”.

16. He also provided (at [110]-[111] of his report):

“[110] Based on Mr Moore’s history of offending and his stated sexual preferences, he may continue to choose young sexual partners. If he were to seek out young adult males for company or relationships, his risk of accessing adolescent males may increase by associating with their peers. His potential victims may be pubescent or vulnerable young males. He may likely offer material support to potential victims to establish trust with them and to justify seeking sex from them as a part of a transactional relationship.

[111] Alternatively, Mr Moore may also use online activities to meet his sexual needs, particularly if he is unsuccessful or perceives that he would be unsuccessful in meeting a sexual partner of his preference in person. Given he appears to continue to endorse inappropriate sexual interest of pubescent males, he may be more likely to view sexualised images of people who match these physical characteristics. This may in turn increase his risk of seeking child abuse material”.

17. As I observed in State of New South Wales v Moore (Preliminary) [2026] NSWSC 578 (at [37]):

“ … Dr Parker appeared to refine his opinion in a supplementary report dated 25 September 2025. It is important to set those paragraphs out in full, as below:

‘[27] Based on Mr Moore’s history of offending and his stated sexual preferences, he is likely to continue to choose young sexual partners. If he were to seek out young adult males for company or relationships, his risk of accessing adolescent males may increase by associating with their peers. Alternatively, his failure at such exploits may lead him towards younger targets. His potential victims may be pubescent or vulnerable young males. He may likely offer material support to potential victims to establish trust with them and to justify seeking sex from them as a part of a transactional relationship.

[28] Alternatively, Mr Moore may also use online activities to meet his sexual needs, particularly if he is unsuccessful or perceived that he would be unsuccessful in meeting a sexual partner of his preference in person. Given he appears to continue to endorse inappropriate sexual interest of pubescent males, he may be more likely to view sexualised images of people who match these physical characteristics. This may in turn increase his risk of seeking child abuse material. However, I note this would not constitute a serious offence under the Act, although it could potentially be a pathway to a hands-on offence against a child.”

(Emphasis added.)

18. In considering other assessments and reports, it is also convenient to draw upon my summaries within [46]-[52] of State of New South Wales v Moore (Preliminary) [2026] NSWSC 578, as follows:

“[46] Beyond Dr Parker’s reports, the plaintiff tendered other supporting documentation which I will briefly address as follows.

[47] In 2020, Ms Mandy Lau prepared a risk assessment report dated 12 February 2020, and then a supplementary risk assessment report dated 22 May 2020. On the issue of risk, Ms Lau concluded that:

‘[s]uccessful risk management would involve containment of behaviours associated with risk. The ultimate goal of further intervention and supervision would be to encourage the development and maintenance of a stable and sustainable lifestyle, so that new habits can be formed that might endure beyond supervision, even when Mr Moore is not under any form of legal order. Based on the identified risk areas specific to his offending, continued support and intervention in improving sexual self-regulation, interpersonal skills, particularly in building intimate relationships, effective problem-solving and emotional regulation would be helpful in mediating his risk of further sexual offences. Given Mr Moore may have a very limited parole period remaining after completing treatment, an additional period of supervision would allow him an opportunity for gradual integration into the community with the benefit of professional supports. Having a network of professional supports may be crucial in assisting Mr Moore in managing his risk areas as the personal support network that he has identified appears to lack a thorough understanding of his sexual offending and Mr Moore has yet to develop a high level of insight into his identified risk factors to effectively self-manage his risk.’

[48] Ms Lau, in her supplementary report, opined that the defendant does not meet the criteria for Paedophilic Disorder, but noted that possession of child abuse material is considered a sexually motivated offence and it would therefore be captured as one form of sexual recidivism predicted by the STATIC-99R and the STABLE-2007 risk assessment tools.

[49] Both Dr Anthony Samuels and Dr Richard Furst have previously furnished reports to this Court for the purpose of the earlier ESO application in 2020.

[50] Dr Samuels, a psychiatrist, prepared a report dated 23 September 2020 and, like Ms Lau, opined that the defendant does not meet the criteria for paedophilia. Despite that, Dr Samuels expressed the view that whether or not the defendant technically meets the criteria for paedophilia is “somewhat semantic as there is clear evidence that Mr Moore has had a sexual interest in boys who are at least under the age of 16”. Against that, Dr Samuels ultimately concluded that the defendant poses a risk of committing a further serious sex offence as defined in the Act. He specifically said:

‘Although he has only been charged with one serious sex offence pursuant to s 474.26 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Mr Moore has a history of sexually offending against underage adult males going back to at least 1988. Serious offences involved two young males were dismissed in 1997. At the time of his most recent offence he was on bail for the Commonwealth Offences which highlights a longstanding recalcitrant pattern of offending behaviour. It seems that only recently has he acknowledged a problem of sexual deviance. In addition, even whilst completing the HISOP program in custody he displayed challenging behaviours, had a collection of images of young men in his cell and targeted young male prisoners. In my opinion Mr Moore remains at high risk of continuing this pattern of sexually offending behaviour and of committing a further serious sex offence.’

[51] As to risk, Dr Samuels noted:

‘The main risk factor would appear to be opportunity and the means to offend, including access to the internet and mobile phones or being in localities frequented by vulnerable young males. There is evidence that in the past he has used money or drugs as forms of inducement or to reduce the resistance of young men to engage in sexual activity with him… There are some questions in regard to whether or not Mr Moore has a psychotic disorder and how this impacts on sexual offending but certainly mood instability, impulsivity, increased energy and risk taking behaviours may be associated with sexual offending risk, and non-compliance with prescribed psychotropic medication would be an issue of concern.’

[52] Dr Furst, a forensic psychiatrist, prepared a report dated 12 October 2020 and similarly considered that the defendant poses a risk of committing a further serious sex offence. He observed that:

‘Mr Moore has a significantly higher risk of committing a serious sex offence compared to the average male offender’.”

Any report prepared by Corrective Services NSW as to the extent to which the offender can reasonably and practicably be managed in the community: s 9(3)(d1)

“[53] Tab 6 of Exhibit JM-1 contains a risk management report prepared by Community Corrections Officer, Mr Michael Taylor, dated 21 May 2024. Ultimately, that report concluded:

‘Mr Moore’s response to community supervision has remained generally positive, despite moments of order complacency and poor decision making leading to minor infraction(s) of ESO conditions’.

[54] Also, there is a supplementary report from 29 October 2025. It provides relevantly:

‘… since Mr Moore’s most recent release to the community in August 2025, his overall response appears to have been satisfactory. It is noted that he attended his scheduled appointments with his DSO and engages in an appropriate manner. It is noted that Mr Moore has shown greater insight into his offending history and his overall risk factors. There have been no identified breaches to date’.

[55] Both of the risk management reports contain a proposed supervision plan. It includes, for example, continued engagement with private therapy and with CSNSW psychology services for ongoing risk management sessions.”

Treatment and rehabilitations programs / available courses: ss 9(3)(e) and 9(3)(e1)

“[56] The defendant completed the High Intensity Sex Offender Program (‘HISOP’) in 2020, and subsequently a treatment report was prepared because of that on 19 August 2020. The report described his participated as ‘mixed’ and observed that, ‘Mr Moore was not receptive to feedback and lacked insight into his own behaviour’. Additionally, the report identified that the defendant ‘significantly minimised his own sexual offending history by attempting to explain his current defences as ‘entrapment’’; that he engaged in a ‘range of other unhelpful and inappropriate behaviours’; and that he engaged in behaviour aimed at obtaining a single cell placement or, alternatively, with a cellmate ‘noticeably younger than himself’.

[57] The defendant’s behaviour in the HISOP resulted in various sanctions and external management strategies being adopted, including a request from the psychology team that he not be placed in a cell with anyone under 30 years of age or anyone participating in the custodial program for those with lower cognitive functioning.”

The likelihood that the offender will comply with the obligations of an ESO; and his previous compliance with particular obligations: ss 9(3)(e2), 9(3)(f) and 9(3)(g)

19. As can be gathered from the “background and criminal history” section above, the defendant has previously breached his ESO several times. The final order was made by Wilson J in November 2020, and it was due to expire after three years. However, it ultimately expired on 17 January 2026 as its operation was suspended each time the defendant entered custody. Encouragingly, the defendant has not breached his parole or committed a further criminal offence since the ESO expired earlier this year.

The offender’s criminal history and any pattern of offending disclosed by that history; views of the sentencing court at the time the sentence of imprisonment was imposed: ss 9(3)(h) and 9(3)(h1)

20. These matters are addressed in the “background and criminal history” section above.

Any other information that is available as to the likelihood that the offender will commit a further serious offence: s 9(3)(i)

21. Relevantly, other psychiatric material has been placed before the Court. This includes the psychiatric report of Dr Shannon Paisley dated 7 November 2023 and the psychiatric reports of Lee Knight dated 23 July and 14 December 2024.

22. In considering this material, it is helpful to draw upon the useful summary provided by the parties’ amended joint statement of agreed facts and issues, as follows:

“a. A psychiatric report of Dr Shannon Paisley dated 7 November 2023. Dr Paisley concluded that Mr Moore’s symptoms satisfied the criteria for Persistent Depressive Disorder (p 9) and that his presentation met the criteria for BPD (p 10). She considered that Mr Moore’s attraction to young males may best be described as an Unspecified Paraphilic Disorder because ‘his symptoms and behaviours are characteristic of a paraphilic disorder and have cause[d] clinically significant distress and impairment … He has continued to engage in these behaviours despite the likelihood of significant psychological harm to his victim’ (p 10)[.]

b. A psychiatric report of CNC Lee Knight prepared in relation to the May 2024 breach ESO charges. Mr Knight had been treating Mr Moore since June 2020, and the report notes he also received treatment from Professor Andrew Ellis. CNC Knight noted that before Mr Moore’s arrest, he had ‘noticed that his attitude, behaviour and commitment to the therapeutic process had declined.’

c. A further psychiatric report of CNC Lee Knight dated 14 December 2024. It records diagnoses with Persistent Depressive Disorder, BPD, and Specific Paedophilic Disorder (Hebephilia) (p 4). The report describes Mr Moore’s treatment as ‘varied’ (p 5). It sets out in detail Mr Moore’s engagement with CNC Knight and Professor Ellis.”

Reports of the experts appointed following the preliminary hearing

23. As noted, I made an order pursuant to s 7(4) appointing two experts to conduct separate examinations of the defendant and to furnish reports to the Court. Since then, reports have been furnished by Dr Natalie Puchalski, forensic psychiatrist, dated 8 July 2026 and Dr Calum Smith, forensic psychiatrist, also dated 8 July 2026.

24. As per the parties’ amended joint statement of agreed facts and issues:

“Court-appointed expert report of Dr Natalie Puchalski

…

[44] Dr Puchalski considered Mr Moore met the criteria for unspecified paraphilic disorder ([121]), which is relevant to his risk of committing a further serious sex offence ([143]). Dr Puchalski reported that, while Mr Moore denied current sexual attraction to children and denied current sexual preoccupation, this should be interpreted with caution given his history of offending and the collateral material ([123]). Further, Dr Puchalski opined that Mr Moore appears to have borderline personality disorder, which is clinically relevant in understanding, inter alia, Mr Moore’s emotional dysregulation, interpersonal sensitivity, and impulsive decision-making ([144]).

[45] Using the Static-99R tool, Mr Moore scored 6, placing him in the ‘Well Above Average Risk’ for being charged or convicted of another sexual offence [129]).

[46] Using the STABLE-2007 tool, Mr Moore scored 16, placing him in the high-density range of criminogenic needs ([131]).

[47] Combining the above tools, Mr Moore’s composite assessment placed him in the ‘Well Above Average Risk’ for supervision and intervention ([132]).

[48] During the assessment, Mr Moore reported that, since coming off the ESO in January 2026, he felt ‘more like a normal person’ because his parole conditions are ‘very light compared to an ESO’, allowing him to live life without extensive prior planning ([15]). Mr Moore also told Dr Puchalski that while he carried the stigma of his index offences and breaches, he no longer considered himself a danger to the community ([41]-[42]).

[49] Dr Puchalski opined that Mr Moore poses an ongoing risk of committing a further serious sex offence ([151]) which could not be adequately managed in the community without an order being imposed ([159]).

[50] As to the proposed ESO conditions, Dr Puchalski is of the view they are generally appropriate and that the duration of three years is appropriate ([166]-[167]).

Court-appointed expert report of Dr Calum Smith

…

[52] Dr Smith concurs with the previous Static-99 scoring of 6, placing Mr Moore in the ‘Well Above Average Risk’ category (page 20).

[53] Notably, when canvassing Mr Moore’s risk factors, Dr Smith opined that Mr Moore ‘exhibits extreme minimisation of the nature and impact of his previous offending’ and that he presented as ‘inconsistent, evasive, and dissembling’ (page 21).

[54] Dr Smith opined that Mr Moore is at a high risk of committing a further serious sexual offence (pages 28 and 30). In Dr Smith’s view, Mr Moore’s specific risk appears to be his using the internet to meet his desire driven by his diagnosis of paraphilia, otherwise known as Hebephilia, something which Mr Moore is ‘either in denial about or lies to the interviewer about’ (pages 27 to 28).

[55] Dr Smith considers that Mr Moore should be managed on an ESO for a period of three years, noting that the proposed conditions are generally appropriate. However, Dr Smith considers there should be a timetable for gradually decreasing restrictions to reward adherence (page 31).”

Determination

25. It is my role, in determining this application, to determine whether s 5B(d) of the Act has been met. In other words, am I satisfied, to a high degree of probability, that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order? Indeed, this is the dispositive question that arises within the application. It is otherwise commonplace between the parties, and I have equally found, that all of the other statutory preconditions to the making of an ESO are in this case satisfied.

26. The plaintiff urges the Court to reach the requisite state of satisfaction under s 5B(d). Supporting the plaintiff’s argument is the risk that the defendant would, if not kept supervised under an ESO, commit an online grooming offence, such as that created by s 474.26 of the Criminal Code. This is a position which is consistent with the evidence of both expert witnesses, Dr Puchalski and Dr Smith.

27. On the other hand, the defendant accepts there is indeed some risk, but that it does not reach a level of “unacceptable risk” as required by s 5B(d). Ms Goodhand, on behalf of the defendant, emphasised two important considerations: first, that he has not offended for 12 months while on parole; and secondly, his last “serious sex offence” – the parameters of which being defined by the Act – was committed about a decade ago.

28. Ultimately, I accept the plaintiff’s submissions on the issue. The real, and unacceptable, risk is that the defendant will attempt to groom and solicit an underage male online for real-life sexual activity, such as the conduct he engaged in which gave rise to the index offence more than a decade ago.

29. Various matters need to be acknowledged, though. The defendant has been on parole, continuously, for approximately one year. His non-parole period concluded on 21 August 2025 when he was released to parole and, since that time, he has achieved a great deal, including the following:

30. he has not breached his parole, or his previous ESO which expired in January 2026;

31. he has not committed a further criminal offence;

32. his physical devices have been subjected to a single search pursuant to the somewhat limited powers conferred by the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW) (“CPOR Act”), with no breach arising from it;

33. he has secured stable accommodation at a retirement village which, based on the evidence from the hearing, bears positively upon his risk profile, as illustrated by the following questioning:

“Ms Evans: What about the fact he’s now living in a 50s plus retirement village; do you think that impacts his profile at all?

Dr Puchalski: I noticed that it is stable accommodation and there are, as he has made some age-appropriate social connections with his peers which would be viewed as positive…

…

Dr Smith: I agree that there is certain positive aspects to it, such as age appropriate peers and stable accommodation…”; and

5. he continues to engage with Lee Knight, through which he receives appropriate cognitive and behavioural therapy, as well as, most importantly, anti-libidinal medication.

6. In light of above, it is quite unsurprising that the defendant now claims to have a reduced sex drive, which I accept. However, there is nevertheless evidence that the defendant continues to harbour a sexual interest aimed towards young males.

7. The relatively recent breaches of the ESO which was ordered by Wilson J, are in my opinion particularly instructive. Some of these breaches included surreptitious attempts to subvert the conditions of the order. Relevantly, his conduct suggests he was, at that time, continuing to hold sexual interests towards young males and, quite possibly, males under 16 years of age. Although my latter observation cannot be positively concluded, there is in all of the circumstances, a reasonable suspicion that is pertinent to the question of unacceptable risk.

8. In conclusion, I am satisfied to a high degree of probability, based on all of the evidence, that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order.

Duration

33. The plaintiff submits that the ESO should be made for three years, which is consistent with the position taken by both Dr Puchalski and Dr Smith. Despite this, I am satisfied that an order for two years is instead sufficient.

34. The defendant’s conduct over the past year is a positive sign of progress. He has been out of full-time custody for approximately one year and, while he has remained under quite strict supervision since that time, he has not breached any order or committed a further criminal offence. An ESO for the duration of two years means that by the time the order expires, the defendant will have been kept under supervision for, in reality, three years. As foreshadowed, this in my view is sufficient.

Conditions

35. Section 11 enables the Court to impose such conditions as it considers appropriate. The principles governing this conditioning power were most helpfully summarised by Hoeben CJ at CL in State of New South Wales v Wilkinson (Preliminary) [2020] NSWSC 1813 (at [43]-[44]), as below:

[43] Section 11 of the Act allows the Court to impose such conditions under a supervision order as the Court considers appropriate. This power is constrained by the scope of the Act: Winters v Attorney General of NSW [2008] NSWCA 33 at [19]. Assistance can be drawn from the purpose and statutory objects of the Act. The primary object of the Act, as provided for in s 3(1) is to provide for the extended supervision of such offenders ‘so as to ensure the safety and protection of the community’. Subsection (2) provides that another object of the Act ‘is to encourage high risk sex offenders and high risk violent offenders to undertake rehabilitation’.

[44] Important principles to be considered in relation to the imposition of conditions are:

(i) having served a sentence of imprisonment for their offences, an offender has a right to personal liberty, however, this right is not absolute: State of New South Wales v Donovan at [83];

(ii) in imposing conditions, the Court needs to strike a balance between competing considerations: Attorney General for NSW v Tillman at [68];

(iii) a relevant consideration in imposing conditions is that a breach gives rise to a criminal penalty: State of New South Wales v Ley Thomas Baker (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 483 at [36];

(iv) conditions do not have to have a demonstrated link to past offending, but they should address the risk of future offending based on the scope, purpose and objects of the Act: Wilde v State of New South Wales [2015] NSWCA 28 at [53].

(v) conditions should not be designed toward future general criminal conduct, but instead focussed on mitigating the risk of a serious offence: State of New South Wales v Green (Final) [2013] NSWSC 1003 at [36]-[38].

(vi) conditions must not be unjustifiably onerous or punitive, ‘nor should they simply be an expression of State paternalism or imposed to meet what might be thought to be in the public interest in some generalised sense or because they might be a convenient or resource efficient means of the Department exercising supervision’: State of New South Wales v Bugmy [2017] NSWSC 855.

(vii) conditions ‘must be understood as having substantial work to do; a mere speculative possibility that it could be useful will not suffice’: State of New South Wales v Ley Thomas Baker (No 2) at [36].

(viii) to ensure a balance between the community interests and personal liberty, the Court should impose conditions that are the least intrusive possible (Lynn v State of New South Wales at [129]-[131].”

Appropriate conditions

36. The plaintiff has proposed conditions for the ESO. The defendant accepts that, if an order is to be made, the majority of those proposed conditions are appropriate. I also agree that the majority of the proposed conditions are appropriate.

37. However, the defendant has signalled opposition to some of the conditions. These contested conditions are addressed below.

Condition 9

38. Condition 9, as originally proposed, reads:

“You must live at an address approved by a DSO and notify a DSO of any intention to change your approved address or living arrangements”.

39. The defendant opposes the condition, arguing that, even without the ESO being made, he will continue to be subject to the CPOR Act. Whilst ss 10A(3)(a), 10A(3)(e), 11, 11F and 17 of the CPOR Act impose important obligations upon the defendant to keep the Commissioner of Police informed about his residence, and any change in his accommodation, those provisions do not allow proactive vetting of his residential situation.

40. In particular, the CPOR Act does not give police the power to pre-emptively assess the suitability of the defendant’s proposed accommodation, wherever that may be. The plaintiff argues that such approval is necessary to ensure the defendant’s choice of accommodation does not create a risk to the safety of the community. The plaintiff also argues that the ESO conditions regarding residences can be structured as to ensure the defendant does not place himself in close proximity to children under 16 years of age. Without such conditions, the defendant could move to live closer to children, such as near a school or a playground, without any pre-approval or vetting being undertaken.

41. Further, s 11 of the CPOR Act, which imposes an obligation upon a registered person to report contact with a child within 24 hours of it occurring does not, in the plaintiff’s submission, proactively prohibit or prevent such contact taking place. Rather, it is a condition which only has retrospective application and therefore is not particularly effective in curbing the risk that the defendant will find himself in if he moves near children. The plaintiff describes this as a material gap in the protective framework governing the defendant’s conduct.

42. Section 17 of the CPOR Act creates a criminal offence for breaching the provisions of that Act. The plaintiff correctly submits that its operation is punitive rather than preventative. It operates after a breach has occurred. Thus, its potential to mitigate risk relies on the deterrence that it poses to the defendant, should he be detected, convicted and sentenced.

43. The extent to which the defendant comes into contact with children is a factor which I regard as having a significant impact on the question of risk, even where the most likely place where the risk might materialise is online. The evidence of the two expert witnesses, Dr Puchalski and Dr Smith, is important in this respect. It is clear from both of their evidence that they do not regard the defendant’s risk of serious sexual offending as being siloed into the concern that he would offend online. Rather, both experts regard the defendant’s overall profile to point towards there being a significant risk of sexual offending, but admittedly, the most likely offending is indeed online.

44. I also agree with Dr Parker’s assessment that, if the defendant was to seek sexual intimacy, he is likely to continue to choose young sexual partners. Therefore, if he sought out young adult males for company or relationships, his risk of accessing adolescent males may increase by associating with their peers. Also, as Dr Parker noted, the defendant’s failure at such exploits may lead him towards younger targets and his potential victims may be pubescent or vulnerable young males. He may likely offer material support to potential victims to establish trust with them and to justify seeking sex from them as part of a transactional relationship.

45. Additionally, the defendant’s record of non-compliance with conditions demonstrates that he is capable of significant inventiveness in both the ways in which he can circumvent conditions and also in the ways in which he can mask his offending. This is a further reason as to why the structure of the CPOR Act alone provides insufficient mechanisms to guard against the risk that the defendant will commit another serious sex offence.

46. On balance, it is, in my opinion, appropriate and necessary to provide a DSO with proactive mechanisms to ensure the defendant does not reside in accommodation that exposes him to unacceptably close contact with potential victims of sexual offences. Accordingly, condition 9 as proposed will be imposed.

Condition 11

47. Condition 11, as originally proposed, reads:

“You must allow a DSO to visit you at your approved address at any time and to enter the premises at that address”.

48. Condition 11 involves similar considerations, and the same process of reasoning as condition 9. It leads me to conclude that a DSO should be given authority to proactively check the defendant’s premises by entering it. Restricting that ability to circumstances where such an entry could only be effected upon the crystallisation of a reasonable suspicion, that the defendant has already committed an offence under the CPOR Act, is an unsatisfactory protection for the safety of the community, and it does not effectively guard against the unacceptable risk that is identified in this case.

Condition 13

49. Condition 13, as originally proposed, reads:

“You must promptly notify a DSO of any visitor entering and remaining at your approved address”.

50. Like conditions 9 and 11, the defendant argues that the relevant provisions of the CPOR Act amount to a sufficient protection for the community’s safety. The plaintiff, on the other hand, maintains its position that the CPOR Act is an insufficient mechanism to mitigate risk insofar as its application is retrospective only. The plaintiff argues that the CPOR Act will do little to prevent the defendant from coming into contact, especially sexual contact, with children under 16 years of age.

51. For the same reasons identified with respect to conditions 9 and 11, I have decided to impose condition 13. It is an appropriate and necessary condition to guard against what is the unacceptable risk in this case.

Condition 17

52. Condition 17, as originally proposed, reads:

“You must not go to any place specified by a DSO”.

53. The defendant argues that, should the Court decide to impose an ESO, this proposed condition should be revised to read, “You must not go to any place reasonably specified by a DSO” (emphasis added).

54. The problem about this proposed revision is there can be debate about what constitutes a reasonable basis for specification. The clear purpose of this condition is to guard against the risk the defendant poses. The defendant may well regard any specification as being unreasonable and therefore unnecessary to comply with, which leaves him open to breach and therefore criminal sanction.

55. As I observed in SLD v R [2026] NSWCCA 58 (at [67]) (Stern JA and Huggett J agreeing):

“ … When a person is subject to an ESO, they require absolute clarity about what they can and cannot do. There should be little, if any, room for ambiguity. This is because the consequences that flow from a breach are very serious; proved breaches carry severe criminal penalties, including imprisonment like in this case.”

56. Accordingly, I have determined that condition 17 should be imposed as originally proposed by the plaintiff.

Condition 19

57. Condition 19, as originally proposed, reads:

“You must request and receive approval from a DSO, prior to attending any place used solely or mainly for the sale or display of sexually explicit material, or for providing sexual services or sexually explicit entertainment”.

58. The defendant opposes this condition and points to the fact that he is presently permitted to attend such premises without the need for prior approval. I accept that obtaining prior approval about the defendant’s desire to attend premises associated with the commercial sex industry involves a particularly invasive form of surveillance, but I have nevertheless concluded that it is a necessary condition. Dr Smith described this as a “very complicated area”. He stated in his evidence:

“ …Obviously peoples’ sexual needs are [a] human right. We want to facilitate this. But given the nature of his interactions, even if we assume them to be consensual and the person he’s interacting with to be of age, I would still be concerned about that…How it gets managed in heterosexual high risk offenders is that it is all overt and planned and they go to a licenced, brothel I guess is the word, where they can go and have their sexual needs met in a way that is planned and safe for everyone. And I would believe it is appropriate for Mr Moore to be sharing his sexual encounters and his planning for sexual encounters with community officers” (emphasis added.)

59. It is necessary to maintain visibility of the defendant’s participation in the sex industry as contemplated by condition 19. The risk that he might engage in sexual activity with a minor is far more likely to materialise if his participation is masked from the DSO’s view. At least some aspects of the defendant’s conduct resulting in breaches of the previous ESO were likely to have involved his engagement with people online and for a monetary fee. Given the steps the defendant took to avoid detection, it is not possible now to conclude that he engaged with minors in those instances. However, the conduct underpinning those breaches leads me to conclude that it is appropriate and necessary to have a condition in the terms proposed by condition 19.

Condition 24

60. Condition 24, as originally proposed, reads:

“You must not associate with any person specified by a DSO”.

61. The defendant argues this condition should be revised to read, “You must not associate with any person reasonably specified by a DSO”. For those same reasons outlined in the case of condition 17, I decline to make the amendment sought by the defendant and impose the condition as proposed.

Condition 25

62. Condition 25, as originally proposed, reads:

“Without limiting condition 24, you must not associate with any person:

a. who you know is consuming or under the influence of alcohol without the prior approval of a DSO;

b. who you know is consuming or under the influence of illegal drugs; or

c. held in custody without prior approval of a DSO.”

63. It is now commonplace between the parties that paras (a) and (b) should be deleted from this condition 25. I regard that as reasonable and will impose the condition accordingly.

Condition 33

64. Condition 33, as originally proposed, reads:

“You must provide consent for a DSO (or any other person requested by a DSO) to remotely inspect any internet account used by you, including any internet service provider account, email accounts and social media accounts, in monitoring compliance with this Order.”

65. The defendant called into question the need for proposed condition 33, arguing that other conditions covered the same or similar territory. The plaintiff points out that proposed condition 33 would, if approved, allow the DSO to inspect, in real time, and at random, the defendant’s internet accounts. This is a more extensive obligation than that provided by the CPOR Act, which only requires the defendant to advise the police about when he starts and ceases to use a telephone number, a carriage service or an internet provider.

66. Unlike the CPOR Act, this condition operates proactively. The plaintiff places substantial reliance upon this fact. It facilitates the detection and prevention of further offences, which in turn promotes the community’s safety. For the reasons outlined in conditions 9, 11 and 13 above, I am similarly of the view that proposed condition 33 is appropriate and necessary.

Conditions 36 and 37

67. Conditions 36 and 37, as originally proposed, read:

“36. You must submit to the search by a DSO (or any other person as directed by the DSO) of your person or residence, or any vehicle in which you are travelling or which is under your control, or any item, computer, electronic or communication device, storage facility, garage, locker or commercial facility in your possession or under your control; and to the seizure of any object located during the search.

37. You must not attempt to destroy or interfere with any object that is the subject of a search or seizure, carried out pursuant to this Order.”

68. The defendant submits this condition is unnecessary in light of ss 16C and 16D of the CPOR Act, which already permits police to enter and inspect the defendant’s residential premises.

69. So much is true, but the CPOR Act facilitates only a somewhat limited basis for police to exercise entry and search powers. The power may only be exercised twice a year, unless approval is given by a police officer who holds the rank of superintendent or above, and in circumstances where that officer has a “reasonable suspicion” that the person has committed an offence under the CPOR Act that has not previously been dealt with.

70. In this respect, the powers conferred by the CPOR Act are, to a considerable extent, rear facing. The use of the powers, beyond the yearly limit, requires a “reasonable suspicion” to be formed. The CPOR Act is therefore aimed at stopping conduct that has already taken place. I do not regard this as a sound mechanism to ensure the defendant’s compliance and, equally, the community’s safety. His previous breaches demonstrate a preparedness to deliberately act in a manner designed to mask his true online activity. The threat of random searches – and the fact of random searches – is well justified in these circumstances.

Condition 40 and 41

71. Conditions 40 and 41, as originally proposed, read:

“40. You must not possess, collect or retain any form of printed publications that primarily contain photographs or depictions of persons or characters who appear to be under the age of 18 years. This includes, but is not limited to photographs, store catalogues, magazines, newspapers, books, comics and art works.

41. You must not purchase, possess, access, obtain, view, participate in or listen to:

a. content that primarily depicts children, child-like images, or depictions of persons or characters who appear to be under the age of 18 years; or

b. any other material as directed by a DSO with respect to concerns related to risk of committing a serious offence”.

72. The defendant has expressed concern around the use of the word “primarily”, and has suggested, in its place, “what a reasonable person would consider primarily”.

73. Again, this proposed amendment renders the conditions as unnecessarily vague. It is, in my opinion, far clearer for all concerned stakeholders to leave both conditions intact as originally proposed. As for condition 40 specifically, common sense would clearly dictate that the word “primarily” does not extend to the vast majority of books, store catalogues, photographs, magazines, newspapers, comics and art works.

Condition 42

74. Condition 42, as originally proposed, reads:

“You must not change your name from ‘Bradley Moore’ or use any other name without notifying a DSO”.

75. This condition is contested on the basis that the defendant is already subject to Part 3A of the CPOR Act, which is concerned with changes of names. Specifically, s 19E of the CPOR Act requires the Commissioner of Police’s written approval before a formal change of name is able to be sought.

76. However, this proposed condition 42 of the ESO is designed to prevent the defendant from using names other than Bradley Moore, such as pseudonyms and other online aliases, that do not require any formal approval. It is, in this very precise on-line context, that condition 42 bears significance in that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing a further online solicitation-type offence.

77. This condition has significant work to do. It will, hopefully, deter the defendant from grooming and soliciting young men online. He will need to use his actual legal name, Bradley Moore, in any and every capacity, both in-person and online.

Orders

78. Accordingly, I make the following orders:

(1) Pursuant to ss 5B and 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), the defendant is to be subject to an extended supervision order for a period of two years from the date of this order.

(2) Pursuant to s 11 of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), for the period of the extended supervision order, the defendant is to comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule to this judgment.

Schedule of conditions

Part A: Reporting and Monitoring Obligations

(1) You must accept the supervision and guidance of a DSO and comply with all reasonable directions of a DSO.

(2) Where a direction may be given in writing (or is required to be given in writing) it may be given electronically including by SMS or other messaging service.

(3) You must truthfully answer questions from a DSO, or any other person supervising you, about:

(a) where you are or have been;

(b) where you are going;

(c) who you are with or have been with;

(d) what you are doing or have been doing; and

(e) the nature of your associations.

(4) You must agree to any information relating to your risk, supervision or rehabilitation being shared between those persons and agencies that are involved in your supervision including, but not limited to, a DSO, NSWPF and CSNSW.

(5) You must wear electronic monitoring equipment as directed by a DSO and must not tamper with or remove the equipment.

(6) If directed by a DSO, you must provide a schedule of movements.

(7) If you want to change anything in your schedule of movements once it is approved by a DSO, you must seek approval from a DSO about the change 24 hours in advance, unless a DSO approves a shorter period.

(8) You must not deviate from your schedule of movements except in an emergency.

Part B: Accommodation

(9) You must live at an address approved by a DSO and notify a DSO of any intention to change your approved address or living arrangements.

(10) You must be at your approved address between 10:00pm and 6:00am unless other arrangements are approved by a DSO.

(11) You must allow a DSO to visit you at your approved address at any time and to enter the premises at that address.

(12) You must not spend the night anywhere other than your approved address or any alternative approved addresses without the approval of a DSO.

(13) You must promptly notify a DSO of any visitor entering and remaining at your approved address.

(14) You must request and obtain approval from the DSO prior to permitting any person to stay overnight at your approved address (other than persons who ordinarily reside there).

Part C: Place and travel restrictions

(15) You must surrender any passports held by you to the Commissioner, must not be in possession of any passports, and must not attempt to apply for any passports.

(16) You must not leave New South Wales without the approval of the Commissioner.

(17) You must not go to any place specified by a DSO.

(18) Without limiting condition 17 above, you must not go to any of the following places without the prior approval of a DSO:

(a) Day-care centres, pre-schools and schools;

(b) Amusement parlours, amusement parks and theme parks;

(c) Cinemas;

(d) Libraries and museums;

(e) Camping grounds and caravan parks;

(f) Children’s playgrounds, parks, and areas with play equipment provided for the use of children;

(g) Pools, playing fields and sporting facilities;

(h) Activities intended for the entertainment of children;

(i) Residences where you know that persons aged under 18 years ordinarily reside; and

(j) Internet cafes or other places which provide public access to devices connected to the internet either for payment or for no charge (other than employment agencies).

(19) You must request and receive approval from a DSO, prior to attending any place used solely or mainly for the sale or display of sexually explicit material, or for providing sexual services or sexually explicit entertainment.

Part D: Employment, finance and education

(20) You must take all reasonable steps to participate in programs as recommended by a DSO, including the development of a case management plan which may include employment, education, training or participation in personal development activities.

(21) You must request and receive approval from the DSO, prior to starting or changing any job, volunteer work or educational course.

(22) You must provide any information relating to your financial affairs, including income and expenditure, if directed by a DSO.

Part E: Non-association

Association with children

(23) You must not associate with anyone who you know or reasonably should know is under 18, other than:

(a) incidental contact in a public place in the course of the duties of the minor; or

(b) with the written permission of a DSO and in accordance with any requirements reasonably determined by a DSO.

Association with Others (not children)

(24) You must not associate with any person specified by a DSO.

(25) Without limiting condition 24, you must not associate with any person held in custody without prior approval of a DSO.

(26) You must agree to a DSO disclosing your criminal history to another person. Before any disclosure is made, you will first be given the opportunity to make the disclosure yourself within a timeframe as identified by a DSO.

(27) You must obtain written approval from a DSO prior to joining or affiliating with any club or organisation.

Part F: Access to the internet and other electronic communication

(28) You must obey any reasonable direction by a DSO about the use of electronic devices and access to the internet.

(29) You must disclose the following information to a DSO if directed:

(a) Aliases, electronic identities and log in names;

(b) Email addresses;

(c) Telephone numbers;

(d) SIM cards;

(e) Applications used (including any social networking service);

(f) Online gaming services; g. Instant messaging services;

(g) Service provider account numbers; and

(h) All passwords and log-in details.

(30) You must not use any of the following unless approved by a DSO:

(a) Social networking applications or services (including dating services or applications);

(b) Encrypted messaging applications or services;

(c) Online gaming applications or services;

(d) Instant messaging applications or services.

(31) You must give a DSO a list of the electronic devices you use to communicate with or access the internet. This includes computers, phones, tablet devices, data storage devices and gaming devices. You must advise a DSO of any change to the list immediately.

(32) You must only use an electronic device to access the internet after the device has been disclosed to a DSO and the device has been seen and approved for use by a DSO.

(33) You must provide consent for a DSO (or any other person requested by a DSO) to remotely inspect any internet account used by you, including any internet service provider account, email accounts and social media accounts, in monitoring compliance with this Order.

(34) You must not delete or alter any of the following from your electronic devices without prior approval of a DSO:

(a) Applications;

(b) Emails;

(c) Text messages;

(d) Electronic messages;

(e) Call history;

(f) Files or documents;

(g) Photographs, images and videos; or

(h) Internet or application usage and search history.

(35) You must provide consent for your telephone provider and internet service provider to share information about your accounts with a DSO.

Part G: Search and seizure

(36) You must submit to the search by a DSO (or any other person as directed by the DSO) of your person or residence, or any vehicle in which you are travelling or which is under your control, or any item, computer, electronic or communication device, storage facility, garage, locker or commercial facility in your possession or under your control; and to the seizure of any object located during the search.

(37) You must not attempt to destroy or interfere with any object that is the subject of a search or seizure, carried out pursuant to this Order.

Part H: Access to pornographic, violent and classified material

(38) You must not purchase, possess, access, obtain, view, participate in or listen to material classified as Refused Classification, as defined under the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 (Cth).

(39) You must not purchase, possess, access, obtain, view, participate in or listen to material classified as X18+ Restricted, Category 1 Restricted or Category 2 Restricted as defined under the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 (Cth) or as directed by a DSO with respect to concerns related to risk of committing a serious offence, without the prior approval of a DSO.

(40) You must not possess, collect or retain any form of printed publications that primarily contain photographs or depictions of persons or characters who appear to be under the age of 18 years. This includes, but is not limited to photographs, store catalogues, magazines, newspapers, books, comics and art works.

(41) You must not purchase, possess, access, obtain, view, participate in or listen to:

(a) content that primarily depicts children, child-like images, or depictions of persons or characters who appear to be under the age of 18 years; or

(b) any other material as directed by a DSO with respect to concerns related to risk of committing a serious offence.

Part I: Personal details and appearance

(42) You must not change your name from “Bradley Moore” or use any other name without notifying a DSO.

(43) You must not significantly change your appearance without the approval of a DSO.

(44) You must let a DSO photograph you, dressed, within one week of the commencement of these conditions and following any significant change to your appearance.

(45) If you change the details of any current form of identification or obtain further forms of identification, you must provide a DSO with such details.

Part J: Medical intervention and treatment

(46) You must undergo ongoing psychological or psychiatric assessment or counselling (or any combination of these) and participate appropriately as directed by a DSO, including any therapy sessions, support and treatment programs the subject of the direction.

(47) If directed, you must undergo an assessment for the purposes of a Mental Health Care Plan or Community Treatment Order.

(48) You must notify a DSO of the identity and address of any healthcare practitioner that you consult.

(49) You must take medications that are prescribed to you by your healthcare practitioners and only in the manner prescribed.

(50) You must notify a DSO immediately if you cease to take or decline to commence taking any medication as referred to in the above condition.

(51) You must agree to your treatment and service providers and healthcare practitioners sharing information, including reports on your progress and attendance, and information you have told them, with each other and with a DSO.

(52) You must agree to any information obtained under condition 51 being shared between those persons and agencies that are involved in your supervision including, but not limited to, a DSO, NSWPF and CSNSW.

(53) You must agree to the disclosure of your criminal history to any healthcare professionals that are treating you.

**********

Endnote

Attorney General for New South Wales v Tillman [2007] NSWCA 119 at [5]; Kamm v State of New South Wales (No 4) (2017) 95 NSWLR 179; [2017] NSWCA 189 at [147].